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Book . S5

PRESENTED BY

1825a

NAPOLEON

AND

THE GRAND ARMY IN RUSSIA.

"Non converti ut *interpres*, sed ut orator, sententiis iisdem et earum formis, tanquam figuris, verbis ad nostram consuetudinem aptis: in quibus non verbum verbo necesse habui reddere, sed omnium verborum vim servavi. Non enim me ea annumerare lectori putavi oportere, sed tanquam appendere."

CICERO.

Philadelphia, Oct. 1825.

NAPOLEON

AND

THE GRAND ARMY IN RUSSIA;

OR

A CRITICAL EXAMINATION

OF

COUNT PHILIP DE SÉGUR'S WORK.

BY GENERAL GOURGAUD,

LATE FIRST MILITARY SECRETARY AND AID-DE-CAMP TO THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON.

"Render unto Cæsar the things which are Cæsar's."

Translated from the French by a Gentleman of Philadelphia.

PHILADELPHIA:

PUBLISHED BY ANTHONY FINLEY,

NORTH-EAST CORNER OF CHESNUT AND FOURTH STREETS.

I. Ashmead & Co. Printers.

1825.

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1825a

Eastern District of Pennsylvania, to wit:

BE IT REMEMBERED, That on the fourteenth day of October in the fiftieth year of the Independence of the United States of America, A. D. 1825, ANTHONY FINLEY, of the said district, hath deposited in this office the title of a Book, the right whereof he claims as Proprietor, in the words following, to wit:

"Napoleon and the Grand Army in Russia; or a Critical Examination of Count Philip de Ségur's Work. By General Gourgaud, late First Officer of Ordnance and Aid-de-Camp to the Emperor Napoleon. "Render unto Cæsar the things which are Cæsar's." Translated from the French, by a Gentleman of Philadelphia."

In conformity to the Act of the Congress of the United States intituled, "An act for the Encouragement of Learning, by securing the copies of maps, charts, and books, to the authors and proprietors of such copies, during the times therein mentioned;"—And also to the act, entitled, "An act supplementary to an act, entitled, 'An act for the encouragement of learning, by securing the copies of maps, charts, and books, to the authors and proprietors of such copies during the times therein mentioned,' and extending the benefits thereof to the arts of designing, engraving, and etching historical and other prints."

D. CALDWELL,
Clerk of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.

Sept. 7, 1931

TO THE READER.

Four editions of the work we are about to examine have already appeared, and until the present time we have retained in our port folio this criticism, long since prepared. Why has it been so long withheld? Why is it now published? We shall answer these questions in a few words addressed to the reader.

The form of the Count de Ségur's work, its high price, the portraits and emblems with which it has been successively enriched, induced us to think it destined to classes of society, who, having seen the men and things of which it treats, near at hand, would require no one to judge between them and the author. We have also remarked, that the journals which have spoken most encomiastically, have referred principally to its literary merits; that they have compared it *to the fictions of the illustrious Scotchman;* and, that in reading the history of the Grand Army, *the name of* Walter Scott has spontaneously flowed from their pens. We wish not to dispute this sort of merit accorded to Count de Ségur. It is of small importance to us, if his work were *greater than the Iliad;* or had it been said of him, as has been said of a marshal of the empire, the *quorum pars magna fui, that he had forgotten nothing of that great period but his services;* the irony would be too evident, and leave us nothing to say. The public, through whose hands the four editions passed, were placed on their guard, and could not receive as a history, that which was given to the world as a romance.

But having learned that a fifth edition is in preparation, a small and unadorned volume, whose price places it within the reach of multitudes who have been too distant from the occurrences, not to be drawn into errors, to which the readers of the first edition were not exposed, we have felt obliged to publish this work, which, however imperfect it may be, will not be entirely unavailing.

A parallel instance presents itself to our recollection :— Courtilz de Sandras, published at the end of the 17th century, *The conduct of France from the peace of Niméguen ; the Life of Coligny ; Memoirs of the Count de Rochefort ; the History of the War of Holland, from* 1672 *until* 1677 *; the Life of Marshal de Turenne, &c. &c. &c.* "His prolific and frivolous pen," says the New Historic Dictionary, "poured forth a host of romances, published under the title of histories, which were the more dangerous, because the fables they contained, being mingled with a little truth, were in consequence accepted."

These romances had also a prodigious sale. For a long time no one deigned to refute them ; and for a long time, also, Sandras was regarded as an authority.

"We place his name here, only to warn Frenchmen and foreigners, how much they should mistrust these fictions, under the name of history." (Voltaire Age of Louis XIV.)

The application is self-evident; we add nothing to the sentences quoted.

INTRODUCTION.

Whoever desires to write history, ought, after becoming thoroughly acquainted with his subject, and even before forming his plan, to deduce from all the facts, the moral aim of his work, unless he has resolved to subject them to a system. Readers who undertake to examine such writings, should endeavour to ascertain in which of these situations the author places himself.

The dominant opinion of Count de Ségur manifests itself from the first chapter. He wishes to show *Napoleon filled with the vast project of remaining sole master of Europe.* He is little concerned, whether by this imputation he echoes the superficial and malevolent spirits who have judged a great man after his fall, or of enemies, who during his reign, employed it as an instrument for his overthrow. He is sure to please the former, and not to displease the latter. He flatters party spirit and cotemporary mediocrity; he will be read, he will be praised.

This is not all. After having shown *so great, so universal* a genius, rushing wantonly into a ridiculous enterprize, he attempts to prove, that if *success did not crown his rashness,* it was caused by the *untimely decline of his health;* and, that the great, was nothing but an ambitious man, who had grasped more than his physical strength could retain.

As to his plan, we flatter ourselves we can demonstrate that he has none—that he writes almost at random, mingling facts and bringing them together without connexion or order; confounding the affairs of one epoch with those belonging to another; disdaining to justify his accusations or eulogies; adopting without examination, and without that critical spirit so necessary to the historian, the false judgments of prejudice, of rivalry or of enmity, and the exaggerations of spite or bad feeling; attributing actions to some, and language to others,

incompatible with their stations and characters; never quoting any witness but himself, nor better authority than his own assertions.

He repeatedly mingles political and military matters. Who has revealed politics to him? Unacquainted with affairs, having never approached, either the cabinet, the councils or officers of state, with whom his duty at head quarters gave him no connexion, whence has he drawn his documents? From the pamphlets or conversations of Napoleon's detractors.

In relation to military facts in the work we are to examine, they are confined to a succession of unexact recitals, of pictures without truth, of little anecdotes, for the most part forged, or frequently literally copied from some writings, which have almost uniformly been dictated by a spirit of malevolence.

Without doubt it would be unjust to demand of Count de Ségur, in relation to military matters, what he has not given in his book. The rank of General he has indeed, but where did he acquire the experience of one? All his grades were received while discharging civil offices, to which the usage of the palace has consecrated epaulettes and embroidery. At first joined to the adjutants of the palace,* he became Quarter-master, from the time his duties were designated by his new title;† he performed no others during the Russian campaign, and shared them with Mr. Ernest de Canouville, auditor to the council of state. Mr. de Ségur, who from a Colonel of light horse in the Parisian National Guards, became a Major General,‡ ceased it is true, on his return from Russia, his duties as Quarter-master, but nevertheless did not engage in any active military career; he was appointed governor of the pages, a civil employment, which has nothing military about it, except the dress. If, sometime after, he was charged with the organization of a regiment of Guards of Honour, formed at Tours, he owes to that circumstance the advantage of making the campaign of 1814 with this corps, and the power of offering the fidelity of these guards to the

* The 6th October, 1802. † The 24th September, 1806.
‡ The 22d February, 1812.

prince of Benevento, (Talleyrand) while the Emperor was still at Fontainebleau.*

These details are not inopportune. A new generation who were little more than infants when our days of glory were finished, and the inhabitants of drawing-rooms to whom that glory was for a long time but a troublesome rumour, when reading on the title page of a work, trumpeted by the journals before it had a reader, the following words—by *the General Count de Ségur*, have believed that this general who constitutes himself the judge of a great man, has fought by his side, when he has merely been employed in preparing his quarters. They may believe him to be the emulator, the rival, or at least the comrade of those old generals, whose blood and high deeds have marked, during thirty years, so many fields of battle. They may see in him, according to his own account, one of *those veterans of the grand army*, which M. the quarter-master, calls *his companions*, in his dedicatory epistle, without dreaming how slight are his titles to be regarded as a veteran and a member of this illustrious confraternity. If it be useful to inform the readers of Count de Ségur, that his pen is not that of a military man, although his sword, on the rare occasions in which it has left its scabbard, has been that of a brave soldier, it is equally just to absolve him from numerous errors which a more experienced officer would not have committed.

Might not the military abilities in which Count de Ségur was deficient, have been supplied by his situation at head quarters, and by the relations which the civil service he was charged with, gave him during the campaign of 1812? To answer this question, which we have heretofore touched on, a few words are necessary to explain the nature of this service.

When a march is to take place, the quarter-master receives

* Extract of a letter from the Count de Ségur to the Provisional Government.

"I offer to-day, my six hundred guards and myself to the successor and descendant of the kings of my ancestors.

"I swear fidelity to him, in the name of my officers, of all my guards, and in my own name, which answers for my oaths."

Moniteur, Monday, April 11, 1814.

from the Chamberlain of the palace, or from whoever acts in his place, an order to precede the Imperial head quarters, for some hours, to the point where they are to be established. There, having under his orders two messengers of the palace, who compose the personal of his command, he prepares the Emperor's lodgings and that of his suite; superintends the establishment of his health service, of that of his table, of the office and the stables. This duty done, the Count de Ségur during his leisure, could see what general officers arrived at or departed from the Imperial quarters; he could collect the rumours which were floating around, or the conjectures formed in the midst of officers who were sent on or returned from missions; the more or less animated conversations, and often the indiscreet clamours of the guard room, where some officers relaxed themselves after the fatigues of the day, by venting their ill humour on men and things. Such are the witnesses of Count de Ségur; such are his sureties; such the sources from which he has drawn. It is this which caused a very witty man to remark of his book, that it was *the process verbal of the tittle-tattle at head quarters.*

An expedition as important and difficult as that of Russia, demanded an historian who joins discernment to a knowledge of facts, who is inaccessible to all extraneous influence, and placing himself in an independent situation, sees only times and circumstances, and knows how to escape from the dominion of every new affection. Deficient in these indispensable qualifications, Count de Ségur could only produce, and has produced nothing, but an ill-contrived romance, which he has decorated with the name of history. Bewildered by the success of his striking phrases and romantic descriptions, he has not perceived the incongruities into which he has fallen. That grand army, with which this young veteran pretends to associate himself, is, under his pen, a horde, which combats for plunder. The great man, of whom he wishes to be believed a grateful and faithful admirer, and who poured out on his grand-father, his father, and himself, the treasures of his favour and benefits,* is a madman, rushing blindly upon his own

* M. Philip de Ségur was endowed by the Emperor on the 24th of September,

ruin. The prodigious genius which heretofore had crowned himself with so many laurels, and signalized his name by the reconciliation of parties, and especially by the prosperity of his country, is nothing but a weak, uncertain, irresolute man, without energy, without courage; borne down by the weight of fatigue and disease. He is dead before the supreme hour!!

Notwithstanding, in a few months he repaired all his losses; his creative hand recomposed that army, which under his orders, conquered at Lutzen, at Bautzen, and Dresden. Reduced afterwards to a handful of brave men, he held all the forces of Europe in check, on the plains of Champagne, and if he fell by treason, it was still amid the songs of victory of Champaubert and Montmirail. Scarcely had a year elapsed after his fall, before he restored himself, by an enterprise, the conception of which was not more daring than its execution, and will be the astonishment of future ages. But, once more abandoned by fortune, he gave to the world, during six years, on the Rock of St. Helena, a memorable example of heroic firmness and unconquerable character.

Will Count de Ségur inform us, by what prodigy this genius depicted by him in decrepitude, preserved that vigour and power, which remained so long a time the terror and admiration of his enemies? Had he written such things after his return from the Russian campaign, we might have attributed his errors to a diseased imagination and a melancholic spirit, disturbed by the effect of such great disasters; had he written it after the events of 1813, 1814 and 1815, he would have been inexcusable; yet it is in 1825 he publishes his book!

Had he published before the death of the hero, this work, hailed by ephemeral applause, doubtless an eloquent protestation, arising from amid the Atlantic Ocean, would have placed a great testimony in the balance; and, that posterity which

1806, with a revenue of ten thousand francs upon the great book, on the occasion of his marriage.

On the 15th of August 1809, an endowment of ten thousand francs.

On the 1st of January 1812, with a supplementary endowment of a revenue of four thousand francs, &c.

will preserve the words and actions of Napoleon, that posterity which will have nothing to settle with the historian of the Grand Army, might have known one day that he and his work, once existed. Mr. de Ségur feared such a celebrity; he shall not obtain it from our criticisms. It is to cotemporaries alone that we pretend to speak.

An officer of ordnance under the Emperor, during the campaign of 1812, the orders we have transmitted, and the discussions at which we have assisted, have left us some grand recollections; but we have been even to St. Helena itself, to amass historical documents. We have there lived three years, we have there been able to collect precious information from the conversations of the great man, who admitted us to his intimacy.

These considerations, but still more, our admiration for the Emperor, have induced us to undertake this work. It is highly necessary, when a detractor counts upon the silence of the tomb, that one voice, at least, however feeble it may be, should cause the accents of truth to be heard.

We have drawn on the recollections of our friends, and have been principally aided in our enterprise by a man, who, having been placed in the Emperor's cabinet, from the peace of Amiens, till the end of his reign, was constantly honoured with his confidence.

Note. This criticism was written on the first edition of Count de Ségur's work: our subdivisions into books and chapters, refer to those in his book.

CRITICAL EXAMINATION, &c.

BOOK I.

CHAPTER I.

THE Author of the pretended history of *Napoleon and the Grand Army*, commences by a serious error and a gratuitous supposition.

"By the peace of Tilsit, the Emperor attacked the honour and interest of Russia."

Had Count de Ségur read that treaty, he would have seen that never was a victory less abused. Russia had been vanquished on her own territory, a part of whose inhabitants opened their arms to us. She came out of a struggle in which she would have sunk, greater and more powerful than she was before she engaged in it: she owes to the moderation of Napoleon the glory of having re-created Prussia, after Prussia was no more. In what then, was *the honour of Russia* attacked by the peace of Tilsit?

In relation to her *interest* she judged correctly, that it would be injured by the adoption of the continental system; but she was convinced also, that the continental system was the only method of forcing England to peace; and as England was in the interest of Russia, the stipulations at Tilsit were founded thereupon. "I am as much the enemy of England, as you are," said Alexander to Napoleon, on entering the bark on the Niemen. This sentiment reconciled the two sovereigns, and peace was made.

"France has alienated nations by her conquests, and kings by her revolution and new dynasty."

Belgium, the Rhenish provinces, and Italy, partook of the benefits of her administration; the people of these countries are still attached to as much of it as the policy of their sovereigns have preserved.

The *revolution* was not produced by Napoleon. He reconciled kings to its consequences; which the Republic could never have done. The Emperor and the new dynasty had assured them against the destruction of the monarchical system in Europe, proclaimed by the republic. The assertion above, and the following, *that France could have no more friends*, but *subjects only*, is intended from the beginning to establish, that Napoleon could fix his power upon universal monarchy alone; a false imputation (we remark in passing, and once for all,) to which the experience of the last ten years, and time which wears away passions and discloses truth with his wings, have already in part done justice. We begin to blush at being the echo of foreign cabinets, who have intentionally made Europe ring with their clamours against the ambition of Napoleon, because he employed all his efforts to defend and fortify France against them; an obligation bequeathed to him by the revolution. The Emperor made war to force England to peace, and England excited the continental sovereigns against him, to keep up the war. Hired by her gold, these sovereigns became her tools.

Should Napoleon have remained on the defensive with means disproportioned to the attack? It would have been to betray the hopes of the nation, and compromit the deposit of glory and prosperity she had confided to his hands. Disposing like a man of genius, of the resources France offered to him, he triumphed over his enemies, who could not pardon him for the high rank on which he had placed her, but concealed their resentment under the appearance of submission. Napoleon was obliged, in order to secure the nation against the future, to seize the profits and means of pacific exchange, at the same time that he lessened his enemies' power of doing injury.

"The vast project (of an universal monarchy) Napoleon

with so much difficulty concealed, that it already had begun to escape from him on all sides."

The description of the immense preparations demanded by so great an enterprise, is traced with much emphasis; but the epoch of its execution is not assigned. We should be tempted to conclude that Russia until now, was in profound security, executing faithfully the conditions of the alliance, without suspecting the storm which was preparing against her; yet, it is proved by the avowal of colonel Botourlin, in his history of the campaign of 1812, that it was Russia who first prepared to make war on us.*

After having spoken of the necessity of an alliance with Austria, Prussia, Sweden, and Turkey, Mr. de Ségur adds,

* "Austria did not move; Prussia no longer existed; the Swedes too weak to be of any assistance to their allies, could scarcely sustain themselves at Stralsund. England placed in difficult circumstances, did not seem disposed to push the war with activity. These considerations engaged the Emperor of Russia to procure a reconciliation with the enemy. The famous interview which occurred on the Niemen, resulted in the treaty of peace signed at Tilsit." (Military History of the Campaign in Russia, in 1812, by Colonel Botourlin, Aid-de-camp to H. M. the Emperor of Russia; Paris, 1824.) "The Emperor Alexander could not mistake the spirit of these dispositions; (of the Tilsit treaty) but the unfortunate circumstances of Europe forced him at any price, to avoid war. He exerted himself especially to gain time to prepare to sustain the struggle properly, which it was well known would probably be renewed." Page 24, vol. 1.

"The sacrifices which had been torn from Austria by the treaty of Presbourg, were too great for the Cabinet of Vienna to be able to resign them patiently. But the disorganization of her armies, the inevitable consequences of the multiplied reverses she had experienced, prevented her hitherto from devoting herself to the realization of the projects she secretly cherished. The Emperor Napoleon sincerely desired to avoid a new war, which might make an unfortunate diversion in Spain. But all his endeavours to affect an accommodation, were considered by the Austrians as nothing but an avowal of his weakness. She (Russia) could not refuse to assist France, without openly violating the engagements contracted with her, and whose sanctity had not been diminished by any infraction on the part of Napoleon. Moreover, whenever the Cabinet at Petersburg, over-leaping moral considerations in favour of high political views, decided to sustain Austria, she was enabled to do it efficaciously, because of the distance of her armies, which were occupied with the affairs of Sweden and Turkey." Page 35, 37, vol. 1.

"The first indications of coolness which began to arise in the relations of France with Russia, had not escaped the penetration of the Emperor Alex-

"*Austria precipitated herself*, (into the enterprise) *nevertheless, she did not do it blindly.*" She threw herself into it with the hope of aggrandizement.† It was not after vague promises, but by a treaty signed March 4, 1812. Austria for a long

ander.* He felt that the alliance concluded at Tilsit, and confirmed at Erfurt, being no longer to the interest of Napoleon, would not long subsist. From that time he employed himself covertly in the organization of all the means of defence, which the immense resources of his vast domains gave him, to maintain the struggle," &c. Page 45, vol. 1.

"The Cabinet of Petersburg did not conceal, but that under such circumstances, the Turks ought to be constrained to make peace, in order without distraction, to be enabled to concentrate all their military strength on the western frontier of the empire." Page 46, vol. 1.

"The Emperor Alexander thought it necessary no longer to delay his preparations for defence, and collected the greater part of his forces on the western frontier of his empire. A division which had remained in ancient Finland since the last war with Sweden, received orders to march upon the upper Duna. The army of the Danube, which, at the end of 1810, were nine divisions strong, now only had four divisions, the remaining five having been removed to the Upper Dniester." Page 56, 57, vol. 1.

"From the day after the signing of the treaty with Prussia, Napoleon sent it to Petersburg, with a proposition intended to remove the grievances of both parties.

"The Emperor Alexander felt too deeply that the avowed grievances, bore only upon accessory circumstances, but the foundation of the quarrel which divided the two empires, was not to be removed except by appealing to arms." Page 71, vol. 1.

"The Emperor Alexander soon after quitted Petersburg and went to Wilna, where the head-quarters of the grand army were established; at the same time he sent an order to Prince Kourakin, Russian Ambassador at Paris, to make known to the French government, that the conservation of Prussia, and its independence of every political league directed against Russia, was so very indispensable to the interests of the Emperor Alexander, that solid

* The only indications of coolness, of which Colonel Botourlin speaks, consisted in a pretence that *Napoleon had been shocked by the difficulties which his project of marriage with one of the Grand Duchesses had met with, at Petersburg; and, that he ardently desired an opportunity of being revenged, by making the Emperor Alexander feel all the weight of his enormous power.* No other is alledged.

† "It is we who have sought it, (the alliance of Austria with France) and we have reflected well before concluding." (Words of M. Metternich to M. Otto, contained in the despatch of that Ambassador to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, dated Vienna, Feb. 15th, 1813.)

time troubled by the enormous aggrandizement of Russia, had addressed representations to Petersburg, relative to the armaments prepared on her frontiers; yet Russia was decided and paid no attention to them. Austria in discontent, concluded a treaty of alliance with Napoleon, and anticipating the probability of the re-establishment of Poland during the war, demanded as an indemnity for Gallicia, the Illyrian provinces, which were granted her.

By the same treaty, Austria engaged to furnish 30,000 men. If we may credit Count de Ségur, *she secretly prepared for them prudent instructions.* When such a fact is stated, some proof is necessary, and no other exists but his assertion. The instructions of the Austrian General might have been to keep as near as possible to Austrian Poland. What would have become of these *prudent* instructions, if Napoleon, listening to a sentiment of distrust, which he never felt, brought into Russia the corps of Prince Schwartzenburg, by leaving in Poland the Polish army? The only engagement made, was that the Austrian army should not be divided, and should remain under the

and stable relations could not be established with France, unless there was between her and Russia, a neutral country, which should not be occupied by either of the two powers; consequently, that the first basis of all negotiation must be a formal engagement for the entire evacuation of all the Prussian territories, and all the fortifications of that country, whatever might have been the epoch or motive of their occupation by the French or allied troops. Russia moreover demanded the reduction of the garrison of Dantzic, to the footing on which it had stood anterior to the 1st of January, 1821." Page 72, 73, vol. 1.

"Before his departure for Dresden, Napoleon had sent General Count de Narbonne, his Aid-de-camp, to Wilna, with propositions of peace. The answer he brought back to Dresden was, that the Emperor of Russia referred him absolutely to the communications which his ambassador had made at Paris, and it was only on obtaining these preliminary bases that he could consent to treat." Page 74, 75, vol. 1.

"The magnificent festivals which were given on this occasion, (the pacification of Dresden) continued until the return of Count de Narbonne from Wilna. The next day, that is on the 17—29th of May, Napoleon left Dresden, and took the road to Thorn, where he arrived on the 5—24th of June. He resolved no longer to delay taking the field, for fear of losing in fruitless negotiations the most favourable season for military operations." Page 76, 77, vol. 1.

command of its own generals, without ceasing on this account to be under the absolute orders of the Emperor Napoleon. If it were a fault to leave this corps too independent, and too near to their frontiers, it was the result of generosity and confidence. The same fault may be alleged in relation to Prussia; it resulted from the same source.

"The success of the war did not depend on the cession of Gallicia, and on the conduct which Austrian jealousy prescribed for this possession; from the time of his entry into Wilna, Napoleon, then might have openly proclaimed the liberty of all Poland, instead of deceiving her expectation, astonishing and cooling her by uncertain words."

Austrian jealousy prescribed no management, since the treaty was formal, and Austria had never more completely assented. In case the kingdom of Poland had been re-established, Austria would have willingly ceded a great part of Gallicia to recover Illyria. The first of these provinces was an acquisition with which his conscience reproached him. Illyria on the contrary, was an ancient, hereditary country, which Austria had not lost without keen regrets; the wound was always rankling. Faithful to his treaties, Napoleon could not lay claim to Gallicia until the kingdom of Poland should be established, in consequence of the war, that is to say, by the peace. He would have been untrue to his ally Austria, who was already alarmed to see an ambassador to the confederation of Poland, if at the commencement of the war he had verbally sanctioned the re-establishment of this kingdom.

This re-establishment would have produced the insurrection and violent re-union of Austrian Gallicia. It was a very different thing to temporize, by leaving circumstances to take their course, or by saying as the Poles demanded, that *the kingdom of Poland existed;* which would have been equivalent to an acknowledgment of this kingdom. But Napoleon had no other object than to remove every subject of uneasiness to his ally; peace was the object of the war. It would have been compromiting the object, if he had made a determination which would have rendered peace impossible. A little farther on, the author supplies the Emperor with words to this amount;

he had no need then to seek elsewhere for the motives of his opinion.

In general, the Emperor feared nothing more than to engage himself for the future, because no one knew better than he did, the importance of allowing events to ripen: one of the great characters of his policy was to be always prepared to seize them, so to speak, at a bound.

Count de Ségur reproaches Napoleon with having neglected to free the southern Polish provinces from the feeble armies of enemies who restrained their patriotism.

Would he have wished the Emperor, having the whole of the Russian forces in front, to draw out his right wing into Podolia, where the Russians were engaged with the Turks? This inadvertence is too striking to require a serious examination.

The following sententious reflection, "that such is the weakness of great men, that they always act in imitation of themselves or of others," is not more judicious. Observation has on the contrary, thus far, demonstrated that what characterises *great men*, is the resources of their genius, and that inexhaustible fecundity which always presents them new means either for escaping from difficulty, or for marching rapidly to success.

The author adds in support of this sentence, that "Napoleon confided to the destiny of battles—that he expected every thing from victory; instead of sacrificing every thing to arrive at that victory, it was by it he wished to attain all things; he used it as a mean, when it should have been his end."

We shall not follow Count de Ségur in the developement of this singular idea, which he disentangles painfully enough. But we shall ask him, if, when the sword was drawn at Wilna, it was not to the destiny of battles he should have confided; and whether there is in war, any other arbiter of destiny, except victory? What ought he to sacrifice to win that victory? To *sacrifice all* is a very vague idea. Does the author understand what he wished to say? Let him explain himself. Is it for time to complete the insurrection of Poland, that he wishes sacrifices had been made? he ought to tell; and since he rea-

sons upon such great events, it was an opportunity of examining why Napoleon decided upon attempting to accomplish his expedition in a single year, instead of making two campaigns. The question was important. The author has not even perceived it.

"The expedition would probably have succeeded, if the untimely decline of his health, had left the physical force of this great man a vigour equal to that possessed by his intellect."

The perfect health of the Emperor at this epoch, was never before doubted for a single instant. Independently of the time he devoted to business, he found opportunities for hunting on horseback during four or five hours, reviewing troops, &c. How are we to qualify this trick of the author, who, not daring to attack the genius of Napoleon in front, supposes a premature decline of his health, to justify himself for attributing faults to this great man which he never committed? He extends his hero on the bed of Procrustes, and, contrary to the custom of historians, who love to ennoble their heroes, he degrades his, places him in vicious or ridiculous situations, and without doubt to debase by excusing him, finally says that he was sick. Is it also to absolve the authors of his premature end? Napoleon showed during the campaign of Russia, as much of superiority and activity, as he displayed in the campaigns of 1813 and 1814. His constitution must have been extremely strong, since, it was able for six years to resist the tortures of Prometheus.

Few persons have capacity, courage, and time enough, to judge of things themselves, and according to their effects. It is found to be a much shorter way to adhere to received opinions. Mr. de Ségur favoured on one side by those natural dispositions which especially belong to the mobility of our character, and on the other, by the influence of a name rendered illustrious by the talents and high places filled by his father, determined to write two volumes upon the Emperor, well persuaded that the title of his work alone, would cause it to be sought by the multitude. Those who read with reflection, will perceive he has taken as the basis of his system, a course entirely opposite that of the writers who have openly declared

themselves the enemies of Napoleon. By the aid of some oratorical precautions, which serve him as a shelter from the observations of all parties, he begins by establishing that all the faults of the Emperor had their source in his habitual bad health.

CHAPTER II.

We shall pass rapidly over the commencement of this very obscure chapter, and the reflections which the author places in the mouth of the Empéror, touching the policy of Prussia, in relation to the French Republic; but we shall take up this sentence.

"Every time that Napoleon traced on his maps the line of the Prussian frontiers, he was irritated to see them still so extensive, and cried out, 'Can it be that I have left this man so much territory!'"*

Who could have related this to Mr. de Ségur? Where has he heard it? The Quarter-master of the palace was never in the confidence of the Emperor, he never set foot within his cabinet. If he had occasionally heard Napoleon speak of sovereigns, he would have known that he never applied to them such inappropriate expressions, and that he could not say of a crowned head—"that man." True, it is customary in certain halls, to employ this term to designate the Emperor Napoleon. It is without doubt, through reminiscence, that the author makes application of it to the king of Prussia. This prince, confined beyond the Elbe, and whose territories border on the Baltic, to the mouth of the Niemen, was vulnerable at all points, and one cannot see what Napoleon could envy him.

"This aversion to a mild and pacific prince, astonishes—we must seek for the causes."

If the king of Prussia was always disposed to peace, he was

* As Mr. de Ségur looks always to effect, it has appeared to him that the words "*cried out*," or *exclaimed*, have something more than the ordinary meaning; he always prefers them to "he said."

ever ready to make war. Napoleon knew it; this prince inspired little confidence, but he had no aversion to him. Notwithstanding our author points out two causes; one is, *the refusal* of Louis XVIII. to the propositions made him by the intermediation of the king of Prussia. In 1803, the Prussian Cabinet felt that it would be advantageous to the tranquillity of Europe, to draw the princes of the house of Bourbon from the situation they were in. Instructions to this effect were sent to M. Meyer, President of the Regency of Warsaw, a city where the Count de Lille then was. This prince made on this occasion a noble answer, which is known to all the world. How could Napoleon have entertained resentment against a proceeding which he had not provoked, to which he had not consented but from deference to his ally, and which moreover, in no way compromited his authority, since there was no question of his right to the throne of France? Napoleon, in fact attached little importance to this negotiation; the love of the French, and the national interests appeared sufficient to him for the security of his power.

As to the other cause, that of the expostulations of Prussia on the subject of Mr. de Rumboldt's arrest; that agent, as well as Messrs. Wickham, Drake, Spencer, Smith, &c. profited by his character of English resident to the Hanseatic cities, to contrive machinations against the First Consul.

Napoleon had nobly signalized his indignation at the violation of the right of nations, in the persons of the Irish refugees, who were given up by the Senate of Hamburg. He showed his respect for the same right of nations, in refusing to set at liberty a diplomatic agent, in whose favour the king of Prussia solicited. The proceeding of this monarch, which in no wise offended against the principles acknowledged by the Emperor, could not be a cause of enmity. If we did not know that aversion never enters for nothing into the policy of a man of Napoleon's disposition, we might cite two, far otherwise efficient causes of such a sentiment; the projects and engagements of Prussia, anterior to the battle of Austerlitz, and the aggression of this power in 1806. But Mr. de Ségur, who writes history, appears to be ignorant of all this.

"Nevertheless, at the commencement of 1805, Russia, Austria, and England, sought, still in vain, to engage Frederick in their third coalition against France."

A third coalition took place. England succeeded in bring-Russia and Austria into it. Its avowed object was to drive the French out of Germany and Italy, to re-establish the king of Sardinia in Piedmont, and to deprive France of her allies. The means of the coalition appeared immense; five hundred thousand men, and considerable fleets, were to have supported those pretensions which the sun of Austerlitz caused to vanish away.

Thus three months after its formation, the third coalition was dissolved, Austria was forced to sign a peace, and it was solely owing to the generosity of the conqueror, that the Emperor Alexander owed the safety of the ruins of his army.

Prussia, which by the treaty of Berlin, signed some months before the battle of Austerlitz, had taken part in the league, owed to the address of her minister, Haugwitz, the conclusion of an offensive and defensive treaty of alliance with France.

"At first, the possession of Hanover tempted Frederick, but when it was necessary to sign, he seemed ashamed and hesitated. Napoleon could not conceive of so timid a policy. This prince, cried he, dares then, neither to make peace nor war," &c. &c.

Does the author, who never saw the Emperor, unless when he traversed the guard-room, who never heard him, except occasionally at public audiences, obtain the words he places in his mouth, from his own imagination, or from his recollection? To have drawn them from recollection, they must have been said in public, and therefore his relation stands for nothing.

"It is asserted at the same time, that perfidious or mistaken men, persuaded Frederick that Napoleon was obliged to appear pacific, because that warrior did not wish for war; they added, that he treated for peace perfidiously with England, at the price of the restitution of Hanover, which he wished to take again from Prussia."

The following were the negotiations to which the author appears to allude:

The death of Pitt, had opened the way for Fox to the mi-

nistry. It was the ambition of the latter to establish a peace between Great Britain and France, and he made the first movements on this subject. In February, 1806, an active correspondence was established between the two cabinets. An equal disposition was felt to open the negotiations upon honourable foundations; but they could not agree as to the mode of negotiating. This difficulty was removed. England yielded to the proposition of France, that they should, preliminary to every thing else, adopt this basis, that either power might mediate in all continental and maritime affairs. This circumstance, and the arrival of Mr. D'Oubril, at Paris, on the part of Russia, decided Fox to send Lord Yarmouth with the necessary powers to treat. This Lord had regular conferences with the French cabinet. They agreed on all points; England retained Malta and the Cape, and relinquished all the other colonies. But at the moment the treaties were to be signed, Fox fell dangerously ill. His death was foreseen, and Lord Lauderdale was despatched to Paris, to retard and break off the negotiation. Scarce had he arrived before he demanded his passports, if France refused immediately to acknowledge the false and unheard of assertion, that the *uti possidetis* was the basis agreed upon with Lord Yarmouth, excepting Hanover therefrom. Thus England would have retained all her conquests, and France, who held nothing of England but Hanover, would have kept nothing.

Notwithstanding all Lord Lauderdale's menaces, France refused to acknowledge this basis. At different conferences the general principle was separated from this basis, in order to go to the bottom of the question. But at this epoch, England was not desirous of peace, because she had hopes of forming a fourth coalition. Already had she prevented Alexander from ratifying the treaty which his envoy, (Mr. D'Oubril,) had signed, and gave rise to misunderstandings between the cabinets of Berlin and the Thuilleries. The envoy, Lord Lauderdale, a violent, adroit, and unscrupulous man, had principally in view to extort from France a declaration relative to Hanover, which should serve to excite the anger of Prussia. The fourth coalition was formed, and terminated the

negotiations. The enemies of France hoped much from the alliance of Prussia, Austria, and England. The Prussian troops had preserved all their reputation.

At a last conference the French plenipotentiaries reasoned thus with Lord Lauderdale: "Suppose that Prussia should be beaten as Austria has been, and that the Emperor should be at Berlin three months after opening the campaign, as he was at Vienna. Would you not regret to have allowed the bulwark to be destroyed which secured Hanover, Holland, and all the mouths of the Elbe and the Weser, so important to your commerce? Moreover, the Russians are still far distant; before the middle of October, the shock between the Prussian army covering Berlin and the French troops who wish to reach there, will have taken place. If, as is probable, the Prussian army should be conquered, it will be destroyed as the Austrian army has been; and the Russians can do no more for Prussia after her defeat, than they could do for Austria, a monarchy which had far greater resources."

Lord Lauderdale comprehended the justice of these observations. He foresaw so well that the fourth coalition was dead-born, since it could not be declared until the arrival of the Russians between the Vistula and Oder, that he demanded "that in case England made peace, the Emperor should not march against Prussia." To this an affirmative was given. But the British ministry saw nothing but the new chances France was to be subject to, without calculating the probabilities of the issue of the campaign: the war with Prussia ensued.

Count de Ségur reproaches Napoleon, "for not having dismembered Prussia."

So serious a question which M. the quarter-master of the palace skims over thus lightly, deserves a long examination. If Napoleon drew back before this dismemberment, it was without doubt from far more important considerations than the frivolous motives imputed to him by the author, such as the effect of the Emperor Alexander's presence, &c. If the weakening of Prussia had produced such an exaltation in this kingdom, what would have ensued on its total dismemberment?

"This vast conspiracy, was that of the friends of virtue. Its chief—was Stein. Perhaps Napoleon might have gained him; he chose to punish him."

The Baron de Stein was an enemy; Napoleon knew it. But he also knew that a man of this character was above corruption. He had no choice; he demanded that an enemy should be removed from the court of a friendly prince.

"In 1809—it was the Prussians who first dared to raise the standard of independence against Napoleon. He threw them into chains destined for galley slaves."

Major Schill had violated the law of nations. In the eyes of civilians and men of honour of all countries, Schill and his companions, traversing a part of Germany, pillaging and killing Frenchmen, while Prussia was at peace with France, rendered themselves culpable as robbers and assassins. Their crime was the same as that of pirates, who without letters of marque, or during entire peace, attack the vessels of a friendly power. The Emperor did not "*send them to the galleys;*" they were tried and condemned by legally constituted tribunals. This satisfaction was due from Prussia: it was Prussia who gave it.

"At the approach of 1812—Frederick, unquiet and fatigued by his subjection, wished to escape from it by alliance or by war. It was in March, 1811, that he offered himself as the auxiliary of Napoleon in the expedition he was preparing."

He was not then preparing the expedition; Russia was arming, and had concentrated considerable forces upon the Dneister; and Prussia who foresaw the storm approaching, sought a powerful ally to shield her from danger. But France was still unarmed: explanations had been demanded relative to these armaments; negotiations were pending. To have accepted the alliance of Prussia, would have been to exhibit hostile intentions, would have been to commit a political error. Napoleon then, did not accept it; but he did not refuse it, reserving the dispositions of Prussia for an opportune moment.

That Prussia in her disquiet should have secretly treated with Alexander, as the author subsequently says, proves no-

thing, except that the king of Prussia did not understand all that prudence had rendered necessary to Napoleon.

The author reveals a curious anecdote; it is, that in 1810, Alexander was about to fall unexpectedly upon Napoleon, and on this subject Mr. De Ségur has himself said a thing sufficiently piquant. If Alexander changed his resolution, it was *because he wished to have the* JUSTICE OF HEAVEN *and human opinion on his side, by not appearing to be the aggressor.* Mr. De Ségur might well suppose that the promoter of the Holy Alliance wished to deceive men; but to suppose that he wished to deceive the Almighty, is rather too bad!!

If the King of Prussia, when he proposed his alliance and fortresses to the Emperor Alexander, had been refused by this sovereign, as the author still says, what should have resulted? That he would have insisted on his alliance, with France, which never happened. Whence we may conclude, that the *subaltern witness,* who quotes the answer of Alexander to Frederick, has not told the truth. For, we repeat it, if Russia had refused the alliance of Prussia, Prussia would have persisted in going to France. However, when the moment arrived in which Napoleon perceived that in spite of all his efforts for peace, the probabilities were all in favour of war, he had to choose between the alliance or destruction of Prussia. He chose the alliance more easily than Frederick himself had determined on it. The author agrees that this prince hesitated; and he connects with this circumstance, the occupation of Pomerania, and the order given to the Prince of Echmülh to *hold himself ready to seize suddenly upon the whole kingdom and the King of Prussia.* The occupation of Pomerania was an impolitic action, which resulted from no combination, but solely from the character of the general who undertook it, and from an exaggerated zeal for the execution of the continental system. He believed, upon false reports, that vessels loaded with colonial produce had entered the ports of the isle of Rugen and at Stralsund. He saw an opportunity of finding the Swedish government in fault, and making a sensible blow upon the interests of England. Marshal Davoust invaded the Swedish provinces without other order than his instructions against

British commerce. It was not disavowed because the evil was done, and a disavowal would have done no good; it was excused as an excess of zeal.

This operation had nothing in common with the measures taken to decide the court of Berlin. One cannot tell from what motives Mr. De Ségur imagines the order for the seizure of the person of the King of Prussia. It should be recollected, that after the defection of the corps of York, that Napoleon had 20,000 men at Potsdam, and as many at Berlin; that policy and the agitation of the public mind in Prussia, would have given him at that period just motives for taking the king as a hostage; who, nevertheless, had not done it, and had ordered Augereau, who commanded at Berlin, to pay the greatest respect to that monarch.

The Prince of Eckmülh was ordered to be ready to enter Prussia if the treaty were not signed. In fact, under such pressing circumstances, it was necessary that Prussia should be either friend or enemy, and the refusal to ally herself with France, could have left no doubt of her connexion with Russia, which the most ordinary prudence would have ordered the prevention of, since the war was so imminent.

"This submission did not altogether satisfy Napoleon; to his strength he added artifice; his suspicions still led him to covet the occupation of the fortresses, which he was ashamed not to leave in Frederick's hands—he commanded every degree of respect to be shown both to the king and his subjects; but at the same time that every sort of arms should be taken from the people which might be of use to them in an insurrection, and he pointed out every thing of the kind, even to the smallest weapon."

We only cite this passage to show the spirit in which Count De Ségur has composed his work. We will take no notice of the words *stratagem* and *shame* employed in relation to so powerful a man as Napoleon, whose character was always superior to such littleness. Were the assertions advanced correct, precautions against a power whose friendship could not be counted on, would be justified by prudence. The event shows that Napoleon was too confident in Prussia, leaving her

a numerous army in Silesia; and what proves that he had not deprived her of every thing, *down to the least weapon*, is the rapidity with which, after the treason of York, she armed a hundred thousand militia with reserved fusils, and furnished them with the necessary artillery.

It is beyond doubt that the Emperor Napoleon refused the twenty-five millions which Prussia demanded at this period by Mr. Hatzfield, since this power still owed nearly four millions, and besides she had not inspired confidence. In regard to her numerous magazines placed at the disposal of Napoleon by the treaty of the 24th February, it was only done because of the impossibility of delivering them to the Russians, to whom they were originally destined.

Such are the facts. From want of acquaintance with them, the author wanders amid conjectures; it is the condition of every writer who speaks of what he is ignorant, and it is that of Mr. De Ségur, who treats of diplomacy without any knowledge of negotiations, and who talks through all the rest of his book about strategy without any knowledge of war.

CHAPTER III.

"Russia is mistress of the heights of Europe—her government can only with great difficulty be driven into a strait and forced to submit, in a space almost beyond the imagination to conceive—without the concurrence of Turkey and Sweden, Russia is less vulnerable."

If by these singular expressions the author wishes to say, that Russia could only be attacked by a power allied to Sweden and Turkey, we reply:

The alliance of Sweden, without doubt, would have been very advantageous, since she menaced Russia with a very dangerous diversion in the north. By an alliance with Turkey one important end would have been attained, that of keeping

her at war with Russia, because this war would have made a powerful diversion in the south; such are the real aids it would have been useful to obtain. Nothing was neglected, whatever this author may say, led by the false rumours which he has taken as guides.

When Mr. De Ségur says, farther on, that the *meanest soldiers in the ranks expected to hear of the Grand Vizier's march towards Kiow*, he shows us that he was one of the number. The Grand Vizier being in front of a Russian army, he must have been beaten more than once before marching upon Kiow. Independent of the alliances which had been concluded with Austria and Prussia, (which were the most important,) and with the princes of the Rhenish Confederation, negotiations were at the same time going on with Denmark and Sweden. That with Denmark succeeded, it was otherwise with Sweden. The negotiation with the last named power failed, because she made one condition which could not be honourably agreed to. Political success then, was obtained wherever it was possible. The alliance subsisted at Constantinople; it was only necessary to maintain it, and it was maintained. It was not offensive against Russia, because England, by a lucky fraud, hurried it to the camp of the Grand Vizier at the moment when success seemed certain to the Divan. The sultan Mahmoud was in the French interests; he still supported them until he learned that peace was concluded by the Grand Vizier. He hesitated long before he ratified it. The Grand Vizier had been deceived by the English, who persuaded him that the Count de Narbonne sent to the Emperor Alexander at Wilna, was an ambassador ready to sign a treaty which would place the Porte at the mercy of Russia. British cunning gave the assurances, and even furnished the proofs; the deceived Vizier deceived the Sultan.

"The Turkish ambassador was treated with the greatest distinction in the French camp; he accompanied Napoleon in all his reviews; the most flattering attentions were paid to him, and the grand equerry (Caulaincourt) was already treating with him for an alliance offensive and defensive, when a

sudden attack by the Russians interrupted the negotiations. The ambassador returned to Warsaw."

Mr. De Ségur who is only partially acquainted with things, who is guided by incomplete notions, and frequently by ill-digested recollections, rarely his own, and who moreover was prisoner of war at this period in Russia,* had heard tell of an oriental ambassador arrived at head quarters. He only makes mention of a Turkish ambassador, and he attributes to him a reception which was obtained and merited by another. Had he taken the pains to ascertain the fact, he would have learned the following circumstances.

On the 25th of April, Mirza Rizza, a man of eminent merit, and one of the most illustrious personages of the court of Teheran, arrived at Finkenstein, in quality of ambassador to the Emperor Napoleon. The Duke of Bassano was charged to negotiate with him the conditions of an alliance offensive and defensive, between France and Persia; and at the end of a few days the negotiation was brought to a happy result. It was this ambassador *who accompanied Napoleon at his reviews;* it was to him the *most caressing attentions* were paid. On the 7th of May he took leave to return to Persia. The circumstance of a Persian embassy was sufficiently novel, and an alliance between France and Persia sufficiently important to be mentioned. All Europe was occupied with this event, except Mr. de Ségur, who has found no trace of it in his profound historical knowledge, nor sought any indications of it in cotemporary documents. If he had only read the bulletins, which an author writing on war ought at least to consult, he would have avoided this omission.† This fact shows with what slightness Mr. de Ségur writes history. Some persons

* He was taken prisoner in December, 1816, while preparing the Emperor's quarters in the village of Nasielk.

† Sixty-third Bulletin; Elbing, 8th May, 1807. The Persian ambassado has had his audience of leave; he brought very fine presents to the Emperor from his master, and received in return the portrait of the Emperor, enriched with beautiful jewels. He returns directly to Persia. He is a considerable personage in his own country, and a man of talent and sagacity. His return home was rendered necessary," &c. &c.

who have remarked the odium which the author in the course of his book throws on the minister who was then charged to negotiate with Mirza Rizza, have thought that he omitted to speak of the Persian ambassador, in order that he might avoid naming the French negotiator under circumstances where nothing disadvantageous could be said of him. If the grand equerry, who for a long time protected the quarter-master of the palace, who protected him in his turn, had been charged with this mission, Mirza Rizza might have obtained some mention.

The Persian ambassador had left head-quarters three weeks before the arrival of the Turkish envoy, on the 27th May.

In the beginning of 1807, the Porte sent Emin Wahib Effendi to conclude a treaty of alliance with France. This envoy fruitlessly negotiated a long time at Warsaw with Talleyrand. The Emperor impatient to terminate the nogotiation, caused the ambassador to come to Finkenstein, where he arrived eight days before the Emperor at head-quarters. The Duke of Vicenza was charged to confer with him, but the negotiation advanced no better. The Emperor wished to speak with him himself; but fatigued with his want of capacity, he sent him to Caulaincourt, not wishing to lose his time in useless conferences. The Emperor quitted Finkenstein, and the Ambassador followed the Duke of Vicenza and Minister of Foreign Affairs to Dantzic. There, after three days of conference, as fruitless as the preceding, the Duke of Vicenza departed from Dantzic to go to head-quarters, and Emir Wahib was sent to Paris.

The mission of this Turk, who was found to be a stupid man, and the choice of whom is thought to have been influenced by the Russians, was intended to obtain an engagement that France should make no treaty with Russia, without the concurrence of Turkey. In vain was it represented to him that France could not thus tie her hands; that this complication would produce nothing but difficulties and obstacles; and that according to the relations subsisting between the two empires, Turkey ought to repose on France the care of her interests. Wahib Effendi remained immoveable. Napoleon

ended by saying to him, "you are wrong; the Emperor Alexander has already made propositions for peace. If you will not come to a conclusion with me, I will make peace with him, and without you." This was the only thing which the Ottoman envoy appeared to comprehend. He proposed to send a courier to Constantinople, to demand instructions, but events pressed on each other, and the peace of Tilsit soon followed the victories of Heilseberg and Friedland. The Emperor wished heartily to conclude an alliance with the Porte, as an ambassador had been sent to him, and he did all in his power to conclude the negotiations. If his efforts were unavailing, the cause is altogether in the choice of the envoy.

For the rest, the alliance with Russia and the deposition of Selim, which happened at the same time, gave another direction to the policy of Napoleon, and was a sufficient reason for his coolness relative to Turkey.

"But, a deputation came from Wilna, soliciting the restoration of their independence, and professing the same devotion to his cause which was shown at Warsaw," &c.

The Prince of Eckmülh received these deputies, and the Duke of Bassano, to whom they were referred by the Emperor, fulfilled in relation to them, the duty of an honest man, by withdrawing them from the observation of the Russians, by disabusing their hopes, and deciding them to return in haste to their friends, whom a fruitless effort would have exposed to the animadversion of their sovereign. In 1812, they strongly manifested their gratitude towards that minister.

"The Emperor of France continued therefore to negotiate with Russia; and the Turkish ambassador, neglected and forgotten, wandered about our camp, without being summoned to take any part in the negotiations, which terminated the war; he returned to Constantinople soon after in great displeasure."

The Turkish ambassador did not remain in our camp. Having gone to Paris, he soon learned the deposition of the Sultan Selim, and departed for Constantinople. The death of a prince destroys the powers of an ambassador. He could not have been displeased with the French government, since the cause which had deprived him of his power, was entirely independent

of France. All the world knows that these things occurred in this manner. Selim was deposed on the 29th of May; there could not have been on the 7th of July, a plenipotentiary to assist at the peace of Tilsit.

"If we must even tell the whole truth, it is asserted that at the interview of Tilsit, and subsequently, a treaty for the partition of Turkey was under discussion."

A historian, without doubt, should tell the whole truth, but he should not repeat unfounded assertions; as it is untrue that any treaty for the partition of Turkey was discussed.

"What is certain is, that shortly after the interview at Tilsit, Alexander's ambition was very sensibly moderated."

What is certain is, that the ideas of dividing the Ottoman empire, were brought forward long after the interview of Tilsit, and were discussed between France and Russia. France renounced it completely, from the first moment that a misunderstanding began between the two countries. The words Mr. de Ségur attributes to the Emperor, are of his own invention, or of the persons he has consulted.

It is the same with the conversations related in his subsequent pages. General Sebastiani and Napoleon, whom he brings on the scene, knew the geography of Europe too well, to make such a partition as Mr. de Ségur has done, and to say that *the Emperor Alexander should be allowed to take Turkey to the Danube*, as if Wallachia and Moldavia were in Turkey, and as if Turkey were not on the other side of the Danube.

Mr. de Ségur has the laudable ambition of imitating the great historians of antiquity, who place in the mouths of their heroes, beautiful, noble, and justly admired discourses; this has procured him from some complaisant friends, the title of the modern Thucidydes and Tacitus. Certainly this is a grand eulogium; but in our opinion, very little merited. Independent of the eloquence and elevation which characterise their harangues, these historians aim at introducing true, just and reasonable things, corresponding to the rank and character of the speakers. Mr. de Ségur does not seem to have profited by the study of his models.

In one of the particular conversations which the author has

attributed to Napoleon, after having supposed the idea of his *uniting Spain to France*, he makes him say, *as to Joseph, I will make him amends*. Does the Quarter-master of the palace seek by this insinuation, to make it believed that Napoleon wished to take possession of Austria to give it to his brother?

"The Congress at Erfurt took place just after this. Napoleon was therefore anxious to make sure of the dispositions of Alexander to conclude an alliance, offensive and defensive."

Such were, according to our author, the motives of the interview at Erfurt, which he calls a congress. It had been positively agreed between the two sovereigns at Tilsit, that they should again meet within a year. The bombardment of Copenhagen by the English, the events in Spain, and the new attacks made against the independence of neutral flags by the British Orders in Council, (of the 11th November, 1807) rendered this interview more necessary. It had no other object than to agree upon the means of obliging England to make peace, the constant aim of Napoleon's efforts.

"Napoleon had then to keep upon terms with Alexander, and felt too much regret at the death of Selim, detestation of the barbarities of the Musselmans, and contempt for their unstable government, to allow him to notice the communication. For three years he had returned no reply to the Sultan, and his silence might be interpreted into a refusal to acknowledge him. He was in this ambiguous position, when, all of a sudden, on the 21st of March, 1812—"

It seems that the Sultan Mahmoud had not been recognized by Napoleon, and that *he had not replied to him for three years* previous to March 1812. There was, however, a French embassy at Constantinople, and an Ottoman embassy at Paris. How will Mr. de Ségur explain such relations between sovereigns who did not recognize each other? Will he inform us how it happens, that an answer was not given for three years, to a government with which we treated by ambassadors?

Mr. de Ségur was not with the army in 1807, when the Persian ambassador was seen by all the world at Finkenstein. In Paris, his functions as Quarter-master, did not require of him any service at the palace. A stranger to all that passed,

whether in the circles of the Thuilleries, or in the Cabinet, he is very excusable for not knowing the simplest things. But he is not so for having neglected to seek for information, since he has assumed the office of historian. If he had even taken the pains to open the almanac, he would have seen that we had at Constantinople in 1808, and 1809, General Sebastiani, and in 1810, 1811, and 1812, Mr. de Latour-Maubourg; and that during all this time, Mouhib Effendi was an Ambassador at Paris. The latter did not obtain his recall, which he had requested, until in the beginning of 1812. Having been treated with great distinction during his sojourn in France, his disposition, which was by no means favourable at first, was so much changed previous to his departure, that on his arrival at Constantinople, he was, in the divan, the zealous promoter of the most intimate union between the two nations. His political views were so well known, that the Sultan Mahmoud, who participated in them, gave him admission to the council which discussed the ratification of the peace of Bucharest, and where, in spite of his assistance, the influence of the Mufti and Janissaries prevailed.

"It can hardly be supposed that he was ignorant of the invariable customs of the Musselmans, which prevented the Grand Seignior from ever appearing in person at the head of his army."

What one could hardly have *supposed*, is the ignorance which the author shows on a historical point, which it would have been so easy to elucidate. Had he taken the trouble to open the history of the Ottoman Empire, he would have seen that from the time of Othman I., Emperor of the Turks, down to Mahmoud the present occupant of the throne, that fourteen Sultans have commanded their armies in person,* and

* Othman I. in 1299.
Orchan II. in 1325.
Amurat I. in 1359.
Bajazet I. in 1389.
Mahomet I. in 1413.
Amurat II. in 1421.
Mahomet II. in 1451.
Bajazet II. in 1481.
Selim I. in 1512.
Soliman I. in 1520.
Mahomet III. in 1595.
Osman I. in 1617.
Amurat IV. in 1622.
Soliman II. in 1687.
until Sophie in Bulgaria.
Mustapha II. in 1695.

that the Sultan does a meritorious act, according to his creed, and one which recommends him in the eyes of his people, when he throws off the luxuries of the Seraglio, to march at the head of his troops against the infidels.

All that Mr. de Ségur has said relative to Turkey, is as exact as could be expected from a historian, ignorant even of facts to be found in the almanacs.

CHAPTER IV.

This chapter, which treats of our relations with Sweden and with Bernadotte, contains some truths. But, as the author has no positive data for any thing, and writes only from hearsay, without giving himself the trouble to verify them, he frequently blunders. Yet, when an author retraces cotemporary occurrences, it is not asking too much, that he should know at least, nearly, what has happened.

"In the course of the same night, a conventicle, consisting of ten deputies of the council of Five Hundred, met at the house of S——. Thither Bernadotte repaired. They settled that at nine o'clock the next morning, the Council should hold a sitting, to which those only should be invited, who were of the same way of thinking; that there a decree should be passed, that in imitation of the Council of Ancients, which had prudently named Bonaparte General of its guard, the Council of Five Hundred should appoint Bernadotte to command theirs; and that the latter properly armed, should be in readiness to be summoned to it. It was at S——'s house that this plan was formed; S. himself, immediately afterwards, ran to Napoleon, and disclosed the whole to him. A threat from the latter was quite sufficient to keep the conspirators in order; not one of them dared to show his face at the Council, and the next day the Revolution of the 18th Brumaire was completed."

It was on the 18th and not the 17th, that the Council of

Ancients gave General Bonaparte the command of the troops of the first military division, which comprised the guard of the legislative body. The Council of Five Hundred had no guard in particular, more than the Council of Ancients. There was, therefore, no command to give to Bernadotte. Mr. de Ségur does not even know the date of the event, which founded the power of Bonaparte, whose historian he has made himself.

After having spoken of the conspiracy of Bernadotte in the west, he adds, "on that occasion Bernadotte's ruin was sealed, if Napoleon had been able to convict him of it."

The First Consul had more than sufficient proofs to condemn Bernadotte. He had the goodness to yield to the intercession of Joseph and of his wife: he forgot all. As for Bernadotte, he never forgave Napoleon for this mercy. There are some souls in which benefits produce nothing but hatred and a desire to do injury.

"But fortune favoured Bernadotte, who was already at Rochefort, by delaying his embarkation, until the war with England was renewed. He then refused to go, and Napoleon could no longer compel him."

Fortune, which aids by delaying *an embarkation*—what a style! it is doubtless by a rhetorical figure, that the author takes an *embarkation* for an *embarkment*. It is taking the cause for an effect. It is equally certain that it is by a figure of rhetoric that he pretends an English declaration of war, rendered it impossible for Napoleon to make a general obey. The fact is, that Napoleon, seeing war breaking out, felt the necessity of keeping General Bernadotte in France, and did not wish, by sending him to America, to expose him to be captured by enemies who already covered the seas.

"Soon after, Napoleon was heard reproaching Bernadotte with his envious and treacherous inaction, during the battle of Auerstadt, and his order of the day at Wagram, in which he had assumed the honour of that victory. Bernadotte on his side—demanded why the Emperor had placed him in such a dangerous and false position, at Wagram? Why the report of that victory had been so disadvantageous to him?" &c.

At the battle of Auerstadt, Bernadotte, placed by the Empe-

ror at Dornbourg, through jealousy against Marshal Davoust, and without any motive which related to Napoleon, would not aid his colleague to gain the victory, and thus in some degree compromited the fate of the battle. At Wagram, by an order of the day, in contradiction to the truth, of which the whole army was witness, he gave the most extravagant praises to the Saxon corps which he commanded, and which had behaved cowardly. Napoleon contented himself with establishing these facts; it was his duty; he ought even to have punished such insolence. He had not placed Bernadotte in a situation more false than was that of Massena. Both found themselves upon the left, when by the fault of the Saxons, an unexpected movement of the enemy had nearly succeeded. Napoleon by changing the front of the whole line, came to the succour of Massena and Bernadotte, and re-established affairs.

"Bernadotte also felt that he owed his crown to the chance which had made him be born and educated in a religion similar to that of the Swedes."

Who can be ignorant that Bernadotte publicly professed the Catholic religion in France, and that he was obliged on his arrival at Gottenburg, to abjure it, and embrace Lutheranism, by a solemn ceremony. The following saying is related of him: "Henry the IVth consented to go to mass to recover a kingdom; I may well for the sake of gaining one, do without the mass."

The details given by Mr. de Ségur, relative to the elevation of Bernadotte, are inexact; this is the truth. In 1807, after the evacuation of Pomerania by the Swedes, two brothers, taken prisoners, named Morner, officers in the regiment of this name, were presented to Bernadotte, who made his house their prison, and about a month afterwards sent them to Sweden. In June, 1810, one of these officers, then a Colonel, announced himself at Bernadotte's house, Rue d'Anjou, in Paris, requested to speak particularly with him, and made known the views which some Swedes had in relation to him, to supply the place of the Prince Royal, who was dying from an apoplectic stroke. Bernadotte received this overture jocularly, and without attaching any importance to it, resolved to make no ar-

rangements with the French government until he should be more seriously addressed on the subject. Four or five days after, the Swedish minister at Paris, (Baron de Lagerbielke) came to see him, confirmed what Colonel Morner had stated, and demanded an answer. This was on Saturday: the next day Bernadotte went to St. Cloud before the levee, and gave an account of what had passed, to the Emperor, who replied, "I know the whole; you have liberty to accept or refuse; I will do on that score, whatever you wish. I have, however, other views; I have charged Alquier to propose a regency, and to wait the events. The son of the late king may be hereafter recalled; but they wish no more of that family in Sweden.—Thus, accept; I would rather see you there than any other; I will support you with all my heart. Make your arrangements." Bernadotte sent a young man to Stockholm, a cousin of Signeul, the Swedish Consul, to advise with his partisans, and authorised him to propose all the money necessary. But nothing was given. The five hundred thousand francs advanced by the Emperor, and about a million lent by General Gerard, were the only sums which Bernadotte placed in the Bank of Sweden, instead of fourteen millions.

Definitively, the choice of the Swedes was provoked by no intrigue; they only thought of Bernadotte, because he was allied to the Emperor, because they were ignorant of the secret misunderstanding, which the envious character of this general had caused, between Napoleon and himself; and because they hoped to gain by it, the good graces and protection of the sovereign of France.

"At the reading of a letter, conceived in this new and unexpected style, Napoleon was seized with rage and astonishment. He exclaimed, striking violently on the letter and on the table on which it lay open—"he! the rascal! he presume to give me advice, to give the law to me, to propose such an infamous act to me!" &c. From that moment his instructions to his ministers, bore the impress of that disposition; the latter it is true, lessened the bitterness of them, but a rupture became inevitable."

Whenever Mr. de Ségur speaks of negotiations, he confounds every thing. The language he attributes to the Emperor, is absurd. The arrangements he imputes to his Cabinet, are not those which were made. He places the proposition for the cession of Norway, at the beginning of the negotiations; while it was the very last act. It appears that it was at Paris it reached the Emperor; it could not have arrived until after he had left Dresden for the expedition to Russia. Every one knows, that to the diplomatic, the minister of foreign relations, had joined confidential communications, of which the princess royal became the intermediary, with a feeling entirely French. She wrote under the dictation of the minister, and the officers attached to her person were her couriers. A last letter which announced, after new exhortations, the desired concessions, was sent to Stockholm, and carried by Mr. de Signeul, Consul General of Sweden, to Paris, chosen and sent for that purpose. This agent returned from his mission, and rendered account of it to the minister at Dresden on the 29th of May. He brought a note dictated by the Prince Royal, which made the alliance of Sweden exclusively dependent on the guarantee of Norway. Bernadotte thus deceived Alexander, with whom he had treated two months before. Napoleon was in his cabinet when he received the letter from his minister; he was not violent, and all he said was confined to this answer. "I will not buy a doubtful ally, at the expense of a faithful friend." This simple recital is, perhaps, more interesting, is above all, truer, and more probable, than the grand storm, for which Mr. de Ségur has invented the thunder.

We cannot insist too much upon the ignorance the author has shown of the Emperor's character, and unceasingly presents him to us, as venting a blind rage, in misplaced and imprudent expressions. It is disagreeable to us to suspect the good faith of Mr. de Ségur; we are inclined to believe, that if he had approached this prince, if he had heard him converse with his ministers, he would not have transformed into an insensate lunatic, the man who was most entirely master of himself in serious affairs, and whose deep penetration

throw a sudden illumination on the justice and fitness of a question.

BOOK II.—CHAPTER I.

"Napoleon, meanwhile, was still at Paris, in the midst of his great officers, who were alarmed by the terrible encounter which was preparing."

We shall see the great officers who were silent, and immediately afterwards, the great officers who spoke, or whom Mr. de Ségur has made speak. How could he have heard them? He neither entered into the cabinet nor the councils, and had no place except in the hall of service.

The first who appears upon the scene is Cambaceres, who, first of all, wished that Napoleon would *divide and partition what was immediately around him*; that is, very probably, the confederation of the Rhine, and a part of Prussia, with whom an alliance existed. To have addressed such discourse to the Emperor, Cambaceres must have been a fool, and supposed that the Emperor was not much wiser; but this nowise embarrasses Mr. de Ségur. He makes Napoleon answer, and say what he never could have said or thought:—"that such had been his project in 1809, but the misfortune of Essling had deranged his plan." It is certain, that after the misfortune of *Essling*, the Emperor could only employ himself in repairing his losses, and beating the enemy. But the day after the battle of Wagram, the execution of the plan was still easier than the evening before that of Essling. The victory was complete; the Austrian army was nothing but a ruin: their dispersed militia refused to resume their arms; the Archduke Charles was turned back upon Bohemia, and the Archduke John upon Moravia; they were near losing all communication with Hungary, and a battle might have thrown them on the confines of their western frontiers; disaffection had

made a rapid progress, and the subjects of Austria, fatigued by so many unnecessary and inglorious wars, had arrived at the point of looking upon the dissolution of the monarchy without dismay, by the separation of the provinces of which it was composed. Such was the internal situation of Austria; externally she found herself without continental allies. Notwithstanding, the morning after the battle of Wagram, the Emperor consented to an armistice, because enough of blood had been spilt, and because he wished for peace.* He did not then wish to divide and partition what was around him; he could not then have said in 1812, that such had been his project in 1809.

"After the treaty of Tilsit, and through the intermediation of Murat, he sought to ally himself with Russia, by a marriage, but that the refusal of the Russian princess, and her precipitate union with the Duke of Oldenburg, had induced him to marry an Austrian princess."

The intermediation of Murat was unnecessary. If Napoleon, who soon found himself on terms of intimacy with Alexander, did not choose during their long conversations to throw out some insinuations relative to a family alliance, he had with him the Prince of Benevento, (Talleyrand,) the most proper person to examine the ground, in consequence of his relations with Prince Kourakin. But the Russian princess was not refused at Tilsit, where she could not have been demanded; because at this period there was no mention of a divorce. It was not until a long time afterwards that an audacious effort of Fouché awakened some suspicions among the people on this subject. It was not spoken of in 1809, at the time of the *precipitate union* of the Grand Duchess of Oldenburg, a precipitation altogether foreign to a project of marriage with the Emperor Napoleon. He knew the decided character of that princess, and would have discovered reasons for not dreaming of an union with her. If, moreover, he had thought of it, there was

* Before Znaym, at the moment that Prince John of Lichtenstein, came to propose an armistice, Marshal Bessieres insisted that Napoleon should join battle: no, answered the Emperor, enough blood has been shed; and he signed the armistice.

nothing to prevent the proposition being made at Erfurt, where the relations between the two sovereigns had assumed the character of friendship.

In 1810, after the divorce was resolved upon, Napoleon thought of the Grand Duchess Anne. He must have a very false idea of his character who can suppose that if the Grand Duchess Catherine had refused him, that he would have demanded her sister. The negotiation thus begun did not succeed. The Emperor Alexander demanded time for his mother to decide; but another negotiation, commenced at the same time with the Austrian ambassador, at Paris, succeeded completely. Thus the tergiversations of Russia caused the Emperor to espouse an Austrian princess.

"The pride of Napoleon had been wounded by the refusal which Russia, in 1807, had made of his hand, since he had exposed himself to a war, by dispossessing the Russian princess of Oldenburg of her duchy."

In this allegation there are as many errors as words. We have explained how much credit is to be given to this pretended refusal; we have no need to show how ridiculous it is to suppose that through vexation Napoleon had included Oldenburg in the thirty-second military division. The author himself adds immediately afterwards, "those passions which so despotically govern other men, possessed but a feeble influence on a genius so firm and vast as that of Napoleon." What then does the preceding signify?

The Duchy of Oldenburg, by its geographical position, must follow the fate of the Hanseatic cities by which it is locked in. The continental system, established by the treaty of Tilsit, could not effectually injure England, unless it was completely executed by the interdiction of the ports to the English commerce, nevertheless the whole of Germany received English merchandize through the ports of the Baltic. The possession of Oldenburg having been guaranteed to the Duke by the treaty of Tilsit, the Emperor offered as an indemnity the principality of Erfurt and the seignory of Blankenhayn; but this exchange was refused, as not presenting an equivalent. Russia seized with eagerness this new pretext for a rupture, and ad-

dressed to the ministers of the European courts a protest, which by its form, as much as its real object, was a serious offence committed against an ally.

Nothing was easier than to agree by negotiation relative to the Duchy of Oldenburg. But Russia, instead of beginning frankly, and in the spirit of the system which closely connected the two empires, seized with avidity this occasion to conceal her intention of breaking with France, in order to yield herself to British influence.

"One obvious fact sufficed to hurry him sooner or later into that decisive struggle; that was the existence of an empire which rivalled his, &c. It was obvious that war alone could decide this great arbitrement, this great and eternal struggle between the poor and the rich," &c.

The author has heretofore explained that the cause of the war related to England, and the maintenance of the continental system, the only mode of bringing the British cabinet to peace. Had he added to this true motive, that the result of this war would be advantageous to Europe, and glorious for the Emperor, whom it would constitute the defender of civilization against barbarism, he would have been comprehended by men of good faith. But what signifies this vague and rather vapid declamation, before such high interests, in spite of his philosophic pretensions, that this war was a *struggle of the poor against the rich?*

"The great officers of his court were alarmed by the double-headed character of the war."

These officers were the ministers of the treasury and finance, who are very singularly confounded with the courtiers. The author, according to his custom, makes them talk. The one, Count Mollien, says that his finances have *need of repose;* very insignificant language from the mouth of so positive a man. The other, the Duke of Gaëte, says, that the state of finances was *never more satisfactory.* It is true that the Duke of Gaëte, who understood his business well, and employed himself with nothing else, speaks like a minister of war about rations of bread and forage; and like a minister of marine about canvass, tar, and masts. How well imagined is all

this! But the most beautiful invention is that which the Emperor has the honour of. His allies, not his enemies, were to pay the expenses of the war. We see clearly the motive of this invention; but the absurdity is equally evident. The allies of Napoleon were Prussia, still indebted for considerable sums, and of whom nothing could be asked; Denmark, who had nothing to give, and Austria, who, very probably, would not suffer it to be done.

"It was that perhaps which drew upon him the reproach of having availed himself of a method which he had rejected in the Austrian war, and of which the celebrated Pitt had given an example in 1793."

Does the author wish by this to insinuate that Napoleon counted upon a method which morals do not allow, but which policy has occasionally employed? History, it is true, reproaches the memory of Frederick the Great, and Pitt, with not being scrupulous in this respect. Even in our days, we have seen agents at the instigation of those on whom they were dependent, devote themselves to these practices. The openness of Napoleon's character was always repugnant to the employment of similar frauds. If he had intended to distribute in Russia counterfeit notes on the Russian banks, it would have been easy to him who could have disposed of half of Europe, and had more than one point of contact with the Russian territories. The author who says at the same time, that Napoleon did not employ this method, might well have passed this subject in silence. We are tempted to believe that he is unwilling to lose an opportunity of casting odium upon the hero of his history.

CHAPTER II.

"Meanwhile Poniatowski, to whom the expedition appeared to hold out the prospect of a throne, generously united his

exertions with the Emperor's ministers in the attempt to demonstrate its danger.—He depicted Lithuania as an impracticable desert; its nobility already become half Russian, &c."

The opinion of Prince Poniatowski was entirely contrary to that which the author has imagined for him. To depict Lithuania as desert and impracticable, it was necessary that he should have been unacquainted with it. What a desert, in fact, is the rich and fertile Samsgitia, which forms part of the government of Lithuania? To suppose the author correct, he should not have made the Russian campaign. The prince well knew that the whole of Lithuania remained at heart attached to Poland; and Mr. de Ségur himself quotes the arrival at Tilsit of a deputation from Wilna, coming to *demand independence at the hands of Napoleon, and offering the same devotion to his cause that had been shown at Warsaw.* The quarter-master of the palace having none but vague notions, it is not surprising that he should occasionally say one thing for the other. But how does it happen, that wishing to write history, he has not sought to know the truth, and especially to avoid every instant contradicting himself.

"He addressed himself to his three great officers," &c.

The author gives us here the process verbal of a sort of council of his own invention, where he makes the actors brought forward, talk in his own way. We recognize in it a cold copy of the dialogue of Sylla and Eucrates, which he employs without quoting, and which is the most piquant of this part of the work. When he makes one of his three interlocutors speak on the subject of the bad condition of the army, he attributes no answer to Napoleon, on so grave and important a point. Without doubt he thought the Emperor would have answered sufficiently by the first battle. For the rest, the reader may easily appreciate the importance which Mr. de Ségur wishes to bestow on the councils of these three personages. One of them, the Duke of Frioul, had twice travelled the route between Petersburg and Memel, as a courier. Admitting that one may know a country by riding post, the Duke of Frioul could only have known Esthonia, Ingria, and Livonia, which are not Russia, properly speaking. Another

person,* the Count de Ségur, ought to have known the Russian politics of the time of Catharine; but his knowledge, which went so far back, was inapplicable to circumstances. As for the third, (the Duke of Vicenza,) he had resided several years at St. Petersburg, and his opinion would have had far more weight, if his prejudice in favour of the Russians, had not been perfectly known to Napoleon.

The author, after attempting to establish a resemblance between the expedition of Napoleon to Russia, and that of St. Louis to Africa, adds,

"The latter (the expedition to Russia,) was indispensable to the accomplishment of a great design, on the point of being accomplished: its object was not out of reach; the means for reaching it were not inadequate."

Singular conclusion to a chapter intended to prove directly the contrary. The *great design almost accomplished,* was to constrain England to peace by the continental system. To say that *its achievement was indispensable,* that *the object was not out of reach,* and that the *means for reaching were not inadequate,* is to justify this great design under all its aspects. Notwithstanding, Mr. de Ségur did not write his book with this view.

CHAPTER III.

We have seen Napoleon at variance with his great dignitaries, his ministers, and chief officers; we shall now see, "this mysterious man, giving *to those features, so formidable to others,* the expression of *a mild and affecting benevolence*; employing *the irresistible impulse of the most frank and confiding disclosure;* affecting a *caressing voice,* exercising in short, *a magnetic influence upon the military man, and upon the minister of the old school;* finally with superficial and inexperienced individuals,

* Father of the Author.

to whom he wished neither to explain nor dissemble, he cuts matters short by saying, "you understand nothing of all this; you are ignorant of its antecedents and consequences."

We are tempted to believe, that the Quarter-master of the palace counts himself among those who assisted at this council, as these latter words cannot be better applied to any one than to the author of the campaign of 1812.

Next comes the turn of the princes of the family, of the Empress Josephine, and of Cardinal Fesch, who is keenly rated for not wishing to see a star at noon-day.

The author makes these last interlocutors speak according to his fancy, and he places words in the mouth of Napoleon, which no one ever heard, himself least of all, since he more rarely approached the Emperor. This prince, always imperturbable at the aspect of the greatest dangers, and more than ever indefatigable, he represents in this chapter, as pre-occupied with the idea of his death, and his strength declining so far that he could scarcely sustain a short *ride* in *hunting*, or *the gallop of the easiest horse.*

At the same time, the author informs us, "one great inquietude possessed Napoleon; it was the idea of that same death which he appeared so much to brave," he shows us that his mind, at once too firm and englightened, to allow such great destinies to depend upon a weakness.

At the same time that he shows him resolved upon war, "to consolidate the great empire, by confining the Russian power beyond the Boristhenes," and makes him say, "that peace was at Constantinople, that is, at the end of Europe," (mark well this charitable insinuation) he makes him appear as only entering Russia to *attack the English* during a short campaign, after which, *France could rest.*

At the same time that he indicates *his precipitation to commence this terrible war*, he states that *he only decided on it after a painful hesitation;* and when he *burst forth*, at the audience of August 1811, "this burst of indignation, which was the presage of war, was an additional proof of his repugnance to commence it—a menace which might arrest the preparations of Alexander."

The reflecting reader passes hastily over such pages, which teach him nothing, but that their author knows not to what opinion he should incline.

To finish by a striking sketch, he relates this dialogue between Napoleon and an ambassador, returned from his post, where he has not seen the preparations of Alexander, although they have met the eyes of all Europe. "You too, have become a Russian; you have been seduced by the Emperor Alexander." "Yes, sire, because I consider him in heart a Frenchman." Napoleon would have had cause to think the Duke of Vicenza a Russian, had he thought like the Emperor Alexander; but is it probable, that this ambassador would have agreed that *he had been seduced* during his stay at St. Petersburg, and that he had seen a French Emperor in the Emperor of Russia? The author who does not feel how improbable and ridiculous such a recital is, still believes himself to be writing history!

CHAPTER IV.

In a chapter of five pages, devoted to the negotiation, whose object was to conciliate the two parties, and prevent the war, the author shows us Napoleon *keeping his perplexity a secret*, without perceiving that he who deliberates, has not decided to become the aggressor. The Emperor whom he has depicted hitherto so ardent to pursue this enterprize, and who, two pages farther on, thinks of nothing but Moscow, discovers all at once, what he had not before suspected, that the state of his affairs will not permit him to make war. Reverses in Spain, misunderstandings with the Pope, interruptions produced by the Turks, troubles relative to subsistence in France, which contained nothing but "old men, women, and children, who, weeping, bowed in sadness to the earth, which, without their aid, would remain uncultivated," all this was revealed

to him during "one of these long winter nights, when his star seemed to enlighten his foresight with its most brilliant illumination." The *ruling genii of the people he had conquered, appeared to him* with menacing aspects. Troubled by this phantasmagoria, "he became thoughtful and agitated. He collected accounts of the different powers of Europe, and ordered an exact and complete summary of them to be made."

Can the genius of Napoleon, which combined so much of bravery with so much circumspection, attempted nothing which he had not thoroughly examined, and executed rapidly, because he had long and profoundly meditated on it, be perceived in the above phrases? Has the author intended to write history or a melo-drama? Napoleon keenly felt the necessity of terminating affairs in Spain. He regretted being constrained to abandon them, in order to repel a powerful enemy, which excited against him the indefatigable enmity of England. He could not have been exposed to compromit his character for such brilliant but untimely glory, as that of adding to his surnames of conquest, that of *Russian*, unless we suppose him afflicted with madness. If this be not what Mr. de Ségur wishes to prove, it is at least the moral to be drawn from his book.

He places himself by his side, as a witness of his agitation. "During those long winter nights, when individuals are left more than usually to themselves," forgetting that the nights of Napoleon were in great part consecrated to labour, and that *being alone*, he could not have spectators. However, the author has seen him "half reclined upon a sofa, starting up convulsively," and exclaiming, "who calls me?" like the Orestes of Crébrillion, or like the drunkard, from whom it is thought the tragedian has borrowed this sublime movement.

We yet see nothing of the negotiation: here it is—

"On the 25th of March, Czernichoff transmitted new proposals to his sovereign. Napoleon offered to make a declaration, that he would neither directly nor indirectly, contribute to the re-establishment of the kingdom of Poland." This declaration had been consented to, a year before, in proper form.

On the 1st of January, the Duke of Vicenza, had agreed

with M. de Romanzoff on a treaty, which was sent to Paris with the ratification of the Emperor Alexander. By the first article, France engaged *that the kingdom of Poland should not be re-established.* Many other articles were favourable to the Russian project of extension. But it was the first especially, that shocked the Emperor. "I am not fate," said he, "all that I can do is to engage not to contribute directly nor indirectly, to the re-establishment of the kingdom of Poland." The first article having been thus modified, the Emperor made no change in the others. He signed the treaty, and sent it to Petersburg. Alexander appeared hurt that Napoleon refused his pure and simple ratification to a treaty previously ratified by himself. These discussions, the augmentation of the Russian army on the frontiers of the Duchy of Warsaw, the insistance of Russia on obtaining Dantzic in exchange for Oldenburg, confirmed the suspicions of Napoleon relative to the wish of Alexander, to profit by the difficulties in Spain, to possess himself of Poland.

Negotiations were pending during a year; and Mr. de Ségur, who says the whole in a page and a half, makes the negotiation commenced on the 17th of April, to terminate in a few days. It is true, that in these few lines, he shows Napoleon always ready to treat. The Russian Emperor eluding the negotiations, and the Muscovite ambassador presenting almost at *the same moment the ultimatum*, or, in other words, his master's declaration of war. The author, who is not often embarrassed, nevertheless paints Napoleon as the aggressor. He moreover takes care to say, that not being able to make the ambassador come out of the circle of Popilius which he braces round him, Napoleon caused his minister to write to Mr. de Romanzoff, to endeavour to bring about a reconciliation by this direct communication; that he sent with the same view, Count de Narbonne to Wilna, with a letter for the Emperor Alexander; that not disgusted with the failure of his pacific efforts, he ordered Count Lauriston to present himself at the Russian head-quarters, to renew his instances and propositions; and that it was only after the fruitlessness of these multiplied attempts, that he acquired the certainty, that his enemy would not be appeas-

ed, and that from the impossibility of negotiation, war became the only means of obtaining peace. Driven, pushed to extremity by the Emperor Alexander, Napoleon at length sets out; he departs with regret, and marches in front of this struggle, which his persevering efforts could not prevent, and against an adversary, who two months before had declared war against him.

CHAPTER V.

Mr. de Ségur gives six pages of this chapter as the winding up of all the negotiations; it might have been shorter, as there is not one word in it relative to negotiations. It is filled with little fabricated anecdotes, collected for the purpose of praising several persons in whom the Emperor placed some confidence.

First comes Talleyrand, "who was to have been sent to Warsaw, but the jealousy of a rival, and an intrigue, again involved him in disgrace. Napoleon deluded by a calumny, adroitly circulated, believed that he had been betrayed by him. His anger was extreme; its expression terrible. Savary [the sole protector of Talleyrand] made vain efforts to undeceive him."

The author does all he can to guess at this jealous and intriguing competitor; who was the Duke of Bassano. The anecdote is about as true as the imputation made against the character of that minister. Napoleon in fact, had an idea of sending Talleyrand on an embassy, to effect the revolution of Poland. He hesitated; and it was still a secret when he learned by private advices from Vienna, that this secret was known. *He did not believe that he had been betrayed; his anger was not extreme, nor its expression terrible;* it was not worth the trouble. He renounced his project, and that was the end of it. A letter written by Talleyrand sometime after, was sent to Wil-

na, and Napoleon did not *force*, (as the author says) "his secretary to send that letter to the very minister who stood most in dread of Talleyrand's influence." What need was there that the Secretary of Napoleon should be *forced* to send a letter on political affairs to the minister, whose department was politics, because this minister dreaded the influence of Talleyrand, who for several years had been without influence. History is well employed in making such stuff.

The following is similar, and relates to the same minister: He was heard to repeat, "that the Emperor was not sufficiently great; that it was necessary for him to become greater still, in order to be able to stop." Who heard him? Was it Mr. de Ségur? The Duke of Bassano may have often treated him with kindness; but no one thinks that he would have mentioned to him his political ideas. It is possible that ministers have been known to approve the plans of the Emperor in public, and blame them in private, since events have pronounced against them. They have also been known to oppose projected resolutions, courageously, but solely in presence of Napoleon, and to interdict themselves from all censure, as soon as it was decided that they were to become *decrees of the sovereign*. These latter doubly performed their duty. But perhaps they are not vaunted, and we can conceive that Mr. de Ségur, who had no connexion with ministers, except when invited to dance or dine with them, did not share deeply in ministerial secrets.

He knows, however, he says, that one minister *was silent;* that if another *flattered* the Emperor, *there were some who did not withhold the truth;* one by *sighing*, another by *turning pale*, and a third by *reddening with anger;* that the ministers and aids of Napoleon, "were often seen to end their altercations, by abruptly retiring and shutting the door after them with violence."

Could the Quarter-master of the Palace, (who perhaps sometimes saw the outer door of the Cabinet from afar off,) have seen these fine things, since no one else has seen them? Mr. de Ségur, who stops at nothing, joins to this list of opposers, generals Rapp and Lauriston. There is but one difficul-

ty—the one was at Dantzic, and the other at St. Petersburg. For the rest, all the world knows that the ministers and aids of Napoleon, were persons of too good breeding, and Napoleon too well acquainted with what was due him, to allow of such pranks. One might believe, that the author had never approached neither Napoleon, nor his ministers, nor his aids-de-camp.

"He gives these details, because they are either unknown or imperfectly known; because Napoleon in his closet, was quite different from the Emperor in public; and because this part of the palace has hitherto remained secret."

If it has remained secret, how came it to the knowledge of Mr. de Ségur, who, Adjutant, or Quarter-master of the palace, has never, by any title, entered the interior? The idea which the author wishes to give of this court, is new, and will entirely derange the idea which has been formed of it in Europe.

"In that new and serious court, little was said." In that new and serious court, the Emperor was always addressed with respect, and confidence was not reposed in such as by the nature of their offices were strangers to it.

"All was rigorously classed, so that one saloon knew not what passed in the other." How then could Mr. de Ségur know, what was not known in the saloon of service?

"It is difficult to comprehend the great events of history, without a perfect knowledge of the characters and manners of the principal personages." By this reflection the author passes judgment on the picture he has delineated; but he is persuaded of its fidelity: let us felicitate posterity on having this assurance of it.

"Meanwhile, a famine was announced in France. Napoleon was compelled to suspend his departure—that war, in which the loss of every hour was irreparable, was delayed for two months." The author states in the following phrase, that these hours were not lost, since "the delay gave the new harvests of the Russians time to grow," but no matter. Mr. de Ségur will tell us in the first chapter of the following book, that Napoleon, immediately after having received the ultima-

tum of the Russian Ambassador, quitted Paris on the 9th of May. In fact, this delay of two months, no more existed, than its alleged cause. From the 18th of August, 1811, in the midst of the festivals of that day, Napoleon was warned that the appearances of the harvest were unfavourable, and had unexpectedly united and formed with many of his counsellors, which the solemnities of the occasion had brought to St. Cloud, a council, in which the subsistence of France was the first object. The same day he determined on precautionary measures, the successive developement of which, procured abundant resources to France, against the foreseen calamity. These measures were such, that at the end of the same year, all the assistant supplies for France were assured, in such a manner, that before quitting Paris, their execution was complete. It cost France but twelve millions, and the scourge was stayed. This fact was possibly worthy of history; but it did honour to the government of Napoleon!!!

If the author really believed that Napoleon ought to have left Paris sooner, he might, instead of supposing an imaginary cause of delay, found a very plausible one in the utility of allowing Austria and Russia time to prepare themselves for the execution of the treaties signed in March, in the necessity of allowing the troops which were on the Oder, time to arrive on the Niemen; in short, in order not to neglect the last hopes of reconciliation. While the answer to Prince Kourakin was deferred, because it could not have been done, but by accepting the war, the minister of foreign relations, treated directly by letter, with Count de Romanzoff. His answer was waited for; it was anticipated that he would disavow the hostile injunctions of Kourakin.

However this may be, Mr. de Ségur decides on allowing Napoleon to leave Paris; but it is only to seek a battle.

"Such were his anticipations.—Such was Napoleon. The founders of empires press forward to their object, like fate, whose ministers they seem, and whose march, neither wars nor earthquakes, nor all the scourges which Providence permits, ever arrest, without deigning to make the utility of their purposes comprehensible to their victims." To this trite re-

flection, which pretends to be philosophical, and which by its nature rather belongs to a sermon than a historical work, we content ourselves by replying, that the *founders of empires, the scourges, and earthquakes* of which M. the Quarter-master speaks of, have not been unprofitable to him nor his family.

BOOK III.—CHAPTER I.

The departments of France which Napoleon traversed intoxicated him with testimonies of confidence and devotion; but *in Germany* he *found less affection*, says Mr. de Ségur. No one will accuse this reflection of being deficient in innocence.

The Congress of Dresden, for which a historian worthy of the name, should have sought high and serious motives, had but one object for Napoleon, according to the Quarter-master, *of showing* and *enjoying his power*. But farther on he is of another opinion, when he makes the Emperor say to General Dessolle, that *the congress of Dresden*, not having determined Alexander to peace, nothing more was to be expected but war. Powerful considerations had then produced this congress at Dresden. A man as well informed as Mr. de Ségur, might have given us on this great circumstance in the life of the Emperor, something less puerile: especially as Mr. de Ségur is an universal man; at Paris, he penetrates into the councils; he judges affairs and men; at *Dresden* he *sees* all things; he assists at the congress of Sovereigns, at their banquets, at their most intimate conversations; he enters into the recesses of their hearts; he there seizes upon their humiliation, resentment and hatred. Even the secrets of empresses do not escape him: one is jealous of the *head-dress* of her daughter-in-law, the other *weeps* if Napoleon asks her to retrench something of her dress, to avoid humiliating her mother-in-law.

Thus the Quarter-master places himself as third person between the Emperor and his consort.

"Meantime, during the early days of meeting, surprise was expressed at the absence of the king of Prussia from the Imperial Court; but it was soon understood, that he was prohibited from coming. This prince was the more alarmed in proportion, as he had less deserved such treatment. His presence would have been embarrassing. Nevertheless, encouraged by Narbonne, he resolved on making his appearance. His arrival was announced to the Emperor; the latter grew angry, and at first refused to see him." What did that prince want of him? Wherefore did he persecute him with his presence? What need had he of him? But Duroc insisted; he reminded Napoleon of the want he would experience of Prussia, in a war with Russia, and the doors of the Emperor were opened to the monarch."

The author, according to his custom of forgetting nothing, quotes the very words and names the spectators. The latter will not contradict him, since they are dead; but we have no need of them; there are facts sufficient to prove, that in all his fine pages on the subject, there is not a word of truth.

Napoleon was expected at Berlin: the palace he was to occupy was prepared. He relinquished his intention; but with a view of satisfying the King of Prussia, he carefully informed him of the motives which had changed his plans, and invited him to join at Dresden, the illustrious guests of the King of Saxony. A person belonging to the minister of foreign relations, Mr. Benoit, was sent to Berlin with a letter of the Duke of Bassano to the king, and despatches for M. de Hardenberg and M. de St. Marson. These letters were received with attention. The king hastened to accept of the invitation; he set out for Dresden, and the reception he met with on his arrival, was such as it ought to have been, after such antecedents. In the emotions he experienced at the time, he offered his son to accompany Napoleon as his Aid, presented him to the Aids-de-camp of the Emperor, and demanded their friendship for this illustrious companion in arms.

What then becomes of the intervention of the Count de Narbonne, and the *resistance* of the *irritated* Emperor? What becomes of the persistance of Duroc, who lectured his master, and of the charitable insinuation that the king of Prussia was *the more alarmed in proportion, as he had less deserved such treatment?*

CHAPTER II.

In this chapter, Mr. de Ségur appears to have for object, the representation of the army as a horde of pillagers. He even goes so far as to say, that *some of the leaders set the example*, and were *emulous in doing evil.* The author depicts Napoleon as always threatening, but in vain, and not knowing how to make himself obeyed. He pretends that the Emperor, "might reproach himself as the cause of the irregularities which irritated him." What does Mr. de Ségur mean by that? Does he mean that the Emperor excited them, or neglected the means of preventing them? No, because he says, that Napoleon *desired order;* that he keenly reproached a strange prince, a king's son, for the disorders committed by his troops; that "immense quantities of provisions, adequate to the immensity of the undertaking, were there accumulated. No detail had been neglected. The active and impassioned genius of Napoleon, was then entirely directed towards that most important and difficult department of this expedition. In that he was profuse of exhortations, orders, and even money—that his days were occupied in dictating instructions on this subject; at night he frequently rose to repeat them."

It was not enough to represent the army as disorganized, before commencing the campaign, but the marshals must be shown quarreling together. He supposes an extremely sharp altercation between Davoust and Berthier, whose enmity he dates from many years back. "In 1809," says he, "Berthier was

his superior, for some days, during which, Davoust gained a battle, and saved the army by disobeying him. Hence arose a terrible hatred." The author again grossly deceives himself about facts known to all the world. In 1809, the Emperor joined the army in the night of the 16th and 17th of April. The Austrians had passed the Inn and were marching on the Iser. There were no battles, solely some skirmishes had occurred between the Austrian and Bavarian troops. Napoleon did not approve of the arrangements Berthier had previously made; and he hastened to send orders to the different corps of the army. The execution of these orders produced the affair of Phaffenhoffen, and the battle of Tanse on the 19th; that of Abensberg on the 20th, the fight of Landshut on the 21st, and the battle of Eckmülh on the 22d. It may be said of Napoleon, that the battle of Abensberg, the manœuvre of Landshut and the battle of Eckmülh were the boldest, most skilful and most beautiful of his operations. How then could the author assert that Davoust *gained a battle and saved the army, by disobeying Berthier*, since as we have stated, no battle occurred before the arrival of the Emperor, and those which happened afterwards were fought by his orders, and under his immediate command? Yet he makes Davoust accuse Berthier of treason in order to bring forward this incredible exclamation.

"It sometimes happens, that I entertain doubts of the fidelity of my oldest companions in arms; but at such times my head turns round with chagrin, and I do my utmost to banish so heart-rending a suspicion." It requires a head organized like that of Mr. de Ségur, to conceive such thoughts. We plainly see that he has written his book since 1814.

Here is something still stronger. The army of Davoust was completely provided with every thing. "He had anticipated every want, all means of supplying them were ready," and the author adds, "such great exertions ought to have pleased; they, however, displeased." How are we to characterize such a reflection? What! Could Napoleon be displeased by the execution of his orders?

"This marshal, it was said, wishes to have it thought that he has foreseen, arranged and executed every thing. Is the

Emperor then, no more than a spectator of this expedition? Will the glory of it devolve on Davoust?" Who does not expect to hear Napoleon check any one who should have held such a language to him? But it is not so. The gentle Emperor, as if illuminated by a flash of light, ingenuously exclaims, "in fact, one would think it was he that commanded the army."

Enough of this; all his gossip is absurd. Napoleon acknowledged with much satisfaction, the skill with which Davoust conducted his troops, and anticipated their wants; he pointed out the administrative talent of this general, as a model, and those who have really approached the Emperor, have often heard him dwell with complaisance on such commendations of him. It was the peculiar merit of Davoust; no one has ever contested it; and it would have been singular, had Napoleon, to whom it was so advantageous, ever shown any discontent in relation thereto.

CHAPTER III.

This chapter begins with a true picture, which relieves the reader's mind, after being fatigued by the painful sentiments which take possession of him, from the commencement of the work. These pages make us regret that Mr. de Ségur has not written his whole book in the same tone of truth; but he soon hastens to quit this frank and unaffected course, to re-enter the tortuous route of conjecture and digression.

The account he gives of the forces of the army, is very inexact. Official documents in our possession, charged with notes in Napoleon's own hand, show, that at the passage of the Niemen, the army contained 325,900 men under arms, of which, 155,400 were Frenchmen, and 170,500 allies; &c.

Mr. de Ségur swells the number of troops entering Russia,

at the beginning of the campaign, to 445,200 men. His account is still higher than that procured by Czernicheff for the Russian staff, by bribing a writer in the war office, who lost his life by his treason. This account amounted but to 414,600 men. However, if we suppose that this last statement is that of the complete corps, and then calculate the necessary losses these corps must have suffered in their march to the Russian frontier, we shall discover how much exaggerated the statement given by Mr. de Ségur is.

In his chemical and metaphysical analysis of the sentiments which animated the army, we vainly seek for the two most natural sentiments in the bosoms of French soldiers, honour and love of country, whose names are not so much as mentioned. Is it an omission? Or is the author sufficiently unfortunate, not to have felt their power? He speaks of none but frivolous and pitiful motives. "To this must be added," says he, "the expectation of plunder; for the exacting ambition of Napoleon had as often disgusted his soldiers, as the disorders of the latter tarnished his glory; a compromise was necessary; ever since 1805 there was a sort of mutual understanding; on his part to wink at their plunder, or their's to suffer his ambition."

How could the pen of a French soldier trace this *hope of plunder!* and of what odious transaction does it give an idea!! On reading such lines, what need is there of repeating that French veterans repel with indignation, the dedication of a book in which the author has so horribly outraged them. Our rankest enemies have never brought forward an accusation so disgraceful to the French name. It was reserved for M. the quarter-master of the palace, to take on himself the responsibility.

Have we not remarked with what solicitude the Emperor strove to correct the disorders in the army? Eager to ascertain the truth, he questioned the inhabitants and the officers. No one came to him from a division or corps of the army, or from the route the troops had passed over, without being questioned as to what happened in the rear. As soon as the truth was known, his resolution was taken; he formed flying columns.

He wrote to the generals, and to the commandants placed on the route of the army; he menaced them with punishment in case these disorders were not immediately checked. He incessantly repeated that pillage dishonoured the troops and destroyed the resources of the disciplined soldier. If we were to state any period in which his solicitude was especially remarkable, it was that which our author assigns to the shameful transaction with which he endeavours to tarnish the glory of the Emperor and soldiers of France. Mr. de Ségur was ignorant of all this, because Mr. de Ségur was not in a situation to see any thing. His subaltern situation confined his little observations to too narrow a circle. But how comes it that he is ignorant of the terrible orders of the day at St. Poeltens in 1805, &c. &c.? Why is he ignorant that among other examples, that at Berlin in 1806, the Emperor condemned a grenadier of the guard, convicted of plundering, to be shot; and at Madrid in 1808, two voltigueurs of the same guard suffered for the same crime?

How can we reconcile these odious imputations with what the author subsequently says in this striking disavowal. "We loved him as the companion of our labours; as the chief who had conducted us to renown. The astonishment and admiration he inspired, flattered our self-love.—Period of intoxication and prosperity, during which the French soldier, lord of all things by victory, considered himself greater than the nobleman, or even the sovereign himself, whose lands he traversed. To him it appeared as if the kings of Europe only reigned by permission of his chief and of his arms."

BOOK IV.—CHAPTER I.

"Napoleon satisfied with his preparations, at length declared himself?"

Thus begins the chapter. The author forgets that in the preceding pages he has shown us the Emperor "incessantly

irritated and discontented." Of what then was he satisfied, since all his efforts to obtain peace were unavailing, and he was obliged to appeal to arms? Does Mr. de Ségur wish to insinuate that when Napoleon so ardently desired to preserve peace, that it was in the hope of obtaining war? If he desired to write history impartially, he would not have passed by in silence an important fact known to all Europe. It is that the return of Mr. Prevost, the Secretary of Legation, who arrived on the 19th of June, at Gumbinen, alone informed the Emperor that the order given to General Lauriston, to go to the Emperor Alexander, was ineffectual, as passports were refused to him, and thus the last hope of preserving peace was destroyed. It was not until three days after that the Emperor made his proclamation to the army.

"At Tilsit Russia swore eternal alliance with France, and war with England. She now violates her oaths. She will give no explanation of her capricious conduct, until the French eagles have repassed the Rhine; by that means leaving our allies at her mercy."

Here are the true motives of the war frankly exposed. The author does not speak of the proclamation of the Emperor Alexander, except to give it the superiority over that of Napoleon; he finds it to be *simple* and *moderate*. Simple! and the Emperor Alexander made a political, religious, and fanatical war. Moderate! yes, but why was it so? Because this prince was alarmed at the false position in which he had placed himself.

From the year 1810, all his actions had for object the invasion of the Duchy of Warsaw. The arrival of the Russian division from Moldavia on the frontiers of Poland; the extraordinary recruiting carried on throughout the whole Russian empire, at a period when, with the exception of the garrisons in the Prussian fortresses, there was throughout all Germany no French army, but a weak one at Hamburg, and the private intrigues with the cabinet of Berlin had sufficiently disclosed his plans. If these could have been doubted, the disposition of the Russian armies, placed on the borders of Prussia and Po-

land; the immense magazines collected at Wilna, Minsk, &c. would have convinced the most incredulous.

In reality, if Alexander had wished to remain simply on the defensive, he would not have stationed his troops at a distance of sixty leagues from his frontiers, nor established on the first line such enormous magazines. Surprised by the skilful manœuvres of the Emperor, and by the rapidity of his marches, he saw his centre driven in, and the fate of his left wing jeoparded. We may add, that at the same time he made his proclamation, he sent his minister of police, Balachoff, to the head-quarters of Napoleon to arrest the march of the French army by feigned negotiations. Such were the causes of the moderate tone of the Emperor Alexander's proclamation.

CHAPTER II.

We now come to the passage of the Niemen.—"Napoleon, (says our author,) who had travelled in a carriage till that time, now mounted his horse." Does Mr. de Ségur wish to have it believed that Napoleon disdained to participate in the fatigues of a soldier, and therefore made war at his ease in a carriage? Those who have known him, are well aware, that when any important object did not demand his attention on a march, he sought in the carriage that repose which his multifarious occupations prevented him from obtaining. But most frequently he was engaged in business while in the carriage.

"Napoleon reconnoitred the Russian river, (the Niemen,) without disguising himself as has been falsely asserted." Since Mr. de Ségur attaches so much importance to appearing particularly acquainted with a very trifling circumstance, he should have informed himself better. It would have been correct to say, that on the 23d of June, the Emperor clothed himself with a cloak and fatigue cap of a Polish light-horseman, belonging to a squadron serving in his guard, to reconnoitre

the Niemen. Napoleon did not cross this river under *cover of the night*, because he could not have chosen his point of passage in the dark; finally, because in June daylight begins in that country at two o'clock in the morning. How then can Mr. de Ségur assert that Napoleon, during the reconnoitre crossed this boundary, when it was only at ten o'clock at night of the 23d, that the army commenced its passage? Would he have allowed himself such a license unless for the sake of bringing forward the following remark: "that five months afterwards he was only able to repass under cover of the same obscurity," which is as incorrect in fact, as it is malicious in intention.

One might believe, from our author's description of the passage of this river, and of the night during which it was effected, that no one had ever before slept in a bivouac. What singular ideas would soldiers form of him while reading his jeremiades on passing a beautiful summer night under canopy of the stars! Happily the French troops were not so much demoralized by that night's bivouac as was Mr. de Ségur. Their courage was not chilled, since "so great was their ardour, that two divisions of the advanced guard in disputing for the honour of being the first to pass, were near coming to blows."

Further on, he stations Napoleon at the end of a bridge he had passed *without hesitation, to encourage the soldiers by his looks*. These are the same soldiers who were near coming to blows, as he informed us, for the honour of crossing first.

"They appeared indeed more animated than he; whether it was that he felt oppressed by the weight of so great an aggression, or that his enfeebled frame could not support the effect of the excessive heat, or that he was already astonished to find nothing to conquer."

Mr. de Ségur is not aware, that when an army attempts to pass a river by surprise, that it manœuvres in such a manner, as not to have an enemy to encounter. When this has succeeded, how can there be any *astonishment that nothing is found to conquer?* The only obstacle to conquer was the river; and this was conquered.

Mr. de Ségur, however, is not. He has more than one re-

serve prepared; "the enfeebled frame of Napoleon could not sustain the effect of the excessive heat." Thus, the general, who had so often braved the climate of Italy in the dog-days, who, amid the sands of the desert, had supported the ardours of a Syrian sun, could not, on the 24th of June, on the banks of the Niemen, resist the heat of the north of Europe. The reader may be tempted to believe, that it is another Napoleon who is meant. In fact, the portrait traced by Mr. de Ségur, throughout his work, no more resembles the general of the army of Italy, than him, who in the following year conquered at Lutzen, at Champaubert and Montmirail.

Our author agrees, that what he says is not probable, but is not at all embarrassed by this. It is no longer the heat nor the astonishment at not finding the enemy, which depresses Napoleon, but a moral cause: *he feels this great aggression weighing upon his heart.* The phrase is not French—the sentiment still less so. Mr. de Ségur forgets that in his preceding chapters he has shown the prince Kourakin *dictating an ultimatum*, which left no alternative but war; he forgets that the Russian army was formed long before the French army, and that the Emperor Alexander was *at the head-quarters of this grand army*, even before Napoleon had quitted Paris to go to Dresden; he forgets these circumstances, detailed by himself, and which are all connected with the refusal of keeping peace. By the conjunction *although*, and by his multiplied alternatives, *however*, figures which he is particularly fond of, he offers nothing but riddles to the reader. But unfortunately, among all the words he gives, he never makes known the true.

"He suddenly dashed into the country, and penetrated the forest which girts the sides of the river. He set spurs to his horse; he appeared on fire to come into contact with the enemy alone."

How dares a writer, who holds a military title, travesty by an extravagance worthy of Don Quixotte, the obvious action of a general in chief, who reconnoitres the ground on which he is to act? The Emperor did not, as Mr. de Ségur represents him, madly ride alone through the woods. He himself headed a strong reconnoitering party of cavalry, and sent others in

several directions to obtain intelligence of the enemy. But M. the Quarter-master, knew nothing of this; it is probable he remained near the tents where his business called him.

In general, this chapter is a morsel for effect, on which the author appears to have counted much. It contains matter for a melo-drama. First, we have the emperor lying in his tent, *extended in exhaustion, with a stagnant air in the midst of an oppressive heat*; then comes the night; some sappers cross to the other bank; they find *a single Cossack, who demands who they are*—Frenchmen, answer they. *What do you want?* says this officer, and *why do you come into Russia?* A sapper briskly replies to him, *to make war on you!* to *take Wilna*, to *liberate Poland*. At these words *the Cossack disappears in the woods; three musket shots are heard; it is the signal that the grand invasion was commenced.* The French columns defile. "The genius of conquest inflames their imaginations." We see Napoleon hasten to place his *feet on the Russian territory, and unhesitatingly make the first step towards his ruin.* To the genius of conquests, succeeds that of tempests. Our author does not forget the omens. *The horse of Napoleon stumbles—the day grows murky, the wind rises, and a storm comes on as great as the enterprise!* The army is unwilling to acknowledge the *reprobation* of so great an aggression. The bridge over the Vilia is broken down.—Napoleon becomes *angry at it*—it is Xerxes, whipping the Hellespont with rods; "he affects to despise it like every thing which opposes him, and orders a squadron of Polish cavalry to throw themselves into the river." This conclusion makes odium succeed ridicule. The author casts on the memory of the Emperor, the accusation of having sacrificed the lives of so many brave men to a senseless anger: the following is the truth.

Napoleon arriving on the Vilia, found the bridge destroyed. Wishing to have news of the enemy, he ordered a squadron of Polish light horse of the guard* to pass the river like the Cos-

* It was the first squadron, commanded by the chief Kotzietolski, and composed of the first company, Captain Zaluski, and the fifth company, Captain Szceptycki. General Krasinski who commanded the regiment, threw himself into the water to save one of his soldiers.

sacs, by swimming. Some of them, not so good horsemen as the rest, separated from the squadron; a light horse lancer of the first company, named Trzcinski, was the only one who perished. An officer of the same squadron, Count Joseph Zaluski, then Captain, at present aid to the king of Poland, having abandoned his horse and was near being drowned: he was saved by the sappers and soldiers of the light infantry. What are to become of Mr. de Segur's lamentations? What becomes of the *exultions of horror and admiration* with which he supplies the army?

It is the same with *the storm great as the enterprise*: it must be reduced to a simple gust. What led our historian into error, is, that he had read in Labaume, that a storm broke out at the moment when the corps of the Viceroy passed the Niemen, on the 29th of June. He has applied it to the passage of the Niemen, by the Emperor at Kowno, on the 24th, without troubling himself with the five days which occurred between the two operations. But Mr. de Ségur does not look so closely. Moreover, by brewing this storm at the very passage of the Emperor, he gives his story a much more dramatic air, and takes occasion to group around this pretended phenomenon, those mystic reflections, which so well agree with the character of his mind. It was only after the great torrents of rain mentioned by Labaume, that so large a number of horses perished, in consequence of the sudden coldness of the air.

Such is the description of the passage of the Niemen, written, as the phrase is, in the *romantic* style, since it is filled with descriptions and little details, related in sounding words. For ourselves, we qualify it as *romanesque*; thus should a history be called, where the scarcest ingredient is truth.

CHAPTER III.

The author next transports us to Wilna, which he represents as in a delirium of joy; but he is careful to warn us that "this enthusiasm, unreflecting in some, and the mere effect of excitement in others, was but of short duration: this unreflecting enthusiasm, is presented in the same page as the effect of a *still living patriotism;* thus a patriotism, which has lived for a long time, is not an unreflecting patriotism. This patriotism was *excited*, according to our author, and notwithstanding, he says it was manifested by an universal effusion. But an *excited* sentiment cannot be any thing but factitious. Mr. de Ségur should inform us how it was produced. Had the police of Paris then preceded the advanced guard, to prepare applauses for the army when it entered Wilna?

The Emperor there received an address from the Diet of Warsaw, to which he replied. Mr. de Ségur hastens to accuse him of having chilled by his answer, the zeal of the Poles, "they were unable to comprehend the cause of the circumspection of his reply. They began to doubt the intentions of Napoleon; even some of those around him asked what could be the motives of a prudence which appeared so unreasonable."

If, by the persons who were around him, we are to understand the Quarter-masters of his palace, and some officers, who saw nothing in this campaign but a privation of the pleasures of Paris, it is of little importance in history, to know what was asked by those *around* this prince. These gentlemen were very far from having the importance which they take upon themselves at present, and it is not according to their judgments the Emperor is to be judged.

Does any one wish to know why Napoleon did not say "the kingdom of Poland exists," as the deputies of the Polish confederation requested of him? They are the following: the

Emperor had many interests to conciliate, and duties to discharge. His first duty was to procure peace, and his first interest to enter into no engagements, but such as should be subordinate to the interests of France. *If he, whose every word was a decree,* had said, "the kingdom of Poland exists," he would not have laid down his arms until it actually existed. If this *kingdom owed* its existence to the unanimous efforts of a *population which covers countries so distant and extensive,* nothing could have imposed on him the obligation not to acknowledge, still less to destroy it. It was a different thing to be bound by circumstances, or his free will. He had not bound Austria to *the cession of a part of Gallicia, except in case by the event of a war, the kingdom of Poland should be re-established,* (terms of the treaty of alliance.) What are we to understand by *event of a war?* It was peace, which by terminating, would have liberated Poland. This could not be, since the war was scarcely commenced, the insurrection, which at the single sentence, *Poland exists,* would have burst forth in Austrian Gallicia, a province containing as many hearts devoted to their country, as those where the sentiments of independence is the most enthusiastic. Austria knew and feared it.

Was Napoleon, at Wilna, in a position to say the solemn words which would have justified the fears of this power, and to withhold those alone which could have satisfied her? Are his duties, his interests, and conduct, sufficiently explained? These are not conjectures, nor the rumours about head-quarters, but the substance of instructions then given to Count Otto. In the campaign of 1806, against Prussia, when Russian Poland only was in question, Napoleon maintained the same reserve, because then, as at all times, peace was the object of his wars.

Mr. de Ségur, after having laid before us the politics of the guard-room, depicts the *coldness of Lithuania,* to which was *attributed even the expressions of her patriotism,* and whence resulted, both to Napoleon and her, "a false position, wherein every operation terminated in errors, contradictions, and half-way measures."

To complete the whole, he adds, that Napoleon suffered a

provisional government to be formed, "the choice of which was unlucky in some points; it displeased the pride of an aristocracy, at all times difficult to gratify." It is unfortunate for the historian that none of this is true. The Lithuanian government, composed of seven members, counted six chosen from their highest nobility; Count Soltan, Prince Alexander Sapieha, Count Potocki, Count Sierakowski, Count Prozor, and Count Tysenhaus. The seventh, Mr. Sniadecki, had been designated as representing the celebrated University of Wilna, of which he was president. The election of these persons was unanimously approved.

"Napoleon counted on four millions of Lithuanians, of whom only a few thousands joined him." The whole population joined him and served in his cause.

"A guard of honour had been decreed to him, (says Mr. de Ségur) three horsemen alone followed him." After Napoleon had quitted Wilna more than a month, the Prince Sapieha proposed to him a guard of honour, of which he sent him the list, and the Emperor, little disposed to receive it, had only accepted of fifty persons. It was found to be much more considerable, and by order of Napoleon became the nucleus of the second regiment of Polish light horse of the guards, the command of which was given to the brave General Konopka. Mr. de Ségur never saw them; he was never informed of their fate, for he would without doubt have informed us, that several hundred young men, belonging to the most distinguished families of Lithuania, were surprised by a division of cavalry commanded by General Czaplitz, Aid-de-camp to the Emperor Alexander, and fell into the hands of the enemy at Slonim.

This event should not have escaped the historian, who takes note of three horsemen, according to the Quarter-master, who were three Polish gentlemen whom the Prince of Neufchatel had attached to the staff as interpreters. There are few pages in this history without some such blunders.

We say nothing of the great debate between the Polish generals accompanying the Emperor, and some officers in his service. The imagination of our author has, according to his system, only arranged these conversations, to show the cool-

ness of the Lithuanians. The devotion, the sacrifices, and misfortunes of that noble country might have inspired him with more elevated ideas.

"That victory was postponed by the flight of the enemy. The Emperor might have waited for his convoys—but he did not wish to forego his grasp. He therefore pushed forward 400,000 men [he emphatically adds, for fear that we should not praise such activity] in a country which was incapable of feeding the 20,000 Swedes of Charles XII."

The plan of the Emperor completely succeeded. From the opening of the campaign he had cut off the left wing commanded by Prince Bagration, the corps of Doctoroff, as well as the Russian division Dorokow,* from the centre of the army, which was obliged to fly near the Duna, upon his camp at Drissa, abandoning the immense magazines collected in Lithuania and Samogitia, leaving us master of these provinces.

Having arrived at Wilna, the Emperor did not *push* forward 400,000 men upon the track of the enemy. He manœuvred the first and fourth corps to prevent the separated corps of the Russian army from reuniting on the Duna, at the same time that with the principal corps, he marched against Barclay de Tolly. We might have expected from these operations the destruction of Bagration, who, fronted by marshal Davoust, having the Viceroy on his flank, and pushed by the King of Westphalia at the head of more than sixty thousand men, could not have passed the Dneiper without giving battle to forces, which by their superiority would have crushed him.

* This division, forming the advanced guard of Count Schouwalof, was stationed at Orany, which the disorder at head-quarters, after the movement of the Emperor, caused to be forgotten. It was forced to follow the movement of Bagration upon Smolensk. The corps of Doctoroff alone, gained the camp at Drissa, by abandoning its baggage and a great number of carriages.

CHAPTER IV.

Mr. de Ségur gives himself ample scope in this chapter; he enumerates the pillages, burnings, disorders, and miseries which he says, signalized the march of the army. We shall make but one remark, that during the wars of the fine times of Louis XIV. of those of Marshal Saxe, or Marshal Broglio; in the brilliant campaigns of Marengo, Austerlitz, Jena, and Wagram, if a writer had amused himself with minutely describing what passed in the rear of the army, he would have made pictures similar to those of Mr. de Ségur, and caused the same emotions in the drawing-rooms of Paris, as have been excited by our author. This *historian* delights much in scenes of disorder and pillages; he has really a vocation as *painter of disasters*. Here follows a specimen of his style, which without doubt will not open for him the doors of the academy. To avoid fatiguing the reader, we shall only extract from a single page.

"A position of so much excess, engendered fresh excesses. These rude men, with arms in their hands, assaulted by so many events, could scarcely remain moderate."

"They took their revenge of the proprietors by destroying their property."

"There were some who actually destroyed themselves rather than proceed to such extremities."

"Many became callous, one excess led to another, as people often grow angry with the blows which they inflict."

"In the midst of so inauspicious an aspect of nature they became denaturalized."

"They imagined that their sufferings authorised them in making others suffer."

Faithful to his habit of self-contradiction, Mr. de Ségur tells us some lines farther on, "in other respects, these disorders were very rare in Lithuania."

Soon after, he pretends that a marshal tells the Emperor

that several soldiers of the young guard were dead of hunger. He makes Napoleon suddenly interrupt this report, and exclaim, (because the Emperor always *exclaims*, never *speaks*, in Mr. de Ségur's book,) "It is impossible, where are their twenty days provisions? Soldiers well commanded never die of hunger."

This answer was very just. But the palace officer attributes it to the *desire of escaping pain by incredulity*.

Next we have as usual, the fictitious gossip of head-quarters. Those to whom the marshal returned from Spain went to make his complaints, and who without doubt had a mission to explain them, ought indeed to have been named. It is doubted whether they would ratify the words the author places in their mouths. As to the conversations, made up long after, in which it is stated, "that the health of their leader was impaired—that he could not survey the difficulties without contempt—in order to preserve the energy requisite to surmount them—that already disturbed and fatigued by the new and critical situation into which he had thrown himself—he marched, always pushing forward, in order to put an end to it as soon as possible"—are only remarkable as displaying the incoherence of ideas natural to a writer who does not know what he wishes to say.

He terminates the chapter by saying, that the dispositions of Napoleon "were dictated by the most clear sighted prudence; but that he had suffered himself to be carried away by habit—by the necessity of short wars, rapid victories, and sudden peace." This reflection is wrongly founded. When a serious question was presented to the mind of Napoleon, he examined it on all sides with that great perspicacity, which is the eagle glance of genius; and when he perceived its advantages, his decision was as quick as lightning. It was this promptitude in execution which led superficial observers to believe, that he allowed his passions to run riot, and trusted too much to chance.

CHAPTER V.

The Russians were retreating in every direction. Soon after Mr. de Balachoff presented himself at Wilna, with a message from the Emperor Alexander; "however, (adds de Ségur) there were no fresh overtures, either verbal or written, presented by Balachoff. Napoleon did not hesitate; he would not stop at Paris, how could he retreat at Wilna?"

The author appears not to know that Mr. de Balachoff came to propose to Napoleon an armistice, and to negotiate a peace, on condition that the French army should repass the Niemen. The Emperor did *not hesitate*, and ought not to have hesitated, to reject these propositions. Nevertheless, his great desire for peace made him reply, that he would voluntarily negotiate without concluding an armistice, and by preserving the country which each occupied. Would the Quarter-master have wished Napoleon to repass the Niemen with all his troops, abandoning all the advantages which his successful plan of the campaign had procured him, and thus have given to the Russians time to reach their entrenched camp at Drissa? Such, indeed, would have been the result of the acceptation of the propositions brought by Balachoff.

Our author has seen in the mission of Balachoff what no one *has discovered* except himself, "that Alexander never would address or even answer Napoleon any more." Mr. de Ségur seems to have but one object; that of presenting our enemies always under the most favourable aspect, and casting on us the reproach of aggression. The injurious expressions he attributes to the Emperor, speaking to Mr. de Balachoff on the subject of Alexander and his generals, refute themselves.

"Then, pointing out Caulaincourt to the Russian minister, 'there,' said he, 'is a faithful knight of your Emperor; he is a Russian in the French camp.'" Then follows a long quarrel between Caulaincourt and Napoleon. The recital cannot be otherwise than inexact, since it is not in character, and be-

cause no one about the Emperor could permit himself to be wanting in the respect due to him. Moreover, how are we to explain this pretended anger of the Duke of Vicenza, because the Emperor had called him *a Russian*, when Mr. de Ségur says, in the third chapter of his second book, that this Duke answered Napoleon *firmly*, (who accused him of having become a Russian, and having been seduced by the Emperor Alexander) *Yes, Sire, because I believed him a Frenchman at heart.* It appears that the Duke of Vicenza would not have refused a title at Wilna in which he had gloried at Paris.

After a superficial sketch of the march of the King of Naples towards the Duna, and that of our right against Doctoroff and Bagration, Mr. de Ségur thus expresses himself: "several persons have pretended that there was too much circumspection, or too much negligence, in the first operations of the invasion." Thus, the author accuses Napoleon of tardiness; forgetting that until now he has accused him of precipitation.

Like those who, to give more weight to their assertions, imagine details and circumstances, Mr. de Ségur, in order to convince his reader that he has studied the Emperor minutely, physically as well as morally, describes him at Wilna as "lying down to inspect his maps, which he was obliged to do on account of the short sight which he shared with Alexander the Great and Frederick the Second."

Napoleon was not near-sighted. M. the Quarter-master knows not that to examine a map militarily it is necessary to look at it very closely. We should not have taken notice of this, were it not a new proof that Mr. de Ségur has never seen the Emperor in his privacy.

CHAPTER VI.

Our right wing "had in front of it a general and country difficult to conquer." But from the opening of the campaign, this general, "*difficult to conquer*," endeavoured to retreat to the centre of the Russian army from which he was cut off. The skilful manœuvres of Napoleon rendering his efforts vain, he had no other choice than that of plunging into the morasses in his rear, to arrive on the Dnieper before the French. If Davoust on one side, and the King of Westphalia on the other, had executed the orders they had received, the exit from these marshes would have been closed on Bagration. Napoleon expected every moment to hear news of the surrender of the Russian general and his forty thousand men. He was at Wilna with a strong reserve, prepared to receive the reports from his right and left, and those of the movements of the enemy opposed to him. He could not relinquish this central situation, before he knew what Bagration would attempt, so long as this general threatened to attack him. He was employed at the same time in organizing the government of Lithuania, erecting fortifications around its capital; gaining acquaintance with the plans of the enemy; hastening the arrival of his equipages of bridges, of his parks of artillery, and his numerous convoys of provisions; in short, in keeping alive the enthusiasm of the Poles.

To these powerful motives, which detained the Emperor at Wilna, Mr. de Ségur judges it opportune to add that of a pretended loss of strength. This opinion, which he repeats incessantly, and whence he deduces the origin of the faults which he attributes to the Emperor, and, as we have already stated, entirely without foundation. *A vigorous constitution no longer seconded him as heretofore*, he says to those who approach this *genius so vast*, &c. his *corpulence*, and the *baths* he used, form a subject of *regret* and sad reflections to them.

Napoleon, from his youth, was accustomed to use baths, not

"as an indispensable relief from bodily ailments, which his policy carefully concealed," but first, because habit made them necessary; and, moreover, assiduous employment in the cabinet, and fatigue, rendered them of service to him. The *man* was never more *wanting* to the *hero*, than the *hero* was *wanting to the man*. Our author often sacrifices truth to the desire of making brilliant antitheses.

This enterprise, which until now he has represented as untimely, and which he here calls *perhaps the most useful to Europe*, did not fail in consequence of a *stormy day and a sudden fever*. All that was humanly possible, was attempted and accomplished. The battle of Morkeva had all the success it could have had. It was not the ill health of the French leader, more than the skill of the Russian generals, which caused this European enterprise to fail: it was the premature cold.

By the emphatic description which the author has given of the Berezina, he seems to fear that the sufferings experienced by the army on its return, will not be sufficiently known! The geographical knowledge he displays is still defective when he advances "that all the rivers which in this country flow in a direction from one pole to the other, have their eastern banks higher than their western, as in Europe." The northern part of Europe forms a plain, of which Moscow may be taken as the centre. Hence, beyond that capital, the descent of the plain makes, on the contrary, the eastern banks of the rivers in this country lower than their western.

CHAPTER VII.

As soon as Napoleon was certain that Bagration could not reach Wilna, and learned that the army of Barclay de Tolly was concentrated in the intrenched camp at Drissa, he moved upon the central point of Glubokoe. From the time the Russians knew of this movement, they feared lest Napoleon should

arrive before them at Witepsk, where they hoped to join Bagration, and took that direction in great haste. Napoleon, learning the evacuation of the camp at Drissa, guessed their project, and marched in that direction.

The Emperor Alexander, forced to abandon the great magazines he had formed on the line of operation by Pekow, quitted his army to return to Moscow, in order to create new resources, both of subsistence and men. The proclamations he then made were not distinguished by the spirit of moderation, so much vaunted of by Mr. de Ségur, in speaking of that which was published at Wilna. Must we conclude that the character of Alexander was changed? If, as our historian says, the first depicted his character, the last should equally do so. Napoleon is designated under the name of Moloch, and the French to a race of *locusts which scorched the earth, and which the earth repulsed, finding them too heavy for her outraged bosom.* What is this difference to be attributed to? Did it not arise from Alexander's not being under the same necessity of dissimulating? These are the darts which the Parthians launched while flying.

Napoleon directed his central force upon Bezenkowiski. He went to Kamen "always in a carriage, except during the night, either from necessity or perhaps with a view to keep his soldiers in ignorance of the inability of their chief to participate in their fatigues."

These insinuations show that this author is either absolutely ignorant of the details of the Emperor's mode of living during war, or prove against him a feeling of injustice which induces him constantly to represent this prince in an unfavourable light. We cannot answer his allegations to greater advantage than by making known how Napoleon spent his time whilst he was with the army.

The active life he led in the fields was subordinate to military operations. Habitually he marched on horseback with the army when it was in motion and near the enemy. When it was performing great evolutions, and the operations took place at considerable distances, he waited until the corps which were on the march were near the positions indicated. He re-

mained then at head quarters. There he devoted his attention to the internal administration of France, and answered the reports which were daily addressed to him from Paris by his ministers: for he governed the empire at the same time he directed his army. Economical of his time, he calculated the moment of his departure, so as to be at the head of his corps at the moment when his presence was necessary. He then travelled rapidly in his carriage. But even during such a journey, he was not idle. He was employed in reading despatches, and most generally he received the reports of his generals, and expedited his answers immediately. The despatches from Paris were sometimes sent to him at the same time. A lamp suspended in his carriage enabled him to work during his journeys at night, as if he were in his cabinet. At the doors always marched his aides-de-camp and secretaries, and a brigade of his saddle-horses followed with the escort.

It was thus he remained at Wilna while a part of his army marched upon the Duna. He did not quit this town until the 16th, at ten o'clock P. M.* Early on the 17th. he was at Swentziani, where, having received a report which informed him that the enemy had repassed the Duna at Druia, and surprised the cavalry commanded by Sebastiani, he sent new orders to the corps of the army and arrived amidst his troops at Glubokoe on the 18th at noon. He did the same in his march upon Kamen and Bezenkowiski, where he arrived at the very moment the corps ordered arrived there.

Such was the privileged organization of this great man in every thing, that he could sleep an hour, be waked to give an order, and again address himself to sleep, without injury to

* We have seen above that the corps of Marshal Davoust had marched in the direction of Minsk. He arrived there on the 8th, and departed on the 13th, always flanking Bagration's left; passing by Ygumen, he crossed the Berezina at Beresino, and arrived at Mohilof on the 20th, thus preventing the junction of Bagration's army with that of Barclay on the Duna. The corps of the viceroy had quitted the environs of Wilna (Neutroki) on the 7th, and passing by Ochmiana, arrived on the 17th at Dokszitzi. Marshal Mortier arrived with the guard and with the Bavarian cavalry on the 16th at Glubokoe.

his repose or health. Six hours of sleep were enough for him, whether he took them in succession or at different intervals in the twenty-four hours.

On the day preceding a great battle, he was constantly on horseback, to reconnoitre the force and position of the enemy, study the field of battle, and visit the bivouacs of his army. Even during the night he visited the line again, to assure himself of the enemy's force by the number of his fires, and in some hours he would tire down several horses. On the day of battle he placed himself at a central point, whence he could see all that passed. Near him were his aids and secretaries. He sent them in all directions with orders. At some distance in the rear of him, were four squadrons of the guard, two on each hand, but when he quitted this position he only took a squadron as an escort. He commonly pointed out to his marshals the place he had chosen, in order to be more easily found when they sent messages to him. As soon as his presence became necessary at any point, he set out for it at full gallop.

How can Mr. de Ségur have the simplicity to say, that it *was not a puerile vanity* which induced Napoleon to pass the Duna? To whose mind could such a puerility present itself? The Emperor passed the Duna to reconnoitre personally, in order to discover whether the army of Barclay de Tolly had already passed this point, in his march upon Witepsk; of this he assured himself.

After having eulogised the precision of the marches of all the corps, which at the end of a month's separation and a hundred leagues from the point they had left, arrived at *Bezenkorwiski* on the *same day and hour*. Mr. de Ségur gives an exaggerated account of the tumult produced in the town, by this junction. He cannot be ignorant, however, that all the armies in the world show the same aspect, when a great number of troops are concentrated at a capital point. Is this circumstance peculiar to our troops, or does he seek to pass them for an undisciplined horde?

"On the 25th of July, Murat proceeded towards Ostruno with his cavalry. At two leagues from that village, Domont,

Du Coetlosquet, Carignan, and the 8th hussars, were advancing in column."

In reading this passage, might not one suppose that Messrs. Domont, Coetlosquet, and Carignan, were all generals at least, since he names them as he does Murat, without giving them any title? It would be a great mistake; these gentlemen were simply officers in the 8th hussars, and we may know why he brings forward their names in this manner, by inquiring to whom they are related.

The corps of Osterman attempted to defend the defiles of Ostrouno; producing a sufficiently sharp action. Mr. de Ségur does not perceive that he attacks the honour of one of our brave regiments, (the 24th of the line) by saying that "many others, who under the plea of supporting the wounded, or of being wounded themselves, successively abandoned their ranks." It is a gratuitous stain he has cast upon the French glory. The Quarter-master of the palace was not in that affair. He could not for the same reason, say that he saw Murat at the head of a regiment of Polish lancers, charging in spite of himself, pushed by the "Polish lances, couched and condensed behind him." The author should have known enough of military matters to have been aware that the interval between the squadrons, must have been quite sufficient to have allowed the king of Naples to retire, had not his personal bravery induced him to make the charge.

The following assertion is another attack upon the reputation of a French regiment. The Russians defended a wood, "the 92d regiment intimidated by the heavy fire which issued from it, and bewildered by a shower of balls, remained immovable, neither daring to advance nor retreat, restrained by two opposite fears—the dread of danger, and the dread of shame."

How can the Quarter-master of the palace thus assume the office of tarnishing the honour of our regiments! As he was not present at the affair, he should have read the report of prince Eugene; he would have found that prince, in speaking of this regiment, thus expressing himself—"It required the

valour of the troops, and the steadfastness of the generals who commanded them, to succeed in so difficult an attack."

CHAPTER VIII.

The French army, after having repulsed the Russians in the fight of Ostrowno, continued to march upon Witepsk. On the 27th, the Russian army was discovered in order of battle near that town. The French advanced guard made its dispositions for approaching the enemy; the presence of the Emperor also augmented the ardour of his troops.

"The King of Naples, whose brain was intoxicated by the general notice he attracted, yielding himself to his usual impetuosity, urged the Chasseurs of the 16th upon the Russian cavalry. All eyes beheld with terror, that feeble French line broken on its march by the deep ravines which intersected the ground, advancing to attack the enemy's masses. These unfortunate men, seeing themselves about to be sacrificed, proceeded with hesitating steps to certain destruction.—In consequence, at the first movement made by the lancers of the Russian guard, they took to flight—but the ravines, which it was necessary to pass, obstructed their flight—they were precipitated into them, where many perished."

This circumstance is represented with as much inexactness as partiality for the Russians. We see with regret the injustice done to a handful of brave men.

After having passed the little bridge which separated us from the enemy, the 16th Chasseurs, preceded by two companies of light infantry, of the 9th regiment of the line, were to form in front of the defile, in order to facilitate the passage to the other corps which followed. The left of the 16th Chasseurs supported the light infantry, who had gained the bank of the Dnna. The 16th did not advance to charge the enemy, but only to gain the ground and prevent the bridge from being

encumbered. It was at this moment that the cavalry of the Russian guard, protected by the fire of a battery of 12 pieces, charged this regiment, which was led by General Piré. The 16th Chasseurs endeavoured to employ a manœuvre which had already succeeded several times; it received the charge without moving, and at thirty paces distance discharged their carbines. The velocity of the Russian cavalry was not checked by this fire, and the ranks of the 16th were necessarily thrown into confusion. This regiment was driven back upon our infantry, but its loss was inconsiderable, and much less than that of the Russians. The latter lost a great many men, by attempting to carry the two companies of Voltigeurs, who had been passed by, and who by their fire, made a rampart of the enemy's horses and horsemen; such is the fact. Where then did the Quarter-master of the palace learn, that the brave Chasseurs of the 16th, *marched with hesitation* to a certain *destruction*, about to *be sacrificed, and flying on the first movement of the Russians*. These pusillanimous sentiments could never have entered into the hearts of conquering French soldiers. In a work dedicated to the veterans of the Grand Army, and in which we remark so many minute details, Mr. de Ségur should have mentioned the names of the two brave captains who commanded the companies of the ninth, *Guillard* and *Savary*; it is true, however, that these are plebeian names.

The author represents Napoleon as hesitating to attack the enemy in the position they occupied. "The soldiers were astonished," says he, "at this inactivity, at the moment of having overtaken an army." He shows us Murat "unable to convince his chief, rashly proceeded to pitch his tent almost in the midst of the enemy." That our troops, animated by the sight of the Russians, expressed the greatest desire of attacking them at once, may be conceived, but that the king of Naples pressed the Emperor to attack an army of nearly a hundred thousand men in position, with the few forces he had in line, is to attribute to this prince, language and opinions, which his warlike habits could not have given rise to. To reconnoitre an army well, which occupied more than a league of surface, the most skilful man, with the greatest activity and

genius could not have done in less than a day. A first reconnoitre would have only given a general idea; a second reconnoitre, at midday, was necessary to decide his plan of attack, of the which the third, made in the evening, would confirm the arrangements. It was only then he gave his orders for the next day, and he passed the night in judging, by the arrangement of the fires, whether the enemy had not changed his line.

General Barclay altered his determination, and during the night the Russian army retired in all directions.

Listen to Mr. de Ségur's description of the Russian camp: "Every thing about that camp exhibited the science of war; the symmetry of all its parts; the exact and exclusive nicety in the use to which each of them had been applied; the order and neatness which thence resulted; there appeared more order in their defeat than in our victory!" &c.

It appears that Mr. de Ségur, whose duties called him to Witepsk to prepare the Emperor's quarters, never saw this much vaunted camp. We, who were charged with its examination in detail, found it in extreme irregularity, great uncleanness, and so confused that it was impossible to estimate the number of men and animals who had bivouacked in that place.

In relation to the lessons which the Quarter-master gives us from the flying Russians, we mention only to show in what spirit his book is written, and what nation he wishes to please.

"As soon as the Emperor had made up his mind, he returned to Witepsk with his guard. There, on the 28th of July, in entering the imperial head-quarters, he laid down his sword, and abruptly depositing it on the maps with which his table was covered, 'Here I stop;' here I must look round me; rally; refresh my army, and organize Poland. The campaign of 1812 is finished; that of 1813 will do the rest."

The Emperor, in advancing rapidly upon Witepsk, had a double object, that of reaching this city before the army of Barclay, and of preventing a re-union with the division of Bagration. As soon as he was apprized of the precipitate retreat of Barclay on Smolensk, in order to rejoin Bagration,

who had escaped the pursuit of the fifth and eighth corps, he should have halted. The reasons for this halt, as given by Mr. de Ségur, are just; but as if it cost the author too much to be always consistent; he makes the Emperor observe, "*the campaign of* 1812 *is finished; that of* 1813 *will accomplish the rest;*" and he developes this idea in the following chapter.

It surely would never occur to a military man that Napoleon would wish to take up winter quarters in the month of July.

BOOK V.—CHAPTER I.

"With the conquest of Lithuania the object of the war was attained." The author forgets here all that he has said in the first chapters of his work, that the war on England was to be carried on in Russia; that it was necessary that the Russians should be driven into Asia; "that this expedition was indispensable to the completion of a great design, now almost accomplished, that his object was not unattainable, and that the means for fulfilling it were amply sufficient." The true object of the war was to force the Emperor Alexander to make peace, and to enter into that alliance he once had sworn to, against England. But Mr. de Ségur only lays down these maxims that he may draw this conclusion, *that the Emperor ought to halt at Witepsk.*

After speaking of the different establishments formed in this city, he adds, "neither was the useful alone attended to, embellishment was also considered. Some stone houses spoiled the appearance of the square of the palace; the Emperor ordered his guard to pull them down and clear away the rubbish." Would it not be believed from this, that Napoleon really occupied himself in embellishing the city of Witepsk? If he ordered the demolition of these houses which encumbered the place before the mansion he occupied, it was in order

that the troops should have space to pass in review. Added to which, it is always proper that the environs of head-quarters should be unincumbered.

Murat brings the Emperor information that "the Russian army was panic struck, which his light cavalry alone was sufficient to put to flight." To this ebullition of ardour he makes Napoleon reply quite seriously: "Two great rivers mark out our position, let us raise block-houses on that line; let our fires cross each other on all sides; let us form in square battalion; cannon at the angles and at the exterior; let the interior contain our quarters and magazines."

The author should have given us some details respecting *this great square battalion, with its fires crossing on all sides.* He nevertheless really appears to comprehend these arrangements, since he adds, "It was thus his genius conceived every thing in masses, and his eye expatiated over an army of 400,000 men, as if it were a regiment."

But Mr. de. Ségur represents Napoleon to us as issuing no order, if we except that of commanding the *siege of Bobruisk,* (situated in the midst of a marsh,) to be undertaken *with cavalry.* Such absurdities contradict themselves. The division of Dombrowski, which the author supposes reduced to 1200 men, really consisted of twelve battalions, and one brigade of light cavalry, forming together about 9000 men. It was employed in watching the Russian division of General Hœrtel, and the fortress of Bobruisk. General Dombrowski was to surround this place, which was in a bad state of defence, with his infantry, whilst his cavalry were to clear the environs. He had with him twenty-four pieces of artillery. Besides, *Macdonald, to whom he had transmitted neither instructions nor means to take Riga,* had under his command the numerous artillery used at the siege of Dantzick, and to whom, before leaving Wilna, the Emperor had communicated his plans.

But our author soon forgets what he has said of the intention of Napoleon *to plant his eagles* at Witepsk, and recollects that this prince exclaimed on entering the town, "Do you think, then, that I have come so far to conquer these huts?"

Mr. de Ségur, who loves to draw pictures, should have

sketched one of the imposing ceremony that took place, on the reception of a new colonel of the foot grenadiers of the guard. But he touches on this lightly, as if it were a mere reception of an ordinary officer, whilst it related to one of the most distinguished generals, advanced to one of the highest commands in the army. The author, who has so often quoted the names of inferior officers, might have named that of General Count Friant; less seen at court than them, it is true, but so well known to the army. He might have said, that the Emperor drew his sword, received him himself, and embraced him, saying, "It is a reward for your many and glorious services, but I yet want you. Remain in command of your division during this campaign, you are more useful to me than at the head of your grenadiers, whom I have always under my own eye."

Who would recognize the Emperor by the following portrait? "He was seized with impatience; he was observed to grow restless; the image of captive Moscow besieged him; the state of great irresolution which tormented his mind affected his whole frame; he was observed to wander about his apartments as if pursued by this dangerous temptation; he walked about without any object; inquired the hour, and looked at his watch; completely absorbed, he stopped, hummed a tune with an absent air, and again began walking about:—well what shall we do? Shall we stay where we are, or advance?" &c.

Mr. de Ségur represents him one moment in bed, the next in merely his shirt, and after the precious reasoning in the preceding chapter on the necessity of remaining at Witepsk, he tells us, "that the same danger which perhaps ought to have recalled him to the Niemen, or kept him stationary on the Duna, urged him towards Moscow, having at last determined, he hastily arose, and fired with this prospect, his spirit replete with the energy of his mighty conception, appears possessed by the genius of war; his voice deepens, his eye flashes fire, and his countenance darkens; his attendants retreat from his presence, struck with mingled awe and respect."

The historian of the grand army has, without doubt, taken his model at Charenton.

CHAPTER II.

Mr. de Ségur, without alluding to new events, which may have induced Napoleon to change his plan, represents him as thinking of nothing but leaving Witepsk, and advancing towards Moscow.

"His resolution once taken, he was anxious that it should satisfy his friends; it was by their sentiments that he was enabled to judge of those of the rest of the army; surrounded by disapproving countenances, and opinions contrary to his own, he felt himself uncomfortable." From this it would be supposed that he was censured by all the world, and that he alone was in opposition to them. The Emperor regulated himself very little by the opinion of *his courtiers*. He never possessed the weakness of being harrassed by *disapproving countenances*, or the folly of *judging the sentiments of the army*, by those of persons who were only of consequence from the services they performed about his person. He could have lowered away every *disapproving countenance* by a frown. As to his inquietude, it sometimes existed, it is true, but was rarely manifested. Napoleon was well aware that courtiers are censurers by nature, when removed from the eye of their master; and knew what apology to make for human weakness; and if he overlooked the discontent caused by fatigue and privations, and was too just to be irritated at it, he possessed wisdom enough never to permit it to influence his determinations. He was, above all, certainly aware that the sentiments of persons holding no command in the army, and who did not even live among the troops, were no criterion of those of the army. Napoleon knew how to appreciate men and things, a knowledge of which the chamberlain appears to be entirely ignorant.

The author here recommences the scenes he had already played at Paris, and with the same actors. If he is to be believed, the Emperor was wholly surrounded by tattlers and men without education. In spite of all the observations made

for him, "he would march on both capitals at the same time, in order to destroy every thing in the one, and preserve every thing in the other." Here is truly an extraordinary specimen of distributive justice. It is to be lamented that the Duke of Frioul, to whom such a secret was revealed, is no longer in existence to explain this wonder. This conversation with Duroc is introduced in order to make the Emperor reply, "that on that supposition, as the Russian war no longer offered him any advantageous result, he ought to renounce it; and if so, he must turn his arms against Prussia, and compel her to pay the expenses of the war." How can it be supposed, that whilst the Prussians were marching under the eagles of Napoleon, he was meditating their ruin? General Yorck may have asserted it to extenuate his defection, but what motive can have induced Mr. de Ségur to credit this invention.

He makes M. Daru say, that this war was not *national*. M. Daru could never have used such language. The deliverance of Poland rendered it more *national* than all the other enterprises of Napoleon. After the war on the boundary of the Rhine, it was the most *national* which had been undertaken.

In all this chapter the author represents Napoleon to us, as occupied in convincing *the great*, in combatting their objections, and trying to ascertain whether they still wished to make an effort to reach Smolensk. Napoleon sooths them, and when he interrupts them it is "with subtle arguments.—Throughout this discussion, his conversation and whole deportment were remarkable for affability, simplicity, and good humour, &c. a circumstance which sufficiently explains why, notwithstanding so many misfortunes, he was so much beloved by those who lived on terms of intimacy with him." The quarter-master never lived in this intimacy, and he proves it by the spirit in which he has dictated his work.

If this picture of the confidants of Napoleon was faithful, it must be avowed that this prince possessed courtiers who not only were but little attached to him, but were wonderfully refractory. There never was a general, thus advanced in a distant country, who could have succeeded, meeting with such opposition.

The soldiers even murmured "that they no longer saw him, except on days of battle, when they had to die for him, but never when they required the means of existence." What has become of the great attention the Emperor paid to the proper nourishment of his troops? Where those "*magazines as immense as the enterprise was daring*," that he had collected?

Great metamorphoses take place under the magic wand of Mr. de Ségur; all his characters change masks, and are to be recognized no longer. Napoleon has lost the power of will, and of making himself obeyed. Berthier is no longer the zealous messenger of his orders; nor Monton, the haughty military tribune, that Cæsar alone conquered;* Caulaincourt, is no more that punctual and exact attendant, who forgets his own sentiments, and remembers his duties alone. Duroc is no longer the discreet confidant, who is silent when it is not necessary to repeat the orders of his master. And the part of the laborious and severe administrator is taken from M. Daru, and he fills that of a political tattler in the presence of the very man who imposed on him the necessity of more reserve.

CHAPTER III.

On the route to Selez the second division obtained a considerable advantage over a Russian corps, and drove it back upon Drissa. Mr. de Ségur estimates the loss of the enemy at only two thousand men, and eight pieces of cannon, when in fact, it amounted to three thousand men, and fourteen pieces

* When the Count de Lobau was colonel of the third regiment of the line, his vote was in opposition to the elevation of Napoleon to the imperial throne. The Emperor, who wished to attach him to his service, commanded his attendance; a single conversation won the Colonel, who soon after became his aid-de-camp.

of cannon. A Russian general, who was killed in this affair, furnishes the author with an opportunity of making a pompous eulogy; *he died*, says he, *like a hero*. He then enters into details of his death, which could only have been furnished him by the Russians. We do not reproach the quarter-master with the praises he bestows on our enemies, although the French generals, who fell in this campaign, never appear to excite his regrets; for he scarcely even mentions their names.

The author supposes that it was only towards the conclusion of the Emperor's halt at Witepsk, that he received information of the proclamations of Alexander, dated at Polosk, on the 18th of July, and of which we have already spoken. He says, that Napoleon was mortified at the gross calumnies they contained; he is deceived, they only excited a smile.

In his position at Witepsk, Napoleon hoped the hostile armies, now re-united near Smolensk, would make some false movements of which he would take advantage. The attack of the Russians on General Sebastiani at Inkown, confirmed him in the belief that the whole army of Barclay had left the environs of Smolensk, in order to attack him. His decision is immediately taken, and Mr. de Ségur has reason in observing, that it "was grand and bold, like the enterprise itself." He was in hopes of marching rapidly to the left bank of the Dneiper, and by advancing up this river, to reach Smolensk before the Russians, a movement which would place us on the flank or rear of the enemy's army; four days sufficed him to throw Davoust's corps, and those under his command, before Liadovi. The boldness of this manœuvre, admired even by the Russians themselves,* and the rapidity of its execution, refute most positively all that the author has said of the indecision and inertness of the Emperor.

* See Military History of the Campaign in Russia in 1812, by Colonel Boutourlin, Aid-de-Camp to the Emperor Alexander. (Page 252, vol. I.)

BOOK VI.—CHAPTER I.

The author, who has no fear of repetitions, has again described the fine manœuvre of Napoleon, of which he spoke at the end of the preceding chapter. This movement, even by the admission of our enemies, one of the finest military operations performed by Napoleon, nevertheless, furnishes the quarter-master with a subject for censure: he always distributes his eulogies with great parsimony, whilst he scatters his disapprobation with an unsparing hand. Here is a division, that "owing to an ill-written order, had been wandering for twenty-four hours in marshy woods:" a movement of no importance, and which a judicious historian would have passed over in silence. But when the Emperor does not afford our author any point for criticism, he finds one in the army, which he represents as marching in great disorder.

CHAPTER II.

In our movement on Smolensk, by the left bank of the Dnieper, we fell in with the Russian division of Newcrowskia at Krasnow, and for whose situation at this place it is difficult to assign a reason. This division was on the point of being destroyed; Mr. de Ségur supposes that it would have been taken, if it had not been for the tardiness of Grouchy. The fact is, that in the rapidity of its retreat, it could only be overtaken and attacked by cavalry. The artillery had been delayed in the passage of a defile at Krasnow, and could not be employed, notwithstanding the assertion of our author. If it had arrived in time, this division would have been totally

destroyed. Our historian, faithful to his system, never mentions, that in one of the brilliant charges of our calvary, Colonel Marbeuf was mortally wounded.

On the 15th of August,* Prince Eugene considered it his duty to carry the Emperor his good wishes, when Napoleon observed, "Every thing is preparing for a battle, I shall gain it, and we shall see Moscow." According to our author, Eugene *kept silent*, but in going away, he returned for answer to the questions of Marshal Mortier; "Moscow will be our ruin." Duroc, the most reserved of all, loudly declared, that "he could not foresee the period of our return." "Thus," says our author, "did disapprobation begin to be expressed."

CHAPTER III.

Napoleon had availed himself so ably of the hesitation and false movements of the Russian generals, in their march on Witepsk, that it was only at Smolensk that they became aware of the danger which menaced them. This place was taken at once. Mr. de Ségur represents Marshal Ney as *inflamed* at the sight of this city, and reproaches him with having attempted to take possession of it immediately. "A ball struck him on the neck, incensed, he despatched a battalion against the citadel—nothing could stop them but the Russian walls." Marshal Ney was too much accustomed to balls, to be irritated at receiving one in his clothes; it was not then to revenge himself that he marched a battalion of the forty-sixth to the attack, but to drive the enemy opposed to him into the citadel, in order to reconnoitre it. It is to be regretted that he had not followed up his first idea, and made at once a vigorous attack; for the city would have inevitably fallen, the citadel being only faced with earth. The quarter-master, who pays little

* Napoleon's birth-day.

attention to military operations, does not give with exactness the position of the French army around Smolensk: the following is his account. "Davoust, and next to him Count Lobau, were to deploy on the right of Ney, the guard in the centre as a reserve, and further off the army of Italy. The place of Junot and the Westphalians was indicated; Murat and Poniatowski formed the right of the army."

The author should have told us which division was commanded by Count de Lobau, since Marshal Davoust had reassumed the command of the divisions formerly under his command. A little further, he says; "The French army thus posted had defiles and precipices in its rear, but Napoleon concerned himself little about retreat, he thought only of victory." The quarter-master, who, it appears, wished to give lessons of tactics to the Emperor, ought to have known, that two great roads were open for the retreat of the army; (that of Prince Eugene, as well as Pajol's division, had been posted at Goritnia, to protect the banks of the Dneiper on our left, and that our right was flanked by the corps of the Duke of Abrantes, a little in the rear. Mr. de Ségur, who appears to understand so well the plans and character of Barclay de Tolly, should have told us why he despatched Bagration, not to Elnia, as our historian has asserted, but to Dorogobow; and why he himself remained with his army at Smolensk. One of two things is certain; either Barclay wished for a battle, or he did not. In the first case, he should have united his forces, instead of dividing them; in the second, he ought to have evacuated Smolensk. Mr. de Ségur gives us a motive for the halt of Barclay in this town; "that having to cope with a gigantic foe, he felt authorised to expect from him gigantic movements." We candidly avow this is beyond our comprehension. If Barclay had to cope with a *gigantic foe,* ought he not to have concentrated his force instead of dividing it?

CHAPTER IV.

Napoleon after being assured that a portion of the Russian army had quitted Smolensk, and posted themselves on the route to Moscow, determined to attack it.

Here we find the brave "Murat prudent, when not heated by the presence of the enemy; disapproving of this resolution." The author even adds that, "he threw himself at the feet of his brother and conjured him to stop—this Moscow will be our ruin."

Mr. de Ségur certainly does not vary in the ideas he attributes to his characters, nor in their mode of expression. Murat only repeats here, what the author, a few pages back, has given as the expression of Prince Eugene. To make the King of Naples express himself in such terms, is to hold him up as a general of little experience. How could the Emperor halt before Smolensk? Did Mr. de Ségur suppose that he would retrace his steps? The only plan left was to carry this place; besides having passed a part of the night with the King of Naples and in the tent of the Emperor, we can safely assert that no such conversation took place. The whole army was eager to see Smolensk in our power. The attack being resolved on, Napoleon invested this city both above and below the bridges, in order to destroy these avenues, and thus force the enemy to evacuate.

It was in one of the batteries thrown up for this purpose (that on our right) that Mr. de Ségur supposes that Murat, "despairing of the issue of the war, sought death to escape from them"—a complete absurdity.

The author, who has no clear ideas on military movements, tells us that Napoleon gave orders, "that at the same time, the artillery of the guard should batter the great wall with its twelve pounders; it was disobeyed." This accusation of disobedience would be disgraceful to the guard, but it is unfounded. The Emperor, at the same time that he ordered a vigorous

cannonade to be kept up on the bridges, directed a few shots against the walls, in order to see what effect they would produce; finding that it required too great a waste of time and ammunition to effect a breach, Napoleon ordered the engineers to attack it by mining. "In mounting to the assault, our attacking columns left a long and wide track of blood, of wounded and dead." At the assault of what, Mr. de Ségur? there were no outworks, the suburbs were occupied by troops, but they were not entrenched; there was no place to assault. "The same blunder which Ney had made a battalion commit, the preceding day, was repeated by the whole army." Who could have believed, that a man holding the rank of general, would write such absurdities? what other means were there, to take the place, without first driving the enemy out of the suburbs?

"The Count de Lobau, who had made himself master of the ditch, but could no longer maintain his ground there, ordered shells to be thrown into the city—he was dismayed by so great a disaster, which he believed to be his work."

There are two circumstances difficult to comprehend. The first is to know what corps Count Lobau commanded; for by the account of the author himself, we see in the environs of Smolensk, Ney on the left, with his right on Davoust, whose right was supported by Poniatowski. Where then is the corps of the Count de Lobau? Mr. de Ségur should have informed us. In the second place, we would ask, how the Count de Lobau, who ordered the shells to be thrown into the city, could be *dismayed* that they should fire it? Can Mr. de Ségur be ignorant of the effects produced by shells? The brave Polish General Grabowski was killed in entering the city, yet our author makes no mention of it.

CHAPTER V.

The Emperor traversed the field of battle, "melancholy review of the dead and dying! dismal account to make up and render." Thereupon Mr. de Ségur gives us to understand that our dead had been previously interred, to prevent unpleasant impressions being made upon our soldiers. But was it possible to conceal their number, when the whole army were on the spot? Does he wish us to believe that French soldiers fear death? The puerile vanity of shining in schoolboy amplifications, outweighs with him all other considerations. He gives us a *side* scene of Napoleon's, when surrounded by Ney, Davoust, Mortier, Duroc, &c. and adds that it is "to relieve his heart from the load which oppressed it—he launched out against the enemy's general and army, as if he could have destroyed it by his reasoning, because he could not by victory." "Every word the Emperor had uttered, merely proved his disappointment."

All this tirade against the Russians, that he makes the Emperor give way to, is that he himself may utter a flourishing eulogy on that people. "They had arrived at that point," said he, "at which nations still possess all their primitive virtues, in addition to those they have already acquired." A short time after this, an aid-de-camp brings information, that on the right, Regnier and Prince Schwartzenberg had gained an important advantage over Tormasoff, and driven him in Volhynia. Napoleon immediately exclaims, "there, you see, the poltrons! they allow themselves to be beaten even by Austrians." Is it probable that the Emperor would have carried imprudence to such a height, as to insult the Austrians, at the very moment when they deserved his thanks? In joining this assertion to that our author made him utter at Witepsk, "that he must turn his arms against Prussia, and compel them to pay the expenses of the war," are we not tempted to believe that our historian wishes to justify in advance, the after con-

duct of these two courts, and diminish the odium attached to their defection.

He makes those generals most in the confidence of Napoleon observe, "if Europe were to rise against him, he would have no subjects but his soldiers, no empire but his camp, even then, one third of them being foreigners, would become his enemies." Could such ideas have arisen at this period in the mind of any one? This anachronism is a new proof, that this romance was written under the influence of a new order of things, and in the total forgetfulness of the past.

The author retraces scenes of discontent, which are but repetitions of those at Wilna, Witepsk, &c. His inventive genius might surely have furnished him something more novel.

CHAPTER VI.

In what a state of unhappiness is the Emperor Napoleon! As if it were not enough to hear continually about him, the eternal complaints of Murat, Caulaincourt, Daru, Berthier, Ney, Loban, &c. he is now beset with two new counsellors, Rapp and Lauriston. Rapp is the orator; he arrives from Dantzick, but this does not prevent him from detailing the disorder prevailing among our troops, in Germany, from the Elbe to the Oder, and from the Oder to the Vistula, he terminates by saying that the troops complain of being kept always on the march. Not satisfied with the eloquence with which he has endowed Rapp, Mr. de Ségur himself gives the following statement of the situation of our troops. "Agitated by a vague inquietude, they marched on amid the dull uniformity of the vast and silent forests of dark pines; they crept along these large trees,* bare and stripped to their very tops, and

* Does our author wish to say that the soldiers climbed the trees?

were affrighted at their weakness amid this immensity; they then conceived gloomy and absurd notions," &c.

The most hackneyed writer of melo-dramas for the boulevards, would have hesitated to put in the mouth of one of his fools such an absurd speech.

The abuse lavished on the soldiery after their departure from Wilna, will be recollected. Here our author gives us another terrible picture of the number of victims, strewed along the route, which he calculates as amounting to at least one quarter of the French troops, and one half of their allies.

Rapp does not spare details, but the Emperor does not enter into any explanation with him; another general, however, obtains more confidence; this is Sebastiani, he appealed to the very words of Napoleon, "that he had declared to him at Wilna, that he would not cross the Duna; and like the others laid great stress on the state of the army: It is dreadful, I know, replied the Emperor; from Wilna, half of it consisted of stragglers, now they form two thirds of it; there is no time to be lost, we must extort peace." From this calculation it is evident, that Napoleon would be obliged to march rapidly, if he wished to carry a single soldier to Moscow, for from Smolensk, when only half the distance had been traversed, only one third of the troops were able to carry arms—a ridiculous assertion, which refutes itself.

Mr. de Ségur finds out that the Emperor contradicts himself in the different conversations held with his generals. The evils apparently increase, for in the preceding chapter, this historian makes the Count de Lobau observe on entering Smolensk, "What a fine head for cantonments: this was the same thing as advising him to stop there, but the Emperor returned no other answer to the counsel than a stern look." Some pages afterwards, Napoleon repeats to Davoust and his generals, the observation of Count Lobau, "he considered that city as an excellent head for cantonments, &c. *Now*," continued he, in speaking to Davoust, "*my line is well covered, we will stop here.*" But at the same time, he sends reinforcements to Ney and Murat, in order to carry on the pursuit of the Russian army. He wishes to avoid "*any serious affair,*" and yet he

commits the pursuit of the enemy "*to the two rashest of his officers.*" Davoust, "*that prudent and methodical marshal,*" he places under the orders "*of the impetuous King of Naples.*" Thus, says our author, "the contradictions in his words were communicated to his actions."

It is easy in Mr. de Ségur to clothe a creature of his imagination, with such contradictions in his words and actions. But it is not on his frivolous representations that Napoleon will be judged in history. This prince never said that he ought to halt at Smolensk, for such an idea never crossed his mind.

CHAPTER VII.

As soon as the bridges were re-established, Marshal Ney passed the Dneiper in pursuit of the enemy, but not as Mr. de Ségur asserts, "with anxious eye and attentive ear." How can this author affirm, that in not finding the enemy, troops so brave, and led by so intrepid a chief, "were relieved from the weight of great apprehension?" Let him eulogise the Russians, when they merit it, if he pleases; but let him not insinuate, that French troops ever feared them. This campaign, disastrous as it was, has sufficiently proved the reverse.

We have seen in the preceding chapter, that General Barclay had despatched on the 17th of August, the corps of Bagration, towards Dorogobow. He himself, (Barclay de Tolly) abandoned Smolensk on the 18th at day-break, and retreated on the road to Poreczie, whence he marched his corps in two columns, by cross roads, to gain the route from Smolensk to Moscow, the left column by Prouditchi, the right by Lubinow. Each would therefore traverse an arc of a circle, the chord of which was formed by a portion of the road to Moscow, on this there only remained, to harass our advance, the four regiments of Cossacks, left by Bagration, under the command of

General Karpoff. This feeble rear guard had the great charge of covering the two points, by which the columns were to regain the great road.

The Russian general, engaged in these defiles, was sensible of the danger to which he was exposed, he therefore hastily ordered an advance guard under General Touczkof, to regain the great road by forced marches, and afterwards to advance in the direction of Smolensk, to sustain the Cossacks under Karpoff.

"At length," says Mr de Ségur, "after an arduous march, the head of the enemy's convoy came in sight of the high road, at the moment when the French had but to force the height of Valoutina, and the passage of Kalowdnia, in order to reach that outlet. Ney had furiously carried that of the Stubna."

Marshal Ney, after having passed the Dneiper, had advanced towards Gorbounowow, between the two great roads leading to St. Petersburg and Moscow, whence his light troops had driven part of the Russian right, whom they met there. This Marshal having learnt that the Russians had retreated on the Moscow road, regained it in order to pursue them. The enemy as we have observed, having only left some regiments of Cossacks to defend this route, Ney experienced but few obstacles until he approached Valoutina. "But Korf driven upon Valoutina, had summoned to his aid the column which preceded him." This fact is inaccurate: General Korf commanding the rear guard of Barclay, after having defended the suburbs of Smolensk against Ney, retreated by the same route as Barclay (that of Poreczie) towards Paloniewow. He did not retire as our author asserts, by the great road to Moscow, and he did not fight at Valoutina.*

About 11 o'clock, Marshal Ney attacked the enemy, whom he met on the Moscow road, and rapidly drove them behind a marshy stream, where, on other Russian divisions coming to their assistance, he made a decided stand. General Barclay

* When the troops of Marshal Ney, attacked Gorbounowow, they cut off this rear guard, and to relieve it, Barclay sent the division of Prince Eugene of Wirtemberg to its assistance, this division retook Gorbounowow, at the moment that Marshal Ney advanced on Valoutina.

was fully aware of the importance of arresting the advance of the French, at any price. He flew to this position and ordered up successively the other divisions as they came out from the cross roads into the grand route.

The Emperor having been informed that Ney met with some resistance, sent him the division of Gudin and placed it under his orders.

Towards 4 o'clock this division arrived on the battle-ground; being formed into a column of platoons, it advanced upon the enemy who occupied a height, commanding the road, and covered by a marshy stream, over which was a small wooden bridge, that it was necessary to pass in order to reach them. This narrow defile was protected in every direction by the Russian artillery. The 7th light infantry, headed by General Gudin, marched with shouldered arms to force the passage. Each platoon as it passed the brook, replied to the Russian cannonade with loud cries of *vive l'Empereur*. This regiment was followed by the 12th, the 21st, and the 127th, but at this moment the brave General Gudin, had both legs shattered by a cannon ball. He was replaced by the Count Gerard; the action became very warm, nevertheless, the French gained the opposite height. Four times the columns of the enemy rushed upon them, and were as often repulsed. The whole corps of Baggowout, the division of Alnewief, and that of Prince Eugene of Wirtemberg, were engaged in this struggle, which lasted till 10 o'clock at night, at this time the enemy finding they could not retake the position wrested from them by Gerard, commenced a retreat.

"There was almost as much glory in their defeat as in our victory." Being present ourselves at this battle, we are aware that the Russians displayed great courage, but the author ought to have stated, that besides being superior in numbers to the corps of Marshal Ney, and the division of Gerard, the enemy occupied a superb position, and that his numerous artillery gave him still greater advantages over us, as from the nature of the ground we were unable to use ours. Yet, in spite of these obstacles, the attack of Gerard's division, made us masters of this formidable position; and which French troops

alone could have carried. We do not fear being contradicted by any military man, when we assert that this was one of the most glorious exploits performed by our army.

"One of the enemy's generals, the only one left unhurt on this field of carnage, endeavoured to escape from among our soldiers by repeating the French word of command; he was recognised by the flashes of their fire arms and secured."

It was not by accident, as the author appears to indicate, that General Touczkof was made prisoner. In one of the last attacks, a large column of Russian grenadiers charged a battalion of the 7th light infantry and a battalion of the 12th of the line at the point of the bayonet. The shock was violent, but the enemy was repulsed with great vigour. In the struggle, a lieutenant of Voltigeurs, attacked the Russian general, and after twice wounding him on the head with a sabre, took him prisoner in the midst of his own troops.

"The Russians astonished at having been attacked only in front, styled Murat the general of the high roads." This reproach, if the Russians ever applied it to the King of Naples, ought to have been better refuted by Mr. de Ségur. Murat with his cavalry, was not on the high road, but considerably on the right of Ney (when he made the attack,) in order to communicate with the corps of Junot, which passed the Dneiper at Prouditchewow, and was intended to turn the left of the Russian division. Our soldiers with more reason might term Barclay a *general of high roads.*

Mr de Ségur seems to reproach the Emperor, with not being present at the battle of Valoutina, and in the reasons he assigns, he does not overlook that of fatigue. One of his most predominant points, is representing the Emperor, as overcome with fatigue, and both physically and morally worn out. It may easily be conceived, that some remains of shame has prevented Mr de Ségur, from attacking the Emperor, with the same arms as his enemies; but, it is base, thus to disguise an outrage under the semblance of pity; the intention, and we say it with regret, is as manifest as the effect.

The two great Russian armies had retreated, as we have already stated, one by the Moscow road, and the other by the

St. Petersburg road. In despatching the corps of Marshal Ney, and the cavalry of the King of Naples, on the Moscow road; which, by his orders, the Duke of Abrantes ought to reach near Lutchini, he thought that these corps united, as they could only have an affair with a rear guard, would be strong enough to overthrow it; and that his presence was more necessary at Smolensk, as a central point, for receiving accounts from all quarters. After having waited, about a league from this city, in a central position, between the roads from Smolensk and Moscow, Napoleon did not return to his head-quarters till about 5 o'clock in the evening, at which time he thought the affair must be concluded. But before leaving this place, he sent his aid de camp, General Gourgaud, to the King of Naples, having with him under his orders, several officers (and among others, M. Rohan Chabot.)* He ordered him to follow up the attack, on the Moscow road, and to cause the movements of Marshal Ney, the King of Naples, and the Duke of Abrantes, to be simultaneous. This officer was to bring the Emperor accounts of the battle; it was not until after this, that Napoleon returned to Smolensk.

From the dispositions ordered by the Emperor, the Russians would not have been able to defend the position of Valoutina. He had reason to believe, that the Duke of Abrantes, after having passed the Dnieper, would have continued his march towards the high road, and outflanking the Russian position on the left, would have forced them to a precipitate retreat. He knew that the division of Morand, of Davoust's corps, marching on the left of the high road, would equally outflank the Russian position on its right. Could he foresee that his orders would not have been executed?

Notwithstanding the entreaties of the King of Naples, and the orders and instructions of the Emperor, which were communicated by the aid-de-camp, Junot would never advance on the road in rear of the Russians. It appears as if this general who had given so many proofs of the most exalt-

* M. Rohan Chabot was aid-de-camp, to General Count de Narbonne.

ed courage, already experienced the effects of the disease which destroyed him sometime afterwards. The aid de camp seeing that this general would not execute the order he brought him, said, "My lord, what am I to say to the Emperor?" The Duke of Abrantes was surrounded by his staff, and appeared very much depressed. He replied with temper, "You will say, Sir, that I have halted, as the night has arrived. The aid-de-camp answered that there yet remained four hours of light, that Marshal Ney had suffered much in the attack he was obliged to make in front. All his solicitations were in vain, the Duke of Abrantes would not make any movement.

The affair being over, the aid-de-camp arrived at midnight at Smolensk, to lay the account of it before the Emperor. Napoleon greatly chagrined at the useless loss of blood at Valoutina, and by the death of General Gudin, demanded why Junot had not executed the order that had been given him. The officer related what had passed; the Emperor sent for Berthier, and observed to him, "that it appears Junot is incapable, he has not attempted to turn the Russian position, owing to him we have a bloody affair, and have lost Gudin. I do not wish that he should command the Westphalians—he must be replaced by Rapp, who speaks German, and will manage them well." The Prince of Neufchatel wrote the orders relative to this change, but afterwards, Marshal Duroc and other officers of high rank, old comrades of Junot, succeeded in calming Napoleon, and the general retained his command.

"He immediately ordered Davoust to support Ney and Murat." In the preceding chapter, Mr. de Segur has already sent him on this undertaking, and has observed that it was improper that the *most prudent* marshal should be put under the orders of the *most rash*. These two chapters, where he speaks of the same movement, have so little accordance, that it might be supposed he is treating of different events, which took place at two months interval; but all the details of Mr. de Segur are as confused as his recollections.

CHAPTER VIII.

The sketch which the author gives of the distribution of the rewards decreed by Napoleon, is interesting, but it wants details. Mr. de Ségur, who is in general diffuse, has omitted the following among others. The Emperor in visiting the position of Valontina, said to General Gerard, "this is a field of battle that I admire, four Russians for one Frenchman; General, this is as it should be." He afterwards praised the courage of the troops, recommended several times, order and discipline to them, and on arriving before the 7th light infantry, he said,—Point out to me the best officer in the regiment. Sire, they are all good. That is no reply, answer me like Themistocles, the best is myself, the next, my neighbour. Captain Moncey at this time wounded and absent, was named to him. What, said the Emperor, Moncey, who was my page, the son of the Marshal, designate another.—Sire he is the first—Well then, I will bestow the decoration on him.

Mr. de Ségur does not permit the mind of the reader to flag, he follows up this review, with that of the hospitals, where his taste for distressing scenes displays itself; he does not halt at Smolensk, but reverts to Witepsk, and even to Wilna, where he paints them in the most sombre colours. He appears to attribute to the Emperor all the sufferings and deprivations of the soldiers, and of which he gives a most exaggerated account.

To do justice, we would observe, and without fear of being contradicted, that of all commanders, whether ancient or modern, Napoleon was the most humane and attentive to the wounded, that he never forgot them in the enthusiasm of victory, that his first thought after a battle, was always for them. If his soldiers have sometimes been in want of food, of beds, of medicine, all necessary objects in the treatment of the wounded, the author may reproach the commissary general of the army. The Emperor had given all the orders, and placed at

the disposal of the military staff as ample means both in horses and men, as were furnished for the artillery. This last weapon, notwithstanding the battles which took place, has never been in want of ammunition. When the commissariat could find means of conveying supplies in such quantity as to require several thousand wagons,* surely they could have had little difficulty in furnishing some travelling wagons for the use of the surgeons, the neglect of this was the cause of the demand made by the medical staff at Smolensk, to General Lariboisiere, commandant of the artillery, to give up to them the tow lining of the caissons, for dressings for the wounded.

CHAPTER IX.

The author says that "Napoleon had employed two officers to sound the sentiments of the Russian people," to excite them to an insurrection, "but this attempt had only served to put them on guard against him." He then immediately adds, "this expedient was repugnant to Napoleon. Subsequently at Moscow, he received several addresses from different heads of families, offering to head partial insurrections, which were rejected." Thus the same page presents two material contradictions. We need not be astonished, as the author has accus-

* The artillery of the army before Smolensk, viz. 1, 3, 4, 5 and 8th corps, and the reserve of cavalry had a train composed of

57	cannon	12	pounders.
267	ditto	6	do.
32	do.	4	do.
2	do.	3	do.
16	mortars	6 inch	4 lines.
122	ditto.	5 do.	6 do.
490			

and 2,477 caissons of ammunition, which formed a total of 2,967 carriages, not comprising the travelling forges, pontoons and spare gun carriages.

tomed us to it. He says farther on, "that our looks excited horror"—that then "the Emperor perceived the enormous magnitude of the enterprise—that so long as he encountered nothing but kings, their defeat was but sport; but the kings being conquered he had now to do with people, and it was another Spain which he had found, at the other extremity of Europe." In Spain, the people rendered fanatics by the monks, among whom each family counted one of its members, rose against us. They were the principal party in the war, and if we may use the expression, they made it in person. At our entry into Russia, on the contrary, there were no combatants but regular troops. It was the government which made the war; the government had commanded the nation to retire before us; or rather it had ordered the soldiers to burn the dwellings as they retreated, which was a sure mode of forcing the inhabitants to retire. This is what occurred, and what Mr. de Ségur ought to have known. But where has he seen Russian *guerillas?* In what engagement had our troops to fight with peasants? Let Mr. de Ségur inform us, and we may see with him this *Spain which he found at the other extremity of Europe;* but nothing of this existed. As in all other parts of his book, we have exaggeration, confusion, and supposition! It was not until after the battle of Moskwa, and during our retreat, that we saw some peasants, excited by hopes of booty, massacre several of our wounded, who had fallen into their hands.

"He (Napoleon) was perplexed, hesitated, and at a stand—a fever of hesitation attacked him; his eyes turned towards Kief, Moscow, and Petersburg." "At Kief he should envelope Tchitchakoff and his army. By marching with St. Cyr upon St. Petersburg, he should envelope Wittgenstein. On the other hand, it was at Moscow he should strike Russia to the heart." "Of these three plans, the latter alone appeared practicable"—and yet, adds the author, "he had the history of Charles the XIIth before his eyes."

Would not one infer from these words, that Charles the XIIth was his guide, in this plan for attacking Moscow, when on the contrary, the fault of the Swedish monarch was that of

not having marched against that capital. There is no need of being a soldier to know this; it is sufficient to read the history of Charles the XIIth, not even that written by the Chamberlain Alderfeld, but simply that by Voltaire.

It is well known that from his arrival at Smolensk, having his line of operations and communications secured, since he was master of Poland and of Riga, the march of Charles the XIIth, was conformable to all the rules of strategy. The error this king committed, was that of quitting the route of Moscow to move upon the Ukrain, which in causing him to lose his line of operations, and preventing the arrival of Lewenhaupt with reinforcements of men and provisions, was the cause of all his disasters.

The position of Napoleon at Smolensk, which he made a great depot and point of support, permitted him to direct himself with greater security upon Moscow, from which he was but ten marches distant. Moreover, it was only on leaving Smolensk that he entered an enemy's territory. Eight marches in the rear were the magazines of Minsk and Wilna; in the third line those of Kowno, Gridlo, and Bialstock. Those of the fourth line were at Elbing and Marienverder, Thorn, Warsaw, &c. Still farther in the rear, those of Dantzic, Bromberg, and Posen; in short, in the sixth line, upon the Oder, the magazines established in the fortifications we occupied.

CHAPTER X.

The author gives the detail of a victory gained at Polotsk; it was of such importance that the Emperor might have been tranquil at this point and assured that the enemy would not move for a long time. This victory obtained for General St. Cyr the rank of Marshal. "Notwithstanding this success, the determination to proceed beyond Smolensk was too peril-

ous for Napoleon to decide on it alone; it was requisite that he should contrive to be drawn into it." How can we suppose that the Emperor, once master of Smolensk, would have stopped there, when the armies of Bagration and Barclay were retiring upon Moscow, and no good reason prevented his following and attacking them? For the Emperor was certain that the enemy would give battle in defence of his capital. Our author himself, in the conversations he attributes to the Emperor with his generals, in the preceding chapters, *on the disorganization of the army*, the great number of men remaining in the rear, &c. makes him say, that *he had no time to lose; that he must compel a peace, which was at Moscow.* If we admit these perpetual hesitations on the part of the Emperor, it is necessary to acknowledge that this great man had lost his mental faculties. But facts continually invalidate Mr. de Ségur's insinuations.

At Wilna and Witepsk, Napoleon is represented as a being without energy, will, and even reason, not knowing what to do, nor what course to take, giving no order, and expecting every thing from chance: and yet we see him providing for every thing, and directing, at the same time, both policy and war. We have seen him from his first march, overturning entirely the Russian plan of campaign, forcing them to abandon their line of operation, their magazines, their intrenched camp, and their communications, and so to speak, delivering up to us without a battle the whole of Lithuania. At Witepsk, at the moment when Mr. de Ségur represents the Emperor sunk in a profound lethargy, the re-united Russian generals coming to attack him; which was what he desired. They believed that he wished to move with the French army upon their right: they manœuvred in consequence, while with the rapidity of lightning he passed the Dnieper, and was on their left flank. These important movements were so well combined, their execution was so precise, that Barclay and Bagration, in spite of all their light troops, their numerous agents and partisans in the country, were not warned of their danger, except by the attack made on their rear against Smolensk, by that great captain whom they hoped to surprise upon their right, in scat-

tered cantonments, and as Mr. de Ségur exhibits us, in an almost continual state of torpor and indecision.

We have established how false is Mr. de Ségur's assertion. May we be permitted to offer our personal testimony? We received directly the orders of the Emperor; we saw him incessantly, both when they were given, and when an account of their execution was rendered to him, and we have never seen him such as he is depicted by M. the quarter-master of the palace.

[Extract of a confidential letter from the Duke of Frioul, grand-maréchal of the palace, which is in our hands.

"*The Bivouack before Witepsk, July 28th, evening.*

"The army, after three days fighting and repulsing the enemy, has arrived before Witepsk. All the corps are united this evening; to-morrow we shall have a battle, unless, as is feared, the enemy quit the position they have taken before us, to cover Witepsk. Yesterday and the day before, in the different combats which happened, and in which but few of our troops were engaged, the Russians were always vigorously repelled. We have taken prisoners, and many pieces of cannon. The Emperor *enjoys the best health.* We have lost General Roussel, of the army of Italy, who was accidentally killed by a patrol. Colonel Liedot, of the artillery, was mortally wounded while reconnoitring. Ferreri has lost a leg. We impatiently wait for news of the Duke of Tarentum having passed the Duna, and put in march the besieging equipage."]

Is it not injustice to say at the beginning of this chapter, that his lieutenants had done more than him? Ought the general in chief of an army of nearly 400,000 men, to be present at all the engagements which take place? He could not be every where at once, which was unfortunate. He gave his orders and instructions, made known the general character of his plans, and it was for his officers to conform to them as much as circumstances and localities would allow.

Certainly, if Napoleon had been with the 5th, 7th, and 8th corps, Bagration would not have passed the Dnieper; him and

his army would have been lost to Russia. If Napoleon had been with Schwartzemberg, the corps of Tormasone would have suffered the same fate; had Napoleon been with Ney, the Russian army would have paid dear at its sortie from Smolensk for the error its generals had committed in making a circular march in the midst of traversing roads almost impracticable, to regain the grand route from Moscow and the Dnieper to Soliowno.*

Marshal Davoust, who, in the seventh chapter, was placed by his *own wish* under the orders of the King of Naples, appears in this to have escaped from his ignorance; he obeys with a bad grace. Happily, as "Barclay," says Mr. de Ségur, "having retreated, without resistance, as far as Dorogobuje, Murat had no need of Davoust." We do not see any other *resistance* which could have prevented Barclay's flight, except his honour; certainly Mr. de Ségur did not wish to say this. The enemy soon appeared to stand; the King of Naples made his dispositions to attack. He wished to place Davoust on the left, but the latter wished to remain on the right.

"Discord reigned in the Russian camp, as well as in our advanced guard." The avowals made by Mr. de Ségur are worth remarking. "Confidence in their commander, that strength of arms, was wanting; his every step seemed a blunder; each resolution that was taken the very worst. The loss of Smolensk had soured all." These few words of the author's appear to us to refute all the eulogies he has given of the skilfulness of the leaders, and to the order which reigned in the Russian armies. Mr. de Ségur falls from contradiction to contradiction, because he constantly knows no better what he says than what he wished to say.

When Napoleon learned that the Russians were willing to give battle, he quitted Smolensk. The author appears to reproach him for having "neglected the hostile armies of Essen at Riga, of Wittgenstein before Polotsk, of Hœrtel before Bo-

* A general whom some persons have long opposed to the Emperor, (Moreau,) consulted by our allies on the best plan of attack against him, answered, "Combat Napoleon wherever he is not present." It seems that M. the palace officer is not of this opinion.

bruisk, and of Tchikhakoff in Volhynia; the whole number making 120,000 men, by whom he allowed himself to be surrounded with indifference. But according to his custom of not agreeing with himself, a few lines further on he says, "but 157,000 men were sufficient to destroy the Russian army, and take Moscow;" and he hastens to make a calculation which shows us throughout superior to the same corps of the enemy of whom he has above spoken. "He should thus have 280,000 men, including the Lithuanian and Polish levies, to rest himself upon, while with 155,000 more, he had made an incursion of ninety-three leagues, for such was the distance between Smolensk and Moscow." All this grand enumeration of forces, acting upon several points, has no other object than that of bringing forth this reproach; "but these 280,000 men were commanded by six different leaders—and the most elevated of them, who occupied the centre, was a minister of peace, and not a minister of war." What, then, would Mr. de Ségur have? Could a single army, under the immediate command of a single leader, have occupied a space so extensive as from the Baltic sea to the confines of Turkey? The minister of peace had no military command. His duties, as well as the title given him by Mr. de Ségur, were purely pacific. The actual leader of all those armies was the Emperor. He communicated immediately with them, and had no need of an intermediator.

BOOK VII.—CHAPTER I.

At its departure from Dorogobuje the army marched towards Moscow, the Emperor, with Murat, being in the centre, Davoust, Ney, and Poniatowski, on the right, and the army of Italy on the left. The central column following the same route as the Russians, had very few resources. "In order to live better it ought to have set out later every day, halt-

ed earlier, and then extended itself more on the flanks during the night." The question was not only how to live better, but to march in a military manner. Mr. de Ségur cannot here resist his disposition to censure, although he himself knows that what he indicates was *not at all possible.*

"It was a curious sight to observe the voluntary and continual efforts of so many men to follow a single individual to such great distances." The author well knows that in all the armies throughout the world, a great number of men are led by a single person. What object has he in making this reflection? It is true that Mr. de Ségur sees in the French army an army of volunteers, commanded by the Emperor, who was not accustomed to consider as volunteers the troops under his orders.

This chapter contains details relative to the soldiers' mode of living whose existence appears a prodigy to our author, and upon the pains taken by the military administration. Such exaggerations, familiar to the author, are to be remarked, as the hatred of the soldiers to one another, "which would infallibly have led to most sanguinary intestine conflicts, had not all been subsequently overtaken by the same misfortune, and involved in the horrors of a common disaster." Nothing is wanting to the above sentence but the word *fortunately.*

CHAPTER II.

Here again Mr. de Ségur refutes himself. In the preceding chapters he has represented Napoleon without foresight; and from the commencement of this, we are told that near Dorogobuje, this prince sent an order to Marshal Victor to move upon Smolensk.

The author reproaches Napoleon with having "dated from the heart of Old Russia a number of decrees." Does he not know that the Emperor, in quitting France, had left no regen-

cy, and that his government was so well organized, that from the heart of Russia he governed France as well as if he had been at the Thuilleries?

What does this circumstance mean of the bridge which the guard burned through heedlessness, though charged to guard it? In relating such a fact, does not the author wish to have it believed, that the disorder was such in the French army that the most disciplined corps in it behaved thus through *heedlessness?*

In an affair of the advanced guard, in which the King of Naples, hurried on by his boldness, was for a moment compromitted, the author says, "At the moment of the most imminent danger, a battery of the Prince of Eckmühl twice refused to fire. Its commanding officer alleged his instructions, which forbade him, on pain of being broke, to fight without orders from Davoust." A marshal had no right to break an officer. All he could do was to request it of the Emperor, by laying the facts before him; and, certainly, Napoleon would not have broken an officer for having obeyed the King of Naples, and fired on the Russians, being in battery before them. Moreover, the fact is about as true as that of the refusal of the artillery of the guard to fire on Smolensk, related in the fourth chapter of the sixth book.

Has not Mr. de Ségur related this pretended insubordination of a chosen corps, in order to make it be believed, that the greatest disorder reigned in the army? It is more probable that he has only presented this incident as a subject of quarrel between Murat and Davoust. He has profited by it on one hand, to make a pompous eulogium on the Russians, which in the mouth of Marshal Davoust, is at least misplaced; and on the other, to satirize the manner in which Murat conducted his troops! What he says of it is inexact; for the cavalry thus used could not continue the march for many days. It is unfortunate that the author does not give us Murat's answer; but he adds, "there was something in the misunderstanding between these chiefs, which did not displease him." The Emperor, doubtless, saw with satisfaction an emulation which was advantageous to the service, but every misunderstanding, if any had existed, would have afflicted him.

CHAPTER III.

The author falls into a new contradiction. He has stated that the quarrels of the leaders had something in them that did not displease him; here he says, "that the quarrels of his leaders *disturbed him*," (Napoleon.)

The quarrel of Murat and Davoust, which already fills nearly the whole of the second chapter, recommences in, and fills the latter part of this. These rivalries, related with such complaisance, are ridiculously exaggerated. They might have occupied the idler's of the guard-room, but they are so unimportant, have so little influence on the march of affairs, that to mention them, at such length, may lead to error, and give a false idea of our army. It is, moreover, a parody of the quarrels of Achilles and Ajax; Patroclus himself plays a part. In the Emperor's army every one obeyed. One would believe, that Mr. de Ségur's heroes, like those of Homer, were princes bringing troops, who were their subjects, to the train of the king of kings, which they commanded as masters, and who ceased to combat as soon as any phantasy induced the leader to shut himself up in his tent.

The fact is, that General Compans, whose division appeared to be the cause of quarrel between Murat and Davoust, had never, directly nor indirectly, any discussions with that prince. Murat, pursuing the enemy, managed his cavalry like a good general, and not as M. the palace officer relates. In many circumstances the infantry were necessary to him. Marshal Davoust had some differences with him on this subject near Biazona. The king sent General Belliard to the Emperor to explain to him the need he had of a division of infantry. Napoleon, after hearing Belliard, sent for General Compans, and said, General, what does this quarrel mean? it will retard our march. Compans answered, that he knew of no misunderstanding between the King of Naples and Marshal Da-

voust; but that he thought the advanced guard would march faster, if the infantry accompanied the cavalry of the king, who often was stopped by the least defile, or the repair of a bridge, and that with some infantry such inconveniences would not take place. I am of the same opinion, said Napoleon: it is well; return to your division. A few moments after, the Prince of Neufchatel was sent to Marshal Davoust, to inform him, that in future, Compan's division would march with the advanced guard, under the King of Naples. The good effects of this arrangement were soon apparent.

CHAPTER IV.

The author attributes to the Russians a bitter censure upon Barclay de Tolly, to reply to it by a brilliant apology for the conduct and character of this general of the enemy. He agrees that Barclay *had failed* in suffering himself to be surprised at Wilna—but it was remarked, *that subsequently at Witepsk he had forestalled Napoleon.* We pray Mr. de Ségur to explain to us the manœuvres of this Russian general which he vaunts so much, when he quitted the environs of Smolensk, to come and attack us in our cantonments at Witepsk, which he mistook so far as to believe us on his right, while we were moving on his left flank. We ask him to explain all these comings and goings of the Russian army at this period, from Smolensk to Roudnia and Nadeva. We request him to explain if Barclay had well formed his plan of retiring before us, why he fought at Smolensk, instead of occupying that town only by a rear guard, having already sent the corps of Bagration towards Dorogobuje. We further demand of him to explain why Barclay exposed all his army to be attacked and destroyed by ours, in his retreat by the cross-roads to move upon Soloniewo, while the great route to Moscow, which was a much shorter road to this point, was only defended by a rear guard

of Cossacs. This conduct was so imprudent, that if the movement of the Duke of Abrantes had been executed as ordered, the troops which Barclay subsequently caused to return by the Moscow route towards Smolensk, to sustain this rear guard, would have been cut off, and the rest of his army would have with very great difficulty have reached this road.

In the same chapter, Mr. de Ségur expresses himself thus on the subject of a flag of truce: Our out-posts were badly guarded—*the same negligence was perceptible*—every *one was asleep*. We make but one observation in relation to this; which is, that the quarter-master of the palace never went to the out-posts, and consequently he cannot be sure of what he has advanced. Moreover, this episode is deficient in suitableness: for if we guarded ourselves so badly before so experienced a general as Barclay de Tolly, why did he not carry off the Emperor from head-quarters?

CHAPTER V.

From the time that Kutusoff took the command, every thing announced an approaching battle.—However, the Emperor is no longer the same man to Mr. de Ségur. He is not a worn man, without energy, borne down by the weight of his enterprise, or pushed by fatality towards his ruin—but a superior genius, making his arrangements "with that tranquillity of mind peculiar to extraordinary men; beholding the whole country with that eye of a conqueror which sees every thing at once, and without confusion; which penetrates through obstacles, sets asides accessaries, discovers the capital point, and fixes it with the look of an eagle." In short, despairing to pourtray all the grandeur of the hero, he exclaims, "How much the historian is at a loss for words to express the name of a man of genius." However, as his rare eulogies must always have a corrective, he shows us humanity as the slave

who daily reminded the kings of Persia, that they were men; and says, "but at the sight of the Gjatz, which poured its waters into the Wolga, he who had conquered so many rivers, felt anew the first emotions of his glory; he was heard to boast of being the master of those waves destined to visit Asia, as if they were going to announce his approach, and open the way for him to that quarter of the globe." These are the hyperboles of a rhetorician, and Napoleon was not one.

"Compans skilfully availed himself of the undulations of the ground; its elevations served as platforms to his guns for battering the redoubt, and it screened his infantry while drawing up into columns of attack. The sixty-first marched foremost; the redoubt was taken by a single effort, and with the bayonet. But Bagration sent reinforcements by which it was retaken. Three times did the sixty-first recover it from the Russians, and three times was it driven out again; but at length, it maintained itself in it, covered with blood and half destroyed."

This relation contains nearly as many false assertions as words. But perhaps the author is excusable; he saw nothing of what he describes. He has no other guides than the narratives published relative to the Russian war, for the most part by persons who have neither seen nor participated in the military movements they detail.

This redoubt, armed with twelve pieces of heavy cannon, had been thrown up on a hillock, situated between the village of Schwardino and the wood which covers the old road from Smolensk to Moscow.

On the side next the village, the ascent of this hill was the least steep, but between this ascent and the wood, was a plain of some extent. In front of the redoubt, and distant about sixty toises, rises a small knoll. General Compans, whom we have seen in the preceding chapters, marching with the advanced guard, was ordered by the Emperor to attack this redoubt. Napoleon considered it highly important to gain possession before night of this position, which covered the left centre of the Russian line. For this reason, without waiting for the other divisions of the first corps to arrive, he ordered

the attack. In the rear and on the flanks of the redoubt, were seen strong columns of Russians, infantry, cavalry, and artillery, amounting to fifteen thousand men.

General Compans soon drove the enemy from the villages of Fomkino and Doronino, and forced them to return to their position on the side of the hill. He hastened to throw five or six companies of Voltigeurs on the knoll which we have mentioned. These scattered over it, and covering themselves as much as possible, were ordered to keep up a constant fire on the artillery men at the guns on the redoubt, in which there was left but few infantry. A battalion was placed in the rear of the knoll to support the Voltigeurs.

The artillery of Compan's division took up a position which enabled them to attack that of the redoubt and the Russians who flanked it. Between the right of Compans and the wood, advanced part of the cavalry of the King of Naples; but the enemy's artillery and cavalry kept this in check.

General Compans at the head of the 57th and the 61st regiments, directed his march on the right of the hill on which was the redoubt. At the same moment he sent General Dupelain with the 25th to the left, on the side of Schwardino—he posted the 111th still farther to the left, in order to turn the right of the Russians.—In his first movement General Compans was attacked by masses of the enemy's cavalry, but he skilfully availed himself of the circumstances of the ground and of a fence, which enabled him to continue his movement, notwithstanding the cavalry, and even to repulse them with considerable loss. A murderous fire soon took place on this side, between the two regiments of Compans, and the Russian infantry, which supported the left flank of the redoubt. They were not more than ten toises distant, and the troops on two gullies opposite to the ground, were covered up to the breast. This bloody fire lasted three quarters of an hour; the excitement and noise prevented the orders of the general to advance with the bayonet from being heard, a manœuvre which would have cost us less.

On their side, the Russian generals finding that they suffered still more than us from this close firing, in vain endeavoured

to bring up their troops for the same purpose; night approached and nothing was decided.

Compans, willing at all hazards to get out of this terrible situation, took a battalion of the 57th, and making an opening through the fence on his right, he ordered it to advance by divisions in close column, covering four pieces of artillery charged with grape shot, which had followed in his rear. He led this battalion to the extreme left of the Russians, flanking the redoubt. When, at fifty toises from them, he unmasked his battery, which caused a dreadful destruction of the enemy. Compans profiting by the disorder which he observed in their ranks, charged with his battalion at the point of the bayonet. The enemy giving way at this point, the disorder was soon general, they abandoned the position they had so long defended, and retired on their second line, thus leaving the redoubt in our power. This battalion of the 57th which decided the affair, lost its Major, and had 200 men killed and wounded in advancing on the enemy. While this passed on our right, the 111th, who were on the left, followed the general movement, but the flames of the village of Schwardino, which was on fire, permitted the Russian general to see that he was followed by only a single regiment on this side—he immediately made a charge on it with his cavalry. This regiment sustained the shock with firmness, but in this charge it lost its two regimental pieces. The Emperor expected that Prince Poniatowski's marching on the right would greatly assist the attack on the redoubt. But notwithstanding all the efforts of this Prince, the many obstacles he encountered in the wood, retarded his march, and only one of his batteries assisted in the battle. The redoubt was not stormed, the Russians abandoned it when the attack of the 107th obliged them to retreat. We found all its artillery in it. The artillerests, the horses, all had been destroyed by the fire of our Voltigeurs. It is false that this redoubt, once in our power, ever was retaken by the enemy; it was, therefore, impossible there should be found any of our dead in it.

"Next day, when the Emperor reviewed that regiment, he

inquired where was its third battalion? In the redoubt! replied the Colonel."

From the account we have given of the events which took place at this point, it is seen how ridiculous is this answer, attributed to the Colonel of the 61st; but to tell the truth, Mr. de Ségur is not the author of it. He has taken this *trait* from Labaume, who has derived, nobody knows where. The fact is, that no French battalion entered the redoubt by main force, for as we have explained, it was the brilliant attack of the battalion of the 57th, which induced the Russian corps, to whom was intrusted the defence of the hill on which was the redoubt, to retire; a movement which left it in our power. The author says that it was the bravery of a Spanish regiment which caused the defeat of the enemy—this fact is also incorrect; when the 111th advanced towards the right of the enemy, and was charged by the Russian cavalry, the regiment of Joseph Napoleon, forming part of Friant's division, came up to support it, but the fire of the 111th was sufficient to repulse the Russians. All this chapter partakes of the ignorance of the author, as to what took place in the affair of the 5th.

CHAPTER VI.

The first rays of the sun, on the 6th of September, showed us the Russian army, in the same posititions they had occupied the evening before, and we concur with Mr de Ségur, that there was a general feeling of exultation. He deduces the motives of this, in the following words. "At last this vague, languid, and wandering war, where our efforts destroyed us, and into which we plunged, regardless of consequences, was arrested; we had reached a goal, a limit, and every thing was about to be decided!"

CHAPTER VII.

Whilst the Emperor was occupied in examining the Russian positions, the Prince of Echmülh came to him, to announce that he had reconnoitered their left, and begged that he might be allowed, to turn it with his five divisions and the corps of Poniatowski. Napoleon refused to accede to the plan, Davoust insisted, on the feasibility of it, but in vain. Now, this plan, is probably a subsequent idea of Mr. de Ségur's, deduced from the opinions of others, of what might have been effected, at the battle of Moskowa. He ordered Davoust, to return to his post, "murmuring against a prudence, which he thought unreasonable." Among a host of reasons, which might be adduced for the refusal of the Emperor, what need was there, of saying, that "age had rendered Napoleon less enterprising than he was?" Was Napoleon an old man at 43 years of age? The fact is, that even now, when we know exactly the force of the Russians at this battle, and their position, no one can decide what might have been the result, if the movement proposed by Davoust, had been carried into execution. For, to succeed, it should have been performed during the night; but it is well known, how hazardous such marches are, made through a wooded and unknown tract of country, and almost without a guide. Even in cases of much more simple manœuvres, and where the results would be less important, we have seen what took place near Smolensk, with Junot's corps; added to which, it is extremely probable, that the enemy having an immense number of light troops, would have soon been apprised of this movement, and hence, would either have frustrated it, or have retreated, and thus, the battle we so anxiously sought, would have been retarded.

How Mr de Ségur, after having represented the army as disorganised, dying of hunger and fatigue, feeble and disheartened, can tell us, "that it was sound, supple, nervous, like those manly bodies which having just lost the plumpness of youth,

display forms more masculine and strongly marked; still, during the several days he had marched in the midst of it, he had found it silent, from that silence which is imposed by great expectation or great astonishment, like nature, the moment before a violent tempest, or crowds at the instant of an extraordinary danger.

"The temerity of the situation, into which he had urged the the army," appears evident to the author, "but there was no rest for it, but in death or victory." But on what did he rely? "on the curiosity of his soldiers to see Moscow; perhaps to plunder."

Always *plunder*. When man is in youth, he finds it difficult to avoid enthusiasm on some subject, and it is seldom that glory, friendship, and gratitude, do not sway our actions. But the officer of the palace, is above these feelings; neither the glory of the army, feeling for his associates, or gratitude to his benefactor, prevent him from viewing the army and the soldiers composing it, in any other light than as plunderers, and, in the chieftain who commands them a disposition to permit it.

The proclamation to the army, "will some day be deemed admirable," says Mr de Ségur, but why is it not so at present? whatever is great and excellent, will always be so.

CHAPTER VIII.

Our author represents Kutusof, as endeavouring in the name of religion, to excite the fanaticism and enthusiasm, of his half barbarous troops. Abuse is heaped on Napoleon. Let the two proclamations be compared: Mr de Ségur tells us, that "this rude and simple people, who had not yet advanced beyond sensations, but who for that very reason, were so much more formidable as soldiers, less diverted from obedience, by reasoning, confined by slavery to a narrow circle, in which

they are reduced to a small number of sensations, which are the only sources of their wants, wishes, and ideas."

Mr. de Ségur has a singular idea of a soldier. What! that he is efficient in proportion to the debased state of his native country? This maxim is contradicted by the history of Greece and Rome, who, at the moment of their most glorious triumphs, were the most civilized nations of the world; but alas! this will not be confirmed by the example of the French troops, who, although belonging to the most polished nation of modern times, *are only the less formidable.* Trusting that Mr. de Ségur will not take offence, we assert, that the glory of the French soldiers is attributable as much to their innate bravery, as to a multitude of feelings arising from a state of perfect civilization, producing a bias to glory.

A few lines lower down, he supposes that the Russians are rather idolaters than Christians, and "that they had converted that religion of the soul, which is wholly intellectual, and moral, into one entirely physical and material, to bring it to the level of their brute and short capacity."

These reflections may be exceedingly beautiful, but it is not a metaphysical and ideological dissertation, that the reader would anticipate from the pen of the historian, who is describing the battle of Moscow; a simple recital of facts would possess much greater attractions for him.

To the just representation made by the author of the reception of the portrait of the King of Rome, he should have added these words of the Emperor, which testify his deep emotion, and the feelings which agitated him in the midst of the enthusiastic exclamations of his troops. Take it away, he will but too soon witness a field of battle!

Colonel Fabvier, aid-de-camp to Marshal Marmont, having announced to the Emperor the loss of the battle of Aropiles, Mr. de Ségur tells us, that "the Emperor received graciously the aid-de-camp of the vanquished general; on the eve of a battle, the fate of which was so uncertain, he felt disposed to be indulgent to a defeat." This fact, and the conjoined reflection, are wholly incorrect. The Emperor testified the most violent disappointment, when he learnt that Marshal Marmont

had compromised the French army, to satisfy a personal ambition, in giving battle without waiting, and in the face of the orders he had received, for the arrival of Soult, which would have insured him the victory.

Colonel Fabvier, who was imbued with the most noble and elevated feelings, conceived his honour compromised by these reproaches of the Emperor, and the next day saw him fighting on foot, as a volunteer, in the most perilous situations, as if to prove, that the soldiers of the army of Spain did not yield in courage to those of the army of Russia.

The details that our author gives of the manner in which Napoleon passed the night, are a mass of unconnected ideas, misapplied words, broken conversations, and of interrupted soliloquies. Who would recognise, in his representation, the general who had commanded in fifty pitched battles? From his statement it would be supposed that Napoleon had never been engaged with an enemy. This passage must have been written from notes, furnished by some valet-de-chambre, to an historian too little acquainted with the Emperor to appreciate their truth.

Napoleon, who is encouraged by finding "his army sound, supple, nervous, &c." "became frightened at the destitute state of his soldiers;" "weak and famished as they were;" Mr. de Ségur makes him say, "how could they support a long and terrible shock?" Observe that he is speaking on the same day, and of the same army. A similar contradiction exists in the portraiture of the Emperor, whom he figures, in the day, "calm and with the look of an eagle;" during the night, "overwhelmed with the fears and solicitudes of a weak child, thrown unexpectedly into an unforeseen situation."

CHAPTER IX.

The 7th of September, at 5 o'clock in the morning, Napoleon posted himself near the redoubt which had been taken the preceding day. From this central position, he despatched many officers to carry into execution the orders he promulgated during the night. The author says, that "the Emperor's attention was then directed towards his right, when, all at once, near 7 o'clock, the battle began upon his left." This is altogether incorrect. The firing commenced from a battery on our right. Does the officer of the palace, in thus making it commence on the left, intend to open his account of the battle with the partial attack of one regiment, (the 106th) which owed its safety to the 92d, "voluntarily running up to its assistance." It might be inferred, from such a commencement, that there was no general present to give orders, and to be obeyed. We will remark, by the way, that this 92d regiment is the same of which Mr. de Ségur had attacked the reputation at the battle of Ostronow.

"It was Napoleon himself who had just ordered his left wing to make a violent attack—he multiplied his orders, used the most violent excitations, and engaged a battle in front, the plan of which he had conceived in an oblique order."

According to the general orders for the battle, Prince Eugene should have attracted the attention of the enemy to their centre and right wing, by an attack on Borodino, in order, 1st, to facilitate the movement of Prince Poniatowski, in the direction of the old road from Smolensk to Moscow: 2dly, to prevent the enemy from weakening his right, in order to reinforce his extreme left, which was to be attacked by Marshal Davoust.

"Rapp, rushing to replace Compans, again led his soldiers on, with fixed bayonets, and at a running pace, against the enemy's redoubt."

The Emperor, pleased with the mode by which General

Compans had made himself master of the redoubt of Schwardino, on the 5th,* confided to him the attack on the breastworks, at the extreme left of the Russian position. This general had under him, his own division, and that of General Dessaix. As soon as the cannonade commenced, he formed his division into two parallel masses. That on the right was destined to draw the enemy from the copse, and thus to cover the movement of the brigade on the left, which marched directly on the redoubt. The division of Dessaix was in a second line, to act as a reserve. At the moment General Teste (with the 25th and 57th regiments) entered the redoubt, (at half past 7 o'clock in the morning,) Compans was wounded by a ball, in the shoulder. This general, who had replaced General Dupelain, in the command of the division, committed it to the charge of Dessaix, who was also wounded a short time afterwards. It was *him* that General Rapp succeeded. Marshal Davoust, who was on the right of the grand battery, was wounded about the same time.†

It was a great misfortune, that the whole of these officers should thus have been wounded, at almost the same moment.

The wound of General Compans, who alone knew the in-

* On the 6th, the eve of the battle, the Emperor sent for Compans, to inform him, that he destined him to attack the enemy's redoubt, placed at our extreme right. Marshal Ney was present. Compans proposed to march his division through the wood, to avoid the enemy's fire. Ney thought it would embarrass the attack, but Compans, who had reconnoitred the spot, declared that it was a passable copse; the Emperor approved of his plan. General Compans added, that what he feared was, that the enemy would throw his right into the wood, and thus place himself between Poniatowski and his division. Napoleon answered, "you are right, but to counteract this danger, you may take the division of Dessaix."

† General Sorbier, sent by Napoleon to the Prince of Eckmülh, reached him at the moment a bullet passed through his horse. The hammer of one of his pistols, forced into the holster, gave the Marshal so severe a contusion that he was thrown down. General Sorbier, for a moment, thought he was dead, and announced it to the Emperor, who made no reply. But in a few moments an officer came up and informed Napoleon, that the Prince of Eckmülh was again at the head of his troops: The Emperor exclaimed with fervour—God be thanked!

tentions of the Emperor, was mortal; this caused some indecision in the movement of the first corps.

According to our historian, Rapp, who had been wounded whilst leading Compan's division, tells the Emperor, "that it would require the guard to finish." Mr. de Ségur apparently believes that the wound General Rapp had received must have disordered his mind. For would he not have given a proof of insanity in proposing to the Emperor to call up the reserve at the very commencement of a battle? But he may since have heard officers discussing this action, and may have heard them observe, that if the guard, both infantry and cavalry, had been brought up, the results of the victory would have been more brilliant. In his system of always criticising Napoleon, he has laid hold of this idea, which he dwells on in the whole course of his narrative, without paying any attention to the time that would be most favourable, and admissible for such a movement. This attack of the guard, which, in all cases, should only be resorted to, to decide or complete a victory, the author thinks, should have taken place at the commencement of the action. He must possess but little military knowledge not to be aware that it is a principle, never to engage the reserve until the last extremity, and that the skill of a general consists, in part, in forcing the enemy to bring up his reserve first. If Mr. de Ségur had studied the different battles in which the Emperor commanded, he would have seen that it was oftentimes owing to this maxim that he was victorious.

"Ney then, with his three divisions reduced to 10,000 men, hastened into the plain."

The corps of Marshal Ney was placed in the centre, having the corps of the Duke of Abrantes as a second line. His right rested on the left of Marshal Davoust; "he did not hasten into the plain, to the assistance of Davoust." He executed the orders he had received from the Emperor, to attack conjointly with Marshal Davoust, the three redoubts that protected the enemy's left. The wounds of Generals Compans, of Dessaix, and of Marshal Davoust, having caused some wavering in the manœuvres of the first corps, its attack did not produce all

the effect that was anticipated. The movement of Ney's three divisions was executed with astonishing accordance, and was completely successful. Encouraged by this attack, the two divisions of Davoust re-attacked the breastwork, and the three redoubts fell in our hands at 9 o'clock in the morning.

According to Mr. de Ségur, the Russians marched up towards noon, in order to retake the redoubts. "The French," says he, "who were still in the disorder of victory, were astonished, and retreated." This event appears to have been copied from the Russian gazettes. It is false, that the French, during the whole course of the battle, ever abandoned the redoubts taken by them at its commencement. The corps of Davoust and Ney successfully defended them against the reiterated attacks of the Russians. The enemy's general perceiving, from the moment of the first attacks, that he had posted his right in a disadvantageous position, hastened to bring up the corps of Baggowout to his left, already weakened by the loss of the redoubts.

The movement that Mr. de Ségur supposes to have been effected by the Westphalians, the mistake he attributes to them, that of firing on our own troops, and the disorder, which, according to him, this occasioned, are circumstances equally controvertible.

The Westphalians, as we have observed, were in reserve in the rear of Marshal Ney; the Emperor, perceiving the failure of Davoust's attack, ordered them to the right of that marshal, thus uniting his corps to that of Poniatowski, which was stationed near Utilsa. It was, therefore, in the beginning of the battle, and not at the middle, as our author asserts, that this corps was posted on the right of Marshal Davoust, and to sustain his attack, not to succour the Poles. It appears from the details Mr. de Ségur gives on this subject, that he did not go *en amateur* to view the battle at this point.

Who could have informed him that our soldiers, pushed by the enemy's cavalry, "were running round the parapet in a state of the greatest panic, and that they only wanted an outlet, to run away?" Again he tells us, "at the same time Ney had again formed his divisions." When was it, they were

ever broken? All these assertions want credibility, as well as the portrait he gives of Murat: "with one hand he fought, with the other he elevated and waved his plume." The author having taken no part in this battle, has suffered himself to be carried away by his recollections of *the Iliad*, and even to imitate one of its descriptions, without paying attention to changes of time and mode of warfare.

CHAPTER X.

"This vigorous action (the capture of the village of Semenowskow) opened us the road to victory; it was necessary to rush into it, but Murat, Ney, and Davoust, were exhausted; they halted, and while they were rallying their troops, they sent to Napoleon to ask for reinforcements. Napoleon was then seized with a hesitation which he never before displayed."

It is a little singular to observe, Mr. de Ségur, thus causing Murat, Ney, and Davoust, to demand reinforcements when they were victorious, and at the moment he tells us, that Bagration had withdrawn his left towards Psarewow, that is three quarters of a league backwards, which would have left us masters of the field of battle, hitherto occupied by the Russian left wing. *The hesitation which he never before displayed* of Napoleon, demonstrates a defect of memory, to say the least of it, on the part of the historian. For hitherto he has constantly held him up to us as tormented with a *feverish hesitation.*

We are now presented with Bagration, who returns from Psarewow, to attack Semenowskow. Friant's division is before it. The officer of the palace informs us that, "his soldiers began to give way; that Murat seized one of their leaders who was on the retreat, by the collar, and exclaimed, "what

are you about?" the colonel pointing to the ground, covered with half his troops, answered, "you see well enough; it is impossible to stand here." "Very well, I will remain," replied the king. These words stopped the officer, he looked Murat steadily in the face, and turning round, coolly said, "you are right! Soldiers, face to the enemy, let us go and be killed!"

Without asking by whom this conversation was related to Mr. de Ségur, we will remark, that there was not for a single moment any disorder in Friant's division, which had hitherto been in reserve, and on that account, the Emperor had ordered it to take possession and maintain Semenowskow. In this division, which contributed so much to the victory, as in the whole French army, there did not exist a colonel whom, at the head of his regiment, it was necessary to conduct against the enemy, by his collar, and who would have given birth to so stupid an order as *Soldiers face the enemy, let us go and be killed.* If all Mr. de Ségur relates on this subject be true, this sole expression, "face to the enemy, let us go and be killed," should have convinced the king of Naples, that he who used such language, was incapable of carrying his words into effect.

"Meanwhile Murat had just sent back Borelli to the Emperor, to ask assistance. That officer insisted, and the Emperor promised the young guard, but scarcely had it advanced a few paces, when he himself called out to it, to halt."

At the moment when our right wing was victorious, the enemy passed the Kolocza, with the whole of Platoff's cavalry, and that of General Ouwaroff, and made a vigorous attack on our left. The light cavalry of General Onnano were driven in, and our infantry at this point were obliged to be formed into squares, by regiments. Prince Eugene was in some danger. It was at this time that the Emperor learnt the disposition of the enemy to resume the offensive on our right. It was therefore natural that he should not have sent them the reserve, before he ascertained the situation of affairs on our left. As to the solicitations of Borelli, a personage of whom the author has not even mentioned the rank, does he believe that any one will credit such tales?

We shall not refute the ridiculous assertion that "the Count de Lobau made the guard advance by degrees, under pretence of dressing the line."

Could a corps of such size, under the eye of the Emperor, steal a movement, if I may be allowed the expression?

"Fortunately the artillery of the reserve advanced at that moment,—Lauriston had obtained the Emperor's consent to that manœuvre."

If Mr. de Ségur is to be believed, Napoleon would not issue any orders, if his generals had not forced them from him. The artillery of the guard, commanded by General Sorbier, had been in battery from the commencement of the action. The Emperor perceiving that the whole reserve of the enemy, infantry, cavalry, and artillery, had been brought up, for the purpose of retaking the position of Semenowskow, ordered the corps of Ney, the cavalry of the King of Naples, and the artillery of the reserve, to the support of Friant's division. The division of the young guard, (Roguet) was also placed as a second line, in the rear of Friant's division: of this, Mr. de Ségur does not say a word. It was the Emperor who ordered this movement, and it never occurred to the mind of any one to advise or offer to execute it; Napoleon commanded, and was obeyed.

The author says, "the whole of that day the Emperor was sitting down or walking about leisurely—at a great distance from the battle." And he forgets that a few pages before, he makes mention of the bullets which fell at his feet. He says, "he merely made some gestures of melancholy resignation—that his calmness was dead, a mild and sluggish inactivity. Some fancied they traced in it that dejection which is generally the follower of violent sensations."

The author should have informed us what were the violent sensations the Emperor had experienced before the battle, to reduce him to the state he describes. "Others, that he had already become indifferent to every thing, even to the emotion of battles. Several remarked, that the calm constancy and *coolness* which great men display on these great occasions,

turn in the course of time, to phlegm and heaviness, when age has worn out their springs."

Must we again repeat that Napoleon was then in the flower of age and of constitution. Does the officer of the palace mean to speak seriously, when he utters such assertions, and which tend to make it believed that the Emperor was a man devoid of both moral and physical strength, a man fallen in a state of complete demoralization, and insensible to every thing. Would not the generals, and officers who approached Napoleon, all the leaders and soldiers of the guard perceived this, if it had been the case. Independently of these witnesses, do not facts speak. It is certain, that from two o'clock, on the morning of the 6th, the Emperor had visited every corps in his army, spoken to all the generals, reconnoitred and studied in detail, the situation of the enemy, and nature of the ground on which the battle would take place. In this manner he passed the day of the 6th; it was not until the night that he prescribed the manner in which the Russian army was to be attacked. After having issued all the orders to the different corps, he took repose for two hours, during the night of the 6th and 7th, the remainder of which he passed in receiving reports and issuing orders. On the 7th, before 5 o'clock in the morning, he was on horseback, and before the redoubt of Schwardino, a central position, from which he could observe all the events of the battle. In his rear, was the reserve (the old guard.) This, by his orders, was displayed in columns by battalions, at the distance of sixty paces, which caused a belief in the enemy, that it was twice as numerous than it really was. The young guard was in advance. He thus kept his picked troops under his own eye, to be made use of according to circumstances, if the victory in spite of all his calculations should be undecided.

In this position, the Emperor was placed in a salient point, from the enemy's line, which formed a kind of triangle opposite ours; from here he could hasten rapidly either to our right or left wing, at the same time be enabled to act against the enemy's centre.

In an army of more than 100,000 men, it is impossible for a commander in chief to follow exactly all the movements on the right and left; on this account such an army is divided into corps, which are subdivided into divisions and brigades, each division is organized in such manner as to manœuvre separately, and to depend on itself. The commander in chief is the soul of this army. Each of the commanders of the *Corps d'Armee* must follow up the orders he has received, in the manner that appears to him most suitable to place and circumstances. Unity in action does not consist in the general in command seeing and executing every thing, and the generals under him being mere instruments. If this were the case, an army should never consist of more than 6,000 men; added to which the different commanders having to inform him what movements were necessary by the events which might occur, the general in command would be liable for the faults they might commit. It would be preposterous to wish the commander in chief of an army of 100,000 men, to be always inspecting his line, and not to depend on the generals under his orders.

On the contrary, in a battle, a general must depend on all his officers, for then the original plan may be modified, and even entirely changed by circumstances, from the general down to the major or captain of artillery, who requires no order to place his pieces, to fall back or advance a few paces, in order to occupy an advantageous position. It may indeed be said, that every one commands in a battle, even to the corporal who is posted with a few marksmen on a bridge or in a defile. To view a battle in a different point of view, or to suppose that so many thousand men are mere machines, that the general in command moves as he pleases, is the height of absurdity. Thus as we have said, the commander in chief is the soul of the battle; he overlooks all, and retains under his own eye a reserve in order to counteract any unforeseen occurrence; it is when he wishes to effect too much that he destroys the unity of action.

Mr. de Ségur, who describes to us the Emperor as engrafted to the spot on which he had placed himself, ought to recollect, that it was from this central position of Napoleon's, that he

despatched the order to Prince Poniatowski to commence the attack; that it was there that Marshal Davoust, slightly wounded, communicated to him the wavering that had taken place in his attack, and that the Emperor, highly displeased, had remanded him to the head of his corps; it was there, when by the vigorous co-operation of Marshal Ney, the three redoubts on the Russian left fell into our hands, and that Napoleon saw that the enemy was withdrawing troops from his right, in order to march them on Semenowskow; it was from thence, we say, that he sent the order to General Friant to take possession of the village, advising him that he should be supported by the artillery of the reserve.

Whilst the Emperor was giving these orders on his right, an irruption of Cossacks and cavalry took place on our left, beyond Borodino, he sent to this place the legion of the Vistula, (Claparede,) which had been in reserve with the guard. Afterwards, when he learnt that the enemy was vigorously assaulting our right, and that the attack of the Poles had been repulsed, he sent an order to the corps of Junot to post itself on the right of Davoust, to establish a communication between that general and the Polish corps. To replace the Westphalians of Junot, who were posted in the rear of Marshal Ney, he sent him Roguet's division of the guard. Finally, when he was informed that the attacks of the enemy on our right were repulsed, and that our artillery was making a horrible carnage in these masses; it was from this central position he sent the order to the King of Naples to make a grand charge with his cavalry, in wheeling on his right wing. Whilst these events took place, he despatched an order to Prince Eugene to make another attack, and to carry the great redoubt. The execution of these different orders had the result the Emperor anticipated; victory decided for us.

This account sufficiently explains the reasons which determined Napoleon to remain in the position he had chosen, and not to change it without cogent reasons.

Thus, he was seen to traverse the whole of our line of battle; when the first line of the enemy was forced, by the capture of the redoubt in the centre, what would have been the con-

sequence, if the Emperor had proceeded to the right, towards the Polish troops, when our left was attacked? and what have happened, if he had been at Borodino, when our extreme right was outflanked by the enemy?

This short detail will enable the reader to judge for himself, why the Emperor remained at his post, waiting the execution of the orders he had issued. We repeat, that he had at command a reserve to counteract unforeseen occurrences; this could not be made use of, since the victory had never, for an instant, been doubtful. All military men agree in the principle, that during a battle, the general reserve ought never to be brought into action, except in cases of absolute necessity; that is, to prevent a defeat. It was from having neglected this principle, that General Melay, almost the conqueror at Marengo, lost his army and all Italy. Believing the victory certain, he pushed on his reserve to render it more decisive. Dessaix's division arrived, the enemy's army could not rally, and it was annihilated.

Still more remarkable examples might be adduced in support of this observation, if there was any necessity for them. Napoleon had, besides, powerful reasons not to neglect this great law of war. Having before him an enemy backed by his capital, and in the way of receiving reinforcements; he himself eight hundred leagues from his country, what would have been the consequence if the battle had been renewed the next day, as was the intention of Kutusof? The French troops, notwithstanding their victory, and perhaps from this very victory, might have been repulsed. A fresh corps of 20,000 picked men alone might have gained the battle.

Moreover, what are these "farther excitements that were not wanting," only that the Emperor had sufficient strength of mind to excuse them, and to appreciate their true value, and to feel all that was imposed on him by his duty as commander in chief.

Mr. de Ségur supposes that the movement by which our right wing advanced, in wheeling on the centre, was made by accident, and without the knowledge of the Emperor. We cannot conceive who can have given him this information. This move-

ment was ordered by the general plan of the battle, and took place in consequence of an order from Napoleon to the King of Naples.

"In this manner, about midday, the whole of the French right wing, Ney, Davoust, Murat,—presented itself on the half opened flank of the remainder of the hostile army, of which they could see the whole interior, the reserves, the abandoned rears, and even the commencement of the retreat."

The Russian left wing, after having seen all its efforts on the village of Semenowskow, completely fail, and being pushed by the vigorous charge of the cavalry of the King of Naples, retired on its second position. Its left was in advance of Psarewo; its right was in communication with the corps of Doctorof in the rear of Gorki, and protected in front by the grand redoubt. This position was still very strong. Our historian asserts, that it was at this period of the battle, that General Belliard came to the Emperor to request that the guard should be detached to this point. But this General could not have said, "that a ravine and thin copse separated us from the Moscow road, on which were to be seen a confused crowd of flying and wounded soldiers, and carriages retreating." For, as we have already observed, the Russian line which covered this road, was still formidable. "The Emperor, however, still hesitated, and ordered that general to go and look again." It would appear that the zeal of this general had misled him the first time, for he speedily returned to announce that the enemy was making preparations to defend himself. Yet he insists on having the guard; "otherwise," says he, "it would require a second battle to terminate the first."

The part that Mr. de Ségur has assigned to General Belliard, does not by any means suit him; it should be that of a blunderer, and not of a skilful general. The speeches attributed to Marshal Bessieres and the Emperor fully demonstrate this. The marshal endeavours to impress on Napoleon "the distance they were from reinforcements, that the whole of Europe is between him and France, that he ought to preserve at least this handful of soldiers." Napoleon answers, "that nothing was yet sufficiently unravelled, that to make

him give his reserves, he wanted to see more clearly on his chess-board." It must be remarked that Mr. de Ségur himself confesses, that at this moment, "the efforts of Prince Eugene had been ineffectual against the grand redoubt." The reply of Napoleon victoriously refutes the kind of reproach that the author makes against him, for not having given the guard.

If Belliard, on returning to the King of Naples and Ney, had conveyed to them the words of the Emperor, they would have perfectly understood him; but instead of that, the author represents Belliard as informing them that he had found Napoleon "seated in the same place, with a suffering and dejected air, his features sunk, and a dull look, giving his orders languishingly in the midst of these dreadful warlike noises, to which he seemed completely a stranger." What relation is there between these imprudent suppositions, and the clear reasons the Emperor had detailed to General Belliard? But all this is to elicit a brutal speech, which he attributes to Marshal Ney, whom he makes observe, "What business has the Emperor in the rear of the army? Since he will no longer make war himself—since he is no longer the general, as he wishes to be Emperor every where—let him return to the Thuilleries and leave us to be generals for him." Marshal Ney's vivacity of character could never have misled his judgment to such a degree as to make him forget a circumstance he was so well aware of, that his fate, that of the army, the expedition, of France itself, depended on the person of Napoleon. Besides, we were ourselves several times with Marshal Ney, during this battle, and the zeal and devotion with which he executed the orders and instructions of the Emperor, have convinced us that he never entertained an idea of criticising them.

But it is not enough, that the military operations of Napoleon should be censured by his generals, they must also be corrected by his comptroller and secretary of state. Both inform him, that "the moment for sending the guard was now come." If Mr. de Ségur wished his opinion, of the weakness of the physical and intellectual faculties of the Emperor, to be believed, truly, he could not have imagined a stronger proof. Be-

hold Napoleon reduced to such an extremity, as to be advised by his comptroller and his secretary of state, that the time for pushing on his reserve had arrived!!! But he must have fallen very low, and without hopes of again rising, or Messrs. Dumas and Daru would have taken care not to advise a military movement to so great a commander. What is the most singular in all this, is, to observe that Mr. de Segur, notwithstanding his title of general, appears to partake of the opinion, "that he should have given the guard," and at the same time puts an unanswerable reason in the mouth of the Emperor, why it should not be given. "If there should be another battle to-morrow, where is my army!"

At the distance we were from France, the imperial guard, was, as it were, a fortified place, under the shelter of which the army could always be rallied. Mr. de Ségur, who has written since the occurrences took place, should have recollected, that if the guard had been broken at the battle of Moskwa, the French army, of which this guard always formed the nucleus, and sustained the courage during the retreat, would have with difficulty recrossed the Niemen.

CHAPTER XI.

In this chapter the author returns to the commencement of the battle and the first operations of Prince Eugene. He represents his attack as taking place in a partial and unconcerted manner. "The attack besides should not have been made so precipitately—the battle having been arranged to begin on the right wing, and pivot on the left." Since M. the palace officer, repeats this assertion to satiety, to take occasion to depreciate the Emperor, we also repeat what we have said: 1st, that the battle commenced by General Sorbier's batteries on the right, ordered to support the attack of Marshal Davoust against the left of the enemy. 2d, that the Emperor

sent Prince Eugene an order to attack Borodino, in order to draw the attention of the enemy that way. 3d. that Napoleon, seeing that the enemy withdrew from his right wing all the corps of Baggowout, to carry it to his left wing, and fearing that Ney and Davoust were not sufficiently strong to resist, gave the order to Prince Eugene to attack the redoubt of the enemy's centre briskly, to prevent him from throwing nearly all his forces upon our right.

Farther on, he tells us that the Viceroy, who could not carry the redoubt at the first attack, sent to inform the Emperor of his critical position, to demand assistance, probably *the guard.* Thus Marshal Ney demands the guard on the right, and Prince Eugene on the left; the Emperor refuses both, and yet Mr. de Ségur blames him. These facts alone prove what reason Napoleon had for keeping it in reserve for this moment. Besides, it is not the fact that he refused assistance to Prince Eugene, when it was necessary, since he sent him the legion of the Vistula, which formed part of the reserve. "It was getting late, our ammunition was exhausted, and the battle ended. Then only the Emperor mounted his horse with difficulty, and rode slowly along the heights of Semenowskoi."

This is altogether inexact; when this village was in our power, the Emperor moved there. He asked for General Friant, who had taken it. Having learned that although wounded, he still commanded his division, Napoleon, in presence of his troops, said, smiling, *In that case I am at ease, let him alone.* But soon seeing the considerable forces with which the enemy were preparing to attack Semenowskoi, he established the 48th, 33d, and the Spanish regiment, on the little hill in front of the village; he formed the 33d into a square upon the site of Semenowskoi, having the 15th on the left. It was from this place that he gave the order to Marshal Ney to unite Compan's and Dessaix's divisions, and flank the enemy by their left. These arrangements being ordered, the Emperor moved rapidly to the centre of the army, and sent an order to Prince Eugene to attack the great redoubt vigorously.

In relation to the *exhausted ammunitions,* no such thing oc-

curred: ammunition was never exhausted. The French artillery, in this battle, discharged 31,000 and some hundred shots. But this enormous quantity of ammunition was replaced as fast as it was expended, by the activity of General Neigre, the director of the Park, according to the measures taken by General Laxiboisière. We could have fought two more battles without drawing on the magazines at Smolensko.

The Emperor ordered the young guard to keep the field of battle. The enemy might be reinforced during the night. Napoleon took measures to sustain this corps. The battle being finished at all points, he returned, behind the redoubt of Schwardino, in order to despatch his orders to the different commandants of his army, where his tents were pitched; and it is there without doubt that Mr. de Ségur saw him.

CHAPTER XII.

The scene lies in the tent of the Emperor. Instead of representing him as occupied in giving orders, Mr. de Ségur supposes him "in a state of great mental anguish and physical dejection. In his army, even in his very tent, victory was silent, gloomy, isolated, even without flatterers. The persons* whom he had summoned, Dumas and Daru listened to him and said nothing; but their attitude, their downcast eyes, and their silence, spoke more eloquently than words."

What Messrs. Dumas and Daru should have done during the battle, was to be silent; the author has made them talk. After the battle, the Emperor sends for them to his tent, to know what measures they have taken relative to the wounded, the ambulances, means of transportation, &c. necessary to the army. It was speaking to them of their duties and they were silent!

* These gentlemen will doubtless be unwilling to accept the denomination of flatterers, with which Mr de Ségur honours them.

In the last chapter Mr. de Ségur has supported by Daru the propriety of giving the guard. All military men even at this day, agree in acknowledging the inutility and danger of this resolution; but as the author places this opinion in the mouth of a minister, we should not be surprised that it savours somewhat of his ignorance relative to military matters. Here is another counsellor introduced by the Quarter Master of the palace, and who has not the advantage of a similar excuse. It is Murat, who comes to demand the cavalry of the guard.

"The enemy's army, said he, is passing the Moskwa in haste and disorder, I wish to surprise and extinguish it." This is to accuse the King of Naples of ignorance relative to the place and position of the enemy. If Mr. de Ségur had taken the pains to look at the map, were it even a map of roads, he would have seen that the Russian army, whose retreat was upon Mojaisk, could not pass the Moskwa, to reach that place. If he had read the reports of the enemy's generals, he would have seen that in fact they had not passed it; that on the contrary, they passed the night on that part of the field of battle which they retained, their right resting on the hill of Goski, and flanked beyond that by a division of light infantry and Cossacks, and their left near the woods, in the rear of Semenowskoi.

The author finally perceives "that the Emperor had judged it indispensable to preserve a select and devoted body." These were powerful motives, but Mr. de Ségur is doubtless one of those, who, according to his own words, was not satisfied with them. For in order to support himself, he creates a concert of murmurs and lamentations on the manner in which the battle was conducted. Murat says that "he has not recognised the genius of Napoleon;" Eugene "that he had no conception what could be the reason of the indecision which his adopted father had shown;" Ney "was singularly obstinate in advising a retreat."

We have several times asked how the Quarter Master of the palace could learn what the Emperor, the Princes, and Marshals, said. His place in the army, was such as by no means to make it probable that he was in their confidence. We ex-

perience the same incredulity relative to the words which he puts in the mouths of the King of Naples, and of Prince Eugene. As for those of Ney we know what to believe. It is not that we think the Marshal said them, but we know whence they were obtained; it was from the *St. Petersburg Gazette*, the editor of which was much more ignorant than Mr. de Ségur. This editor was necessitated to prove that the battle was followed with none but doubtful results for us; and he does it, by supposing that one of the bravest generals, had advised a retreat. Should Mr. de Ségur have supported himself by such an authority?

"The Emperor could only estimate his victory by the number of the dead; the earth was so covered with Frenchmen extended on the redoubt, that they appeared more numerous than the survivors. It appeared that there were on the field of battle more slain, than living conquerors."

One thing worthy of remark is, that the quarter-master of the palace, who takes such a deplorable care in exaggerating our losses, that we may fancy him searching every corner of the field of battle, to bring out the smallest details; who espies in the faces of our officers and soldiers the secret of their sensations to interpret and clothe them in sombre colours, says no word of the losses and consternation of the Russians! If he had wished only to quote their relations, he might have made known that they acknowledged having lost upwards of a *hundred thousand men killed and wounded;* and that more than 20,000 of their wounded were on the route to Moscow.* The number of French killed in the redoubts was very small, in comparison with the Russian bodies found there, which may be easily conceived, if we reflect that what Mr. de Ségur constantly calls *redoubts*, were nothing but *fleches* and *redans*. The Russians, placed behind epaulements, retained them until our soldiers penetrated them on all sides, and killed them with the bayonet. But these works being all open on one side, once in

* See Botourlin, page 349, vol. I. At page 116 he says, that at Tarutino, Kutusof was employed in re-organizing the corps which escaped the *massacre of Borodino*.

our power, offered no protection from the enemy's fire. Thus no troops remained within them ; they were all placed either on the sides or in the rear of them.

We mention this circumstance only to show how the author gives account of things he has not seen. If he had gone over the field of battle, he would not have dared to say that there *appeared to be as many slain* as there *were survivors*. Our loss was not a third as great as that of the Russians. Mr. de Ségur, who has a horrible collection of pictures in his portfolio, does not fail to find one in this place; it is the spectacle which, according to him, the field of battle offered. In another story, to frighten children, he tells of a Russian soldier who lived for some days inside of a *horse which had been gutted by a howitzer, the inside of which he gnawed*. He should have added the size of the man, or that of the horse.

"Seven or eight hundred prisoners, and twenty broken cannon, were all the trophies of this imperfect victory." If he had known that the select troops, and nearly half of the Russian army, were destroyed ; that Bagration and his best general had fallen, and that the taking of Moscow was the result of that victory, however familiar he is with inaccuracy, he would not have asserted that this victory *was incomplete*.

CHAPTER XIII.

Murat is also attacked by the officer of the palace. He, it appears, was afflicted with the same disease as the Emperor, that of refusing all good advice. He commands a charge to be made; one of his aides-de-camp informs him that a deep ravine exists between our horsemen and the enemy, but "Murat, in a greater fury than ever, insisted that they must march, and if there was any obstacle, they would see it. He then made use of insulting phrases, to urge them on." It must be allowed that the French army would have been an extraordi-

nary one, if the Emperor and his generals had been as Mr. de Ségur has pleased to describe them. What he says of our officers, that they were abused in order to force them to their duty, is so marvellous that we are led to believe the officer of the palace does not regard himself as a French officer.

The author, adhering rigidly to his system, figures to us the Emperor "advancing at a still slower pace than the day before, and so completely absorbed," that he did not know whither he was going, fortunately he was warned that he would fall into the hands of the enemy, on which he halted.

As if what we have already undergone was not enough, "the Russian autumn now triumphed over him." To explain this passage, Mr. de Ségur gives us another tempest, which never occurred except in his own brain, but which, according to him, chilled Napoleon, and caused in him "a burning fever, which dried up his blood and oppressed his spirits." If all those who had been around the Emperor on the day of battle were dead, and that there remained no recollection of this day, our historian might speak of this *depression*, this *burning fever*, with his usual confidence in the credulity of his readers. But whilst a great number of individuals, such as his secretaries, physicians, officers, still live, whilst these persons are fully aware that Napoleon was in his usual state of health, laboured with his ordinary activity, and broke down several horses, when they can attest that it was only on the night of the 7th and 8th that he was seized with a loss of voice, caused by the exertions he used on the eve of, and on the day of the battle, how can Mr. de Ségur dare to state circumstances which so many witnesses can disprove?

"Some of our troops entered the town for the purpose of passing through it in pursuit of the enemy, and others to plunder and find lodgings for themselves." The author should have informed us with which party he marched: was it with the first? Although he has hitherto forced us to admire the admirable order in which the Russians retreated, he is compelled to avow that they left an immense number of their wounded in the city, which, however, did not prevent them from setting it on fire. It is true he has an excuse ready for them: "their

humanity had given way to the desire of firing on the first French they saw enter."

The account of the brave action of the voltigeurs of the 33d raises a strong desire to ascertain the name of the gallant officer who commanded them, but the author does not mention it; we will supply this omission, in stating that his name was Callier; he had under his command the company of grenadiers, and the 3d company of fusileers, (Captain Sabatier,) forming at the most 100 men; these two companies belonged to the first battalion of the 33d of Friant's division.

Notwithstanding the confession which escaped from Mr. de Ségur, respecting the number of the Russian wounded, (which did not prevent them from setting fire to the city, where these unfortunate troops were lying,) he adopts his former plan, in asserting that on the two following days, "without finding a single person or thing by which to discover the Russian army." He appears to have forgotten that all the villages, as well on the road as in the neighbourhood, were filled with wounded, marking the bloody retreat of this army.

The Emperor, as he had promised in his proclamation, calculated on resting his army at Moscow, to repair the losses he had experienced, as well by the march as by the various battles, and to complete the different corps. But whilst he was making arrangements to bring up reinforcements of men and artillery, Mr. de Ségur makes use of the circumstance to say that "his mind was weakened," and to lament his distress.

Marshal Davoust, according to our author, requests the Emperor to deprive Murat of the command of the advance guard, and to invest him with it; and Mr. de Ségur appears to censure Napoleon in permitting the King of Naples to retain the command, when he was aware of his "audacious and inexhaustible ardour." What can be wished for more, in the commander of an advance guard, pursuing an enemy's army, than "*an audacious and inexhaustible ardour?*"

But Napoleon learns "that the vanguard was already within two days march of Moscow. That great name, and the great hopes which he attached to it, revived his strength, and

on the 12th of September, he was sufficiently recovered to set out in a carriage in order to join his vanguard."

The author insinuates that the Emperor was ill, which forced him to halt at Mojaisk. The loss of voice with which Napoleon was attacked on the 8th, is an event likely to happen from great fatigue; it is an extremely probable occurrence, after four nights passed *in bivouac*, the 4th near Gridnewow, the 5th and 6th, on the heights of Borodino, and the 7th on the field of battle. The author has nevertheless based upon this loss of voice all the fables which he relates of the illness of the Emperor, for which he has prepared us from the opening of the campaign, and which he is about to extend to the termination of the expedition. He has said himself, that from the 8th Napoleon traversed the field of battle, dispensing his cares on the wounded, whether French or Russians, which proves that his indisposition must have been slight. But it was not the cause of his remaining at Mojaisk, reasons of the highest importance detained him there. After so sanguinary a battle, the general-in-command has many things to occupy him, a multitude of orders to give.

In taking an account of his losses, and of the resources which remain, so important after so great employment of them, to gather provisions, to take measures that every regulation was attended to, to procure information of the enemy, to make himself acquainted with his movements and intentions, above all, when the reports of the advance guard, and information from prisoners, gave him reason to expect a second battle;* such were objects that occupied every moment of Napoleon's time, and truly the vigilance of his active and penetrating mind, was not at fault.†

* This was the case, as the enemy appeared disposed to give us battle before Moscow, from which the French army was only five days march. It was then that the Emperor wrote to the Duke of Belluno to direct the battalions, squadrons, and stragglers, coming up, on Smolensk, in order to proceed from thence to Moscow.

† Amid the numberless orders issued by the Emperor from Mojaisk, the following letter written by himself, immediately after his arrival at his quarters, proves that the disease with which Mr. de Ségur supposed him attacked, had not benumbed his faculties.

When the Emperor received the report of General Lariboisiere, stating that the greater part of the ammunition consumed at the battle of Moskowa, had been replaced by that brought up from the intermediate depots, he left Mojaisk to join his advanced guard, in order to be prepared if the enemy should offer battle. It would be believed from the statement of Mr. de Ségur, that he was obliged to make use of his carriage. Never was this victorious hero so strangely caricatured, what is the motive for a supposition, which is destroyed by the incontrovertible testimony of facts and persons? Does the author believe in his error, or is it the echo of hatred and prejudice? Let the reader judge for himself.

BOOK VIII.—CHAPTER I.

The author goes back to Wilna, to recall to us that Napoleon was the aggressor, and that Alexander "was surprised in Wilna, amidst his preparations for defence." Will he permit us to remind him, that all the preparations of Russia had been made, that their army was assembled on their extreme frontier, and that the Emperor Alexander was already at his head-quarters, at Wilna, whilst Napoleon was in Paris, directing negotiations for a reconciliation, of which he could not relinquish all hopes.

Mr. de Ségur next drags us to Drissa in the train of Alex-

FOR THE MAJOR GENERAL.

Let inspection be made of the city, and trace a redoubt to command the passage. Construct two bridges over the Moskowa. Write to Prince Eugene to hasten to Rouza, and construct bridges over the Serguiewow, to collect as many cattle and provisions as possible, and gain all the information he can. Write to the Prince of Eckmülh to occupy Borisow, and to collect provisions and information. To the Duke of Elchingen, to march his corps to Mojaisk, to-morrow. Leave the Duke of Abrantes to guard the field of battle. Mojaisk, 9th September, 1812.

ander. He tells us that, "it was there that he first consented to receive an English Agent, so important did he deem it *to appear* till that moment faithful to his engagements with France."

Thus to *be* and to *appear to be*, are not synonymous, and it seems to us, that when the Russian cabinet decided on receiving an English Agent, it is natural to suppose that its understanding with that of London had been fixed some time before. We willingly distinguish the Emperor Alexander from his cabinet. Who does not know, that for more than a year before the rupture, that the agents of England exercised an influence over Russia, which was not foreign to the after events.* "So much is certain," says Mr. de Ségur, "that at Paris after his success, Alexander affirmed on his honour to Count Daru, that notwithstanding the accusations of Napoleon, this was his first infraction of the treaty of Tilsit."

If we admit the Russian court only makes an account of those acts which followed hostilities, we may believe this assertion. But is the author serious in relating these details? Does not his duty as an historian impose on him the duty of establishing the facts, and of adding to his account some of those reflections, of which he has elsewhere been so prodigal?

The officer of the palace passes rapidly over the opinions entertained by the enemies of the Emperor Alexander, as "to his military talents;" but dwells with much pleasure on his political measures. "It was admitted," says he, "that they were singularly adapted to persons and places." Mr. de Ségur might include "the addresses he caused Barclay to issue, designed to corrupt the French and their allies."

"It appears, in fact, that in the political means he employ-

* A praise worthy author, M. de Montveran, in his *Histoire Critique et Raisonée de la Situation de l'Angleterre*, printed in 1820, and written in a tone that is unfavourable to the system of Napoleon, thus expresses himself. "Russia was excited, either by the agents of England corrupting the nobility of Russia, who were inimical to the French, or by its ministers about the Emperor Alexander, who although they had worked in silence since the spring of 1811, were not on that account less active or successful." Vol. V. page 358.

ed, there was a very striking gradation of energy." For instance, "In the recently acquired portion of Lithuania, every thing had been spared. The most powerful of the nobles had alone been carried off. In the provinces of Lithuania, which had of old been incorporated with the empire, the men were hurried away with all they could carry off. But in old Russia, every thing that could not be removed, had been destroyed."

The old Russians should be very grateful for the love manifested to them in these humane acts, but "he loves best who chastises the oftenest."

The author then transports us to Moscow. He tells, that "the gift of one serf in ten," which was offered, "immediately, without deliberation," by the nobility of Moscow, "was attributable to submission, and caused a murmuring among the principal nobles." As to their merchants, of whom he represents in horrible colours the fanatic enthusiasm, at the reading of the proclamation, which teemed with abuse of the Emperor Napoleon, "he was obliged to have recourse to restraint to obtain the succours promised with so much patriotism."

These circumstances furnish him with a reflection; we may even say, a maxim, which, it is to be regretted, he did not sometimes apply to the French army and its leader. "The details are of little consequence—every thing in the world loses by being seen too near, and lastly, that nations ought to be judged by the general mass and by results."

CHAPTER II.

Here commences the detail of what took place in Moscow, before the arrival of the French army. The Governor General, Count Rostopchin, promised, in his proclamation, to march with 100,000 men and one hundred pieces of cannon, to defend Moscow; but as soon as he learnt the French were

approaching, he disappeared, first having set fire to the city he was ordered to defend and protect. The author makes Count Rostopchin one of the greatest men of modern times.

He talks of "this noble descendant of one of the greatest Asiatic conquerors." The edifice raised by the officer of the palace is destroyed, when we learn that Count Rostopchin is the son of Count Orloff's steward, uncle to the historian of this name. His fortune commenced with the Emperor Paul, whose confidence he had obtained, before his ascending the throne. He was successively honoured by this Prince, with the management of the army, and in the counsel for foreign affairs. Afterwards he was created Count, as was also his father, and decorated with the grand order of Russia. A family alliance existing between him and Mr. de Ségur, explains the reasons of this writer, in endeavouring to elevate his birth.

The resolution of Count Rostopchin was *terrible*, and of such a nature, that we must revert to the barbarous ages to find a parallel. "It was admirable," says a Frenchman; it was atrocious, exclaims all Europe, and with her the Russians themselves. That it will obtain immortality for its author, there can be no doubt, but it will be the immortality of Erostratus. The passions may exalt this action, even now, but the motive cannot ennoble it. It is a crime with which history will load his memory. "Though but a subject, he decides the lot of the state, without the countenance of his sovereign; a noble, he decrees the destruction of the palaces of all the nobles without their consent; the protector, from the post which he occupies, of a numerous population, he sacrifices their fortunes. He conceives his plan without effort; he executes it without hesitation, and remains satisfied and tranquil." This tranquillity, this satisfaction, which is so much admired by the officer of the palace, shocks and withers the soul.

Instead of employing the plots of a drama, or the artifices of a fabulist, to mislead the judgment of our cotemporaries on this horrible event, he should have said, that a man existed, eager for celebrity at any price, who, to a savage energy, joined an inexorable ambition; who made himself the willing

instrument of a cabinet skilled in corruption, a cabinet accustomed to sacrifice to its interests, friends as well as enemies, and who never scrupled as to the means; that this man was emboldened to disregard the denial of his sovereign to the act, and was audacious enough to assume to himself the whole honour of this frightful catastrophe.

When Mr. de Ségur praises the sacrifice that Count Rostopchin made of one of his palaces, it may be asked, if, in this great disaster, all the world had been ruined; if these pretended sacrifices, made with so great ostentation, had not been repaired, even before they were effected; if, in this great conflagration, English gold had not *insured* some part of the property.

Who has revealed to our author, that Napoleon had recourse "to the weapon of revolution in Russia?" The Emperor has himself replied to this imputation, in his speech to the Senate, the 20th of December, 1812. "The war I undertake against the Russians, is a political war. I could arm the greatest part of her population against her, in proclaiming liberty to the slaves. A great number of villages have demanded it of me, when, knowing the debased state of this numerous class of the Russian people, I have refused a measure which would have devoted so many families to the most horrible punishment."

CHAPTER III.

The pretended historian of the grand army says, "A vulture had entangled himself in the chains which sustain the cross of the principal church, and was held suspended in them." Does he partake of the credulity of the people of Moscow? It was at day-break, that this bird was found attached to the steeple. It does not require much acuteness to divine that the governor, whose inventive powers had been exercised in many other tricks, had prepared this *presage* during the night.

This observation may apply also to an action much less innocent: "He caused (Rostopchin,) the most diminutive to be selected from the prisoners taken from the enemy, and exhibited to the people, that the latter might derive courage from the sight of their weakness." To render them still more *pitiful*, he maltreated, stripped and deprived them of nourishment for thirty-six hours, and in this state had them led around the city like wild beasts, exposed to the insults and blows of the populace. After which he threw them into a prison, where almost the whole perished from famine and misery. We saw some of the unfortunate men who had survived this brutal treatment, making their representation of it to the Emperor, when we entered Moscow. We were ordered to supply them with food and clothing. What a difference between the conduct of the Governor of Moscow towards these unfortunate soldiers, and that maintained towards the numerous Russian prisoners, who traversed Paris, and other cities in France! The commandants of each place gave them food, lavished on them every care, and spared them even humiliation.

The force which Mr. de Ségur gives as that of the Russian army at Fili, which he estimates at "91,000 men, the relics of 121,000 engaged at the Moskwa," only attributes to the Russians a loss of 30,000 men at this battle, whilst Colonel Boutourlin, aid-de-camp to the Emperor of Russia, (writing under the direction of his master, and from notes furnished by the different Russian staffs,) augments this loss to 50,000 men. Thus Mr. de Ségur makes a gratuitous gift of 20,000 men to the Russian army. But to compensate, he makes the loss of the French army amount to "40,000 men;" when it is well known that it was infinitely less than that of the Russians, whose columns remained so long exposed to the fire of 400 pieces of cannon, posted on heights, and ably directed by Generals Sorbier, Foucher, Pernetti, and Anthouard of the artillery.

The author states that Rostopchin, on the news that Kutusof would abandon the city, *devoted himself*. The sacrifice of Count Rostopchin may be received with doubt, for when he fired Moscow, his own palace was spared.

The horror of the scene which terminated the day on which Moscow was evacuated, is disguised by Mr. de Ségur. When Rostopchin opened the prisons, a Russian accused of treason, was dragged from the midst of the horde to whom the governor had given liberty, and carried before him. "He was the son of a tradesman, and had been apprehended while exciting the people to insurrection."

The son of a tradesman had not "been apprehended while exciting the people to insurrection;" all he had done was to translate a French bulletin. His father, whom the author compares to an old Roman, did not *curse his son.* We know on the contrary that he *cursed* the memory of the man who snatched him from him. The unfortunate young man was not "struck down by an ill-directed blow of a sabre; the first blow was given him by the governor himself, who then gave him up to the fury of the populace.* Rostopchin who declared, in addressing the people of Moscow, that "the tribunals were closed, but that was of no consequence, there was no occasion for tribunals to try the guilty," hastened to give this terrible example of arbitrary power, in thus sacrificing an unfortunate man without trial, and on his individual authority. Moreover, he was the first to strike him, and to deliver to a mob, in order to teach the people to administer justice for themselves, and to bathe themselves in blood. What shall be said of the coadju-

* This detail was given us by an occular witness. The Abbé Surugues, an emigrant priest, and curate of the Parish of St. Louis at Moscow, thus details this event, in a letter addressed to Father Bouvet, a Jesuit; which was published both in England and Russia.

"The governor ordered the Sieur Veréachagin, the son of a Russian tradesman, to appear before him; he had been convicted of translating a proclamation of Napoleon, in which he announces his speedy arrival at Moscow. The governor obliged this unfortunate man to advance, surrounded by the dragoons of the Russian police. "Disgrace to thy country," said he, "thou hast dared to betray thy native land, and to dishonour thy family; thy crime exceeds all ordinary punishments, the knout or Siberia; I give thee up to the vengeance of the people whom thou hast betrayed. Strike, and let the traitor die under your blows." The unfortunate man expired, pierced by a multitude of swords and bayonets. They tied his legs with a long cord, and his bloody corpse was thus dragged through the streets, exposed to the outrage of the populace."

tors of Count Rostopchin! What a noble court does this "filthy and disgusting crowd" present! The galley slaves and criminals, he terms "the children of Russia." Such instruments were truly worthy of perpetrating so atrocious an enterprise.

CHAPTER IV.

If it was not known that the work of Mr. de Ségur, had been written for effect, that the ideas he gives birth to, originated full ten years after the events took place, and that every thing that has occurred since that period, has tended to modify these ideas, the sententious reflections, the poetic images, the studied sensibility, scattered throughout this chapter, would substantiate it. The thoughts, the sentiments, he gives to the army, never occurred to any of us. The officer of the palace talks of our "*abasement.*" Why should we be humbled? We were not after our disastrous retreat, could we be so when we were victorious, and that we found ourselves before a conquest the prize of our toils and our courage? The feelings which then filled the heart of every soldier, were those of the glory and renown that our enemies would bestow on us. *Abasement* is the lot of cowardice and treason.

"Murat," says the author, "was for a moment tempted to believe—that he himself would become another Mazeppa." What! the king of one of the richest and most powerful countries of Europe, envy the lot of an obscure chief of a few hordes of Cossacs! Really this is too much! Mr. de Ségur has it is true, given words and actions to his personages, which are in entire contradiction with their character and station; but this last license is too poetic.

The love of satire again misleads our historian when he says, "one of the officers of the Emperor, determined to gratify him, entered the city and seized five or six vagabonds,

drove them before his horse to the Emperor, and imagined he had brought him a deputation." It was merchants and other citizens of Moscow, who seeing the city abandoned and delivered over by its governor to disorder and pillage, came to implore the protection and generosity of the conqueror. What other motive than the desire of pleasing the Emperor, decided Mr. de Ségur to solicit the favour of making part of the expedition to Russia, and to be employed there in duties altogether foreign to his station, and military character. We who have never served Napoleon but in a military capacity, can testify that every soldier in the French army desired to please their chief, and to prove to him their attachment. Those were animated with this wish, who had not their table and lodging daily prepared for them, those who exposed themselves perpetually, to privations, to battles, to bullets, and who exclaimed to Napoleon in the heat of the battle of Moskwa—"Be easy, your soldiers have promised to conquer, and they will do it!"

CHAPTER V.

Military men who read the pretended history of the Grand Army, cannot avoid a smile "at the secret shuddering of the French cavalry, when they heard the steps of their horses," on their entrance into Moscow. The same may be said of *the melancholy*, and all those vague reveries that the author attributes to our soldiers.

He gives his own feelings to the French army. All that is wanting in this account is, that of the nightmare, with which the soldiers ought to have been visited during their sleep, *in bivouac*. But if the army had been troubled with such visions, would it have conquered at the battle of Moskwa?

"The savage and barbarous token of national hatred," that the author supposes was left for us by Rostopchin, were the galley slaves, whose patriotism was founded on the casks of

brandy which had been given them. It is without doubt because Count Rostopchin had adopted them in terming them *children of Russia*, that they are here cited as representing the nation.

CHAPTER VI.

"Napoleon did not enter Moscow till after dark."

Although the fact of this nocturnal entry is of little importance, we notice it, on account of its being false, and the author appears to delight in presenting the Emperor as intruding himself every where, in secret and under cover of night. This no doubt makes a fine description, but truth must not be sacrificed to romance. The King of Naples, passed the bridge of Moskwa at noon, at the head of the cavalry and advanced guard. At two o'clock, Marshal Lefebvre, with a division of the guard, entered Moscow—about this time Napoleon took possession of an inn in the suburb of Dowgomilow, the fire had not yet made its appearance in the city. A single house in the Bazar had been burnt. On the 15th at 6 o'clock in the morning, the Emperor repaired to the Kremlin.

On a fact perfectly simple and natural in itself, the author exercises his imagination, he embellishes, magnifies, perverts it, and deduces consequences, which could attach only to his mode of viewing objects. An officer overcome with fatigue is awoke by a glare of fire, he ascertains that his own corps is in a place of safety, and again falls asleep, leaving others to take care of themselves. On this occasion, Mr. de Ségur makes the following reflection. "Such was the unconcern produced by the multiplicity of events and misfortunes, and such the selfishness arising from excessive suffering and fatigue, that they left to each only just strength and feeling sufficient for his personal service and preservation."

In fact, if Mr. de Ségur, whose functions were limited to his service in the palace, had been requested to perform that of an officer of the army, he would have refused it, and this without being accused of unconcern or selfishness. Why might it not have been the same case with the officer of whom he speaks?

"The Kremlin contained, unknown to us, a magazine of powder." The Kremlin contained no magazine of powder. In the arsenal, every thing testified the precipitation with which the Russians had evacuated it. The court was covered with tow, with shells, and fragments of boxes. In the halls we found 40,000 muskets (English, Austrian, and Russian) an hundred pieces of cannon, lances, sabres, and a great number of trophies taken from the Turks, but no powder was to be found, there was in fact, none within the walls of the Kremlin. Large magazines, of which we took possession, were situated without the city, in isolated buildings; and at the German barrier. These contained 400,000 pounds of powder and more than a million of saltpetre. Rostopchin had neglected to destroy them.

"The guards asleep and carefully posted, suffered a whole park of artillery to enter and draw up under the windows of Napoleon."

The author constantly endeavours to represent the French army as an unorganised horde. Because the imperial guard, posted in the Kremlin, had their artillery with them, Mr. de Ségur tells us that this artillery was suffered to remain from the negligence of the sleeping sentinels. This attack on a picked guard, where there always existed the greatest order and discipline, is in the very spirit of defamation.

During the night, several different parts of the city were set on fire, but all of them at a distance from the Kremlin. Towards four in the morning, an officer of the Emperor's awoke him to announce the circumstance, this prince had only a few moments before, retired to rest, after having dictated orders to the different corps of the army, and laboured with his secretaries. We cannot understand how Mr. de Ségur, who should be better acquainted with the interior service of the palace,

should always represent Napoleon as disliking his repose to be disturbed. He ought to be aware, that officers of the lowest rank never hesitated to awaken him, to make their reports.

The aid-de-camp in attendance, who would have hesitated to announce the arrival of an officer, would have been severely reprimanded. The author might have recollected what took place at Glubokoe, when the aid-de-camp in attendance, delayed announcing to Napoleon, the arrival of an officer from the King of Naples.

It was on the 16th that the conflagration approached the Kremlin, so much as to endanger its safety. At noon the fire seized on the stables of the palace, and a tower adjoining the arsenal. Some sparks even fell in the court of the arsenal, on the tow which had belonged to the Russian caissons, those of our artillery were there. The danger was imminent, the Emperor was informed of it, and he hastened to the spot. The ground where our caissons stood, was covered with burning tow. General Lariboisiere was giving orders to have them removed from the arsenal, when the Emperor arrived. The artillerists and soldiers of the guard, uneasy at seeing Napoleon expose himself to so much danger, augmented it by their zeal. They seized the burning tow in their arms, in order to carry it out of the court. General Lariboisiere then begged the Emperor to withdraw, pointing out to him that the artillery men had lost their recollection from anxiety at his presence. This prince then returned to the palace. After his departure, the fire which might had so fatal a termination, was soon extinguished.

This event took place in the morning, and it was not from it, that Napoleon decided on leaving the Kremlin, on the contrary, the danger appeared to determine him to remain. Already Prince Eugene, Marshals Bessieres and Lefebvre, had conjured him to leave this spot, they could not succeed. An officer* having reported to him, that the flames were surrounding the Kremlin on all sides, he ordered him to accompany the Prince of Neufchatel to an elevated terrace of the palace,

* General Gourgaud.

to verify the fact. The impetuosity, violence of the wind, and the rarefaction of the air caused by the extreme heat of the conflagration, occasioned so horrible a tempest, that the Prince of Neufchatel and the officer were nearly carried away by it. Although they confirmed to the Emperor that all was on fire around the Kremlin, this prince accustomed to dangers of all kind, hesitated to retreat from it, on which the Prince of Neufchatel observed to him, "Sire, if the enemy attacks the divisions of the army which are around Moscow, your majesty will have no means of communicating with them."

Having decided on leaving the Kremlin, Napoleon sent M. de Mortemart, one of his aid-de-camps, to search for a passage through the burning city, to the fourth corps, which he wished to join. He soon returned, to say, that the flames would not suffer him to advance. Some time afterwards, another officer, announced that the passage was freed. The Emperor then ordered his horses, and quitted the Kremlin, leaving in it a battalion of his guard to protect it.

CHAPTER VII.

"We were encircled by a sea of fire, which blocked up all the gates of the citadel, and frustrated the first attempts that were made to depart. After some search, we discovered a postern gate, leading between the rocks, to the Moskwa. It was by this narrow passage that Napoleon, his officers and guard, escaped from the Kremlin. A single narrow winding street, all on fire, appeared to be rather the entrance, than the outlet, to this hell. The Emperor rushed on foot, and without hesitation, into this narrow passage. We walked on a ground of fire, beneath a fiery sky, and between two walls of flames."

A sea of fire neither did, nor could block up all the gates of the citadel. There existed a large esplanade beyond the ditch,

and of course we were not obliged to grope for a passage. The Emperor left the Kremlin by one of the great gates, accompanied as on his arrival, by his officers, and did not depart by a passage between the rocks.

He descended to the quay on the Moskowa where he mounted his horse. One of the police officers of Moscow, marched in front, acting as a guide. We followed the bank of the river for some tme, and then entered a quarter of the town, where the houses having been entirely of wood were totally consumed.

Although we accompanied Napoleon during the whole of this passage, we never saw the *magnificent horrors* described by Mr. de Ségur, we traversed Moscow it is true, over cinders, but not under *vaults of fire*. Perhaps we did not take the right road, but it is false that in our passage, the Emperor was in any danger. It is equally false that our guide "stopped in uncertainty and agitation:" and that it was to some *pillagers* of the first corps, that the Emperor owed his life. The touching meeting with Marshal Davoust "who had desired to be carried back among the flames, to rescue Napoleon or to perish with him," is not more exact. Besides, Mr. de Ségur enables the reader, to appreciate the truth of his description by the circumstance of the convoy of powder, "defiling amidst the fire." The conflagration had lasted for thirty-six hours; what officer would have been mad enough, to expose to inevitable explosion, a convoy of powder, in thus traversing a city, when he might have taken it outside the walls?

The officer of the palace has not found in his numerous descriptions of marches and battles, a single occasion to speak of the order, with which these immense columns of artillery proceeded on their march, and in spite of all difficulties, were always on the spot to vanquish the Russian battalions, and the chiefs of which, knew how to add to martial courage, that spirit of foresight, which contributes to prepare for success, and insure happy results. He might have at least dispensed citing, to the disadvantage of this select corps, an incorrect fact.

"The effort he had made to reach Moscow, had expended all his means of warfare."

It may be perceived that the author is not very conversant with military affairs, if by the means of warfare, he means men, we will answer him, that the French army which had been joined by the division of General Pino, the Bavarian cavalry of General Pressing, and several other detachments, was nearly as strong as before the battle of Moskwa. As to artillery, the intermediate parks which General Lariboisiere, had established between Mojaisk and Smolensk, had already in great measure supplied the place of the ammunition that had been used.*

The Emperor remained at Petrowsky, from the evening of the 16th, to the morning of the 18th, at which time he again entered the Kremlin. It was in these forty hours, that Mr. de Ségur thinks that he ought to have decided on his future plans, and that without waiting for information of the movements of General Kutusof, and the reply to a letter sent "by a superior officer of the enemy's, who had been found in the great hospital." After having said that, in this short space of time passed in the palace of Petrowsky, Napoleon was *astonished and uncertain*, the author adds: "He declared, therefore, that he should march for St. Petersburg. This conquest was already marked out on his maps, hitherto so prophetic; orders were even issued to the different corps to hold themselves in readiness. But his decision was only a feint; it was but a better face he strove to assume—so that Berthier, and more especially Bessieres, soon convinced him."

We have often seen Napoleon reasoning with his officers and

* In a letter of general orders written by order of the Emperor to Marshal Bessieres, dated Moscow 27th September, 1812, relative to the military events, which took place before the arrival at Moscow is the following: "Kutusof, acted properly in retiring on Moscow, he threw up entrenchments on several fine positions, and endeavoured to make us believe, that we would have a second battle, before we could enter Moscow. This measure was so good, that if the conveyances organised by Lariboisiere, had brought up 20,000 charges less, the Emperor would have been checked, although the field of battle was one of the finest we have yet seen, as it was impossible to carry the redoubts, without artillery and a great quantity of ammunition.

ministers, and endeavouring to enforce his own ideas on their minds, but we have not viewed him sporting with their credulity, and playing the part of a juggler with them. Mr. de Ségur gives us this, however, we suppose, as a variation.

This writer supposes, that it was during the halt at Petrowsky, that the Emperor was apprised, "that Kutusof had thrown himself between Moscow and Kalonga." Whereas, it was after his return to the Kremlin. Historic truth is not what Mr. de Ségur searches for; it is of little importance to him, provided he can show off his fallacious reasonings.

"He had so fully calculated on concluding a peace at Moscow, that he had no winter quarters provided in Lithuania." What has become of those "magazines as immense as the enterprise?" What of the stores and fortifications at Wilna, Minsk, Witespk, Smolensk? &c. The officer of the palace ought to have informed us what he means by "having no winter quarters provided in Lithuania."

Napoleon "therefore determined to return to the Kremlin, which a battalion of the guard had unfortunately preserved." Why unhappily preserved, since, a few lines back, the author allows that it would require eight days before Napoleon could receive the answer of Alexander, "and to rally and re-organise his army, &c." But perhaps Mr. de Ségur was better lodged at Petrowsky than at the Kremlin, and therefore wishes that this latter palace had been burnt. As he gives us no reasons for his regret, this is the only one we can devise.

CHAPTER VIII.

The return of the Emperor to the Kremlin furnishes Mr. de Ségur with a multitude of hideous pictures of our bivouacs, and of what passed in the city.

We do not know why he conceals from his readers facts

published by our enemies themselves. "The first cares of Napoleon, on returning to the Kremlin, were devoted to the unfortunate of all classes. He ordered that they should name syndics to discover all who were without an asylum or means of subsistence. He opened hospitals for the reception of the burnt, and promised to send them food. He proceeded to the foundling hospital, which had escaped the fire; sent for the director general, Toutolmin; inspected the establishment; requested the director to make his report to the empress-dowager, and sent it by a courier; this report remained without a reply.

"Napoleon next attended to the state of the hospitals, the greater number of which had been preserved. But what was his astonishment, when it was reported to him that these establishments were in the greatest want of aid, without physicians, without medicines, without nurses; that they contained a prodigious quantity of dead, besides that of the 10,000 wounded, recently arrived from the army; the half had perished from want of assistance, and that the remainder were struggling with want and death! An order was immediately issued to all the French surgeons to establish an administration for the succour of the sick, to remove the patients to proper situations, and to make exact reports of the state of these unfortunate people.

"On the other hand, Marshal Mortier, governor general of the city and general of division, Count Milhaut, commandant of the place, received orders to organise a municipality, and an administration of police, to restore order in the city, and procure provisions, &c."

These details, of which we know the truth, with the exception of the number of wounded Russians, which, instead of 10,000, was more than 25,000,* are extracted from the letter of the Abbe Surrugues, already quoted.

This same Abbe Surugues, curate of St. Louis, at Moscow, in another part of his letter says, "Napoleon placed 50,000

* It is true that more than the half of these 25,000 wounded Russians, perished in the flames, in consequence of the atrocious act of Count Rostopchin.

roubles at the disposition of the Syndics, entrusted with the care of the indigent. The division which was made, assigned 96 roubles to each, but the difficulty of carrying off such a weight having exacted trouble and time inconsistent with the precipitate departure of the French, this distribution was almost without effect."

It is to follow a celebrated adage, which Beaumarchais puts in the mouth of one of his characters, that Mr. de Ségur commences by accusing our picked troops, and even our officers, of "hastening to plunder," and endeavours afterwards to excuse, by saying "it was not from covetousness, for they did hoard, believing that one hand washed the other, and that they had paid for every thing with danger." Is not the justification worse than the accusation? Why thus gratuitously revile his countrymen? This severity, as regards them, has it not been suggested to our author by the recollection of an individual who, curious in shawls and India goods, entered the cellar of a tradesman's shop in the Bazaar, by an opening made in the vault? From this cellar he handed out to the soldiers all the goods he could find; they, thinking that these goods were as much their's as his, disappeared with them, leaving in the cellar him whose cupidity had induced him to descend.

Nevertheless, this amateur plunderer had not for excuse that he believed "one hand washed the other, and he had paid for every thing with danger." For he never was exposed to it, from our knowledge, the only risk he had encountered in this campaign, was the remaining in the cellar.

There is, besides, a very great difference between *plundering* and *seizing provisions*. That Mr. de Ségur, who had twice a day his meals with the officers of the Emperor's palace, was not obliged to search for provisions, may readily be supposed. But when he finds it amiss, the poor regimental officers, who had not this advantage, and who, when they saw a shop or house burning, should take a few bottles of wine and some provisions, that he terms this plundering, it is an abuse of words, and a severity which cannot be justified.

The author should have said without scruple, and without any oratorical evasions, that the mode of warfare now adopt-

ed, being carried on with immense armies, whose prompt and rapid movements concentrate sometimes in one day 200,000 men on a point, renders it absolutely impossible to issue regular rations to the troops, that foreigners have proved it in Germany and France, where they have plundered and pillaged at the same time; what should be avoided is ill-treating the inhabitants, and that on this head, no troops in Europe have shown more humanity than the French; complaints of murder and violation being almost unknown in countries occupied by our troops, and on the contrary, all foreigners, and particularly the Russians, have been accused of both, in all the villages through which they have passed, even in Germany, among their allies. It is, nevertheless, this Russian army, that Mr. de Ségur paints to us as "having attained real glory," whilst he brings constantly before the reader, accounts of the plunderings of our unfortunate soldiers, taking merely flour and pork.*

* The letter of the Abbe Surrugues, curate of the parish of St. Louis, in Moscow, which we have already cited, contains the following passages, respecting the plundering in this capital. The testimony of this emigrant priest is less to be suspected, as it is that of an enemy to Napoleon.

"Nevertheless, the populace broke open doors, and forced the cellars of those shops which were menaced with the fire. The sugar, coffee, tea, were soon pillaged; afterwards, hides, furs, cloths, and in fact every article of luxury. The soldiers, who at first were tranquil spectators, soon took an active part; the magazines of flour were pillaged, the wine and brandy inundated the cellars, &c. In fact, the project of burning the city once established as a measure of war by the Russian government, pillage became an inevitable reprisal on the part of the enemy.

"It may be remarked that the populace of Moscow played a deep part in the pillage; it was they that opened the most secret cellars to the French troops, in order to partake of the booty; it was they who introduced the Cossacks into the houses of individuals after the departure of the French, and the peasants of the environs who took part in the general plundering, carried off and hid all they could.

"A circumstance well worthy of remark is, that the pillage provoked by want was excited and fed by the infidelity of servants, who for the most part betrayed their masters, in indicating the klodowoie and the secret cellars, in order to partake of the booty, and after the departure of the French, the populace of Moscow and its neighbourhood left ineffaceable traces of their insatiate avidity.

"But," adds he, "people have been too much astonished at the virtues, as well as the vices, of that army: the former were less praise-worthy, and the latter less reprehensible; inasmuch, if I may so express myself, enjoined by example and circumstances."

As there are no conventual virtues or vices, and that virtue and vice always exist, a fresh attack on the reputation of the French army may be perceived in this reflection.

CHAPTER IX.

Kutusof, on abandoning Moscow, retreated on the road to Kalouga. The 15th of September the Russian army halted at Panki, four or five leagues from Moscow; the 16th it crossed the Moskwa, at Boraskoe. Kutusof then resolved to assume an offensive position, on the flank of the line of operations of the French, and to cut off their communications; this would enable him at the same time to cover Kalouga and the southern provinces of Russia. The position of Taruntino, behind the Nara, which would give him the advantage of menacing the central road from Moscow to Kalouga, at the same

"The French, thanks to the safe-guard that was given us on their arrival, respected our dwelling. It was untouched until the arrival of the Cossacks, who followed them, and over whom there was no authority to control. I was happy, as regards myself, in escaping with the loss of a few pieces of plate, bottles of wine, &c.

"Thanks to heaven! the church of St. Louis escaped pillage, but it did not escape the Cossacks on their return.

"The unhappy losers went to Petrowsky to implore the Emperor Napoleon's assistance; he appeared to bewail their lot, and promised to devise means to remedy it. Upwards of 400 of them were relieved with great zeal and generosity in the house of Zapatof, at the Porte Rouge, and found there, not only a safe asylum, but also provisions and attentions.

"Many went to the hotel of the Count Razomowski, inhabited by the King of Naples, and were received by this latter with humanity; he distributed succour to them, but it was insufficient for such a number."

time enable him to advance by the two other two great roads, which pass by Zerpouchow and Malojaroslawitz, was chosen as a halting place by the Russian army.

The King of Naples at first believed that the enemy had retired directly on Occa, but as soon as he learnt the real movement of the Russian army, he followed in its new direction. Some military men are surprised that Kutusof, if he had not the intention of engaging in a second battle, before abandoning Moscow, should have retreated on this capital, and afterwards take from thence the route to Kalouga; a movement he might have made, directly and with ease, from Mojaisk, it appears that the effects of his loss at the battle of Moskwa, completely deranged the plans of the Russian general, and that outflanked on his right by the Poles, he could only expect to make his flank movement with safety, by covering himself by the Moskwa, beyond Moscow.

Mr. de Ségur does not give any detail of military manœuvres; he is fonder of giving sketches, which he probably has copied from the Russians, or derived from his own imagination, as is the greater part of his work. He supposes that the Russian soldiers heard the *crackling of the flames* at seven or eight leagues from Moscow. He says that "the fire of their sombre and threatening looks might be seen answering these flames, which they regarded as our work; it already betrayed that ferocious revenge which was rankling in their hearts, and which spread throughout the whole empire, and to which so many Frenchmen fell victims."

In the following page, we read on the subject of these same Russians, the following passages, which appear contradictory. "They have since claimed nothing, even in the enemy's capital, which they preserved; their renown has remained great and unsullied," &c.

"Their sacrifice was complete; without reserve, without tardy regrets;" and we have just seen it was the work of an individual. How did he succeed? It was in concealing from the inhabitants his fatal project; in forcing them to abandon their city by the most violent threats; in opening the prisons of the guilty; in placing torches in their hands, and in carry-

ing away from the city all means of extinguishing the conflagration. It was so little an act of patriotism on the part of the Russians, that the inhabitants who remained in Moscow, joined their efforts to ours to arrest the progress of the flames.*

A complete sacrifice is such a one as that of the city of Saguntum, the inhabitants of which precipitated themselves into the flames, after having thrown into them their wives, their children, and their treasures; such an action justly commands admiration. But the banditti who burn a city where they possess nothing, at the command of a man whom his fellow-citizens hate to such a degree, that for several years he has not dared to appear among them, can inspire but horror.—"Since they have claimed nothing," &c. Have they not taken their portion of the million imposed on France?

"*Their renown has remained great and unsullied, they have known true glory.*" Does true glory consist in massacreing prisoners, in exposing them naked on the snow, in putting them to death in horrible torments? Does it consist in pillaging, in violating our women, in burning our villages, as they

* "During this time the fire attacked the lower part of Patrowska, and consumed all the shops situated below the bridge of the Marshals. The flame, urged by the wind, threatened to surmount the width of the bridge, and consume all the shops which are beyond it, towards the Loubianka; already the inhabitants of this quarter, each with his pack on his back, appeared to expect this last sacrifice. In the church of St. Louis, all was in the greatest consternation; all the unfortunate refugees in this building, their bundle in their hand, and resigned to their fate, came to me to receive the last absolution. I begged them to wait, and promised to advise them when the time for it should arrive. I went immediately to the place of danger, and only succeeded in reaching it covered with sparks and flakes of fire. Nothing but the hand of heaven could have saved us; it inspired the company of grenadiers posted in this place, endowed them with courage to arm themselves with buckets, and wet the roofs of the most exposed houses, with such activity that they prevented their taking fire. This was the salvation of all this quarter, which is the only part of the town which remains untouched, and which comprehends all the height above the bridge of the Marshals, Rojestkuka, the two Lobiankas, the post office, the bank, the Tschistiprout, and the end of Patrowska, situate between the two boulevards, as well as Maraceca."—*Extract from the letter of Abbe Surrugues.*

did in all parts of Champagne? Let the author ask the inhabitants of our eastern provinces what they think of this *renown, so great and unsullied, and of the true glory of the Russians?* he will see how they will answer him.

Mr. de Ségur cites with eulogy the action of Count Rostopchin, who burnt his palace in the country, declaring, that "it shall not be polluted by the presence of the French."

Is it good taste in a Frenchman to repeat this gross insult? The after conduct of Mr. Rostopchin has not been in unison with his words, for a short time afterwards we see him come in the midst of these French, and marry his daughter to one of them.*

We will not ask the author, who establishes himself as the apologist of Mr. Rostopchin, to inform us if this Russian count did not believe himself obliged to burn his country palace, from the fear of incurring the reproach of appearing to have lost nothing by this great disaster of which he made himself the agent.

The officer of the palace is astonished, that after eleven days, Napoleon is still in Moscow, "thus losing the time which he ought to have gained." It was natural to hope, that as the Russian army had been almost annihilated at the battle of Moskwa, the Emperor Alexander would make peace at Moscow. This capital having been burnt, Alexander might fear that Napoleon, paralyzing the army of Kutusof by one of those decisive manœuvres, so familiar to him, would direct his march rapidly on Petersburg. All the information received from that city, announced the fear they had of this movement. Already were the archives embarked, and they expected to see the arrival of the French. It may be permitted to suppose, if Alexander had been left to himself, he would not have incurred these dangers, and would have signed a peace. He was prevented by the Russian high nobility, and by the English envoys, who mingled with corruption, the remembrance of a bloody catastrophe. It was finally to attain this end, that these heralds of a perpetual war, employed the

* To the nephew of Count Philip de Ségur.

Governor of Moscow to burn this capital, hoping by its destruction to excite the national hatred, to deprive us of such a pledge when treating, and to oppose a powerful obstacle to a peace. The flattering opinion Napoleon had conceived at Tilsit and at Erfurt of the character and sentiments of the Russian Emperor, justified the hope which he entertained, that this sovereign, despising odious insinuations, would rather listen to the true interests of his country, than purely personal considerations.

Whilst Napoleon expected this reply from Alexander, he occupied himself without intermission in resting his army, in repairing the losses of every kind which it had met with, in organizing hospitals, in affording assistance to his wounded, and in collecting the provision of all kinds that was found dispersed throughout the city. His cares did not cease with his troops. The unhappy inhabitants of Moscow who had remained in the city partook of them; he employed his best endeavours to alleviate their lamentable situation. The wounded Russians, who were found in the hospitals and houses that the fire had respected, were treated like our own. His solicitude extended even to religion; he opened the churches which had not been burnt, he invited to them the popes and curates, who were dispersed; and gave another example of his respect for the sentiments of a people towards their sovereigns, in inviting them to pray for Alexander.*

* It is due to historic truth to observe here, that the constituted authorities, instead of being opposed to the exercise of the national religion, gave orders to find out the popes, and oblige them to resume their functions.—Some were discovered, but they avoided performing their duties under different pretexts. Many, without doubt, had a legitimate reason, as their churches had been burnt down; every necessary assistance was proffered to others, to enable them to re-assume the exercise of their ministry; but, whether from fear, or some other reason, only two or three could be induced to do so, at the end of three weeks.

"A solitary pope in my neighbourhood, consulted me to know whether he might resume his functions, it was a foreign pope, chaplain to one of the regiments of horse guards, taken by the French before the departure of the Russian army. I begged him earnestly to do it. He obtained the necessary safe-guard from the commandant of the place, to undertake his office with respect; the people flocked in crowds to the only church of their sect which

The author here attributes speeches to several persons, without doubt to give them a reputation for frankness, courage, and above all for foresight. Napoleon wished to send a negotiator to Alexander, but the Duke of Vicenza, "more capable of obstinacy than of flattery," refuses. Can persons who are acquainted with the Duke of Vicenza, put faith in such an occurrence? They well know that he had too high a sense of his duties, and of his own dignity, to reject the missions the Emperor deigned to offer him; and if he had refused any, he would not have commenced with that, which had for its object to check the effusion of blood. To enable us to form an opinion on these conversations, full of asperity, these marks of pride without an object, this want of decorum, we will call on those who have seen Napoleon abdicate his throne, and at the mercy of his enemies.—Who is it, even at St. Helena, ever dared to behave thus to him?

The last words of the Emperor to Lauriston were, "I want peace, I must have peace, I absolutely will have peace, only save my honour."

The Emperor desired peace, since he had undertaken the war against his inclinations. He may have expressed his desire to General Lauriston, but he never could have made use of the expression, *save my honour*, since the honour of France was never compromised, and the proof of it is, notwithstanding our disasters, it never received a blemish.

was open. It was feared that the pope would have been obliged to pray, not for the Emperor Alexander, but for Napoleon. An assurance was given him in my presence, that he need not change a single word in his liturgy, and that he might continue to pray for his legitimate sovereign. He performed his office as usual, and sung the *Te Deum*, it being the anniversary of the coronation of Alexander." (*Extract from a Letter of the Abbe Surrugues.*)

CHAPTER X.

Mr. de Ségur, in informing his readers of the arrival of General Lauriston, at the head quarters of Alexander, represents this negotiator as pleased "in breaking off a negotiation which he disapproved." If it had been so, General Lauriston would have easily perceived that the Russians only wanted to gain time, and had no intention to make peace. Nevertheless, his correspondence contributed as well as that of the King of Naples, to sustain the hopes of the Emperor. If the author is to be believed, Napoleon and the King of Naples alone partook of an illusion that General Lauriston should have dissipated.

"Murat, tired of battles, anxious respecting their result, and, as it is said, regretting his throne, since he had no hope of a better, suffered himself to be charmed, seduced, and deceived."

What does the author intend by this hope that Murat entertained of a better throne? Does he mean to allude to that of Poland? But Murat never thought of changing the rich kingdom of Naples, for the deserts of Sarmatia, and there never was an intention he should. If the kingdom of Poland was to be re-established, it would have rather been Prince Poniatowski, than Murat, who would have reigned in Varsovia.

This same Murat, who has no hopes of a *throne better* than that of Naples, is represented, a few lines lower, as flattered by the idea of being "King of the Cossacks."

A battery of artillery, belonging to an Italian division, was attacked on its route, by a partizan corps, who caused some disorder in the convoy, and blew up some caissons. On this occasion, the author, with one stroke of his pen, disgraces an officer with the charge of *cowardice*. The truth is, the Emperor inquired into the circumstances, and the result proved that the officer was more unfortunate than culpable, and the business rested there.

Who can give credence to the enthusiasm Mr. de Ségur attributes to the Russian recruits? "None (says he) had failed to obey the national appeal; all Russia rose. Mothers, it was said, wept for joy on learning that their sons had been selected for soldiers; they hastened to acquaint them with this glorious intelligence, and brought them along themselves, to see them marked with the sign of the Crusaders; to hear them cry, 'Tis the will of God!"

The condition of a serf is such, that the situation of a Russian soldier, miserable as it is, appears a happiness to him. Nevertheless, since the discomfiture of Alexander's armies, the terror and discouragement the French armies had inspired, were such, that the recruits did not wish to march. To make them rejoin the camp at Taruntino, they tied them two and two, and conducted them by Cossacks, who beat them on with the staffs of their lances. If Mr. de Ségur had consulted the French officers, who had been prisoners, and who had been carried in the rear of the Russian army, he would have learnt this.

The author, whose imagination is always in the clouds, and who has already given as a presage, the account of a vulture caught in the chains of a steeple, gives us as a fatal omen, "those flocks of ill-omened birds, who appeared as if they meant to defend the cross of the steeple of the great Ivan." The tower of Ivan being the loftiest in the city, it was natural that it should constantly afford an asylum to a great number of ravens; above all, after a fire, which had destroyed most of the other steeples.

The author wishes us to believe, that this presage had singularly affected the mind of the Emperor. He says, "that he was accessible to every kind of presentiment; he strove himself to perceive, and to make others recognize his star, in a brilliant sun;* this did not amuse him. To the sullen silence of inanimate Moscow, was superadded the still more menacing silence of Alexander. It was not the faint sound of

* A star in the sun is curious enough.

the footsteps of our soldiers, wandering in this vast tomb, that could rouse our Emperor from his reverie."

"His nights in particular became irksome to him. He passed part of them with Count Daru." The Count Daru must have been but little flattered by this, doubtless, involuntary intrusion.

We shall not follow the author in these conversations; it may readily be perceived that they have been fabricated since the events took place.

CHAPTER XI.

Mr. de Ségur, true to his system, presents the Emperor to us, as pleasing himself by self-abuse on the state of his affairs, "catching at every thing to keep up his hopes, when, all at once, the first snows fell; with them fell too all the illusions." The *illusions* of the Emperor did not fall with the snow, considering that he had done all to effect a peace that his duty prescribed to him, that the hopes Murat and Lauriston had given rise to, were not realized, and that he had but one month of good weather to act in, he decided on joining his reinforcements. The author reproaches Napoleon with not wishing to leave part of his artillery in Moscow. The army around this city had still, at their departure, 601 pieces of field artillery, with a sufficiency of ammunition. The artillery teams had been reinforced by the horses of the pontoon carriages, which were left in the Kremlin. It, therefore, could never have occurred to the Emperor, to abandon to the Russians a part of his artillery; it would have been a greater injury than if he had waited for another battle. But Mr. de Ségur seeks after every occasion to exhibit Napoleon more as one who has lost his reason than as a skilful general.

"In this desert country the Emperor, says he, ordered the purchase of 20,000 horses."

A number of individuals belonging to the army had more horses than was conformable to regulations. It was this excess that the Emperor ordered to be purchased, in order to give them to the artillery and military equipages.

Thus, at Wilna, Witepsk, and Smolensk, the Emperor is shown surrounded with *disapproving looks*. "He opens himself freely to Count Daru." He announces to him his project of crushing Kutusof, and marching upon Smolensk. But Count Daru, "who had before approved this course, replied, that it was now too late, that the Russian army was reinforced —that the moment his troops should turn their faces towards France, they would slip away from him by degrees,—'What, then, is to be done?' exclaimed the Emperor."

The situation of Napoleon, reduced to advise with his minister, is merely incongruous; but this exclamation from a man whom we have seen so great and powerful, *What is to be done?* inspires compassion. Happily the quarter master of the palace comes to his aid, by giving him his advice through Count Daru. Here is this *lion's counsel*, "make one vast entrenched camp of Moscow, and pass the winter in it;" bread and salt will not be wanting, he would answer for it. The Emperor might have counted on it, if the administration had provided the army with food from the beginning of the campaign. "The rest foraging on a large scale would supply." The author who makes Count Daru talk so much to the purpose, forgets that he has said in the preceding page, "Napoleon expected forage for two months to be provided on a tract where the most distant and dangerous excursions were not sufficient for the supply of the passing day." The poor horses would run a great risk of dying of hunger; but, be at ease for the cavalry; "such of the horses for which they could not procure food," were to be "salted down," as Count Daru proposed. "Here we might stay, till in spring our reinforcements, and all Lithuania in arms, should come to our relief," &c.

In making a man of such information speak thus, the author should have informed us what advantages this counsellor would

have found in the Emperor's remaining at Moscow, rather than moving upon Smolensk and Witepsk, to make his winter quarters and prepare for a new campaign. The quarter master of the palace doubtless forgets, that Kutusof's army, which daily increased, would have been in the spring in a still stronger situation than ours, even at that time, while ours, blocked up in Moscow, and reduced to its own resources, would have daily seen its cavalry and baggage horses perish. If to these military considerations, we join political ones which are obvious to all, does it not appear evident that there is not a word of truth in this conversation?

At the same time that Mr. de Ségur depicts the Emperor "amid the dreadful storm of war and elements which was gathering round him, his ministers and aids-de-camp saw him pass whole days in discussing the merits of some new verses which he had received, on the regulations for the *Comedie Française* at Paris—prolonging his meals to stifle thought by repletion—passing whole hours half reclined as if torpid, with a novel in his hand, &c.? At the same time he shows him in so unfavourable a light, and pours disrespect upon him, he shows "Kutusof gaining that time we were losing—neglecting no advantage—at once bold and skilful, preparing slowly on impetuous war, &c. Rostopchin receiving a daily report from Moscow as before its conquest," &c.

We recognise in this picture, a new trait of our author's impartiality, and the same spirit which presided over his interior scenes at Paris, Wilna, and Witepsk.

An armistice had been agreed upon with the Russians after the movement of General Lauriston. Mr. de Ségur has painted at full length the good understanding which existed between the outposts of the two armies, and in which he does honour to the extreme confidence of the King of Naples. However, to save the Russians from the charge of bad faith which they incurred by the unexpected attack of Winkowno, he pretends that Murat had declared to Miladorowitch, that the *armistice no longer existed;* this assertion is entirely unfounded.

The quarter master of the palace also supposes that Murat warned the Emperor, "that a woody country on his left might

favour attempts against his flank and rear; that his first line backed against a ravine, might be precipitated into it, that, in short, the position which he occupied in advance of a defile, was dangerous, and rendered a retrograde movement absolutely necessary. But Napoleon would not consent to this step;" the motive which our author gives for this refusal is, that this Prince "dreaded the appearance of receding. He preferred risking every thing."

We are obliged to say here, that Mr. de Ségur deceives himself by wishing to prove, that Napoleon being at Moscow, twenty leagues from Murat, directed minutely the position of his troops. The Emperor understood war differently, as we have already repeatedly shown, he gave a general order, and left the detail of its execution to whomsoever it was addressed.

The Emperor had recommended to the King of Naples to observe the Russian camp, and to take the most suitable position for that purpose, without passing the Nava; but he had not by any means prescribed the particular arrangements, which could solely be determined by circumstances.* If Murat had

* The following letter supports what we have advanced: to this the King of Naples might have quitted Winkowno to retire on Worownow, if he feared an attack.

The Prince of Neufchatel and Wagram to H. M. the King of Naples.

Moscow, Oct. 13, 1812, 2 o'clock, A. M.

The Emperor, according to your reports and the observations you have sent him, thinks that the position of Worownow is fine, compact, and may be defended by infantry, which may easily cover the cavalry. If you are of the same opinion, you are authorised to take that position.

The Emperor has sent his horse this evening, and, after to-morrow, the army will join you, to move against and drive off the enemy. Three days are necessary for the army to arrive near you; you will still have four or five days to pass, and in case the enemy attacks you, or the nature of things renders it impossible for you to avoid the losses you have met with during eight days, you have the resource of taking position at Worownow. All the wagons you have sent are loaded with provisions; those sent this evening will also set forth to-morrow, &c.

In a letter, dated from Moscow, 14th Oct., 1812, at 10 o'clock, P. M. and written by the Prince of Neufchatel, to the King of Naples, there is the following passage: "Make the best examination you can of the defile by which you can move upon Mojaisk, so that if you retreat before the enemy, you

a wood on his left, it was necessary to free himself of it. If he had a ravine in the rear of his position, he should have taken a better one. Does our historian not know these first military notions? or would he throw on the Emperor the surprisal of Murat in his position at Winkowno?

This last conjecture seems the more probable, as he says in the following page, that "young Berenger presently arrived. He brought intelligence that Murat's first line had been surprised and overthrown, and his left turned by favour of the wood," &c. in short all that he had foreseen, was realised!

The quarter-master of the palace should have told us that the Russian general, profiting by the confidence we had in his word, recommended hostilities suddenly, in the hope of destroying our advanced guard; but the valour of the King of Naples and the troops under his command, disconcerted this plan. The enemy's loss was greater than ours; if we lost Generals Fischer and Dery, whose names are not mentioned by Mr. de Ségur, the Russians lost Generals Baggowout and Muller. Benigsen, who appeared to have been the promoter of that affair, gave thereby a new proof that he understood the revolutions of the palace better than military operations.

What a singular opinion would strangers form from reading, that "no one durst apprise him that the report of cannon was heard towards Winkowno—some from incredulity or uncertainty, others from love of ease; dreading the first movements of his impatience, or fearful of being sent to verify this assertion, and to expose themselves to a fatiguing excursion!"

"At these tidings Napoleon recovered the fire of his early years."

The Emperor, who according to Mr. de Ségur, was failing

may be well acquainted with that route. The Emperor supposes that your baggage, park, and the greatest part of your infantry, may retire without being perceived by the enemy.

"Is it true, that in passing the defile of Worownow, your cavalry can be covered by your infantry, and in a less fatiguing position than that it would be in on a level country, which keeps it continually on the alert? Under all circumstances, it is very important to procure several days provisions for your troops. There are at Moscow, some thousands of quintals of flour, and plenty of brandy at your disposal," &c.

at 42 years old, while Kutusof at 80 had the energy of youth, had not waited for this circumstance to order the retreat and to awake from the pretended apathy into which the author plunged him.

Several letters written by the Emperor during his stay at Moscow will be found in the appendix. This very small fraction of the great number of orders given by him relative to military affairs during that time, will suffice to show his activity and foresight. We shall be satisfied that Napoleon had not waited for the attack on Winkowno to organize and reinforce his army, secure his communications, complete the trains of his artillery, augment his stores of ammunition, (by the powder found near the German barrier, and the balls collected on the field of battle,) remove his wounded and useless objects, and be ready to move actively on any point he wished. We pass in silence the despatching of couriers, which occurred every day, for Paris, carrying instructions for all parts of the internal administration, politics, finances, war, &c.

In one page, "the division Clarapede was on the route to Mojaisk," and in the next, he says, "Clarapede and Latour-Maubourg cleared the defile of Saskaflia." We ask of the author, how the division Clarapede could be on the same day in two places, more than twenty leagues distant from each other? But in a work which swarms with so many important errors, we should not take up such inaccuracies.

BOOK IX.—CHAPTER I.

In this chapter, the Emperor himself gives the motives of his stay in Moscow. "He had been obliged to allow time to the soldiers to recruit themselves, and to the wounded collected in Moscow, Mojaisk, and Kolotskoi, to move off towards Smolensk. But, as if it were impossible to allow the Emperor to say two rational things successively, he hastens to add,

that Napoleon, pointing *to a still serene sky*, asked, "If in that brilliant sun they did not recognise his star?"

This image of a star in the sun delights Mr. de Ségur very much; it is often found in his book. In general he seeks to have it believed, that Napoleon had a puerile confidence in his star, and liked to testify it; which is absurd. Such a man as he was might count upon his genius, his talents, and profound meditations; but he believed as much in his star as Cæsar did in the sacred hens.

All the preceding chapters show us this great captain plunged in sleep and lethargy, and yet our author says, "Napoleon entered Moscow with 90,000 fighting men, and 20,000 sick and wounded, and quitted it with more than a hundred thousand combatants. He left there only 1,200 sick. His stay, notwithstanding his daily losses, served to rest his infantry, to complete his stores, to augment his force by ten thousand men, and to protect the recovery or retreat of a greater part of his wounded."

In the middle of a long description of the equipages and train of the army, at its departure from Moscow, the author brings forward the *gigantic cross of the great Ivan.*

This cross which was placed on the top of the steeple of Ivan Weliki, was 30 feet high, and made of wood, covered with thin plates of gilded silver. The sappers who were ordered to remove it, let it fall and dashed it to pieces: the silver was stripped off and the wood abandoned. A small cross of pure gold, about ten inches long, was fixed in the middle of the great one. This alone was preserved and removed along with the treasure of the army. Thus the *gigantic cross* of Mr. de Ségur, is reduced to ten inches. Half of his assertions should suffer a similar reduction.

Succeeding to this cross, we see *the Russian peasants with their beards, conducting or carrying our booty, of which they formed part, &c.* By saying this, does the palace officer mean that these peasants were enslaved, and justify thereby the infamies which the Russians committed on the unfortunate French left in the hospitals of Moscow, and recommended to their hu-

manity?* It is false, that any peasant was reduced to captivity; some followed for the sake of obtaining what was abandoned by us, and others were hired as servants.

The author has employed four pages to describe the sortie from Moscow, and but a few lines to the skilful movements by which the Emperor deceived the enemy, by turning his position from Taruntino, and moving upon Kalouga by Borowsk and Malojaroslawitz.

CHAPTER II.

On his arrival at Borowsk, in the evening of October 23d, the Emperor learned that the Viceroy occupied Malojaroslawitz, "but," says Mr. de Ségur, "he went to sleep on this success, instead of entering it." He appears by this to reproach Napoleon for not having immediately moved upon Malojaroslawitz. But this prince, having learned that the Russian corps of Doctoroff marched upon his left, and was at Aristowo, could not have moved upon Malojaroslawitz, before being quite sure that it

* General William de Vaudoncourt, in his *Memoirs to serve for a history of the War between France and Russia, in* 1812, a work superior to all those hitherto published on this campaign, both on account of the author's talents and the exactness of the facts related, states "that on the 23d of October, the Russian General Ilowaiki entered Moscow, that he found there in three hospitals, about 400 sick or wounded Russians, and 650 sick or wounded Frenchmen, who had been too weak to be removed with their comrades. A part of the latter had, notwithstanding, been thrown into carriages to be carried to Twer; but they all perished from cold and misery, or were assassinated by the peasants, charged with the conveyance of them, who cut their throats for the sake of their clothes. The rest were left in the hospitals with the French surgeons, who remained to take care of them, but the Russians neither gave them food nor medicine."

General Vaudoncourt having been taken prisoner during the retreat, has been enabled personally, to collect much information of the highest interest, which will make his memoirs valuable to all those who wish to have a just idea of the events of that war.

was not the whole Russian army which marched upon Borowsk. Moreover, what motive should have decided the Emperor to move on Malojaroslawitz, when, according to Mr. de Ségur, the division of Delzons had found it *unoccupied?* This phrase, *the Emperor slept upon this success, instead of entering it,* signifies nothing."

The criticism of M. the palace officer, is owing to his not having consulted the maps, for he says, in speaking of Malojaroslawitz, "it was the only point where Kutusof could cut us of from the new road to Kalouga. Notwithstanding, at Borowsk we were in the same danger."

The author has said, that our delay at Witepsk caused our misfortunes; then, that it was our march upon Moscow; and then, our delay in that capital. Here, however, on the subject of *a day sacrificed at the passage of the Naxa and Marsh,* he adds, "be this as it may, we may date all our calamities from that delay."

An officer of Prince Eugene came to the Emperor to announce, that Malojaroslawitz, not having been occupied, except by two battalions, the enemy had attacked them at daylight, and overcome this feeble body of troops. He added, that the Viceroy marched to the support of the division of Delzons. Mr. de Ségur then says, "the whole army of Kutusof was hastening up—that his columns already placing themselves across the old road to Kalouga, which was open the preceding day, which we might have occupied and travelled if we had pleased, but which Kutusof would henceforward have it in his power to defend inch by inch."

What M. the palace officer advanees, is intended to support the reproach he has previously made on the slowness with which the Emperor moved upon Malojaroslawitz. We have already made known the reasons which prevented the Emperor from marching directly on it, before the enemy appeared. We may add, that according to the instructions the Viceroy had received, he should have occupied Malojaroslawitz strongly, and that instead of two battalions only, it was the entire division of Delzons he should have placed there. As soon as Napoleon received the news that the Russians were attacking

that post, he sent one of his officers* to Prince Eugene, to order him to hold Malojaroslawitz. He informed him that he was marching to his support, and directed him to secure the town by strong batteries on the right and left. The Emperor had then foreseen and directed every thing that was necessary.

Mr. de Ségur coldly relates the loss suffered by the fourth corps in the person of Delzons. The intrepidity of this general, and the affecting death of his brother, might have afforded the historian of the grand army, some expressions of regret and esteem for these brave men. The Russian generals, even Koulnief, were eulogized by him: it is painful to see that he neglects to render the same justice to the French generals.

According to his custom, at the same time he exaggerates our forces, he diminishes those of the enemy. The three French and Italian divisions, which, under Prince Eugene, conquered at Malojaroslawitz, consisted of but 16,000 men. The Russian army, consisting of sixteen divisions, had 70,000 men engaged. Our loss was about 3,000 men; the enemy lost 8,000. This affair was one of the most glorious for the French and Italian troops, on account of their disproportionate number. The author seems to reproach the Emperor, by saying, "that so sanguinary a conflict might have been spared." However, had he reflected, he would have understood, that in consequence of the enemy's position, and the bad state of the roads, it was impossible that our march from Moscow could have been more rapid. The army could not advance in close columns; it marched in echelon.

"The *corps d'armee* had remained out of reach of each other." The proof of the contrary is, that the corps of Marshal Davoust, which marched in the rear of that of the Viceroy, arrived at Malojaroslawitz on the morning of the 24th, and the Emperor arrived there at noon.†

* The orderly-officer, General Gourgaud.

† The Emperor left Borowsk early; he was breakfasting two leagues from that town, with the King of Naples, the Prince of Neufchatel, and General Lariboisiere, when the reports of cannon were heard. He immediately mounted, and near noon he was with his staff opposite Malojaroslawitz, on

Had the author acquainted himself with the marches of the army at Marengo, Ulm, and Eckmülh, he would have recognized, that the same man and the same mind presided over the army at Malojaroslawitz.

CHAPTER III.

The quarter-master of the palace, commences in this chapter by an error, which though of slight importance, merits some notice. He insinuates, that during the battle the *Emperor was on the right of the grand route, at the bottom of a ravine, on the edge of a brook in the village of Gorodinia.* During the whole of the battle, the Emperor remained upon the road which leads to the bridge of Malojaroslawitz, whence he saw the action, and gave his orders. It was thence that he made the division of Gerard pass the Louja, upon a second bridge, which was constructed below the Wore, and directed him to move from the right of Malojaroslawitz, and extend his right to the woods of Terentiewa. He also sent Compans' division against the left of Malojaroslawitz. He attempted himself to place a battery upon the left bank of the Louja, to support the right of General Gerard, from one bank to the other. It was only at night that the Emperor returned to the house, which Mr. de Ségur says, was "old, dilapidated, wretched, dirty, obscure, and divided into two apartments by a cloth." The most correct observations of our author, are those made in relation to the interior of the lodgings occupied by the Emperor. We do not contradict the author on this subject, but observe, it was not until after the battle, that the Emperor entered the hut.

Marshal Bessieres, whom Napoleon charged with reconnoitring the Russian position, came to tell him, "it was un-

an eminence above the Louja, on the left of the road, and perfectly situated for observing the movements of the enemy.

assailable! Oh heavens, exclaimed Napoleon, clasping his hands, are you sure you are right? Are you not mistaken? Will you answer for that? Bessieres repeated his assertion; he affirmed that three hundred grenadiers would suffice to keep in check a whole army."

This theatrical consternation, and clasped hands raised towards heaven, contrast in a striking manner with the character of Napoleon. It is here especially that the author is neglectful of the rule prescribed to historians as well as poets, to make their heroes act and speak in consonance with their known characters. The author has read somewhere, that the position of Malojaroslawitz was forced with difficulty, to gain the route to Kalouga, and without considering, that from the evening we were masters of the bridge and town, which constituted its strength, makes Marshal Bessieres say, that the position taken by the Russians beyond that town, was *unassailable*, and that *three hundred grenadiers would suffice to keep a whole army in check*. This assertion evidently proves that the author has not even seen Malojaroslawitz. Three hundred grenadiers could not oppose an obstacle to an army, except in an almost inaccessible defile; the true defile was the bridge and the town, and of these we were in possession. The Russian position was so assailable, that on the evening of the battle Kutusof retired with his army nearly a league, in order to establish himself behind the little brook of Korigea.

Who, then, could have seen Napoleon at the end of this pretented report of Bessieres, "crossing his arms with a look of consternation, hanging his head, and remaining in the deepest dejection?" Who could have heard him say, "his army was victorious and himself conquered: his route was intercepted, his manœuvre thwarted. Kutusof, an old man, a Scythian, had anticipated him. It was not his fortune then that had failed him, but he who had been wanting to his fortune?" These fine things, like so many others, are only related by Mr. de Ségur; yet it is very improbable that he made a third person between the Emperor and Marshal Bessieres.

Master of Malojaroslawitz, nothing hindered Napoleon from moving upon Kalouga, by passing the corps of Kutusof. On

the other hand, if he wished not to join battle, what prevented him from amusing Kutusof before Malojaroslawitz, and sending the rest of his army, by Kremskoe and Medyn, to Kalouga. This movement had even been begun, since the corps of Poniatowski, according to Mr. de Ségur himself, had been sent to Kremskoe. We may then say, that the *stupor* and consternation into which he plunges the Emperor, that feverish anxiety, that "cruel night during which he lay down, rose up, called out incessantly, &c." scenes so faithfully reproduced at Witepsk and Moscow, have flowed from the brain of an author who delights in such conceptions. He has often heard that Napoleon was in the habit of rising at night; he thinks this very remarkable, and nothing was more common. Had he possessed a more perfect knowledge of what passed at the Emperor's, he would have known that when the army was in operation, it was the constant custom of this Prince to get up every night, from midnight till two o'clock in the morning, the hour about which the reports arrived, sent by the generals at the close of the preceding day. But Mr. de Ségur, whose nights were peaceful, knew nothing that happened during his slumbers.

About five o'clock in the morning, an orderly officer* whom he had ordered to pass the night at the outposts, to learn as much as possible of the enemy's movements, came in. He informed the Emperor that the Russians appeared to occupy nearly the position they held in the evening; but upon the right he heard, as did General Gerard, cavalry moving in that direction, and which were supposed to be marching upon Medyn.

Napoleon then sent successively for the King of Naples, Marshal Bessieres, and Count Lobau, and said to them, "it appears that the enemy remains, and that we shall have a battle. In the present situation of the army, is it advantageous to fight or avoid it?" Bessieres and Murat had no doubt of our conquering the militia of Kutusof, for, said they, the Russian army was destroyed at Moskwa. But a battle will disorganize the army; the artillery and cavalry horses have suffer-

* Gen. Gourgaud.

ed much by bad forage; new losses of horses cannot be repaired; our wounded would be lost men; to move upon Kalouga would be a hazardous enterprise under existing circumstances; what they thought better was to retire upon Smolensk. The Emperor having examined, in a few moments approached Count Lobau, and said, "and you, Sir, what is your opinion?" "Sire, my opinion is to retire upon the Niemen, by the shortest and best known route, that of Mojaisk, and as promptly as possible," which he repeated at several times. Napoleon appeared shaken; but said he would go look at the field of battle before he decided, and called for his horses.

The recital given by Mr. de Ségur of the rush of the Cossacks upon the Emperor, is full of error. As soon as he knew the Cossacks who charged the sutlers on the route, he moved to the left, saying, "*Squadrons of the guard, forward!*" But these squadrons had not mounted at the same moment with Napoleon. Three companies of the escort only had followed, one of chasseurs, one of lancers, and one of dragoons. These moved rapidly forward, and their presence checked the Cossacks. It is not true that they approached so near the Emperor that one of them thrust his lance into the chest of Rapp's horse. Neither is it more true that this general took Napoleon's horse by the bridle. Some orderly officers, and the staff of the Prince of Neufchatel, advanced with the body guard at the same time that the Emperor retired towards the squadrons of the guard, which were seen approaching from a distance.

It was in this skirmish that the chasseurs of the guard and the Poles had with the Cossacks, that at the moment of the arrival of the horse grenadiers, that Mr. Lecoulteux, having slain a Russian horseman, and taken his lance, was wounded by a sabre cut across the body, by a grenadier of the horse guards, who mistook him for a Cossack, because he had on a red cloak, which covered his dress. It is false that the Cossacks were *bold even to insolence.* It is false that they were seen *retiring through the intervals of our squadrons, at a slow pace, tranquilly reloading their arms;* three weak companies were sufficient to disperse them. This was so much so that they hastened to ford the Louja, across which they were pursued by

our cavalry. The orderly officers, Athalin, Lauriston, Chabrillant, Montagu, Tiligniers, &c. were present with us at the affair. They can certify to what we have advanced, as well as Mr. Lecoulteux, who was so grievously wounded. Mr. de Ségur was probably at Gorodinia, and made this description as he has done so many others, from hearsay.

He terminates the chapter by saying, *all this makes one reflect.* What is much fitter to provoke reflection is the manner in which this fact, and so many others, have been brought forward.

How can the author say that the Emperor "remained there half an hour, lost in astonishment that the enemy dared to attack him, and that too the very day after a victory; and that he had been obliged to fly." What is there astonishing that headquarters should be attacked unexpectedly by light horsemen? Certainly the victory of Wagram was a great one, yet in the evening of that day, the Emperor was obliged, by a charge of cavalry, to take refuge amid his guard, who were formed into a square. We might cite numerous examples of similar rash enterprises.

Mr. de Ségur makes another horrible picture of the field of battle of Malojaroslawitz. Does he then think it possible to make war without losing men? By his description of a battle field one would imagine he heard a Parisian shopkeeper, who found himself instantaneously transported to one.

CHAPTER IV.

"Can you forget, comrades, the fatal field which put a stop to the conquest of the world, where the victories of twenty years were blasted, where the great edifice of our fortune began to totter to its foundation?"

This chapter commences in this elevated tone. An idea quickly presents itself to the mind, which is, that if the brave

veterans of the grand army have lost every thing, there are persons whose fortunes have suffered few checks, and who are on the road to fresh honours.

According to Mr. de Ségur, Napoleon was situated "between the two armies, his steps and his eyes wandering from south to west, along the roads to Kalouga and Medyn, both which were closed against him. On that to Kalouga, were Kutusof and 120,000 men." But on that of Medyn, we cannot see what was to stop us. The officer of the palace says, that Platoff was there with his Cossacks; but however contemptible an opinion he may entertain of the French army, he cannot suppose that the Cossacks ever could be considered as an obstacle to it. It is true, according to him, that "they traversed this army through and through." But these circumstances did not thus occur. As we have stated in the preceding chapter, they had forded the Louja on our right flank, and plundered several sutlers on the road, but being charged by some platoons of the guard, they were forced to fly by the route whence they arrived.

The author does not inform us, that the Emperor remained all day on the field of battle, before he determined to adopt the advice of those generals who recommended a direct retreat on Smolensk. The time he spent on the plain of Malojaroslavitz, the repugnance with which he left it, gives reason to believe that he foresaw that the Russian army, disheartened by the battle of the preceding day, would beat a retreat. The unanimous opinion was, however, that the Russians would give battle, and this was the strongest argument of Murat, Davoust, &c. to induce him to regain the road to Mojaisk.

Instead of alluding to the reconnoitres made by the Emperor, Mr. de Ségur brings him back to Gorodinia, where he supposes a council of war which never took place. He gives according to his plan, the speeches of Murat, Marshals Davoust, Bessieres, Berthier, Eugene, &c. and makes them deliberate on a retreat, when, before leaving the plain of Malojaroslawitz, Napoleon had already ordered his dispositions as to the direction the corps were to take in their march. But these conversations furnish Mr. de Ségur an opportunity of

making Bessieres observe, that "neither the army nor the guard had sufficient spirit for such efforts;" as if it was not allowed, even by our enemies, that this celebrated corps never tarnished its reputation in the most critical situations, and that the feeling of honour, of courage, and of fidelity, which animated it, could only finish with it. Marshal Bessieres knew this corps too well, was too proud in the command of it, to have said, "It wanted spirit."

At the termination of these conversations, and the quarrels they induced, the author finds nothing better to do, than to make the Emperor lose his reason. "Those who attended him have asserted, that the report of another warm affair with the Cossacks towards Borowsk, a few leagues in the rear of the army, was the last shock which induced him finally to adopt this fatal resolution."

This testimony of valets-de-chambres ought to flatter the Cossacks greatly, they should be proud of the part that our author makes them play.

CHAPTER V.

"It was after the greatest effort that of Malojaroslawitz, had been made, and when he had nothing to do but to march that he retreated."

Here Mr. de Segur agrees with us in contradicting the opinion he has placed in the mouth of Marshal Bessieres, "that the position of the Russian army was unassailable, and that three hundred grenadiers would suffice to keep in check a whole army." Such contradictions are found throughout the work.

We have already stated, in the preceding chapter, that the intention of the Emperor was to offer battle again to the Russians. For, being sure of conquering them, he would be ena-

bled to march on Smolensk, by Kalouga, Medyn, or Mojaisk, without fear of being pursued.

Notwithstanding the assertions of Mr. de Ségur, we will again repeat, that it was only from the solicitations of his principal generals that he decided on not giving battle. One of the most powerful motives which influenced him, was the fear of the treatment his newly wounded would experience, if he should be obliged to abandon them.

The Emperor had judged properly; the Russian army retreated. But when all the generals are opposed to the opinion of the commander in chief, success may be doubtful. Napoleon often yielded to the opinion of others with a facility that has been censured. He has been heard to observe, that in situations much more dangerous, but which it is useless to cite here, that he would have avoided great reverses, particularly towards the end of his career, if he had depended on himself alone.

It is worse than weakness to suppose, that "two affairs with the Cossacks had disgusted him." It does not merit a serious refutation.

"From this moment, he had nothing in view but Paris, just as in leaving Paris he saw nothing but Moscow."

The desire of returning to Paris had no influence on his determination. In conquering the Russians and occupying Moscow, he had attained the first object of the war; the second, which was peace, not having been accomplished, prudence and his duty prescribed to him to rejoin the remainder of his army and his magazines, in order to take up winter quarters, and to put himself in train to re-commence the campaign in the following spring. If the winter, whose rigour and premature arrival had baffled all calculations, had not surprised our legions, they would have arrived uninjured at their quarters.

In leaving Moscow, the Emperor had no intention of establishing himself behind the Beresina, as the corps of Macdonald, of St. Cyr, and of Oudinot, on the left, of Schwarzenberg, Regnier, and Dombrowsky, on the right, ought to keep in check Wittgenstein, Essen, Titchakof, and Tormasow, who were opposed to them. It was not until his arrival at Smo-

lensk, that he decided to march on the Beresina, having learnt that the numerous reinforcements received by Wittgenstein, had obliged St. Cyr to abandon the Duna, and that the sluggishness of Schwarzenberg had permitted Titchakof to gain several marches on him in advancing on Minsk. If his orders had been executed, notwithstanding the slowness of Schwarzenberg, our magazines at Minsk, Wilna, and Borisof, would have been saved, covered by the divisions of Dombrowsky and Soison, by the reinforcements which were at Wilna, and by the second corps. Thus the army, assured of the passage of the Beresina at Borisow, would have taken up position behind this river.

How could a Frenchman write, that "the French army marched with downcast eyes, as if ashamed and humbled," when a corps of this army only 16,000 strong, were sufficient to beat the Russian army, of which, by the account of Mr. de Ségur, the retreat resembled a rout. It is a want of truth and dignity.

As to the criticisms he makes on the plan of the campaign of the Emperor, it is to be regretted that he did not communicate then, what he now lays before his readers. Napoleon in his *debility* would have been happy to have discovered a saviour in the officer of the palace.

CHAPTER VI.

Marshal Mortier was left in the Kremlin with but eight thousand men. "This Marshal was looked upon as a devoted victim; the other chiefs, his old companions in glory, had left him with tears in their eyes." The Emperor left the Kremlin on the 19th of October, in the morning, leaving orders that Marshal Mortier should evacuate it on the 23d. This Prince, marching on the road to Kalouga to meet the army of Kutusof,

Marshal Mortier did not consider himself a victim by remaining in the citadel. Twenty days' labour had so strengthened the fortifications as to render them susceptible of a long defence with one division of the young guard, and Mortier had only to fear the attacks of Winzingerode's Cossacks, and the Russian peasants. Where did Mr. de Ségur learn that these Cossacks were the scouts of ten thousand Russians? and what does he mean by the four days' resistance of Marshal Mortier in the Kremlin, where he was not besieged? What proves that the garrison in this citadel was unknown to the enemy, is, that when Winzingerode and his aid-de-camp were taken prisoners, they were only guarded by a few horsemen, besides General Winzingerode had no Russian infantry with his corps. How could Cossacks, with their lances, attack the Kremlin? Its thick and lofty walls would alone have prevented their entrance, without there even being any garrison. The reproaches that Napoleon addressed to General Winzingerode, when he was brought as a prisoner before him, are exactly repeated. As to the distinction made by the Emperor, between a Russian fighting for his country, and a stranger hiring out his services, Mr. de Ségur says, "a proof there was calculation even in his wrath." The words which he puts in the mouth of Gen. Winzingerode, "that Alexander had been his benefactor and that of his family, and that all he possessed he owed to him, &c." were both noble and just; such sentiments do honour to those who profess them; it is a pity that the author does not feel their propriety. The Emperor, who is always presented to us as a man whose faculties are impaired, and having lost all jurisdiction, here at least displays an energy which should have commanded the respect of his censurers at head-quarters. These gentlemen tried to qualify the just reproaches addressed by the Emperor to Mr. Winzingerode. "It was disapproved, and each was eager to accost the captive General, to encourage, to console him." What truth is there in this account? I appeal to the author. That the Emperor's expressing his just resentment, displeased him, we must believe, since he acknowledges it. But that he or his friends testified their

displeasure, by an affected disrespect to their chief, we may be permitted to doubt. It is very well to say so now, when we cannot see it in its proper light.

CHAPTER VII.

The author, in painting this memorable expedition, has covered his pallet with but sombre colours, and already anticipates disastrous consequences, from the severity of the cold. Let him restrain his impatience, pictures will not be wanting; but let him not hasten to assert, that the winter attacked the army three days after it left Moscow. Until the 6th of November, that is, for sixteen or seventeen days, the weather had been fine, and the cold much less, than it had been in many months of the campaigns in Prussia and Poland, or even in Spain, (in the mountains of Castile,) during the winter campaign the Emperor made there in person, in 1808.

Mr. de Ségur gives as a decisive and positive fact, the report made by a Russian prisoner, on the 28th of October, that all the enemy's army had marched by Medyn on Wiazma, and he adds, that "the first impulse of the Emperor inclined him to neglect this notion."

Notwithstanding the geographical knowledge the author attributes to this soldier, it was impossible that he could make such a statement to the Emperor; for at this time, Kutusof himself had no intention of advancing on Wiazma, as we shall prove by his marches.

After the battle of Malojaroslawitz, Kutusof retreated on the road to Kalouga, and halted on the 26th, at Gonzarewow. From the movement that Prince Poniatowski had made towards Kremskoe, the Russian general feared that Napoleon would advance by Medyn on Kalouga, and directed his march to Polotnianoizavod, on the route from Kalouga to Medyn.

Miloradowich, on learning that the French had left Malojaroslawitz, fearing to find them already at Medyn, retreated to Adamskoe, situated between this city and Kutusof's position. Thus Kutusof was at Polotnianoizavod on the 28th, and remained there till Napoleon was at Oupenskoe, near Mojaisk, full twenty leagues from him. He made this movement under the idea that Napoleon was marching on the Kalouga by Medyn. The Russian soldier, even if he had been the confidant of Kutusof, and supposing that he had traversed twenty leagues in the twinkling of an eye, could not have said, on the 28th, that the Russian army was advancing on Wiazma. Besides, Kutusof having learnt, on the 29th, that the French army was retiring on Mojaisk, wished to approach it, in order to follow it in its retreat, which, he believed, was directed on Witepsk, passing by Wolokolamsk, Zoubtzow, Beloi, and Souraz, and the 29th he commenced his march in two columns, and halted for the night at Adamskoe, in the rear of Medyn. The next day, the 30th, he arrived at Kremskoe, and it was not till then that he was apprised of the real direction of the retreat of the French army.

We have entered into this detail of marches, to prove, substantially, to Mr. de Ségur, how much he is deceived, since at the time at which he makes his Russian soldier speak, Kutusof believed that the French army was advancing by Medyn on Kalouga, which decided him to manœuvre, in order to prevent being cut off from that city.

What the author afterwards advances, respecting Davoust, who had sent in the Russian soldier, that his news might be disseminated, and to revenge himself, because the Emperor had not taken his advice, is a supposition unworthy of the character of this marshal. What necessity is there of defaming both the Emperor and the French generals?

The metaphor "of the weather which had not been invited to his council, and which seemed to revenge the slight," is a play on words worthy of the *Precieuses ridicules*.

It cannot be supposed that there was no bridge over the Kalocza at the return of the army; for all the trains of artillery, &c. which had arrived at Moscow, passed by it, there was a

cantonment of artillery at the abbey of Kolostkow, and the eighth corps was stationed at Mojaisk. This incident affords the author an opportunity of censuring the Prince of Neufchatel, to whom, at least, he could not refuse a long experience and acquaintance with the details for a grand army. Mr. de Ségur gives us to understand "there was no staff, no general order, no common tie, nothing which bound these corps together." Even admitting that this bridge had not been repaired, the reproach should have been addressed to the eighth corps; but it did not merit it, for the bridge was there. The great park of the artillery of the army was sent on the right of Borodino, by a bridge constructed for the purpose, in order that this passage should not be encumbered.

"After passing the Kalocza," says Mr. de Ségur, "we marched on, absorbed in thought, when some of us raising our eyes, uttered an exclamation of horror—the cry of, it is the field of the great battle! formed a long and doleful murmur."

This proves evidently that the author has not examined the field of battle. He supposes that it was on the left bank of the Kalocza, whilst the grand redoubt, the three other redoubts taken by Ney and Davoust, the village of Semenowsky, carried by Friant, all in fact he alludes to, are on the right bank.

If the reasonings of the officer of the palace after the battle of Moskwa, if the conversations he reports have not sufficiently demonstrated that he has not seen what he relates, we find a new proof in the description he gives of the field of battle on our return. But we do not envy him the pleasure he experienced in viewing on his route, "30,000 half devoured corpses," which did not exist there.

If the traveller he speaks of, takes him some day for his *cicerone*, he will run great danger of being led astray.

CHAPTER VIII.

The author cannot resist his desire of relating an anecdote, of which he has not even the merit of invention; it belongs exclusively to Mr. Labaume. It is that of a French soldier, whose two legs had been shattered in the battle, who lived for fifty days in the body of a horse. In giving an account of the battle, our writer has already recounted to us a similar incident, the only variation is, that the first soldier was a Russian, and the latter a Frenchman.

Is not the imagination of the author wearied by giving birth to such disgusting pictures?

All the wounded had been carried off on the evening of the battle and the following days. The eighth corps had been left in position at Mojaisk, charged with this care. We may be assured that every thing to be found on the field of battle had been collected, even the bullets. The general of the artillery gathered up about 20,000, with which he renewed his ammunition.

The description Mr. de Ségur gives of the hospital at Kolotshoi, appears to be an accusation against the military commissariat. Multiplied orders had been issued at Moscow, and it was particularly to the attentions which should be lavished on the wounded, that the indefatigable activity of the Emperor directed itself. The artillery constantly provided for all its purposes, and instead of being in want of ammunition, the army was obliged to destroy a portion of it, on its retreat.

Was it more difficult in the commissariat to procure medicines and bandages, than in the artillery to convey its ammunition? The Emperor on leaving Moscow had expressly ordered, that all carriages, his own not excepted, should be appropriated to the wounded which were capable of being removed.

It was thus when in Egypt, on the return of the Syrian expedition, after having employed the whole of the horses to car-

ry the wounded, he was seen to march on foot through the sands of the desert, in order to give up to a wounded man the horse on which he rode.

The author says, "an atrocious action was witnessed, committed by the sutlers who threw the wounded who had been placed in their carts, into the ditches—only one survived." This is too much exaggerated. It is true that some miserable sutlers, urged by cupidity, sullied themselves with this crime, but it was punished as soon as committed, and severe menaces prevented a repetition of this disgrace.

To efface from the mind of the reader the painful impressions that such an act of cruelty would necessarily excite, the officer of the palace ought to have cited the numerous examples of that active humanity so characteristic of the French, and which was called forth by this unfortunate event. The most part of the wounded that had been placed by orders of the Emperor in his carriages, and those of the army were saved. Among them was Mr. de Beauveau, lieutenant of carabiniers, who owes his life to the circumstance of his being accommodated in one of the imperial carriages.

The fact respecting the bodies of Russian prisoners found lying in the route, is related with the same want of exactness. The following is the truth; the Emperor, at the head of his staff, marched on the right of the great road from Smolensk. He remarked the bodies of two or three Russian soldiers, lying not far from the road; he called the aid-de-camp* who was before him, and ordered him to see what they were; this officer brought him word that they were Russians. The Emperor appeared astonished, and said, What, the Russians before us! The aid-de-camp replied, Sire, I learnt that the Spaniards and Portuguese entrusted with the escort of the prisoners, have shot several of them, who refused to march. The countenance of Napoleon became severe; What, said he quickly, massacre the prisoners! Berthier, what does this mean? Berthier replied that he was ignorant, but that he would inquire into it. An inquiry was made: the Spanish soldiers pretended that the

* Gen. Gourgaud.

column of prisoners having found brandy, in a wagon abandoned on the road, had drank immoderately, and that some being drunk, endeavoured to disarm the soldiers of the escort, who in consequence fired on them. Measures were taken that such disorders should not again occur.

"Napoleon kept a gloomy silence, but on the ensuing day these murders had ceased." What can we understand by this but that the Emperor was the author, or an accessary, to these murders? This gratuitous outrage on the elevated character of Napoleon, can only excite indignation. His policy even was interested in not tolerating these cruelties, for the Russians were in a situation to make reprisals, and to a much greater extent.

The author pretends "that these unfortunate people were then merely left to die of hunger;" and he adds, a few lines farther, "but what could we do?" What was done? The captive Russian prisoners lived as did our soldiers, on horse flesh. "We were cruel from necessity." We were not cruel and there was no necessity to be so. Two or three thousand disarmed Russians, at liberty or prisoners, could add little to our sufferings or prosperity. These prisoners by degrees were left in the rear, and were picked up by their countrymen.

"In one of the halts of that day, there, on the rough side of a frozen field, strewed with wrecks both Russian and French, Napoleon attempted, by the energy of his words, to relieve himself from the weight of the insupportable responsibility of so many disasters; he had in fact dreaded the war, and he devoted its author to the execration of the whole world. But the Duke of Vicenza, perhaps too impatient, betrayed his indignation by a gesture of anger and incredulity, and abruptly retiring, put an end to this unpleasant conversation."

It is a painful task, always to be obliged to point out, this strange passion for presenting under a false light, the natural sentiments of Napoleon, in the situations in which he was placed, and which could not but be honourable to him. We must be unhappily constituted to suppose that perversity would be carried to the point of clothing a deliberate imposture with an appearance of sensibility. No, the responsibility of disas-

ters, unknown at the time our author alludes to, did not weigh on Napoleon. "This war, which in fact he feared," (why did he not rather say, endeavoured to avoid) could not be imputed to him.

The Duke of Vicenza, always chosen for the principal actor in these unpleasant scenes, which only existed in the imagination of the author, certainly will not accept the part which Mr. de Ségur wishes him to play.

CHAPTER IX.

The Emperor remained at Wiazma to wait for Marshal Davoust, who executed his movement too slowly. The officer of the palace makes the *corps of Prince Eugene* censure this marshal on this subject, who replied, "that his horror of every kind of disorder, at first led him to attempt to introduce regularity into this flight."

Marshal Davoust could not have made use of this expression. The French army never took flight from the Russians. From Moscow it could have marched on St. Petersburg, and certainly the author would not have called this march, a flight. The Emperor wished rather to return to Smolensk, in order to pass the winter in Lithuania. This march, voluntarily taken by Napoleon, cannot then be termed a flight. It was not the Russians he wished to avoid, but the winter in the middle of Russia.

The taste of Mr. de Ségur for metaphor, leads him to say that "in the march of Czarewo-Zaimicze, the sound of the enemy's drums mingled with that of his voice," (Davoust.) This could not happen, since only a few Cossacks followed this marshal on this road, as the only infantry at this place, (that of General Paschewitz) did not arrive at Gjatz, until night. That of the advance guard of General Miloradowitch,

which followed our left flank, also did not arrive until the night at the height of Czarewo-Zaimicze.

The author terminates this chapter by a flattering sketch of the Russian General Miloradowitch, and prepares us for his warlike deeds. But in the following chapter, at the battle of Wiazma, this general himself refutes the pompous eulogies which have been bestowed on him by the historian of the Grand Army.

CHAPTER X.

"On the third of November, Prince Eugene was proceeding towards Wiazma, preceded by his equipages and his artillery, when the first light of day showed him at once his retreat threatened by an army on his left, behind him his rear cut off, and on his right, the plain covered with stragglers and scattered vehicles, fleeing before the lances of the enemy."

It is false that the corps of the Viceroy had behind him his rear cut off. This corps advanced, followed immediately by that of the Prince of Eckmülh, of which Gerard's division formed the rear guard. The communication between these two corps was always open. The author supposes that the artillery of the Viceroy was at Wiazma. This fact is also incorrect—the baggage of that prince only, was there; he would not have committed the fault of marching without his artillery.

The account of the battle at Wiazma, so glorious for the troops of Marshal Davoust and Prince Eugene is strangely misrepresented, it may be seen that the officer of the palace has not comprehended it. The following is what passed:

When Prince Eugene, in marching on Wiazma, followed by the corps of Davoust, perceived that the enemy who advanced on his left, wished to cut him off from the great road near this city, he advised the marshal of it, and concerted his

movements with him. The corps of the prince were formed in column on the right of the great road, (facing Wiazma) one of his divisions rested its left on the road facing the enemy, who advanced on this side. The corps of Davoust continued its march on Wiazma. The division of Compans forming the head of the column, after having driven back the Russian troops, who obstructed his route, passed the ravine of Pruditcha, and immediately wheeling to the left, displayed in rear of this ravine, covering the city. The Italian division, formed on the left of the road, kept the enemy in check during this movement. When Compans had formed his line in rear of the ravine, as well as the other divisions of the first corps, this Italian division, and the others under the Viceroy, passed in turn, the ravine, in order to form on the left of the first corps, also covering Wiazma. Established in this position, our troops, whom the enemy hoped to drive back on the city, repulsed all his attacks and made a great slaughter.

"Eugene and Davoust, heard another action in the rear of their right, they imagined that the rest of the Russian army was approaching Wiazma by the Yuknof road—the outlet of which Ney was defending—the noise of this fight in the rear of their own, threatened their retreat, alarmed them."

This is a new proof that the author does not even remember the battle ground. Otherwise he would have known that Eugene and Davoust, from the position they held, could see perfectly all the movements of the enemy opposed to Marshal Ney, and that they had nothing to fear from that quarter. The corps of the Viceroy stole away during the night by Wiazma, covered in its turn by that of Marshal Davoust. The division of Compans did not pass through the town, but traversed the Wiazma on the outside, by a bridge which had been constructed there.

The French army at this time was not in the state of disorder and demoralization, that the French historian would wish us to believe: the best proof is, that the corps of Eugene and Davoust alone drove back the 25,000 Russians, who wished to obstruct their route, and who were commanded by this same

General Miloradowitch, so praised by Mr. de Ségur in the preceding chapter.

"Kutusof unconcernedly rested himself within hearing of the battle," and the English commissioner "excited him in vain—he called him traitor, nothing could induce him to stir." Among many reasons that the author gives for the inaction of this *temporizer*, as he calls him, he forgets to mention the recollection of the battle of Malojaroslawitz, where three divisions of French had repulsed his army.

He says, "the Russians had penetrated into the town (Wiazma) when Davoust attempted to pass in his turn." It would have been useful to have explained how the Russians entered Wiazma, between the corps of the Viceroy and Marshal Davoust, which united on their march, and how they caused the skirmish alluded to. But Mr. de Ségur does not undertake to justify all that he advances. Under his pen, our losses are exaggerated, and those of the Russians are not noticed.

CHAPTER XI.

The officer of the palace, who has exercised himself for a long time in figuring by anticipation the horrors of the winter, here says, "But on the 6th of November, the heavens declared against us." It is, indeed, from this fatal day, but only from this day, that may be dated the premature winter, which deceived all calculations, and overwhelmed the army with so much misery. In three days it would have arrived at Smolensk, where the numerous magazines would have furnished it with the resources it stood in need of, and permitted it to continue its operations with new vigour.

The author adds, "Trophies, glory, all those acquisitions to which we had sacrificed every thing, became a burthen to us."

The French, in their misfortunes, did not hesitate to sacri-

fice vain trophies, but they never found their glory a burthen. It might appear one to some epauletted courtiers, who preferred the dust of the gallery of St. Cloud, to that of camps, but it never weighed down those who had really merited it.

CHAPTER XII.

The author has said, that *Napoleon was obliged to fly*, "that it was a new spectacle to see Napoleon constrained to yield and to fly." Here Napoleon is "ashamed at appearing to flee."

The Emperor was not, in truth, insensible to the disasters of his army. But could shame cover his face, when this army, weakened as it was, but strong by his presence, demonstrated to the enemy, that it was still able to make itself respected? Mr. de Ségur confounds the feeling of shame with the grief of a great mind, struggling with adversity.

"He found (at Dorogobouje) the hand mills ordered for the expedition."

During the halt at Moscow, Napoleon, always provident, had ordered the artillery to construct hand mills. The workmen of this corps finished several, of which the guard made use. Those of which Mr. de Ségur speaks, had been demanded by the commissary general, their tardy arrival is ready proof of the conduct of this department.

The news of the affair of Mallet, which an express brought to the Emperor, serves as a pretext for sinister reflections to the author, who magnifies and distorts every event, to deduce from it the most fatal consequences.

The blind confidence with which Mallet had plotted his conspiracy, the disproportion between the weakness of his means, and the audacity of the attempt, would necessarily strike the Emperor. But what made the most impression on him, was

not only the little foresight, and absolute want of presence of mind and resolution, in the heads of the police, it was the too evident proof that monarchical principles, in their application to his dynasty, had spread their roots with so little depth, that the great functionaries, at the news of the death of the Emperor, forgot, that the sovereign being dead, there was another present to succeed him. It was also the lamentable imprudence with which, without waiting his orders, they had caused the execution of several officers, whom false appearances might have deceived, and who, in the bottom of their heart, had no intention of committing a crime. The Emperor was heard, from the first moment, to express his wounded feelings.

An aid-de-camp of Marshal Ney, announces to Napoleon, that this marshal was obliged to abandon Dorogobouje, and "that he was obliged to retreat precipitately behind the Dnieper."

The same day that the Emperor had halted at Mikalewska, (the 6th,) Marshal Ney had posted his rear guard beyond the Osma, near Gorki. It was not till the 7th, that the Russian general, Miloradowitch, attacked the rear guard near this river, and followed it to Dorogobouje. There Marshal Ney stood firm, and repulsed all the attacks of the enemy, who seeing that he could not succeed in forcing him, marched the division of Prince Eugene of Wirtemberg, on his right, a movement which decided the marshal to abandon Dorogobouje and retreat on Ougea. The enemy only followed him with Cossacks. Miloradowitch, after the brisk resistance he had met with Dorogobouje, advanced on the left of the grand army of Kutusof. How then could Marshal Ney inform the Emperor, by his aid-de-camp, that he had retreated *behind the Dnieper?* Dorogobouje is situate on the left bank of this river. Thus to *retreat precipitately behind the Dnieper*, Marshal Ney must have passed over to the right bank, which he did not. The corps of Prince Eugene alone passed over this river. The Dnieper crosses the road from Dorogobouje to Smolensk, at Soloniewo, the head quarters of the Emperor were established the same day (7th) near this place. But it is false, that the corps of Marshal Ney arrived at this point on this day; for,

as we have said, this marshal retired on the Ongea. Mr. de Ségur, instead of making pictures, and supporting them by reflections which only tend to mislead the judgment of his readers, had better have given us details of this affair, and of the glorious resistance Ney opposed to the superior force which attacked him in Dorogobouje.

The aid-de-camp of Marshal Ney was sent, says Mr. de Ségur, to inform the Emperor "of the disorder into which the corps that had preceded him had fallen, and to say, that after a dreadful night, in which snow, wind, and famine, had driven most of his men from the fires, the dawn had brought him a tempest, the enemy," &c.

If the mission of this aid-de-camp had no other object than to inform the Emperor of the disorder of the army, and to communicate to him on this subject, sterile reflections, it was at least useless, and Mr. de Ségur might here have dispensed with giving two new pages of speeches, and have told us "that the eagles had ceased to protect—they killed." Napoleon was too well aware of our misfortunes, but if the officer who had been sent to him, was furnished with means of remedying them, the author should not have omitted them.

Why does he not make known that at Dorogobouje, the general commanding the artillery proposed to the Emperor, to order from Smolensk, fresh wagon horses to meet us? Napoleon instantly approved of this measure, the execution of which was very useful. Orders were also given to send provisions to meet us.

"Napoleon was sensible that nothing could now be done, but sacrifice the army successively, part by part, beginning at the extremities, in order to save the head." "As for Ney, he saw that a victim was required, and that he was marked out as such, he resigned himself."

The Emperor never had the idea of sacrificing any part of the army, he proved it sufficiently by the solicitude he extended to every part of it. Besides, the cold would kill the *head* as well as the *extremities*. The Prince of Eckmülh had commanded the rear guard to Wiazma, he was relieved by Marshal Ney, who did not consider himself a *destined victim*, be-

cause he was charged with the care of protecting the march. This reflection may be considered as an insult offered to the memory of this Marshal. He well knew that some one must command the rear guard, and certainly no one was better fitted for this post than Marshal Ney. These assertions are disproved, especially as from Dorogobouje, the rear guard was only pursued by Cossacks, and not by the enemy's infantry.

"The Russians, however, advanced under favour of a wood, and our forsaken carriages, whence they kept up a fire of musketry on Ney's troops. Half of the latter, whose icy arms froze their stiffened fingers, got discouraged, they gave way, justifying themselves by their faint-heartedness, on the preceding day, fleeing because they had fled."

These reflections are the more misplaced, as there was not, as we have already said, any Russian infantry on this route. If the author had once been with the rear guard, he would have seen the Cossacks flying from armed men, and only attacking the servants and unarmed. Marshal Ney often amused himself in checking the advance of this light cavalry, by leaving across the road a caisson, to which was hung a lighted match. The Cossacks seeing the smoke issuing from the caisson, dared not approach it until it had exploded, which retarded them some time. Where has the author seen the troops seeking pretexts to *fly?* They might have been worn out by fatigue and cold, but never cowardly. Their constancy has made this retreat as illustrious, as their intrepid valour has immortalized our glorious campaigns.

The thought "that Marshal Ney exposed his life, like a private soldier, with a musket in his hand, as when he was neither husband nor father, neither possessed of wealth, nor power, nor consideration, in short, as if he had still every thing to gain, when in fact he had every thing to lose," never approached the heart of this marshal. On every occasion, in the fields of Fleurus, as in those of Moskwa, such considerations never caused any hesitation in Ney, to place himself in the midst of danger. In these privileged souls, *every thing is to be lost* when honour is compromised, every thing to be gained when fresh glory is to be acquired.

Mr. de Ségur says, that "his generals and his colonels, among whom he himself remarked Fezenzac, strenuously seconded him," in aiding to defend a fortified house. If Mr. de Ségur wished to cite Colonel Fezenzac, he might have found a better occasion, than that of a miserable attack of Cossacks, repulsed by a few musket shots.

Yet in this chapter, the mind reposes for a moment, consoled for the injustice and disapprobation lavished on the French army and its leaders, in seeing that one of its most illustrious generals has found favour with the officer of the palace, and that he praises his heroism without any restriction.

CHAPTER XIII.

The misfortune which the army of Italy experienced at the passage of the Wop, a torrent, "which when he crossed before was a mere brook, he now found a river," is described in vivid colours. It is charged with that superabundance of distressing details, which characterise the style of our writer; but we find few praises of the courage and constancy of the unfortunate troops, who reduced to the point of considering the attacks of the enemy as nothing, struggled with pertinacity against the constantly increasing obstacles, which opposed to them a murdering sky and an earth covered with ice.

"The Cossacks stripped the prisoners whom they took, and collecting them in troops, drove them naked over the snow, by heavy blows from the shafts of their lances."

These cruelties exercised on our unfortunate prisoners, analogous to those the author relates, where he observes, "they met with nothing but Cossacks, and an armed population, which encompassed, wounded, and stripped them, and then left them with ferocious bursts of laughter, to expire on the snow," contradict the eulogy he has elsewhere made, of the

magnanimity of the Russians. We are far from believing, that it was by order of the generals or other authorities, that these atrocities were committed, but why were they tolerated? How can Mr. de Ségur reconcile such barbarities with his assertion, "that they alone have known true glory, and that their renown has remained great and pure?"

"Their generals strove in vain to drive them off, they took their blows without murmur or opposition."

The generals gave an example of submission to privations, to their soldiers, but they never *struck* them. Whatever the historian may assert, they would have blushed to have to shut themselves in houses, and to have defended all entrance to them, whilst the troops bivouacked on the snow. If there existed such insensible egotists, to the sufferings of their comrades, it was not among those who held commands in the army.

"There was a moment, when this unfortunate army was but a shapeless mass, a mere rabble rout, whirling round and round."

The army of Prince Eugene was never in the state of disorganisation the author mentions. It soon proved at Krasnoi, that it was not a "*a rabble rout—nor a shapeless mass.*" The division of Broussier, which formed the rear guard, had still with it two batteries of artillery in good condition.

"Prince Eugene, nevertheless, contrived to save his rear guard. It was in returning with it towards Smolensk, that his stragglers had been driven back on Ney's troops."

When the head of the fourth corps reached Smolensk, Prince Eugene left in position the division of Broussier, with the Bavarian cavalry, to check the advance of the Cossacks. This division did not incur any damage; the Cossacks were cautious in attacking it seriously. As to what our writer says of the "stragglers *who were driven back on Ney's troops*," the circumstance is impossible. The road from Doukhowethina to Smolensk, which Prince Eugene followed, comes out at Smolensk, in rear of the position occupied by Marshal Ney on the road from Dorogobouje. Thus the stragglers of Eugene

could not be driven on the troops of Marshal Ney, who covered them in this direction.

"The colonel of the fourth regiment, the young Fezenzac, found means to relieve these men, who were half perished with cold."

This officer, in all probability, was not obliged to use much eloquence, to decide the brave soldiers of the 4th to march against the Cossacks; for, as we are obliged to repeat, this route was only followed by the enemy's light cavalry. The circumstance was not of sufficient importance to elicit the remark of "the superiority of the sentiments of the soul over the sensations of the body." Besides, this superiority of sentiment is the lot of all those who think and act nobly, without distinction of rank. It is, without doubt, by inadvertence that this common place maxim is to be found here.

CHAPTER XIV.

The officer of the palace, after having traced a heart-rending picture of the disorder which reigned among the unarmed soldiery, whom the governor of Smolensk would not receive in this city, before the arrival of the organised corps, says, that on the arrival of the guard, "they execrated it. Were they then to be for ever sacrificed to this privileged class, fellows kept for mere parade, who were never foremost, but at reviews, festivities, and distributions?"

If it were still necessary to prove that the officer of the palace has comprehended nothing in the army, by the side of which he sometimes marched, what could we desire more than the opinion of the imperial guard he causes the stragglers to utter? What! this celebrated guard, which often of itself constituted an army, whose presence alone in the greatest battles had insured victory, whose efforts, when it was necessary,

were never doubtful, even at the last extremity, when it wished rather to die than to submit, was according to him, *for mere parade!* a toy that Napoleon carried from one end of Europe to the other! Our historian should have informed us at what reviews, at what *fetes* it had been present since leaving Moscow. This *class, privileged* only from its courage and discipline, was the soul, nay, the life of the army. What more natural than to make every exertion to preserve it.

In the description the author gives of the disorder of our troops at Smolensk, we only perceive a criticism on the commissariat. "Napoleon reckoned upon fifteen days' provisions, and forage for an army of 100,000 men. There was not more than half the quantity of flour, rice, and spirits, and no meat at all."

The Emperor ought to have calculated on great resources at Smolensk, as since his departure from this city for Moscow (the 24th August,) he had given all the necessary orders that they should be procured. He testified great disappointment at this not having been accomplished. "The commissary saved his life only by crawling for a long time on his knees, at the feet of Napoleon; probably the reasons which he assigned did more for him than his supplications."

Our author here alludes to a chief of the commissariat department for *fresh meat*, who, by his statements, had sent to meet us, near 1000 head of cattle, when in reality he had sent nothing. The report made to the Emperor on this subject, informed him that this man had sold these cattle to the Jews, who had taken them to the Russians, and Napoleon ordered that he should be taken before a military tribunal. In truth, it was neither his *reasons* nor his supplications which saved him. The author would not have alleged so many reasons in favour of this unfaithful contractor, if he had known these details.

During the three months that had elapsed from the Emperor's leaving Smolensk, it would have been very easy to have collected provisions, by drawing them as well from the immense magazines prepared in the rear, as from the resources afforded by the country. Lithuania had not been ravaged, it was well disposed to us, and no enemy's corps had remained

there. At his departure from Moscow, Napoleon had every reason to calculate on finding a great stock of provisions at Smolensk. Messrs. Daru and Matthew Dumas were of the same opinion.

"For the rest, he was passionate, because he could not help it; he had not deceived himself in regard to the inadequacy of his supplies."

The Emperor, in seeing his army in want of food, by the non-execution of his orders, was right in expressing his disappointment with bitterness. *He was not passionate, because he could not help it;* he forgot to punish.

"The genius of Napoleon, in attempting to soar above time, climate, and distances, had, as it were, lost itself in space."

How can we reconcile this opinion with that found in page 4? "Admitting even that the rapidity of his expedition was only equalled by its rashness, success would have probably crowned it, if the premature weakening of his health had left the physical constitution of this great man all the vigour of his mind," with that to be seen in another page? "This enterprise was indispensable to the completion of a great design, on the point of being accomplished; its object was not out of reach; the means for reaching it were not inadequate." He had ventured every thing "on a first movement of Alexander's." We have already refuted this accusation of imprudence and rashness, with which the author loads the memory of Napoleon. He had marched on Smolensk and Moscow, to defeat the Russian army, and to force Alexander to a peace.

"He was still the same man as in Egypt, Marengo, Ulm, and Esslingen." How often has he not attempted to prove, in the course of his book, by reasoning, or by distorted and oftentimes false facts, that Napoleon was only "the shadow of himself; that age (forty-three years) had weighed him down," &c. Finally, does he not say, "Where were now the rapid and decisive movements of Marengo, Ulm, and Eckmülh?"

"It was Ferdinand Cortez—it was the Macedonian burning his ships, and above all solicitous, in spite of his troops, to penetrate still further into unknown Asia."

This comparison is difficult to explain; independent of the

resolution that such a determination supposes in a man who is deprived of it, "who has ho longer that prompt decision, variable and rapid as the circumstances which called it forth." What resemblance does there exist between the situation of Napoleon and of that of the conqueror of Asia? If after the passage of the Niemen he had destroyed his line of communication, and abandoned all in his rear, to show his army that it must depend upon itself, the comparison would have had some foundation. Besides, who is the *Macedonian that burnt his vessels?* Alexander never destroyed his. When, after the conquest of all Asia Minor, he left the borders of the sea, and quitted Miletus to continue his expedition, his fleet being useless to him, he ordered it to return, and to be employed in conquering Pontus and the neighbouring countries. But we need not be astonished that Mr. de Ségur is ignorant of the history of Alexander, when he is so badly acquainted with that of the campaigns of Napoleon. Where did he perceive that in Egypt, at Marengo, at Ulm, at Essling, this great captain trusted all to fortune? Before alluding to such great military combinations, the officer of the palace ought to have taken the trouble to have read the accounts of them, and studied them.

The *History of the Grand Army* is only the amplification of a rhetorician, whose vacillating and melancholy imagination delights in tracing sketches, in which the colouring is always false. The facts are never given frankly; the reflections are strained and contradictory. Finally, that which the *History of the Grand Army* most wants, is historic truth.

BOOK X.—CHAPTER I.

"On the same day, at the same hour, the whole of Russia had reassumed the offensive. The general plan of the Russians was at once developed."

This general plan of the Russians, which was suddenly de-

veloped on the same day, at the same hour, may very well be supposed, now that the events have taken place, but at that time Kutusof was only occupied in defending himself and reorganizing his army.

"On the 18th of October, at the very moment that the cannon of Kutusof were destroying Napoleon's illusions of glory and of peace, Wittgenstein, at one hundred leagues in the rear of his left wing, had thrown himself upon Polotsk. Tchitchakof behind his right, and two hundred leagues farther off, had taken advantage of his superiority over Schwartzenberg, and both of them, the one descending from the north, and the other ascending from the south, were endeavouring to unite their forces at Borizof. This was the most difficult passage in our retreat, and both these hostile armies were already close to it, at the time that Napoleon was at the distance of twelve days' journey, with the winter, famine, and the grand Russian army between them."

To believe the author, the Emperor had not learnt by the attack of Kutusof, at Winkowow, that all hopes of peace were destroyed, and, nevertheless, the orders issued by this prince,* on the 5th, 6th, 10th, 13th, 14th, and 15th of October, demonstrated that he had already adopted measures for evacuating Moscow and retiring on Smolensk.

The assertion of Mr. de Ségur, in relation to Wittgenstein and Tchitchakoff, is entirely erroneous. Tchitchakoff was on the 18th of October at Brzecz—Litowsky on the Bug. On

* On the 5th of October, Napoleon wrote to the Major General on the subject of carrying off the wounded from Mojaisk, the Abbey of Kolotskoi, and at Gjatz. On the 6th of October, Napoleon wrote to the Major General that Junot should transport all the wounded to Viazma, and that Baraguay d'Hilliers should remove them from Viazma to Smolensk, ordering that in the course of eight days none should remain at Rouza, at the Abbey, at Mojaisk, or at Gjatz. The 6th of October, he wrote the Major General, ordering that no troops should go beyond Gjatz, or Mojaisk. The 10th of October, Napoleon wrote to the Major General to give orders that the detachments of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, should halt at Smolensk. The 13th October is the date of the Major General's letter to the King of Naples, announcing that the army was about marching from Moscow to join him and drive off Kutusof. The 15th of October, the Emperor gave orders to the first, third, and fourth corps of the guard, to hold themselves ready to march.

the same day Wittgenstein attacked Polotsk. From Polotsk to Borisof is five days' march, and from Brezecz to the same point, is at least twelve days' march. Thus these two generals, that Mr. de Ségur represents as uniting, were separated from each other seventeen days' march. In writing this passage, the officer of the palace could never have consulted a map. How can he suppose that Kutusof, who was posted on the road to Kalouga, separated the French army from Borizof? Moreover, this same day, the 18th October, when Tchitchakoff and Wittgensteiu are supposed to have united, Tchitchakoff was beaten by Regnier in endeavouring to march on Warsaw. It was not until the 20th of October that he regained his position at Brezecz. On the 28th only, after having left 28,000 men under the command of Sacken, whom he ordered to watch Schwartzenberg, and to mask the movement he intended to make on Minsk, he took up his line of march upon this city, where the head of his column arrived the 16th of November. Prince Schwartzenberg was reinforced by Durutte's division, making the number of men under his command about 50,000.

Tchitchakoff left Minsk the 19th, to advance on Borisof, which he took possession of on the 21st; and the 23d he ordered Lambert's division to cross this river to obtain information of Wittgenstein. This division fell in with the corps of Oudinot, which drove it back, and forced it to retreat to the right bank of the Berezina. Thus, more than a month after the period at which Mr. de Ségur supposed the corps of Wittgenstein and Tchitchakoff to have united, they had not yet met.

Marshal St. Cyr had occupied, since the 18th of August, an entrenched camp before Polotsk. "This camp showed how easy it would have been for the whole army to have taken up its winter quarters on the frontiers of Lithuania." The author praises the excellent construction of the barracks: "they were beautiful military villages, properly entrenched, and equally well protected from the winter and the enemy."

Immediately afterwards, he says that during these two months the French lost many men, in searching for provisions; "that they were continually betrayed by the inhabitants, and

even by their guides." Then he adds, "in consequence of these checks, and of hunger and disease, the strength of St. Cyr's army was diminished one half—the Bavarians reduced from 22,000 men to 4,000."

What has become of that facility of wintering, if we had already experienced such losses? And as if the contradiction was not strong enough, he adds, on the next page, "his works were only marked out, as much as was necessary, not to cover their defenders, but to point out the place where their efforts would be principally required." What then were *those beautiful military villages, properly entrenched?* It appeared that their fortifications were only simple pickets, to mark the spots where the corps were to make a stand. This facility of taking up winter quarters, was not then as great as the author supposes.

CHAPTER II.

How can the following passages be reconciled; "Wittgenstein was repulsed, Steinheil defeated, and 10,000 Russians, with six generals, killed or put *hors de combat;*" with "confidence and joy, and plenty reigned in the enemy's corps, sadness and scarcity in ours." Sadness, at what? is it at having defeated the Russians, or melancholy at leaving a country where "famine and disease reigned," to enter into a country abounding in all kinds of food and forage? Has the author forgotten, that on the arrival of the second corps at the Berezina, the regiments had abundance of provisions and cattle?

Mr. de Ségur gives a singular description of the retreat of Marshal St. Cyr; he pretends that it was made "by all the roads leading to Smoliantzy." The motive for this retrograde movement, according to him, was "to find more provisions, to march with greater freedom, and more concert." The motive of finding more provisions is sufficiently good, had not the

enemy followed him; but of dividing, to march in *concert*, appears difficult to comprehend. Marshal St. Cyr, in retreating on the corps of Marshal Victor, which was about 30,000 strong, and who, in leaving Smolensk, marched on his right; and not being pushed briskly by the Russian corps, whom he just defeated, found little to impede his progress. In consequence, the only check he met with was on his left column.

The author represents the Emperor at Mikalewska, hearing only of disasters. "His countenance remained the same, he changed none of his habits, nothing in the form of his orders; in reading them, you would have supposed that he had still several armies under his command."

The corps of the army were yet in a state of organization, composed of divisions, brigades, and regiments. The losses that they had met with on the road, had certainly much weakened them, but this was no reason that their orders should not be given to them in the ordinary form, since their organization was still the same. Moreover, until the passage of the Berezina, the Emperor had not even changed the denomination of his corps, and he acted properly in all respects. For the enemy seeing by the orders of the day which he intercepted, by the prisoners he made, by all the means he had of receiving information, that the army possessed the same number of corps, and the same organization as at the opening of the campaign, could never believe in the great losses, we had experienced, and always considered us stronger than in reality we were. If, on the contrary, several corps had been united, to form one or two, it would have revealed our weakness to the enemy, and at the same time only tended to put the whole in confusion.

"As to Baraguay d'Hilliers, whom an officer had just accused, he had him brought before him, stripped of all his distinctions, and sent him off to Berlin, where he anticipated his sentence, by dying of despair."

General Baraguay d'Hilliers had been honoured with the command of a division, which was formed at Smolensk; he had encamped his troops on the road from Smolensk to Elnia. The approach of the Russian army in this direction, ought to have led him to unite his division, which he neglected. On the

9th of November, one of his brigades was attacked by three Russian partisan leaders, and although 1600 strong, of which 500 were cavalry, it capitulated, and laid down its arms. The remainder of the division fell back hastily on Smolensk. Other French posts, the most considerable of which was situated at Klemenstiewow, were also carried. The greater part of the wagon horses, which were cantoned in the neighbourhood, at some distance, were also carried off by the Cossacks. The Emperor testified his anger to General Baraguay d'Hilliers, that knowing the approach of the enemy, he had thus scattered his forces. He deprived him of his command, and sent him to Berlin. It is not true that this general was *stripped of all his distinctions;* he had not yet been tried. For a general, so sensible of honour, and so good a Frenchman as General Baraguay d'Hilliers, the misfortune of having merited a trial would have a fatal effect on his already impaired health.*

Independent of the irreparable losses, in men and horses, that this oversight of General Baraguay d'Hilliers caused us, the Emperor was greatly hurt to learn, that a French corps, of 1100 infantry, and 500 cavalry had lain down their arms to partisan corps. Marshal Ney, some days previous, to demonstrate to his soldiers how little these troops of Cossacks were to be feared, had given an order to a captain of grenadiers, to take fifty men, and set fire to a village, situate about half a league from the road, and then retire on another village, which he pointed out to him, ordering him to rejoin him after this expedition. "You will be surrounded by five or six hundred Cossacks, or more; but stand firm, you have nothing to fear." The captain went, and executed his order exactly. He was surrounded and harassed by a 1000 to 1200 Cossacks. In vain

* In a letter from the Prince of Neufchatel to General Charpentier, Governor of Smolensk, dated Viazma, the 1st November, 1812, he gives him an account of the movements of the army, and charges him to make them known to the governors of Mohiloff and Minsk; prescribes new measures to him relative to victualling; requires from him account of the state of the stores, provisions, and ammunitions, then at Smolensk: he adds, "Make the movements of the army known to General Baraguay d'Hilliers, &c. *I have already made known to you that this general must not commit himself: repeat this to him from me.*" (See Appendix.)

the Russian commander dismounted half his men, he could not break through this handful of heroes. Marshal Ney then sent half a battalion to the support of these fifty grenadiers, who with their officer rejoined the column uninjured.

Do not the reflections that Mr. de Ségur, (who reverts incessantly to the past to accuse the present,) causes the soldiers to make on the thirty-four days at Moscow, and on the little care that was taken to provide for their various wants, evince a disposition to censure the Emperor? During his stay at Moscow, he lavished his cares on his army. On his departure, his solicitude was directed to the wounded; all carriages, even his own, were appropriated to them. The orders given to the commanders of the different corps, instructed them to take twenty days' provision, which appeared sufficient to reach Smolensk before the cold weather. Troops and *depots* of provisions were expected to be found at Wiazma and Dorogobouje. The author, therefore, accuses Napoleon wrongfully of imprudence. All our misfortunes were caused by the cold, and because the orders of the Emperor had not been executed.—(See the Emperor's Letters, in the Appendix.)

Mr. de Ségur terminates these long reflexions, by saying, that from Moscow, "it was always necessary to return, and nothing had been prepared, even for a pacific journey homeward." What! if peace had been made, could we not have procured provisions, and retreated to our boundary line? Would we have wanted resources? Would not the Russians themselves have been interested in procuring them for us?

The Emperor hoped to find at Smolensk fresh troops, and considerable stores. Although his hopes were not entirely realized, Smolensk offered us some resources; flour was issued to the corps, and whatever was in the store-houses was distributed. The Emperor at first thought of preserving this city, and of taking up a position towards the Duna and the Boristhenes. Having learnt that Admiral Tchitchakoff was advancing on Minsk, and that the reiterated orders he had sent to Victor, to drive Wittgenstein beyond the Duna, had not been executed, he decided on retiring behind the Berezina.

The author appears to reproach Napoleon with having halt-

ed five days at Smolensk, nevertheless the five days had been employed as usefully as possible for the army. The long march it had made from Moscow, without halting, had occasioned a great number of stragglers. It was hoped, that a few days rest would rally the greater part of them. Besides, all the corps had not arrived at Smolensk at the same time as the Emperor, and he was obliged to wait for the last before commencing his march.

It may readily be supposed, that Mr. de Ségur, who possessed no knowledge of the plans of the Emperor, may have imagined that he wasted his time designedly. It may also be supposed, that among the *wise*, of whom he has several times spoken, and of which number he no doubt forms one, there should be some who would have wished to have retreated with all speed to Wilna, or even beyond the Niemen or Vistula, let what would happen to the remainder of the army. The officer of the palace is here, as elsewhere, the organ of the discontented, whose tattling he has carefully recorded.

"It was known, that Ney had received orders to arrive at Smolensk, as late as possible, and Eugene to halt for two days at Doukhowtchina." The letter of Napoleon to the major general, which we shall cite, denies the part relative to Ney.* As to Eugene, he passed the Wop on the 9th, and arrived on the 10th at Doukhowtchina; he halted there the 11th, to refresh and organise his troops, and it was not until the 13th that he reached Smolensk.

Among other reflections the author attributes to the French soldiers, is found the following: "Was the Emperor ignorant of the joy of the Russians, when, three months before he stopped to attack Smolensk, instead of marching to the right to Elnia, where he would have cut off the enemy's army from

* Semlewo, November 3d, 1812.

Napoleon to the Major General.

My cousin, write to the Duke of Elchingen, that as soon as he takes the command of the rear guard, he will cause the army to file off immediately, for they are wasting the fine weather without advancing. The Prince of Eckmülh retains the Viceroy and the Prince Poniatowsky, to repulse the attacks of the Cossacks they may see, &c.

their capital—Now, will the Russians imitate his error, which was so serviceable to them?"

Who would believe, that it is a writer, bearing the title of general, that makes such an observation? What! the Emperor ought not to have taken Smolensk, but to have left this place in the power of the enemy, in his rear, in order to march to Moscow! Peace could never take place till the Russian army had been defeated, and their capital taken possession of; the whole plan of the Emperor rested on this basis. Smolensk is, with reason, considered as the key to Moscow, since whoever is master of Smolensk can march upon Moscow without danger. If what the author asserts be the fact, why have the Russians in all their accounts spoken of the terror and depression throughout Russia, caused by the capture of this important point by the French?* In our retreat circumstances were entirely different. The Emperor, in marching to Moscow, was right in occupying Smolensk, in retreating to the Berezina he could not retain this place. Kutusof ought not to lose his time in attacking it, but should endeavour to join the army of Tchitchakoff as speedily as possible, in order to cut off our retreat; he was in his own country and had nothing to fear in his rear.

"Will not the cutting off Augereau and his brigade, upon that road, open his eyes?" General Augereau and his brigade were taken, not by Kutusof, but by the Russian partisans, Denisof, Dawidof, and Seslavin, who united for this purpose.

The author supposes, that the Emperor remained in Smolensk, for the pleasure "of dating his despatches five days, from that city, and thus giving his disorderly flight the appearance of a slow and glorious retreat." Here the temper of those who wished to escape all danger, and avoid privations as speedily as possible at any price, is still evident. We are obliged to repeat, that the Emperor only remained at Smo-

* The loss of Smolensk had spread consternation through the interior of the empire. If Napoleon could have pushed on a corps as far as Moscow, before the Russian army was prepared for a general action, the consternation would have been complete, and that nation discouraged, would probably have regretted the sacrifices she had made for independence.

(*Bourtourlin*, vol. I. page 304.)

lensk a sufficient time, to rally the stragglers, and send off his wounded and sick,* to profit by the resources of this city, and to prevent his retreat from being converted into a flight, which would have taken place, if he had constantly marched without halting. A proof that these five days were not lost to the army is, that, on leaving Smolensk, it again showed in the battles of Krasnow that it had not degenerated, and that after these battles, Kutusof never again attempted to cut off the retreat, or even to pursue it too closely.

The author attributes these sentiments, on the halt at Smolensk, to the officers of Napoleon. He adds, that they were "secret, for their devotion to him remained entire for two whole years longer." This confession is somewhat *naif*. What! the attachment of officers to the Emperor only to last whilst he has gifts, honours, and money, to lavish on them!!! Notwithstanding the praises bestowed on Messieurs so and so, we doubt whether they are flattered by the opinion Mr. de Ségur entertains of their attachment.

After several eulogies on general Latour-Maubourg, the author says, "He always marched with the same order and moderation in the midst of the most immoderate disorder, and yet, what does honour to the age, he attained to the highest distinctions as quickly and as rapidly as others."

We cannot exactly perceive, what there is in common between the honour of the age and the rise of Mr. Latour-Maubourg. The Emperor held as a principle, to reward merit wherever he found it. It is but rigid justice to acknowledge, that he always put this in practice, and therefore to allow him all the honour.

According to the officer of the palace, the French army, consisting of 100,000 men under arms, had been reduced, in twenty-five days, to 36,000, and these feeble remains were overburthened with 60,000 unarmed stragglers, which only sup-

* On the 7th of November, there were in the hospitals of Smolensk, three thousand six hundred and seventy-eight sick, of whom two hundred and two were Russians; on the 8th, nine hundred were transported to Orcha, and the remainder were removed thither while we remained in that city.

poses 4,000 killed, wounded, or left in the rear since the departure from Moscow.

These remains of the corps "Kutusof was preparing to cut in pieces successively." This expression is revolting in the mouth of a Frenchman. Truly, if our soldiers "were cut in pieces by Kutusof," the Russians were cut in pieces by the French army, and this so effectually, that we never again saw them.

CHAPTER III.

The Emperor, on quitting Smolensk with his army, was obliged to make it move in succession, to avoid the confusion and incumbrance of the artillery, wagons, and stragglers. On the 13th, he sent off the division of Claparede, with the treasure and the baggage, and, on the 14th, he himself marched with his guard, leaving, at Smolensk, the corps of Davoust and Ney, who were mutually to support each other, and to evacuate this city on the 16th, first blowing up the fortifications.

Napoleon arrived at Koritnia, where he passed the night. The next day, Miloradowitch, at the head of 20,000 men, did not dare to impede his progress, contenting himself with discharging a few pieces of artillery on his troops. The Emperor reached Krasnow. "The sight of Sebastiani, and of the first grenadiers who preceded him, had been sufficient to drive away the enemy's infantry." It was on the 14th that Claparede's division, arriving at Krasnow, drove from thence the light corps of Ojarowsky, which wished to post itself there. The imperial guard, with the Emperor, did not suffer, the enemy not having dared to attack it. "But, says the author, the Russians from their heights saw the whole interior of the army, its weaknesses, its deformities, its most shameful parts, in short, all that is generally concealed with the greatest care."

The guard marched in order, and Miloradowitch feared to view too near *these deformities, these shameful parts*, as he dared not oppose its march. Mr. de Ségur, who has drawn so flattering a portrait of this hostile general, whom he compares to Murat, is forced to refute by facts, the eulogies he has showered on him. After the passage of the guard "he became bold, concentrated his forces, and descending from the heights, took up a strong position with 20,000 men, across the high road; by this movement he separated Eugene, Davoust, and Ney, from the Emperor, and closed the road to Europe against these three leaders." The imagination of Mr. de Ségur, leads him to forget that the scene *took place in Lithuania!*

CHAPTER IV.

Prince Eugene, who with his corps had slept near Koritnia on the 15th, was three leagues from Krasnow, when the stragglers who marched before him, were attacked by the Cossacks of Miloradowitch. These men, generally unarmed, formed themselves into squads, repulsed these attacks, and fell back on the corps of which they had formed part.

Eugene perceiving that Miloradowitch wished to obstruct his passage, posted the Italian guard on the right of the road, and the divisions of Phelippon and Broussiere on the left. The third division was posted in the rear. In this position, and although they had but a few pieces of artillery, and that the enemy amounted to 20,000 men, he repulsed vigorously, all the attacks of Miloradowitch. During the whole battle, the prince manœuvred in menacing the right of the Russians, when night arrived, and he saw that they had considerably reinforced their menaced right, he put his corps under march, in order to pass in the rear of the Russian left; by this move-

ment he turned the corps opposed to him, and rejoined during the night, the young guard, who were in advance of Krasnow.

Our historian describes these movements in a diffuse manner, and mixes with them intemperate observations, that only tend to render the accouut obscure. What signifies "enemy's battalions which lined both sides of the road," on which the corps of stragglers advanced, in order to join Eugene, and who, "either from pity or admiration, called out to our men to halt, they entreated and conjured them to surrender." We will not accept this feeling of *admiration*, because it has a bad effect to praise and flatter ourselves, but we reject with indignation the expression of *pity*. It is a feeling, however, which is in harmony with the idea of the yoke under which Kutusof made us pass, according to the officer of the palace. We must only observe, without hyperbole or boasting, that the remembrance of Malojaroslawitz, and the determination of these heroes, awed their enemies. The author himself says a few lines afterwards, "Victory was so new to them, that even when they held it in their hands, they knew not how to profit by it, they delayed its completion until the next day."

CHAPTER V.

Napoleon on arriving at Krasnow on the 15th, learnt that the Russian army was in the neighbourhood, and that the corps of Ojarowsky was posted near this city, and menaced the left of the road; he resolved to prove to the Russians, by a night attack, that the French army, notwitstanding the misfortunes it had encountered, was still animated with the same courage. For this purpose, he ordered General Roguet, with his division of the young guard, to attack that night, the corps of Ojarowsky. They were instructed to fall on the Russians with the bayonet, and without firing. This expedition resulted as was

expected by the Emperor. The Russians being surprised, lost many men. The most advantageous effect of this bold movement, was the circumspection with which it inspired Kutusof; he immediately relinquished the movement which he had ordered the corps of Tomasow to execute, to cut us off from the road between Krasnow and Liady. Such brave deeds ennobling the misfortunes, which we owed to the inclemency of the weather alone, should have exalted the imagination of a French writer.

The remarks that the author attributes to Kutusof, on his dilatoriness, are degrading to our army; he supposes it captive and under the yoke of the Cossacks, who "would chastise it whenever they wanted to strike out of the high road."

What he makes Wilson say, that the Cossacks might be heard to exclaim, that "it was a shame to allow these skeletons to escape in this manner out of their tomb," is as extraordinary. Kutusof would not attack the French army, because, the whole Russian army had been vanquished at Moskwa; that which he had re-organised, had been beaten at Malojaroslawitz and at Wiazma, although they had five times the numerical strength of the French. He knew that, if in the French army, he found soldiers marching separately and discouraged, that the courage of the remainder only increased with their diminution of numbers, and that Napoleon was at their head.

That an Englishman should not have felt this, or if he did, not expressed it, may be conceived, but a Frenchman!

On leaving Smolensk, the Emperor had ordered Ney to command the rear guard. This marshal was not to quit this city till the 16th, after having blown up the fortifications, the Prince of Eckmülh was directed to support him. On the 16th; early in the morning, Davoust having left a division with Marshal Ney, took up his line of march with the four others. During the day, after having advised Ney of Prince Eugene's battle, he continued his march on Krasnow. Marshal Ney supposing that he should only find Cossacks between him and Napoleon, would not march until the 17th. The position that Miloradowitch had taken on the road from Smo-

lensk to Krasnow, during the night of the 16—17th, separated these two corps from the Emperor.

At the same time they learnt, that the Russians at Krasnow, whose movement on Dobroe the attack of General Roguet had checked, were disposed to re-attempt it. The position of Napoleon was critical. On the one hand, he saw his retreat on the point of being cut off, and on the other, if he retreated he abandoned two of his corps. He sent for Berthier, Mortier, Lefebvre, and Bessieres, and stated to them that they must prepare to attack the enemy the next morning. These marshals replied to him, by detailing the state of their corps. No matter! answered Napoleon, we must march without hesitation, to the assistance of Davoust and Ney. At day break, therefore, he put himself at the head of his guard, to bear down on the enemy. This bold movement of the Emperor's, who with a handful of men, marched against the whole Russian force, produced its effect. Miloradowitch quitted his position on the road, and approaching the centre of the Russian army, permitted Marshal Davoust's corps to pass, who immediately joined Napoleon.

This chapter, with the exception of some passages, that we thought it right to notice, is in general written with a spirit of justice, the want of which is to be regretted in the other parts of the work. The army and its leader are less caricatured. With the exception of some faults of ill-placed censures and intemperate observations, the heroic attitude of Napoleon, the grandeur and nobleness of his resolutions, are faithfully represented. After describing this wonderful movement, how can the author have permitted the odious accusation to remain in his book—"Napoleon felt that he must sacrifice the army successively, part by part, commencing with the extremities to save the head." Does he not perceive that he has himself victoriously refuted the reproaches of sluggishness, blindness, indecision, and insensibility, with which he has loaded the Emperor?

CHAPTER VI.

"THERE (at Liady) also were unfortunately consumed all the papers, which he had collected in order to write a history of his life, for such was his intention when he set out for this fatal war."

It is ridiculous to suppose that the Emperor, setting out for a war, should have carried all his papers, in order to write a history of his life, as if he expected to have enjoyed perfect rest in Russia. This Prince had no papers relating to his history consumed, as he had carried none with him. Besides, what does the author mean by this collection of papers? Napoleon had no occasion to take this trouble, as the acts of his life belong to the world. He had caused his correspondence, as commander in chief of the armies of Italy and Egypt, to be enregistered. These registers never quitted his archives. His intention was, to have taken advantage of the repose afforded him by a general peace, to digest a complete history of his campaigns and of his reign, and if he could have procured, at St. Helena, his precious materials, he would still have been better able to have erected an imperishable monument to the glory of the French armies.

The officer of the palace never permits an opportunity to escape him, of repeating, that it formed part of the Emperor's plan to halt at the Borysthenes. How could he suppose, that in leaving Paris, he had formed the project of halting on the confines of Lithuania? He wished to force that peace they refused him; but he could only accomplish this by destroying the Russian armies. If his military plans had all succeeded, this peace might even have been obtained in Lithuania; but then he would not have remained there for the pleasure of writing his campaigns. Events having another issue, he could not in the month of July, go into winter quarters.

Arrived at the Duna, he had still four months to act in. He decided to march to Moscow, certain that Russia would not

give up this capital without a battle. It was on this battle that his hopes of peace were founded. But before undertaking this, he left the corps of Macdonald, St. Cyr, and Oudinot, on the Duna; and on the frontiers of Volhynia, the corps of Schwartzenberg, of Reynier, and Dombrowsky, to keep in check the opposing Russian armies; at the same time that considerable corps, that of Victor, and that of Augereau, were organising in his rear, the one to form his reserve, the other to insure a communication to the Rhine.

Master of Smolensk, towards the middle of August, he continued his march to Moscow, which was distant about ten days' march. The battle he sought took place; the Russian army was in part annihilated. The capture of Moscow ensued; every thing promised peace. But it would have been too injurious to England, and the burning of Moscow had been resolved on, a sacrifice which inflicted more injury on Russia, than the most disadvantageous peace. To insure the success of so atrocious an enterprise, England placed herself between Alexander and Napoleon, and covered with a Russian mask, put in play all the resources of her crafty policy, in order to entangle Alexander, and to fortify him against every attempt at negotiation. It was thus that in Turkey she had deceived the Divan, by corruption and falsehood, and forced the Sultan to sign a peace.

CHAPTER VII.

Mr. de Ségur supposes that the Emperor, on his arrival at Orcha, was uncertain of the route he ought to pursue; he makes him call a council, in which General Jomini is conspicuous. It may be well to remark, that this General did not hold such a rank in the army as to entitle him to be called to a council. He was, at this time, only commandant of the little

town of Orcha. If Napoleon had asked information from him, it would have been solely on account of his office, and to learn what resources were to be found in this city. Our historian attributes a plan to the Emperor, in order that he may make Gen. Jomini oppose it. Napoleon never declared, "that he meant to abandon his line of operations on the Minsk, unite with the Dukes of Belluno and Reggio, cut his way through Wittgenstein's army, and regain Wilna, by turning round the sources of the Berezina."

If he had entertained this project, and had demanded the opinion of General Jomini, that officer ought to have added to the reasons he offered, that in manœuvring thus, Tchitchakoff would arrive from Minsk at Wilna, long before the French army. But the whole project, and the council, are refuted by the Emperor's orders, dated, Doubrowna the 18th and 19th November, 1812.

By his letter of the 18th, to the Major General, he gives him the following orders: "Write to the governor of Minsk that I will be at Orcha to-morrow; let him know that I have ordered the second corps, with a division of cuirassiers, and a hundred pieces of cannon, commanded by the Duke of Reggio, to march as speedily as possible, and by the direct road, to Borisof, to make sure of this important post; and from thence to march to Minsk. In the mean time, General Dombrowsky will reach this place with his division, and will observe the motions of the corps at Minsk. Recommend to him to send messengers to the Duke of Bassano and Prince Schwartzenberg, and to write to you frequently."

In a letter of the next day, at three o'clock in the morning, the Prince of Neufchatel wrote to the Duke of Belluno: "The Emperor will arrive at Orcha to-day at noon; it is necessary, Marshal, that you should take post nearer to Borisof, Wilna, and Orcha, than the enemy's army. Endeavour to mask the movement of the Duke of Reggio, and induce a belief, on the contrary, that the Emperor is advancing on General Wittgenstein, a movement natural enough. The intention of H. M. is to march to Minsk, and when he is master of this city, to take the line of the Berezina, &c."

In this pretended council, Mr. de Ségur makes Jomini act a ridiculous part. "He then stated that he knew of a road to the right of that town (Borisof) constructed of wooden bridges, passing through the marshes of Lithuania." According to him, it is the only road which would conduct the army to Wilna, by Zembin and Molodezno. This discovery could not have required much topographical knowledge in General Jomini, as it is indicated on all the maps, and known to all the Polish officers of the Emperor's staff. The wagon-masters of the regiments of the second corps returned by this road from Wilna.

In this short exposition, the true value of the succeeding details may be appreciated, and it may be supposed that General Dode had not much difficulty in dissuading the Emperor from a manœuvre, which, as we have just seen, he had no intention of executing.

Another error of Mr. de Ségur is the order he says was given to "General Ellées, to take eight companies of sappers and pontonniers, to secure the passage of the Berezina, and General Jomini to act as a guide." On the 19th the Emperor was at Orcha; the bridge of Borisof was not taken possession of by the enemy till the evening of the 21st. Thus it was not at Orcha, as the author states, but on the 24th, at Bohr, that the Emperor sent off General Elées. (See appendix.)

The officer of the palace is also deceived in saying that at Orcha the disorder of the army augmented; on the contrary, the magazines in this city allowed some rations to be issued to the troops. A thaw having succeeded to the severe cold which overpowered us since leaving Smolensk, the bivouacks became supportable. The artillery was still numerous, notwithstanding what the author may assert. A park of artillery which had been posted here, supplied us with almost as much ammunition as had been used, and five complete batteries were distributed among those corps of the army which stood most in need of them. The garrison of this place, as well as the Polish cavalry which had been cantoned in the neighbourhood, reunited themselves to the army. Mr. de Ségur himself says, "Shelter and the distribution of provisions had effected that

which threats had failed to do; the stragglers were rallied," &c.

CHAPTERS VIII. AND IX.

The intention of the officer of the palace in writing these two chapters, where he gives an account of the events which happened to Marshal Ney, since his separation from the army, events so glorious to the memory of this illustrious Marshal, deters us from giving several criticisms that this episode is susceptible of. We will only notice the following observation: "So much did he possess of the temperament of great men, a strong mind in a robust body, and that vigorous health without which no man can ever be a hero." A multitude of examples contradicting this assertion, might be cited. It is weakness of mind which renders the body inactive; a mind strongly tempered, in which dangers only tend to infuse a new energy, may sustain a feeble covering. Ney was one of these privileged men. Even had he possessed a feeble body, he would not the less have been a hero.

It is to be regretted that Mr. de Ségur has not given more in detail the brilliant action that Marshal Ney was engaged in, at the head of the third corps and Ricard's division.* Why has he not mentioned the impetuous attack of the 15th light infantry, of the 33d and 48th who overthrew the Russian line three times, notwithstanding a terrible fire of fifty pieces of cannon? Why has he not spoken of those brave companies of sappers and miners, commanded by Colonel Bouviers, who were destroyed in this battle? Why has he not said a word of Generals Dufour, Barbanegre, of Colonel Pelet of the 48th, and of so many other officers, who, wishing to excel their soldiers in

* Since the wound of General Friant, General Ricard commanded his division, which had been detached from the first corps, and placed under the orders of Marshal Ney, at Smolensk.

courage, fell like them, crying, Vive l'Empereur! Vive la France! Why has he not made known that it was Colonel Pelet, who, bloody as he was, decided Marshal Ney to pass the Dnieper on his right, instead of marching to Mohilow, on his left, as the Marshal at first intended?

The author should have apprised his readers, that the Emperor, at his departure from Doubrowna, had given instructions to Marshal Davoust, who commanded the rear guard to remain in that city as long as possible, in the hope that Ney would have retreated by the right bank of the Dnieper. In fact, a few moments after the departure of Davoust, which took place too soon, Marshal Ney presented himself before Doubrowna, but the bridge had been destroyed. Mr. de Ségur, in general so profuse of details, has left us to wish for more on the satisfaction expressed by the Emperor, at the news of the re-appearance of his brave companion in arms. This Prince was then at Barania, dining with Marshal Lefebvre, when an aide de camp,* whom he had left at Orcha, to divide the artillery among the different corps, announced to him that some Polish officers had arrived in the city, demanding succours for Marshal Ney, who was a few leagues from thence. The Emperor immediately rose, and seizing the officer by his arms, said to him with the greatest emotion, "Is this true? Are you certain of it?" This officer having replied that he was certain of the fact, that he had accompanied Prince Eugene, who, with his corps was marching in the van of the Marshal, having at last convinced the Emperor of the truth of his report, H. M. exclaimed, "I have two hundred millions in the cellars of the Thuilleries—I would have given them to save Marshal Ney!"

* Gen. Gourgaud.

BOOK XI.—CHAPTER I.

"The army had thus for the third and last time repassed the Dnieper, a river half Russian and half Polish, but of Russian origin."

We shall not notice the *Muscovite origin* of the Dnieper, the question of knowing which existed the first, Moscow or the Dnieper, is worthy of occupying the meeting of a burlesque academy; it will be a companion for the famous question of the pre-existence of the chicken and the egg.

The author states that "they marched from Orcha to Borizof, on the 22d, in melted snow, and through a deep and liquid mud. The weakest were drowned in it."

It is a strange abuse of the *hyperbole* to say that the mud was deep enough to drown any one. The thaw certainly continued after we left Orcha, but its progress was slow. The road was not in the least broken up; only its surface of ice and snow was covered with mud and water; the frost came on again on the night of the 22d—23d.

The author repeats his observations on the conduct of Napoleon in this campaign. The precaution he makes use of, in putting them in the mouths of the leaders of the army, gives them neither more weight or probability.

He makes some observe, "that like Charles XII. in the Ukrain, Napoleon had carried his army to Moscow only to ruin himself;" others that "the hope of terminating the war in a single campaign had been well founded; that in pushing his line of operation as far as Moscow, Napoleon had given to that lengthened column a base sufficiently broad and solid." But one of the principal objections of these, is, that he had not "on the field of the battle of Moskwa profited by Marshal Ney's first successes."

We have already shown that the reproach which Mr. de Ségur makes to the Emperor on the subject of the battle of Mosk-

wa, is unfounded: we repeat that the battle of Moskwa was attended with all the success that should have been expected; the taking of Moscow was the consequence—peace ought to have been the result. The flower of the Russian army fell there; from their own confessions the Russians lost 50,000 men. Besides, after this battle, where has the Russian army conducted itself with the same vigour? Was it at Malojaroslawitz, where three French and Italian divisions defeated it? Was it at Wiazma, where our rear guard passed through the centre of Miloradowitch? Was it at Krasnow, where Napoleon with 1500 men drove back Kutusof at the head of 100,000 Russians? Truly, if these last soldiers had been similar to those who had fought so bravely in the field of Moskwa, we should not have obtained such results. How can the officer of the palace, who paints the French army as entirely disorganized, with the exception of the guard, which served it as a rallying point, dare still to reproach Napoleon with not having made use of this picked corps in the battle! The utility of the guard during the retreat, is the best answer that can be made to him. If our army, notwithstanding the disasters with which it had been overwhelmed, could retire from Russia with glory, it is to the foresight of the Emperor that we owe it.

What proves that the observations attributed to our generals by Mr. de Ségur, have been written since the events took place, is, that they are ill timed. They are not such as would then have been made by the leaders of the army, who had a full knowledge of the orders, measures, and recommendations, prescribed by the Emperor before his arrival at Moscow, and his halt there. They knew that his time had been usefully employed there, and upon what objects his provident mind had exercised itself. The impression of these useful plans were yet recent, but the mind of the author has not retained a trace of them. Results are every thing with him. A historian should see with other eyes; he should bear in mind, times, places, remark all things, and interrogate the past, that he may omit no circumstance which may elucidate his narrative. The detailed and exaggerated account he gives of our losses, would imply, that he had examined the circumstantial reports

of the different corps, which would not have been made known till several months afterwards. How could the army have ascertained them at that time? This is a new proof, added to many others, of the truth of this *charming* narrative. The same may be said of the movements of Prince Schwartzenberg's army, which Mr. de Ségur gives as related so minutely by the army, and which could not have been learnt for a long time after.

The reproaches he addresses to Napoleon "of having committed the direction of military affairs to the Duke of Bassano," are without foundation. The Duke of Bassano was at Wilna with his chancery and the diplomatic corps, who could not follow the army. He there transacted the affairs of his department, and exercised, at the same time, great influence in the government of the country. Orders for military movements did not pass through him, they were always sent directly by the Prince of Neufchatel to the generals who were not immediately under the Emperor's eye. If the Duke of Bassano sometimes received communications on this subject, it was to advise him of the course of affairs, that he might take such measures as unforeseen occurrences rendered necessary. But his reports to the leaders of the corps of the army who were on the Bug and the Duna, were generally restricted to transmitting the information that he received from head quarters. The known activity of this minister, leaves no doubt on the exactness of these communications. But we are ignorant, if that at the same time that he urged the Prince of Schwarzenberg to hasten his march and to advance, he endeavoured to avoid inspiring him with a hesitation, which would probably have detained on his frontiers an ally who was already too much disposed not to leave them.

Does the officer of the palace, who here constitutes himself the interpreter of the opinion of the army respecting the Austrian general, wish to exculpate him by saying, that he had received contradictory and impracticable orders, and that the Duke of Bassano had given him false information? If these are the only reasons that the Prince of Schwartzenberg can allege in reply to the heavy accusations, of having abandoned

his line of operations on Minsk, where were situated his magazines, and where our line of retreat passed, in order to cover Warsaw, posterity will judge of the merits of this justification.

CHAPTER II.

The instructions that Napoleon transmitted from Moscow, on the 6th of October, to Marshal Victor, "anticipated a warm attack from Wittgenstein or Tchitchakof, they recommended Victor to keep within reach of Polotsk and of Minsk, to have a prudent, discreet, and intelligent officer about Schwartzenberg, to keep up a regular correspondence with Minsk, and to send other agents in different directions." These instructions should have prevented the misfortune of the capture of Minsk. The author censures the Emperor for not having reiterated them: "they appeared to have been entirely forgotten by his lieutenant;" to justify the latter, he adds, "Finally, when the Emperor learned at Dombrowna the loss of Minsk, he had no idea that Borizof was in such immediate danger, as when he passed the next day through Orcha, he had the whole of his bridge equipage burnt."

As soon as the Emperor was apprised of the taking of Minsk, he ordered the second corps to march rapidly, with a division of cuirassiers, and a hundred pieces of cannon, to Borisof, where the division of Dombrowsky was returning, and to march thence to Minsk, as the letter we have already cited fully proves.

The Emperor had two bridge equipages which were at Orcha, burnt, in order to make use of the horses for the artillery which was in this place. Independent of the difficulty that would have been experienced in conveying bridge equipages to Borisof, Napoleon could not imagine, at this period, that notwithstanding the instructions and orders he had before

given to the Dukes of Belluno and Reggio, that the important post of Borisof would fall so readily into the enemy's power. It is for this reason that he preferred conveying cannon rather than heavy boats, which appeared useless, and which, badly provided with horses, would have been abandoned on the road.

The author introduces here a general of engineers, who "interrogated by Napoleon, declared, that he saw no means of escape but through the middle of Wittgenstein's army." As Mr. de Ségur does not name this officer, it is probable he brings this new actor out to make him give this advice. He forgets, that, before this, he has made General Dode of the engineers, reply to Napoleon at Orcha, when he wished to attack Wittgenstein near Smolianky, that the position of Wittgenstein was *unapproachable*. It is to be regretted, that General Roguiat had not made the campaign in Russia; what a resource the learned author of "*Considerations on the Art of War*," would have been to Mr. de Ségur for all these conversations manufactured after the events have taken place.

"The Emperor pointed with his finger on the map to the course of the Berezina below Borisof, it was there he wished to cross the river, but the general objected to him, the presence of Tchitchakoff on the right bank; the Emperor then pointed to another passage below the first, and then to a third, still nearer to the Dnieper. Recollecting, however, that he was approaching the country of the Cossacks, he stopped short, and exclaimed, Oh, yes! Pultowa! that is like Charles the XII."

In order to believe the truth of this narrative, we must suppose a great absence of mind, either on the part of the Emperor, or of the general of engineers, who communicated this anecdote to the author. Napoleon endeavoured to ascertain a favourable spot for the passage above or below Borisof, and the two which were indicated to him, were those of Berezina and of Werelowo, his intention always being to march to Minsk or Wilna. According to the author, it would appear, that it was not Berezina, which is a long march from Borisof, but a point much lower down. But we only can perceive that of Bobruisk, a fortified place, and occupied by the Russians,

which, with the situation of Kutusof's army, on the lower Berezina, would not have facilitated our passage in that direction. This hypothesis is already almost inadmissible, but Mr. de Ségur does not content himself with it, he marches the Emperor to Pultowa, that is more than 120 leagues from the spot where he was, without doubt that he may compare him to Charles XII., without considering that he adopts, in making this comparison, two situations totally different.

To corroborate this exclamation of Napoleon, he adds, that this idea made such an impression on him, "that his mind, and even his health, became still more seriously affected than they had been at Malojaroslawitz." He cites, as testimony, "a valet-de-chambre, who was the only person who witnessed his distress." Nobody perceived it, and the author gives as a reason, "that the strength of man most frequently consists in concealing his weakness." Thus, neither facts or reasoning are ever wanting in the officer of the palace to support his suppositions.

Wishing to write a histroy, and wanting materials, he is forced to submit to all the disadvantages of such a situation. He was obliged to search for notes in all quarters. Every one furnished him with a morsel, which he hastened to register, and which he publishes without taking the trouble to verify.

The conversation he supposes between Messrs. Duroc and Daru is unlikely. The absurd idea of the captivity of the Emperor as a *prisoner of state*, never could have occurred to them at this time. It could not have presented itself to the mind of the author until after 1815. How could they believe that the Emperor at the head of 50,000 soldiers, and with a numerous artillery, could think of surrendering?

Added to which, this chapter is sufficiently refuted by the actions of that prince. The one is ideal, the other is positive. During the nights of the 22d and 23d of November, he approved of the resolution of Oudinot, to march against the enemy, and to drive them into the Berezina, in case the Russians should succeed in destroying the bridge of Borisof, he was to take possession of a passage on the right or left, and immediately to construct redoubts, and two bridges. At the same

time, he ordered that the artillery horses, which were attached to any other carriages, should be taken from them for the use of the pieces and the caissons of ammunition. Some hours afterwards, and on the same night, of the 23d of November, learning that the enemy in his flight had broken the bridge of Borisof, he ordered the major-general to write the following letter to Oudinot:—

"M. the Duke of Reggio. I received your letter of the 22d, dated from Nacza. The Duke of Belluno will be at Kolopenitchi to-day, the 23d. He will march to Baran on the 24th. Endeavour to make yourself master of the ford of Wesetowo as soon as possible, and construct there bridges, redoubts, and abattis, to support them. We can from thence return to the head of the bridge of Borisof, to drive off the enemy, or return to Minsk, or finally, as you propose, march on Weseika by the road you have made, and which you have found so good, &c."

We shall terminate these observations, by citing a passage from the work of Colonel Boutourlin, Page 362, vol. 2. We there see a Russian rendering more justice to the Emperor than a Frenchman. "Yet, in this situation, the most perilous in which he, (Napoleon) ever was placed, this great captain was worthy of himself. Without suffering himself to be shaken by the imminence of the danger, he dared to measure it with the eye of genius, and still found resources, where a general less skilful, or less determined, would not have suspected the possibility of them."

CHAPTER III.

The letter that we have cited at the end of the preceding chapter, contains nothing which announces an act of despair on the part of the Emperor. He gave his orders tranquilly for the passage of the Berezina, yet the author says, "Ever since the 23d, Napoleon had been preparing for it, as for a desperate action." To substantiate this assertion, he adds, "And first,

he had the eagles of the different corps brought to him, and burnt." This is false. Even supposing that the Emperor had formed this idea, it was impracticable, as these eagles were of copper. Besides, how can it be supposed, that at the moment this prince was rallying the stragglers, distributing to them muskets, carbines, and ammunition; when, by the junction of the corps of Oudinot and Victor, with those who had been at Moscow, he found himself at the head of about 50,000 men, and a formidable artillery; how believe, we say, that he would have adopted such a measure, which would but have served as a signal for disorganization, and which would have been the true cry of *sauve qui peut?*

At the head of 50,000 men, Napoleon would pass any where, and even if the passage of the Berezina had been impossible, neither the Emperor, nor the army, would have been lost.—The author appears to have forgotten the genius of our chief, the bravery of our soldiers, and the battles of Malojaroslawitz, Wiazma, and Krasnow. Moreover, he says himself, that after leaving Smorgonia, the greater part of the colonels still marched, with some officers, surrounding their eagle. Marshal Ney, in a letter to the Prince of Neufchatel, dated the 2d of December, announces that he has sent the *eagles* in the rear of the guard.*

* The Duke of Elchingen to the Prince of Neufchatel.

Bialtwe, December 2d, 1812.

My Lord,—I have this moment received the letter your Serene Highness did me the honour to write, at one o'clock this morning, informing me that the Marshal, Duke of Belluno, is charged with the rear guard. I have reunited here all that remains of the infantry of the second and fifth corps, as well as the brigades of light cavalry of Generals Castex and Corbineau, and the division of cuirassiers under General Doumerc.

I leave the Duke of Belluno the cavalry, a battery of four pieces of 12, and 2 howitzers. I shall march in the rear with the infantry, forming it so as to enable me to guard the bridges and defiles; I cannot hope, with about a thousand men, which are all I have left, to form a reserve. I have sent in the rear of the guard, the remnant of the third corps and the eagles. I think my presence here is unnecessary, and that I can, without danger, leave General Maison in command. I cannot procure for your highness any information from the prisoners of war, as they were immediately sent to head-quarters.

I am, &c.

Mr. de Ségur contents himself with citing cursorily, the sacred squadron, which he says was composed of about 500 officers. In mentioning this circumstance, he appears to have no other object than to point out the misfortunes of our cavalry. Yet the fidelity of these officers, who placed themselves in the ranks, taking care of their horses, going as videttes, &c. are well deserving of notice.

The officer of the palace asserts, that we traversed *the forest of Minsk* in going from Tolaczin to Borisof, when this forest is situated in the government of Minsk, and on the right bank of the Berezina. He also asserts, that "the French army glided through this forest precipitately," on hearing the cannon of Wittgenstein on our right, "this threatening noise hastened our march," says he. He ought to have left such observations to the Russian newspaper writers.

After having given a frightful picture of the French army, which he makes defile before the second and ninth corps, "the sight of so great a disaster struck the second and ninth corps with discouragement, from the very first day." The conduct of these two corps, in the attack they sustained on the two banks of the Berezina, is the best reply to this accusation.

After so much inconsistency and verbosity, our writer says, "That this army felt conscious that nature alone had vanquished it. The sight of its Emperor revived it—he was therefore cherished in the heart of his army like hope in the heart of man; it seemed of all misfortunes, that of incurring his displeasure was still the greatest." These are the real sentiments of the army, given by Mr. de Ségur himself, we are thus obliged always to return to truth.

CHAPTER IV.

When it was learnt, by the return of General Corbineau, that the ford of Studzianka was practicable, this point was

fixed on for the passage. He had discovered two others. "It was then necessary to deceive and displace the enemy. Force could do nothing, recourse was had to stratagem." These words would lead us to believe that the author was ignorant how a river is passed by main force. For with the considerable artillery that we possessed, (that of the guard being still entire,) and protected as we were by the elevation of the bank we occupied at Studzianki, the Russian artillery on the opposite bank would have been silenced in a few moments, the passage might have been forced, but with a loss which the Emperor wished to avoid. If he made demonstrations on several points, it was principally with the view of obliging Tchitchakoff to divide his force, and that the first troops who might pass, should not be attacked by the whole Russian army united.

This passage would have been commenced on the 24th, if the props for the bridge, that Marshal Oudinot was to have provided, and whose construction had been confided to a colonel of artillery, had been properly made. Unfortunately there was so much negligence in performing this important work, that General Eblé was obliged to burn these props, and construct others on the 25th. According to Mr. de Ségur, the Emperor had taken no precautionary measures in relation to the establishment of bridges.

Nevertheless, it was he who at Orcha, gave orders to transport in the two bridge equipages which were found in that city, all the tools, forges, utensils, iron, charcoal, &c. which might be wanted in the construction of bridges on tressels. These carriages were well provided with horses. The bridge equipage, as we have already said, had furnished horses for several batteries at Orcha. General Eblé had with him seven companies of pontonniers, 400 strong, excellent soldiers, who had all preserved their muskets.

It was not the sappers who plunged into the water amidst the floating ice, which filled the Berezina, but the pontonniers. The sappers were only employed in the construction of the tressels.

"On this occasion the winter showed itself more Russian,

than even the Russians themselves, the latter were wanting to their season, which never failed them." We repeat what we have already said, that the Russians, even had they been more Russian than the winter, could not have prevented us from passing. A river of 54 toises in breadth, and whose depth is not more than six feet, is not an insurmountable obstacle to an army, occupying the most elevated bank, and who could fortify it with a numerous artillery.

CHAPTER V.

The officer of the palace has already observed in Chapter III. that Napoleon in preparing to cross the Berezina, "undertook it as a desperate action." He here says, "in leaving Borisof, he imagined that he was setting out for a most desperate contest." We have already replied to this idea, in Chapters III and IV. We will not again recur to what we have observed on this subject.

The author says, "Napoleon rejected as an infamous plan, as a cowardly flight," the proposition which he asserts was made to him, by the King of Naples, *to save his own person.* It is very doubtful if the King of Naples ever made such a proposition. Mr. de Ségur adds, however, "he was not, however, displeased with Murat, probably because that prince had afforded him an opportunity of showing his firmness." It is not the first time that we have remarked, the deplorable disposition of mind, that leads the author to neglect truth and even probability, to make a display of his knowledge of the human heart, as superior to every one else, and say that which had not been remarked by another. Larouchefoucald in his *Maxims*, has made personal interest the main-spring of the actions of men. Mr. de Ségur goes further, he adds to it a savage egotism, and an entirely gratuitous injustice. In his presumption of having alone understood the Emperor, of

having learnt a secret deeply hidden in the bottom of his heart, he appears to represent him as a mysterious, incomprehensible being, beyond humanity, such as the genius of Lord Byron has presented to us in Manfred. Napoleon testifies a noble and generous feeling, the author discolours it. Napoleon ought naturally to have been grateful to Murat for his wish; but this would have been too common-place. According to Mr. de Ségur, he would not express it, because his vanity and egotism would have been compromised. This mania of thus torturing the thoughts and feelings of his hero, is worthy of observation.

"The Emperor, however, impatient to get possession of the opposite bank, pointed it out to the bravest. The French aid-de-camp Jacqueminot, and the Lithuanian Count Predziecski, were the first who threw themselves into the river."

The constant aim of the author is to induce a belief, that every thing was done in the French army without order, and that at the time of passing this river, it thought itself lost, which, however, was not the case. The Emperor had no reason to *point out the river to the bravest*, whom it would have been difficult to distinguish, without doing injustice to others. Besides, to testify courage, there must be danger to incur, and the only one in this instance was to pass a river in which some cakes of ice floated. Napoleon gave his orders, and from the marshal to the soldier under arms, every one hastened to execute them. A squadron, (of Corbineau's brigade) each horseman of which carried a foot soldier *en croupe*, preceded by some tirailleurs, passed the first. These were a short time afterwards supported by a part of the brigade which formed in line on the right bank, to drive off the Cossacks, and to facilitate the labours on the bridge. The Emperor also ordered one of his officers* to swim across, to observe if the nature of the soil on the opposite bank, would permit the passage of artillery, without being obliged to employ fascines. At the same time, by means of three rafts, some infan-

* General Gourgaud.

try were transported to the other side, to clear away the brush-wood which covered it, and to drive back the Cossacks.

Napoleon had ordered the construction of three bridges, two by the artillery, and one by the engineers. But the river having been found wider than had been supposed, General Chasseloup of the engineers, declared he would not be able to construct the third bridge, and delivered over the sappers to General Eblé, and at the same time gave him the tressels he had made. At one o'clock, (the 26th) the upper bridge was finished; it was intended for the infantry. The Emperor immediately ordered Oudinot's corps to pass the first. The brigade of cavalry of Castex was the first; it was followed by Albert's brigade of infantry, then the remains of Legrand's division, and the whole of the second corps; these troops were full of ardour. Two pieces of cannon also passed over this bridge. Marshal Oudinot posted his troops on the road from Borisof, covering that from Zembin.

The second bridge, one hundred toises from the first, and which was destined for the equipages, was finished in four hours, and immediately the artillery of the second corps, that of the guard, the grand park,* and that of the other corps, passed in succession. Several times the tressels of this bridge being forced into the bed of the river, caused interruptions to the passage, and required repairs, but the brave pontonniers, stimulated by the presence of the Emperor, and encouraged by General Eblé and their officers, (Messrs. Chapelle, Chapuis, Peyherimoff, Zabern, Delarue, &c.)† surmounted all difficulties. Plunged in the freezing water to their shoulders, they laboured without relaxation to repair and preserve the bridges, an heroic devotion, and almost beyond human power. Mr. de Ségur should have considered that an army composed of such soldiers, never could be vanquished by the Russians.

* The great park was composed of three hundred carriages, of which fifty were pieces of cannon, under the command of General Neigre.

† We regret not having the power of citing the names of all the officers, subalterns, and pontonniers, who deserved to be signalised by the gratitude of the army. These intrepid soldiers, without hesitation, in many cases sacrificed their lives, induced alone by honour and their high sense of duty.

He states, that the Emperor seeing his troops masters of the opposite bank, exclaimed, "Behold my star again appear!" Napoleon, from the instant he placed his pieces in battery, might regard himself master of the opposite bank, since no Russian battery could have resisted our fire. It was not the mere passage itself, which offered dangers, it was if the corps of Tchitchakoff had opposed with vigour, our crossing the bridge, or had only destroyed the numerous bridges which are over the marshes on the road to Zembin. But the battles we had engaged in since that of Moskwa, and the brilliant charge that General Berkeim had made on Lambert's division of Tchitchakoff's corps, afforded us the conviction, that we would not be checked by the Russians. The Emperor, therefore, could not have exclaimed, "Behold again my star!" besides, where has this author ever heard this prince speak of his star? If Napoleon had placed that confidence in it, he would not have proclaimed it so loudly and constantly.

The observation which follows appears to us to contain a contradiction: "For he was a believer in fatality, like all conquerors, those men who, having the largest accounts with fortune, are fully aware how much they are indebted to her, and who, moreover, having no intermediate power between themselves and heaven, feel themselves more immediately under its protection." If conquerors believe in fatality they are superstitious. If they believe all due to fortune, or to accident, they are materialists. If they have no intermediate powers between them and heaven, they should refer every thing to the divinity, but they cannot be superstitious, materialists, and eminently religious all together. Thus in the whole course of the book, contradictions continually take place between the facts and the deductions.

CHAPTER VI.

"Napoleon appeared pleased in proclaiming aloud, the news (of Schwartzenberg's victory over Sacken,) with the addition that Schwartzenberg had immediately returned upon the heels of Tchitchakoff, and that he was coming to our assistance."

The Emperor believed that as soon as Schwartzenberg should have been apprised of the movement of Tchitchakoff on the Minsk, that he would hasten to follow him in that direction. We shall not attempt to explain the sluggishness that this general testified at that time, after events have sufficiently discovered the causes which directed the policy of the Austrians in this important conjuncture, the results of which had so fatal an influence on the misfortunes of the army.

The officer of the palace insinuates that Tchitchakoff only quitted the Bug in order to oppose our crossing the Berezina. It is only since those events, that it has been supposed that his movement took place with that intention. The truth is, that Tchitchakoff marched to Minsk and the Berezina to endeavour to join Wittgenstein. On this account after he had taken Borisof, he immediately despatched Lambert's division over the Berezina to meet Wittgenstein. But this division having been driven back by the brigade of Berkeim, of Oudinot's corps, this check, on the one hand, and on the other the information of Wittgenstein, and the orders of Kutusof, which the admiral received at the same moment, decided him to descend the Berezina, and to approach the grand Russian army.

In the whole of this chapter the author wishes to convince his readers that it is to the hesitation of Admiral Tchitchakoff's manœuvres, the successful passage of the Berezina by the French army is owing. Without intending to attack or defend the military operations of this general, we will content ourselves in saying, that if he, with all the force he could have collected, had posted himself opposite to the point at which the Emperor had resolved to cross, the passage would, neverthe-

less, have taken place, but the two armies would have lost a great number of soldiers.

"Tchitchakoff could have overthrown, the next day, the 27th, with 18,000 men, the 7,000 soldiers of Oudinot and Dombrouski."

To reply to this assertion, we are forced to repeat what we have already stated; that our artillery was composed of more than 250 pieces, well supplied with ammunition. The right bank rises much above the left bank of the Berezina, and at this spot it is only fifty-four toises in width, our shot would have swept all the approaches to this river, and the enemy's batteries would have been obliged to have kept themselves out of the range of our fire, or they would have been destroyed.

Hence the enemy could not have prevented the construction of the bridges, and under the fire of all our artillery, the army could have been formed in line of battle, on the other side of the river, to march against the enemy, if he had attempted a manœuvre similar to that practised by Vendome to prevent Eugene from passing his bridge at the Cassano. In our situation, it would have been an ordinary battle, of which all the chance of success was on our side, since the army could have displayed, and independent of the quality of our troops, and the courage they derive from circumstances, we would have been superior in numbers to the Russians. It would not have been against the 7,000 soldiers of Oudinot alone, that Tchitchakoff must have struggled, but also against the imperial guard, the corps of Eugene, Ney, and Davoust, which would have presented an aggregate of force much greater than that of the admiral. Now that the events have long since taken place, it is, perhaps, to be regretted that Tchitchakoff had not made this manœuvre. For his army would, in all probability, have been destroyed by ours, and, however great our losses might have been, it would have been better for us to have died as victorious soldiers, than to fall victims to the cold, a few days afterwards. The losses that we experienced at the passage of the Berezina, are to be attributed to the negligence practised in the execution of the orders which the Emperor had given to make the necessary preparations for the passage, such as the construction of tressels,

&c. We have seen above that the corps of Marshal Oudinot occupied the ford, two days before the arrival of the Emperor, but the tressels had been made with so little care, that they were obliged to be recommenced. But from this circumstance, the passage would have been effected twenty-four hours earlier, and without loss.

CHAPTER VII.

On the 26th of November Marshal Victor gained the road at Lochnitza, which had been followed by the army returning from Moscow. General Partouneaux was ordered to form the rear guard with his division. Victor, with his two other divisions, occupied Borisof. On the 27th, at four o'clock in the morning, this marshal took up his line of march to gain Studzianka, where he arrived early. General Partouneaux replaced him at Borisof. It would have been desirable that Mr. de Ségur had informed us what instructions Marshal Victor left with this general, and at what time he was to leave Borisof. He asserts that Partouneaux "was preparing to quit it, when an order reached him from the Emperor himself, to remain there all night." This is incorrect; the Emperor did not send an order to Partouneaux to remain the night at Borisof. This general himself declares, that it was an officer from the Prince of Neufchatel who brought it. But then this officer ought to have been charged with a written order; for those of the major general, when carried by any other officers than his aides-de-camp, were always written. Besides, it was not the regular march, and nothing obliged him to change it. If Napoleon had wished that Partouneaux's division should have remained during the night of the 27th—28th at Borisof, he would have ordered the Prince of Neufchatel to prescribe this plan to Marshal Victor, or if he despatched this order at once to General Partouneaux, he would have sent it by one of his aides-de-camp, or orderly officers, but neither received such a mission.

"Napoleon's idea, no doubt, was in that manner to direct the whole attention of the three Russian generals upon Borisof, and that Partouneaux's keeping them back, upon that point, would allow him sufficient time to effect the passage of his whole army." Our historian has not given the dates we have just cited. If he had done so, the reader would have perceived himself the little foundation there existed for this pretended motive for Partouneaux's halt at Borisof. On the day of the 26th, the following night, and the day of the 27th, almost all the French army had passed the Berezina, with the exception of Victor's corps.

The occupation of Borisof, during the night of the 27-28th, by General Partouneaux, was then not only useless, but it might have tended to endanger the retreat of his division. For, as we have just said, this division retreating the 27th, all the effect expected to have been produced by the French troops at Borisof, was accomplished.

"A crowd of stragglers, who were driven back on Partouneaux, apprised him, that he was separated from the rest of the army," and decided him to evacuate this city to rejoin his corps. The enemy blocked up the road, Partouneax attacked them and was repulsed. He refused to surrender, "he wanted to make a last effort, and clear a sanguinary passage to the bridge of Studzianka, but these men, who were formerly so brave, were now so degraded by their miseries that they basely broke their arms."

General Partouneaux had reason to hope, that he could force the corps opposed to him to open a passage, for this corps was between two fires. It is probable, that he would have succeeded in this attack, if he had made it with the whole of his division; it appears, that a false report had induced him to believe, that the French army had passed the bridges and burnt them, which destroyed his hopes. It is not true, that his soldiers *basely broke their arms*, as a letter from this general proves, in which, on the contrary, he gives the greatest praise to his soldiers. This letter is in our hands.

"Concluding that he was abandoned and given up." General Partouneaux, believing that the bridges were burnt, might

have considered himself as *abandoned* to his own resources, but certainly he never could have believed, that Marshal Victor would have wished to deliver him up to the enemy, and we do not fear to be contradicted by this general, in affirming, that he never believed that he was given up. In the critical situation in which he found himself, perhaps he should have taken a better method of extricating himself. We shall not permit ourselves to make any observations upon this subject, convinced, that in doing what he did, he believed that he was acting for the best.

"Of the whole division, a single battalion only escaped. It was reported, that its leader, turning towards the soldiers, desired them to follow all his movements, and declared, that he would shoot the first man who talked of surrendering. He then quitted the fatal road, glided through to the borders of the river, followed all its windings and turnings, and, protected by the combat of his less fortunate comrades, by the darkness, and the very difficulties of the ground, escaped from the enemy, and brought to Victor the confirmation of Partouneaux's surrender."

This narrative is incorrect. This battalion was of the 55th regiment, and had for a commander Mr. Joyeux. He had been charged with the destruction of the bridges on the Ska, and to form the extreme rear guard from Borisof. On leaving this city, he had taken the left of the road which the army had followed, on which were carts and baggage wagons, and arrived without obstruction at Studzianka, bringing with him a piece of cannon and its ammunition wagon. The Emperor, anxious to see the division of Partouneax re-united to the two other divisions of Marshal Victor, to cover Studzianka, ordered one of his officers* to go and meet it. This officer met, on his route, the battalion of the fifty-fifth. He inquired, if the division of Partouneaux was far off? How, the division of Partouneaux! replied the commander of the battalion, it precedes me, I am its rear guard. The officer, well aware that there were only Russians in the rear, returned with this disastrous intelligence to the Emperor. This Prince seemed greatly

* Gen. Gourgaud.

astonished at this circumstance, which he could not understand. The loss of Partouneaux's division, ought and did not affect him deeply, since it was the only organized corps that had fallen into the enemy's hands from the beginning of the campaign. But it is false, that the word *defection* escaped from his lips. At this epoch, the word was unknown in the French army. Another proof, that Napoleon never considered the misfortune of Partouneaux's division as *defection*, is, that, in 1813, he named three of Partouneaux's children to situations in the Lyceums.

CHAPTER VIII.

The Emperor, says Mr. de Ségur, refused to permit the equipages which covered the left bank of the Berezina to be burnt. This Prince had no urgent reason for burning the baggage wagons which remained on this bank. His only motive would have been, not to have left them as trophies for the enemy; but what miserable trophies a few baggage wagons would have formed! It was a trifling consideration, compared to the situation to which this loss would have reduced the wounded, and those families who had followed the army from Moscow, and who, even in falling into the hands of the enemy, might still preserve some resources. In every point of view, in a military sense, it was perhaps advantageous to leave the approaches to the bridge encumbered after the passage of the army and its artillery, for it was to create a new obstacle to the enemy. The author adds, that it was "from a preference for the opinion which flattered him the most," (this is a remark as false as it is peurile,) "and from a wish to spare so many men whose misfortunes he reproached himself with."

If this is an accusation directed against the authors of the war, it does not fall on the Emperor; if it is directed against his conduct during this expedition, it is unjust and malicious.

Besides, is it with these pedantic dissertations, and continual suppositions, that history is to be written?

The enumeration that our historian makes of the Russian and French troops at the battle of the 28th, diverges greatly from the truth. "Tchitchakof, with his 27,000 Russians of the army of the south, debouched from Stachowa, against Oudinot, Ney, and Dombrowski. These three could hardly reckon 8,000 men in their ranks, which were supported by the old and young guard, who then consisted of 2,800 infantry and 900 cavalry."

The corps of Oudinot and the division of Dombrowski, consisted of 9,300 men, that of Marshal Ney, 5,400. The infantry of the old guard, which, at its departure from Smolensk, was 5,777 strong, still consisted of 4,500, the young guard 2,200, the cavalry of the guard 2,000, dismounted cavalry of the guard, under the orders of Colonel Daulancourt, (now a general,) 1,800; the corps of Marshal Victor, reduced to the divisions of Daendels and Gerard, consisted of more than 11,000 men. This made with the corps of Eugene and Davoust, and our numerous artillery, an army of upwards of 45,000 men, perfectly armed.

"Among the losses of the day, that of young Noailles, Berthier's aid-de-camp, was remarkable. He was struck dead with a ball. He was one of those meritorious, but too ardent, officers, who are incessantly exposing themselves, and are considered sufficiently rewarded by employing them."

Mr. de Noailles was, without doubt, an estimable officer, but why praise him alone, among so many brave men, who distinguished themselves on this occasion? The author does not say a word of General Legrand, who was wounded, and conducted himself with so much intrepidity; of General Maison, who did not testify less; of General Cadras, who was killed; of Generals Merle, Grundler, Berkeim; of General Zajonczek, that Nestor of the Polish army, who had his leg carried off; of the brave Colonel Dubois, of the 7th Cuirassiers, who contributed so much to the success of the affair. It is true that these officers bear names which glory alone has ennobled. Besides, when we cite it is just that we should cite

properly. It is false that M. de Noailles was killed by a ball. He had just brought an order to the 23d regiment of Chasseurs, and was speaking to Colonel Marlot, the commander of this regiment, when a charge of Russian cavalry took place. The horse of Alfred de Noailles fell, and two Cossacks were seen to drag this officer by the collar, and striking him. The 23d made an effort to rescue him, but it was fruitless, and M. de Noailles, of whom nothing more was heard, was, in all probability, massacred by these barbarians.

In the account of this battle, Mr. de Ségur has forgotten to make known the order that the Emperor gave to the division of Daendels, to repass the Berezina, and go to the assistance of Marshal Victor, who, with the division of Gerard only, was sustaining so disproportionate a struggle against the efforts of Wittgenstein, and that at the moment that the Emperor and the troops which had passed the Berezina, were violently attacked by the army of Moldavia. It is true, that in reporting this occurrence, the author would have himself refuted the passage in his book, where he says, "Napoleon felt that he had no other plan than to sacrifice, successively, the army, part by part, commencing with the extremities, in order to save the head."

"Night came on before Wittgenstein's 40,000 men had made any impression on the 6000 of the Duke of Belluno." If, in all the narrative of this campaign, the Russians had furnished to the historian of the grand army an exploit as glorious as that of Victor's soldiers, he would not truly have been so sparing of his eulogies.

CHAPTER IX.

The officer of the palace, in this chapter, heaps horrors upon horrors. It relates only to the last day of the passage; the bridges were then much encumbered, but the picture which

he presents is exaggerated beyond all measure. His predilection for disgusting scenes hurries him away. "The more fortunate gained the bridge by scrambling over heaps of wounded women and children, thrown down and half suffocated, whom they again trod down in their attempts to reach it." There were in the army some female sutlers, and a *few* children. On our return from Moscow, several families having followed us, the number of these were augmented. The idea of women, of children struggling against death, has been a great resource to the authors who have described this campaign. But Mr. de Ségur has surpassed his predecessors, the Labaumes Puibusque, Ker Porter, &c. He reproduces this image every moment, and in three pages he repeats four times, *the women and children*, as if the number had been immense, and as if, instead of an army, it had been a wandering tribe of Tartars, carrying their families in their train.

"The night of the 28-9th added to all these calamities. Its darkness was insufficient to conceal its victims from the artillery of the Russians. Amidst the snow, which covered every thing, the course of the river, the thorough dark mass of men, horses, carriages, and the noise proceeding from them, were sufficient to enable the enemy's artillerymen to direct their fire. About 9 o'clock at night, there was a still further increase of desolation, when Prince Victor began his retreat."

This fanciful description appears destined by Mr. de Ségur to serve as a completion to his picture. During the nights of the passage, the bridges were entirely clear. The mass of stragglers, who wished to pass during the day, retired at night to their bivouacs, from whence no order, no entreaty could draw them. If the Russians had fired during the night, the stragglers would have been eager to have profited by the clear passage of the bridges, to cross the river; but it was not so. On the 28th, the day of the glorious action of the 9th corps, towards 5 o'clock in the evening, the fire ceased on both sides. At 9 o'clock, Marshal Victor commenced his retreat, and at one in the morning, the whole corps had passed in perfect order, with all its artillery, leaving on the left bank only a feeble rear guard. About the same time, the two batteries

of flying artillery of Colonels Chopin and Serruzier passed. During the whole of this night, the enemy did not fire a single shot; the author demonstrates this himself, in saying, "The multitude, benumbed with cold, or too anxious to preserve their baggage, refused to avail themselves of the last night for passing to the opposite bank." In vain were the carriages set "fire to in order to tear them from them." Now if the Russians, as we have before said, had thrown a few bullets in the midst of these apathetic and thoughtless beings, the greater part of the stragglers would have passed the bridges.

If, as the Emperor had ordered, the means of constructing the bridges had been ready on the day of the 24th, we should have passed on the night of that day, on the day of the 25th, and on the 27th, in the morning, all the French army would have found itself on the right bank of the Berezina. Thus the loss of Partouneaux's division would not have taken place, nor the attack of Wittgenstein on Studzianka; in a word, we should not have to deplore all the misfortunes which occurred. This passage, which was effected in despite of all obstacles, notwithstanding the difficulties which occurred, was not by any means as disastrous as several writers, who are delighted to exaggerate our misfortunes, have endeavoured to make it believed. The men that we lost were not among the combatants; three pieces of cannon only were left on the other bank; finally, the number of prisoners that the enemy picked up (by the Russian account) did not amount to more than two thousand stragglers, wounded, sick, and sutlers.* At half after eight in the morning of the 29th, fire was set to the bridge, and it was not for an hour afterwards that some Cossacks approached it.

Our readers may be pleased, that we should make them acquainted with the opinion given by the Russian historian, whom we have already cited, on the conduct of the Emperor, at the period of the passage of the Berezina.

"Invested on all sides, Napoleon never lost himself; he de-

* See History of the Campaign in Russia, by Colonel Boutourlin, volume 2, page 383.

ceived the generals opposed to him, by skilful demonstrations, and gliding, if we may so express ourselves, between the armies, who were prepared to rush on him; he effected his passage at a well selected place, where every advantage of ground was in his favour. The bad state of the bridges, the amelioration of the construction of which did not depend on him, was the only cause which, in retarding the execution, rendered it so perilous. Thus the great losses that the French experienced, should not be attributed to Napoleon, and ought only to be placed to the account of the unfortunate circumstances in which his army found itself, and which it was not in his power to control."

And it is a Russian who says this!!

CHAPTER X.

After having given the description of the road leading to Zembin, which passes through the marshes, over which are bridges of several hundred toises in length, the officer of the palace appears to regret that the Russians had not destroyed these bridges, and expresses himself thus; "caught between the morass and the river, in a narrow space, without provisions, without shelter, in the midst of a tremendous hurricane, the Grand Army and its Emperor, would have been compelled to surrender without a blow."

On the supposition that the bridges had been burnt, their reparation impossible, finally on that of the marshes of the Gaina, through which the road passed, not being sufficiently frozen to bear men and horses, the Grand Army and its Emperor would not have been forced to surrender without a blow. The author says truly, that we were caught between these marshes and the Berezina, but he does not say that the third side of this triangle was occupied by the Russians. How could a man who

bears the title of General, think that in such a situation, the Grand Army and its Emperor, would not have marched against the Russians and cut their way through them, to gain the road from Borisof to Minsk ! !

After the exaggerated descriptions that Mr. de Ségur gives of the weakness of the French army, this expression of *grand army* here employed, has a signification which might be proper from the mouth of a Russian newspaper writer, but which sounds ill in that of a Frenchman.

In retracing to us, as is his custom, the passage of the Berezina, the romantic author had forgotten one of his favourite subjects, a forced storm; we find it here. This hurricane ought to be diminished to a little wind and a few flakes of snow. As to the severity of the cold, we can appreciate it on learning that the Berezina was not frozen.

Mr. de Ségur in speaking "of an elderly nobleman of the times long passed, when light and brilliant graces held sovereign sway," makes allusion to the Count of Narbonne. "This general officer of sixty," says he, "was seen sitting on the snow-covered trunk of a tree, occupying himself with unruffled gaiety every morning, with the details of his toilette; in the midst of the hurricane, he had his hair elegantly dressed and powdered with the greatest care, amusing himself in this manner with all the calamities, and with the fury of the combined elements which assailed him." Mr. de Narbonne, notwithstanding his age, went through the Russian campaign with the ardour of a young man. Is it good taste in Mr. de Ségur to endeavour to throw ridicule on this estimable general, who always faithfully served the Emperor and France, and died at Torgau, charged with the defence and government of that place.

CHAPTER XI.

The only important subject in this chapter, is the first intimation which Napoleon makes to Messrs. Daru and Duroc, of his resolution to set out immediately for Paris. His motives were powerful and undeniable. Those which Mr. de Ségur puts in his mouth, were not the principal. There were others which materially influenced his determination. A Russian historian has better understood them than the French author. "Napoleon," says he, (Boutourlin, vol. II. page 392) "was not only the leader of the army which he left, but as the destiny of all France rested with him, it is clear that in this conjuncture, his first duty was less to assist at the last struggles of the wreck of his army, than to watch over the safety of the great empire which he governed. He could not better fulfil this duty, than by returning to Paris, in order to hasten by his presence, the organization of new armies, become necessary to replace those he had just lost."

He left the chief command to the King of Naples, to Count Daru the administration, and the Prince of Neufchatel remained Major General.

Mr. de Ségur states that a *violent and secret scene* took place between the Emperor and Berthier, in which he makes this old companion in arms of Napoleon, play a humiliating part. Our writer should have told us how he obtained a knowledge of it. A particular conversation certainly took place between the Prince of Neufchatel and the Emperor, which he has since related. It was on the question of making choice of a commander for the army; Napoleon was decided in confiding it to Eugene. The Prince of Neufchatel insisted for a long time in favour of the King of Naples. He testified in his arguments, a force and obstinacy which did not belong to his character. He finished by declaring, that if the Prince Eugene commanded the army, he would not remain under his orders. We can pardon this veteran of the French military glory, whom the

Emperor had raised so high, and allied to sovereigns, by marrying him to a princess of one of the oldest reigning families in Germany, this fatal repugnance to serve under a chief who did not wear a crown. Mr. de Ségur should have known of this long conversation, which took place in a room adjoining that, in which were the officers of the household. He learnt vaguely, that the Prince of Neufchatel had refused to remain with the army. There was nothing more wanting, to give scope to his imagination, in reporting the secret scene he mentions. It is the characteristic manner of this author, and it may well be supposed that it was thus he composed the greater part of this history.

CHAPTER XII.

This chapter contains the account of the glorious deeds of the French troops, who formed the rear guard under the orders of Marshal Ney and General Maison. In speaking of a battle which took place before Malodeczno, the author mentions, that the enemy not being able to repulse the troops opposed to him, directed a part of his force "to another entrance," and that "as good luck would have it, Victor with about 4000 men, the remains of the ninth corps, still occupied this village;" it would have been very extraordinary that Generals Ney and Maison, who made head against the enemy before Malodeczno, with a few hundred men, should have been ignorant that this village was occupied by Victor and 4000 men. The latter was there with his corps in consequence of an order from the Major General.*

* The Prince of Neufchatel and Wagram to the Duke of Belluno.
Malodeczno, Dec. 4, 1812—4 o'clock in the morning.
Duke of Belluno, Sir,—You will to-day continue your retreat, and come on and take up your position at Malodeczno, taking care that the carriages

This chapter terminates with a quarrel between Marshals Victor and Ney, on the subject of the command of the rear guard. Mr. de Ségur represents Ney "as giving way to his passion in the most violent manner, without producing any effect on the coolness of Victor." We do not clearly underderstand the cause of this quarrel, as the letter of the Duke of Belluno* to the Major General, proves that this marshal commanded the rear guard.

and stragglers are all kept in advance. The second corps, which will maintain this city until your arrival, will then be placed in the rear. The head quarters will be at Bienitza, by the route of Markowo. If provisions had been found here, they would have halted; but the first considerable magazines are at Smorgoni; these are, bullocks, brandy, and biscuit; make this known to your stragglers, that they may rally at these magazines. If you have any ammunition wagons, send them to Smorgoni for provisions. At all events we shall endeavour to send you ten thousand rations of biscuit and beef; this will enable you to halt where you may find it necessary, without the apprehension of your troops disbanding. If the means of transport do not allow of your receiving provisions in the course of to-morrow, you must continue your march to Smorgoni, that is to say, till you reach the stores, and there you will halt. Send out a proclamation to call together the stragglers, and direct them on to Smorgoni—let the drums call them together, and let an officer of the staff read it to them.

Signed—ALEXANDER.

* The Duke of Belluno to the Major General the Prince of Neufchatel and Wagram.

Bivouac, 5th Dec. 1812—4 o'clock in the morning.

My Lord, the battle maintained on the 4th by the rear guard, was the last it could effect against the enemy; the troops which composed it are now so reduced, and those that remain are so exhausted, that I am obliged to withdraw them out of the reach of the enemy, and to avoid every chance of fighting. The report which my first aid de-camp must have made to your Serene Highness, on the situation and state of my troops, is the exact truth. The advanced guard of the corps which follows us, arrived yesterday at Bienitza, as soon as we did, although we marched in the night, and that the bridges of Malodeczno were destroyed. It was 11 o'clock; if I had wished to maintain Bienitza, I must have given battle or sustained another disadvantageous attack, from the great disproportion of my troops to those of the enemy. I have therefore taken the only feasible step, that of retrograding, and going to rest in a village two leagues from Bienitza, and four from Smorgoni. Our videttes and those of the enemy, can see each other. I shall probably be followed as closely to-day as yesterday, and I think that it would be better if his majesty were at a greater distance from us. The stragglers op-

CHAPTER XIII.

We here find fresh observations on the feelings of the army towards the Emperor. The officer of the palace says, "it is true that a seditious movement was impossible."

This remark is idle; to whom would an idea of sedition occur? There was a reciprocity of feeling between the army and its chief, which renders this supposition impossible.

The pliability that Mr. de Ségur attributes to the Emperor towards the marshals, "whose approbation of his project he gained, some by his arguments, and others by his confidential communications," is in contradiction with the character of Napoleon. All the army desired it, and learnt with joy the determination he had adopted; they felt that the safety of all rested in him, that they might lose men, cannon, provinces, but that in losing him, they would lose every thing.

The confession that our historian causes him to make before his officers, is still more ridiculous, and in what terms does he make it? "If I had been born to the throne, if I had been a Bourbon, it would have been easy for me not to have committed any faults." The design is inexplicable. Does the author wish it to be believed, that the Emperor only undertook the expedition to Russia, to fix himself more firmly on the throne of France? Does he wish to make him pointing out the dangers and misfortune of trusting to his destiny, or to

press us greatly; they are very numerous. The habit they have acquired of only marching in the day, enables the enemy to take a great number, whether they do not care to take them, or that they mistake their columns for regular troops, they follow them with great circumspection. I believe, however, they took several yesterday. I expect to arrive at Smorgoni about nine o'clock this morning; I shall, I conclude, be obliged to go further to sleep, unless indeed, I should find some troops to support me. Those of General de Wrede would be very useful in that case. I think the Emperor has given them orders to relieve us, or march with us.—Signed

The Marshal of BELLUNO.

give him a fore-knowledge of the great catastrophe which induced his fall? If such be the case, it must be allowed, that Mr. de Ségur would have the gift of prophesying after the events. It may be asked, where he procured such information? Is it probable, that this idea presented itself to the mind of the Emperor at that moment? Is it possible that he would have expressed it? Has not the absurdity of this idea struck his historian? The heart of Napoleon was torn by the sight of the calamities of his army, but no one was better aware than himself of the causes which had produced them.

We cannot conceive how an officer of his household could have erred so stupidly, as to attribute thoughts and speeches to this prince, which are in so complete contradiction to his position and character.

But, nobody can misunderstand the aim of such an insinuation.

BOOK XII.—CHAPTER I.

The opening of this book proves the incoherence of the author's ideas. "Having arrived at the departure of Napoleon, I flattered myself that my task was completed." Yet, when he assumed the pen, the events were gone by, and the facts, which ought to have furnished the subject of his work, well known. Why was not his plan put a stop to?

"I had announced myself as the historian of that great epoch, when we were precipitated from the highest summit of glory, to the deepest abyss of misfortune." The historian of that great epoch, has not fulfilled the task he imposed on himself. He has made himself the poet of the calamities and disasters, and not of the great occurrences which took place in this memorable expedition. In saying that we were precipitated from the highest summit of glory, the author does not express his

own idea. We rather hope that he wished to say from the highest summit of prosperity. If this expedition was disastrous, it has been fruitful in deeds of heroism and fidelity, which have shed an imperishable lustre on the French army. All that we have hitherto read, withers the soul, and yet Mr. de Ségur tells us, "that nothing remains for him, but to retrace the most frightful miseries." He again addresses himself to *his companions*, and demands of them, "Why should we not spare ourselves; you the pain of reading them, and I the sad tasking of a memory, which has now only to rake up embers, nothing but disasters to reckon, and which can no longer write but on tombs."

Here our task becomes irksome, and we feel the fulfilment of our duty more painful than ever. Why did not the writer listen to this happy idea of here terminating the melancholy efforts of that memory, which ought, in fact, to be fatigued in *raking up embers?* We will follow him to the end, surmounting our repugnance, and that which should discourage us, will serve as a fresh stimulus.

In the situation in which the necessary departure of the Emperor placed the army, it of course felt the immense void that was left. But, perhaps, the misfortunes which occurred after his departure, would not have arrived, if less eager to reach Wilna, they had made shorter marches. It was to these marches, at a time when the cold had redoubled in intensity, (being at 28 degrees,) that the corps of the army owe their disorganization.

"Most of the colonels of the army, who had hitherto been such subjects of admiration, and had marched on, with only four or five officers or soldiers around their eagle, preserving their place of battle, now followed no orders but their own, each of them fancied himself entrusted with his own safety; it was almost a general cry of *sauve qui peut.*"

The unhappy condition of the army cannot absolve the author from the imputation he casts on the colonels, who, during the campaign, had to support so many moral and physical evils; far more severe than those of a general only charged with a civil service in the household of the Emperor. That

which it would have been just to have said, is, that Marshal Ney, who had in the rear guard, platoons composed of colonels and superior officers, having seen many of these officers cut down by a discharge of grape, found that their services were purchased too dearly by the loss that the army would hereafter experience in them; he thought, with reason, that it was preferable to have some hundreds of men less at this time, and to insure the future re-organization of the army, by rescuing the colonels, superior officers, and others, from the effects of their own fidelity, who, having lost all their soldiers, determined to remain with the rear guard, to share its battles. He, therefore, ordered all officers without men to retire, and to gain the Niemen. He even sent off the serjeant-majors, and the quarter-masters, and in the troops that remained with him, he only wished to retain officers and subalterns proportionate to the number of the soldiers. Mr. de Ségur has not praised a single colonel, he censures them in a mass. We are willing to believe that he was ignorant of the order issued by Marshal Ney, but in his uncertainty, he should have abstained from censure. We have had so many occasions to remark omissions, and errors produced from ignorance of facts, in this work, that this last ought not to have astonished us. But wanting proper information, he has had the temerity to undertake to write a history.

The anarchy and disorder are painted with the same exaggeration. There were no doubt great traits of selfishness, as we may always expect to find in great misfortunes, but there were a multitude of acts of generosity and fidelity. Friends, comrades divided among each other their miserable food, their clothes; soldiers, servants carried their officers or their masters; General Legrand was thus carried by his grenadiers, General Zayonczek saved by his soldiers, the young St. Croix,* who lost his lower limbs at Mojaisk, was saved on the retreat, by his friends; Colonel Marin, (of the artillery of the guard,) was transported by his artillery men, &c. Why only point out the most disgusting parts of the picture? Does the author fear

* Brother of the general of that name.

that he will not attain the end he intended, if he permits us to see the bright side?

CHAPTER II.

The march of the French army to Wilna, is the subject for new scenes, where the officer of the palace redoubles his efforts to surpass the horrors of the preceding chapters. Nevertheless, the state of the army was deplorable enough, without the author's abandoning himself to the melancholy pleasure of overcharging the picture. "The light of the fires attracted some of these miserable wretches, whom the excessive severity of the cold had rendered delirious; they ran in like madmen, gnashing their teeth, and laughing like demons; they threw themselves into these furnaces, where they perished in horrible convulsions. Their famished companions regarded them undismayed; there were even some who drew out these bodies disfigured and broiled by the flames, &c." The pen refuses to transcribe the remainder of this passage. The distinctive character of this extreme misery was, that although no one attempted to avoid death, none sought it voluntarily. The anthropophagy never took place. Was Mr. de Ségur a witness of one of the incidents of this nature which he quotes?—From whom did he receive his information? He knows that the extravagant, the marvellous, and the horrible, please the generality of readers, and he takes advantage of it. Ought we to expect, after such accounts, to meet with a grave dissertation on the uncertainty of omens? to see cited "the predictions which announced an invasion of Tartars, as far as the banks of the Seine?" and the tale "of the pretended storm, which had signalized our entrance on the Russian territory," repeated?

How can he thus abuse the sensibility and credulity of his read

CHAPTER III.

The disorders which took place at Wilna cannot be attributed to the Emperor. At the time of his leaving the army, (Smorgoni, the 5th of December,) he had every reason to hope that the reinforcements of men it would receive, and the quantity of provisions which were laid up at Smorgoni, Ochmiana, and Wilna, would enable the corps to re-organize themselves. Under this idea he wrote the following orders to the major general, dated Bienitza, 5th December.

"My Cousin—I herewith send you instructions for the re-organization of the army; the King of Naples will make such modifications in it as circumstances may exact. I nevertheless think that it is necessary also to organize the Lithuanians at Kowno, the fifth corps at Warsaw, the Bavarians at Grodno, the eighth corps and the Wurtembergers at Olita, the small depôts at Merecz and Olita, and to direct the dismounted cavalry to Warsaw and Kœnigsberg, as well as the stragglers and the military equipages which have no horses. All the remounted cavalry must be sent to-morrow from Wilna to Kœnigsberg, the diplomatic agents must be despatched the day after to Warsaw, and also all the wounded generals and officers must be sent to Warsaw and Kœnigsberg, making them understand the necessity there exists to clear Wilna, in order to accommodate the active part of the army. We are assured that the treasure of the army is considerable; give an order that it be sent to Warsaw and Kœnigsberg, where it is wanted; which will clear Wilna in some degree. Finally, all the orders which may tend to disencumber Wilna should be given to-morrow, as it is necessary on many accounts.

"*Instructions.* Rally the army at Wilna; keep possession of that city, and take up winter quarters; the Austrians on the Niemen, covering Brezc, Grodno, and Warsaw, the army at Wilna and Kowno. In case the enemy's army advances,

and you cannot maintain yourself this side of the Niemen, the right covering Warsaw, and if it can be done, Grodno, the remainder of the army in line behind the Niemen, guarding the bridge at Kowno; have great stocks of flour laid up at Kœnigsberg, Dantzic, Warsaw, and Thorn: let Wilna and Kowno be cleared of every thing, that your movements may be free, the most valuable articles must be sent to Dantzic."

There were at Wilna four millions of rations of flour, three millions six hundred thousand rations of meat, nine millions of rations of wine and brandy, forty-two thousand pairs of shoes, and considerable magazines of beans and forage, clothing, harness and equipments, thirty-four thousand muskets, and an arsenal well stocked with ammunition of all kinds. It may be seen that the reproach of improvidence, which the officer of the palace applies to the Emperor, is wholly unfounded. According to him, "not a single commander ventured to step forward and give orders for distributing these provisions to all that came for them." This is an attack on the heads of the commissariat; perhaps they hoped, by only making the distributions in regular form, to oblige the stragglers to rally; but it was a great misfortune.

The author gives a revolting picture of the hospitals at Wilna; it is a fact, however, that the numerous hospitals in this city had been put, by the exertions of Doctors Desgenettes and Marie de St. Ursin, in as good a condition as possible, but in consequence of the disorder which resulted from the crowded state of Wilna, the administration could do nothing more. Mr. de Ségur has assumed this extraordinary situation of affairs, as the consequence of a neglect which did not exist. His prejudice could not have had a finer field.

"At last, by the exertions of several of the commanders, such as Eugene and Davoust, the compassion of the Lithuanians, and the avarice of the Jews opened some places of refuge."

Officers had been posted at the gates of Wilna, to point out to the soldiers of the different corps, convents and other buildings, which were to serve them for barracks, and where they might rally and receive their rations. But the soldiers were

more desirous of traversing the city in all directions, and of entering the houses.

In consequence of the orders that the Emperor had sent from Zelitska to General de Wrede, this general marched from Vilieka to Slobkchomska. On the 8th of December the King of Naples ordered him to Ruckoni with his Bavarians, amounting to two thousand some hundreds, to relieve the Duke of Belluno, who had formed the rear-guard, and to place himself under the orders of Marshal Ney, to whom that command was again confided. The Bavarian general, after having been attacked in this position by the corps of Cossacks who preceded the Russian advance guard, and who had some pieces of artillery, was driven back to Wilna, which caused a great disorder among the stragglers, sutlers, &c. They beat to arms, but the Cossacks were not willing to enter that day into a city where there was still some organized infantry. General de Wrede, having with him about sixty Bavarian light horse, went to Ney. After having formed his troop in line before his door, he entered the marshal's quarters, having still his sword in his hand. "Marshal," said he, "the enemy is in pursuit. I come to offer you my sixty horsemen as a safeguard on the road to Kowno." Ney was leaning against the fire-place. He took Wrede coldly by the hand, and led him to a window which overlooked the street, and showing him the disorder which prevailed there, and the unarmed mob that was hastening to fly, said to him, "General, do you think that a marshal of the Empire can mingle with such a mob?" The Bavarian General was silent for a moment, then he observed to Ney that if he remained longer at Wilna that he risked falling into the power of the enemy. The marshal replied, "No, no, general fear nothing for me, I have here in my house fifty French grenadiers, and all the Cossacks in the world cannot dislodge me before to-morrow at eight o'clock."

"Wilna might have been defended for twenty-four hours longer, and many men might have been saved."

It might have with ease, been maintained for several days. The cold had caused almost as much destruction in the Russian as in the French army; it marched slowly. The garrison of

Wilna and the imperial guard, could have defended the city against all the attacks of the Cossacks. Although the orders of the Emperor to put this city in a state to resist a serious attack, had not been wholly executed; some palisades had been erected. By holding Wilna twenty-four hours longer, it would have been easy, by means of distributions of all kinds to the stragglers, to have rallied a great number of them, and if the evacuation became necessary afterwards, it could have been made in some order. It is bitterly to be regretted that in these great crises, the Emperor could not have been at the same time at the head of his troops and at Paris. After the passage of the Berezina, the army having reached its magazines, and approached its reinforcements, Napoleon thought was the most favourable moment for him to return to France. If the instructions he had left in departing had been followed, the misfortunes which took place after his departure, would not have happened; they were for the most part caused by the rapidity with which the army hastened to reach Wilna. It was not sufficiently considered that these continued marches and the excessive severity of the cold, could only tend to accomplish the disorganization of the army.

"In that city, as at Moscow, Napoleon had given no regular orders for retreat." At Wilna, as at Moscow, Napoleon had ordered every measure that circumstances exacted. As soon as the communications had been established between the army and Wilna, he never ceased giving orders, to gather together provisions, that the place should be freed of all baggage that was not wanted by the army, which was at Smorgoni and Ochmiana.* The letter of the Emperor to the major

* See in Appendix.

1. Letter from the Prince of Neufchatel to Prince Eugene. Staiki, December 2d.
2. Letter from the same to the same. Selitze, December 2d.
3. Letter from the same to General de Wrede. 3d December.
4. Letter from the same to General Dalbignac. Malodecthzno, 3d December.
5. Letter from the same to the Duke of Belluno. Malodecthzno, 4th December.
6. Letter from the same to the Count of Kreptowicze. Malodetchzno.

general, under date of Bienitza, 5th December, 1812, which we have already cited, prescribed measures as well for the re-organization of the army, as for the evacuation of Wilna of all that could be useless to an active army. It terminates thus: "Finally, all the orders for clearing Wilna must be given to-morrow, as it is necessary on many accounts."

It is inconceivable, that notwithstanding these incontrovertible proofs, that Mr. de Ségur will persist in his system of reviling. For he might have been convinced by the letters we have cited, that, if the orders of the Emperor had been executed, (and there was nothing to prevent it,) this enormous incumbrance of wagons and baggage would not have taken place.

The author, in speaking of the defile of Ponari, says, "Here, in fact, it was, that money, honour, and every remains of discipline and strength, were completely lost—A covered wagon of treasure, which burst open, served as a signal, every one rushed to these carriages."

The following are the facts: the morning of the day in question, a director of the post-office came to Marshal Ney, at Wilna, and informed him, that for want of horses, he had been obliged to abandon his wagon, in which was a considerable sum of money belonging to the government. The marshal demanded of him, if, before abandoning it, he had distributed the money among the unfortunate soldiers with whom the road was lined? On a reply in the negative to this question, Ney expressed a regret, that this money had been left to the enemy. The next day, the marshal, leaving Wilna with the rear guard, and arriving at the foot of the mountain of Ponari, saw a long file of carriages and wagons of treasure stopped. Judging that it was impossible to save it, as the enemy was in close pursuit, he ordered that they should be opened, and that the money which they contained should be given to all who wished to take it, his order was executed. This distribution of the treasure is to be regretted without doubt, but circumstances called for it. Mr. de Ségur, perhaps, would have rather that the Russians had profited by it! Why need

he have made it a subject of accusation against the honour of the army.

"On the most exposed part of the mountain, an officer of the Emperor, Colonel the Count de Turenne, repulsed the Cossacks, and in defiance of their cries of rage and their fire, he distributed, before their eyes, the private treasure of Napoleon to the guards whom he found within his reach. These brave men, fighting with one hand, and collecting the spoils with the other, succeeded in saving them. Long afterwards, when they were out of all danger, each man faithfully restored the depot that had been intrusted to him. Not a single piece of money was lost."

It may readily be supposed, that the officer of the palace would wish to mention with praise one of his colleagues, the Chamberlain Count de Turenne,* keeper of the robes to Napoleon; but how is it, that the exuberance of his imagination has not furnished him with something more flattering to Mr de Turenne, than representing him as distributing the Emperor's toilet articles,† when the rear guard, commanded by Marshal Ney, dispensed him the trouble of keeping off the Cossacks.

Besides, this anecdote, at the same time that it amuses the reader, gives him, in the midst of all these disasters, one consolation, which is, that after the passage of she defile at Ponari, none of the brave soldiers of the guards were destroyed.

* The four civil officers of the Emperor's household, who were in the army under the orders of the grand marshal, were Mr. de Ségur, marshal of the chambers; Canouville, idem; Turenne, chamberlain, master of the robes; Beausset, prefect of the palace.

† These are, no doubt, what the author terms the treasure of their chief; the Emperor had no private treasure, that which was distributed at the mountain of Ponari was the treasure of the army.

CHAPTER IV.

The mode of Ney's retreat was not, as is related by the author. He supposes that this marshal made his troops march during the night, and fight during the day. If this illustrious warrior had adopted so fatal a system of marching, it is very certain that no soldier could have borne it, particularly when we consider, that few regular rations were distributed, and that it was only during the time of the bivouac that the soldiers went in search of food.

The melancholy observations that the officer of the palace attributes to the army after the passage of the Niemen, in casting a last look on that river, contain a recapitulation of our misfortunes, presented in a narrow frame, in order that they may be in better relief. He adds, "Two kings, one prince, eight marshals, followed by a few officers, generals on foot, dispersed and without any attendants; finally, a few hundred men of the old guard, still armed, were its remains, they alone represented it."

His habitual exaggeration, and his prejudiced manner, may be remarked in this short analysis. The following is the real enumeration, made at this time, of the force of the French army:

Troops which repassed the Niemen to Kowno, on the 15th December,	36,000 men.
Tenth corps,	30,000
Polish corps, under Prince Poniatowski,*	20,000
Seventh corps, Saxons and French, under Regnier,	15,000
Austrian corps,	26,000
	127,000 men.

* Prince Poniatowski arrived at Warsaw, the 25th December, bringing back 30 pieces of cannon and his corps. (Manuscript of 1813, by Baron Fain, vol. I. page 30.)

In each regiment they had a tolerably correct idea of the number of men, killed, wounded, and in the hospitals, but not of those who died by the cold, but they had some information of those presumed to be prisoners. Why is it, that, since 1814, there has been a total silence respecting the number of those who have returned, and, that it is said, were so generously given up by Alexander? Not only some return, at the present time, but great numbers have remained in the different provinces of Russia. Mr. de Ségur is far from presenting our misfortunes with these consolations.

As to the guard, at the time of its re-union, (15th December,) at Wirballen, where it remained the 16th, it was still numerous, particularly in men. In the cavalry, the regiment of Polish light-troops, alone counted 412 men and upwards and 200 horses, all good and fit for service, and others that were wounded or sick. A great number of the men belonging to this regiment, having lost their horses, directed their retreat through the woods of Lithuania to Warsaw, where they arrived, protected as well by the inhabitants as by their knowledge of the language of the country.

This chapter terminates with a merited eulogy on Marshal Ney, who displayed in this memorable campaign, all the strength of mind, and fidelity of a hero, and who never abandoned the undertaking till it abandoned him.

CHAPTER V.

When the army had reached Gumbinnen, three days' march from the Niemen, the Russians slackened their pursuit. Their distress was almost as great as our own, and when they saw us out of danger from the cold and hunger, they became more prudent; this permitted the King of Naples to afford some rest to the troops. Mr. de Ségur, in speaking of a council held by

this monarch at Gumbinnen, puts in his mouth, words which were, says he, the *first symptoms of his defection.* He represents him as "filled with anger against the Emperor, who had left him the responsibility of the retreat—and in despair for having rejected the propositions of the English." To these inconsiderate speeches, Davoust replied with as much force as reason. The author adds, "Murat was disconcerted, he felt himself guilty."

"This first spark of treachery was then stifled. It is with regret that history commemorates it, as repentance and misfortune have atoned for the crime."

It is unfortunately ascertained, that the King of Naples was not equal to the circumstances and mission with which he was charged, on the departure of the Emperor; few men are endowed with the power of being equally great in misfortune as in prosperity. From the commencement of his military career, Napoleon had not experienced a real check; he had not, therefore, as would have happened if his fortune had varied, an opportunity of discovering, among his generals, some of those singular beings, whose element appears to be adversity, and who only rise by misfortune.

This Prince was obliged to content himself with studying characters in the chances of war. Murat had always been without reproach, and it required extraordinary events to show him in another character.

But, every thing considered, his defection is not more inconceivable than those which took place in 1814, from March to the middle of April, and notwithstanding his acuteness, the Emperor could not have foreseen such a blindness.

All that a sovereign ought to do, to attach to him those who serve him, Napoleon had done. He had united them to his fortune by two of the most powerful ties, those of interest and self-love. No prince, no government could offer them advantages equivalent to those they enjoyed from the Emperor.

Besides, Napoleon had studied history too attentively, not to be aware of the lot which attends unfortunate princes. He knew that there existed, in modern nations, a very influential mass of individuals wholly employed with their wealth, their

ease, and their pleasures; that these men are neither capable of a firm constancy in misfortune, or of heavy sacrifices; that their attachment to a government is always proportioned to the advantages they derive from it. Thus he was not astonished, after his reverses, to see the multitude avoid him, and hasten to prostrate themselves at the foot of the new power which replaced his.

But one circumstance he had no right to expect; it was that men who professed noble opinions, who spoke with emphasis of their spirit of independence, and who pretended alone to have preserved the national feeling, should make his person, his actions, and his government, the butt of their attacks and their calumnies.

Let the mighty shade of Napoleon be appeased! Whilst ingrates outrage his memory in the very palaces he bestowed on them, the people, who, during his reign, supported almost wholly the burthen of the conscription and taxes—the people know how to render him justice—they revere his memory, and, in the recesses of their huts, exalt his name.

CHAPTERS VI. VII. VIII. & IX.

Chapters VI. VII. VIII. and IX. contain the history of the campaign of Marshal Macdonald, and the account of the treason of General Yorck. The author makes us retrograde to the month of August. He praises highly the Prussian troops, who fought well. But it was not so with their leader, who, according to our author, "had higher views." He establishes a grammatical distinction on this subject, between *defection* and *treason*. The reader will judge which term the conduct of an allied general merits, who, commanding the rear guard of the army, profits by his situation to conclude an armistice with the enemy, without the knowledge of the commander in

chief; who calls secretly around him the remainder of the Prussian corps; who escaped from Tilsit in silence and by favour of the night, and who thus abandoned, in the face of the enemy, the French corps, of which he formed the principal force. The opinion of the French historian, on the conduct of General Yorck, will not be ratified by those who value honour above all.

The kind of convention, by which he appears to diminish the odious part of it, will tend to absolve all who think that contracted obligations are no longer binding when they become burthensome, and that they may be abrogated without disgrace. We have too high an opinion of the nobleness of the sentiments, hereditary in the family of Mr. de Ségur, to believe, that if he had maturely reflected, that he would not have hesitated to brand an action so contrary to all honour.

We are the better assured in our opinion, as he himself says, "Six hundred French, Bavarians, and Poles, remained dead on these two fields of battle; their blood accuses the Prussians for not having provided, by an additional article, for the safe retreat of the leader whom they had deserted."

CHAPTER X.

"In this sudden manner did our left wing fall. Our right wing detached itself from us insensibly, and with the formalities required by its political position. On the 10th of December, Schwartzenberg was at Slonim, presenting successively van guards towards Minsk, Nowogrodeck, and Bielitza. He was still persuaded that the Russians were beaten, and fleeing before the Emperor, when he was informed, at the same time, of the Emperor's departure, and the destruction of the grand army; but in so vague a manner, that he was for some time without any direction."

The Prince of Schwartzenberg was not *vaguely* apprised of the departure of the Emperor; he was instructed of it as officially as possible, by Baron Sturmer, his secretary, who was on a mission to Wilna, and who was sent back to him with this information. Mr. de Ségur must have had a very exalted opinion of the good faith of the Austrian general, to believe that on the 10th of December, being at Slonim, and having an advanced guard towards Minsk, that he was ignorant that on 16th of November, that is twenty-five days before, that Minsk had fallen into the power of the Russians, and that our retreat on this point was cut off. He adds, "in his embarrassment he addressed himself to the French ambassador at Warsaw, who authorised him not to sacrifice another man." Thus, without inquiring into the fitness of the motive of Prince Schwartzenberg's application to the French minister, the author appears determined to absolve him on all points.

Yet, he says, a short time afterwards, "and as the interests of the Russians agreed with that of the Austrians, there was very soon a mutual understanding." They understood each other so well, that towards the 21st of December, (Mr. de Ségur mentions it himself,) "an order from Alexander suspended hostilities on that point. A moveable armistice, which was approved by Murat, was immediately concluded; the two generals were to manœuvre on each other, the Russian on the offensive and the Austrian on the defensive, but without coming to blows."

They were really evolutions of parade, an assault of politeness and deference, which confined itself to the Russians and Austrians alone. "For the corps of Regnier, which formed part of the army of Schwartzenberg, was not included in the arrangement."

The war continued against this corps, reduced by this defection to 10,000 men, as it had with Macdonald, after the departure of the Prussians. But the officer of the palace unblushingly continues, "Schwartzenberg persevered in his loyalty—he covered the whole front of the French line with his Austrian troops, and preserved it. Regnier was, it is true, overtaken and surprised at Kalisha, but that was in conse-

sequence of halting too long to protect the flight of some Polish hosts." These extracts afford another example of the spirit of justice that animates the author. How often have we been reduced to regret, in the course of our observations on his work, that he has not spared to the French army some portion of this treasure of partiality.

After these faithful displays of the conduct of the Prussians and Austrians, follows a recital of the barbarities exercised by the inhabitants of Koenigsberg towards our unfortunate wounded, and a horrible description of the convent of Saint Basil, at Wilna, where the Russians permitted their prisoners to die of hunger and want, in the midst of the plenty afforded by the stores of provisions we had left there. But, in the narrative of the French writer, these horrors rouse the humanity (a little tardy, it is true,) of the Russian Emperor and his brother, who arrived thirteen days afterwards, to remedy them.

CHAPTER XI.

The author says, that "the rallying of the army on the Vistula, had been completely illusory."

The old guard had not altogether more than 500 effective men.*		
The young guard - - -		scarcely any.
The first corps - - - -	1800	
The second corps - - -	1000	
The third corps - - -	1600	
The fourth corps - - -	1700	
	6600.	

* A detailed report, which we possess, of the five regiments of infantry of the old guard, makes the number under arms the 20th of December, 1812, 1,471. The 15th of January, the young guard was ordered to Posen, on the Rhine, to re-orgnise itself, and the old guard went to Paris.

And, adds he, "the greater part of these soldiers, the remains of 600,000 men, could scarcely handle their arms."

We have already given the state of the army on its leaving Kowno. Mr. de Ségur, at the commencement of the campaign, had enumerated it at 445,000 men; afterwards he approaches nearer the truth, in estimating it at 400,000; now he supposes it 600,000. In the *remains* he alludes to, he does not include the fifth corps, which had arrived since the 25th of December, at Warsaw, with 20,000 men and 30 pieces of cannon; and he does not calculate the sixth, the seventh, the ninth, the tenth corps, and that of Schwartzenberg. In the following page, he says "the troops of Macdonald, and the completely fresh corps of Hendelt, preserved their unity. All these remains were speedily collected into Dantzic. Thirty-five thousand soldiers, from seventeen different nations, were shut up in it."

The author thus contradicts himself. Why then has he given 6,600 men as the remains of 600,000, if it is not to propagate an error, and to enlarge our losses, already so great? Was it with these 6,600 men, that a garrison of 35,000 men was formed at Dantzic? Was it moreover from these 6,600 men that garrisons of 6,000 men at Thorn, of 8,000 at Modlin, 4,000 at Zamose, &c. were furnished?

"Alexander arrested the march of his troops at Kalitch." Mr. de Ségur, who has exaggerated so greatly the losses of the French army, ought to have informed us of those experienced by the Russians themselves.

The army of Kutusof, which at the battle of Krasnow was 100,000 men, after the evacuation of Wilna by the French, was not more than 35,000. The Russians, scarcely masters of this city, threw into the hospitals 18,000 sick, of which the greater part were from the severity of the cold.

The author of a sketch of the campaign of 1813, published in German, at Weimar, in 1814, enumerates the Russian troops who had arrived at that time in Prussia, at 20,000; and those who united at Kalitch, where the Emperor of Russia had his head quarters, at 30,000. After having detailed the posts of the different Russian corps, he adds, "it is evi-

dent from this account, that without the adherence of Prussia, Russia would not at that moment have been able to have pursued her successes, and would have been forced to limit her operations to the Vistula.

Sir Robert Wilson, in his Table of the Russian power, says that there were at this time in the army of Alexander, several companies without a single man, and in a great number of battalions there were not fifty.

CHAPTER XII.

The conclusion of the officer of the palace is, that "the star of the north triumphed over that of the south—that the direction of the human race is towards the south; it turns its back to the north—we cannot with impunity turn back this great current of men.—Russian armies have been seen on the Elbe, and shortly afterwards in Italy—they came to reconnoitre these countries, some day they will come and settle there—and that the invasion of the south by the north, recommenced by Catharine II. will continue."

Here is an assertion formally established, and supported by specious reasons, although expressed in a strange manner.

Then addressing himself to those whom he terms *his companions*, observes to them, "whatever was the motive of our expedition, this was the point which made it of importance to Europe. Its object was to wrest Poland from Russia, its result would have been to throw at a greater distance, to weaken the torrent, and oppose a new barrier to it."

Here again Mr. de Ségur is detected in a flagrant contradiction; the necessity of the expedition is proved by himself.—It would be exacting too much to demand of him if he has assigned the true cause of the war.

Finally he adds, "was there a man, or a combination of cir-

cumstances so well calculated to insure the success of so great an enterprise?" Here again, the confession that the moment of the expedition was opportune, breaks forth, and that the Emperor was the man who alone could have insured its success.

Thus the author who endeavoured in the whole course of his work to present the Russian expedition as an unjust aggression, as caused by the personal ambition of Napoleon, disavows in these few words, all that he has advanced, and justifies the necessity, the aim, and the time of this memorable enterprise. But of what importance is this sort of tardy recantation! What purpose do these vain eulogies serve, that only appear to escape him, to clear his conscience from the unjust aspersions with which he has sought to blacken the memory of this great man? And has he taken the pains thus to hold up Napoleon to us, as fallen from himself, given up to a shameful imbecility, deprived of energy, both moral and physical, and to have harassed the mind of the reader by the horrible pictures scattered through a thousand pages, to return to the point at which he should have commenced, that is, with truth!

He thus terminates: "Comrades, my task is finished; it is now for you to render your testimony to the truth of the picture; its colours will no doubt appear pale to your eyes and to your hearts, which are still full of these great recollections."

The veterans of the Grand Army do not recognise truth in this picture, where their illustrious chief, their sentiments, their constancy, their victories, are so strangely disfigured.

How can the author believe that his colours will appear pale, when his memory, as he himself observes, only gathers the ashes, only recounts disasters, and writes but on a tomb?

We can say with him, our task is finished: as much as depended upon ourselves, it has been painful. We have not undertaken to correct all the errors, or all the injustice with which the book abounds; if so, we should have been carried beyond the limits we assigned ourselves. We have not pointed out all the passages which prove that Mr. de Ségur has

only endeavoured to flatter the passions of the moment, when he wrote his work, and which are extinguished daily. We should have been obliged to stop at every page, and besides, would it not be a calumny on the government, to suppose that a work which lowers the glory of our arms, and which only flatters foreigners, would be a title to military rewards.

We have very seldom remarked the extraordinary style of Mr. de Ségur, which fortunately will have no imitators; our aim being too high to notice these trifles. We have wished not to vindicate the memory of a great man, which sufficiently protects itself, and whose name will descend to the latest ages; not to extol the glory of the army, whose renown is beyond our reach; but to pay homage to truth, to cite facts, documents, and men, in testimony against a writer, who, abandoning himself to the extravagance of an unregulated imagination, or speculating on the taste for violent emotions, contracted by the present generation, has sported in a book, romance, poem, or melo drama, in two volumes, with all that enjoys the respect of elevated minds, genius, courage, and misfortune. May the soldiers of Napoleon, may the friends of the French glory appreciate the feeling which has directed our pen, and we shall feel amply rewarded for our efforts.

END OF CRITICAL EXAMINATION.

APPENDIX.

NAPOLEON TO THE MAJOR GENERAL.

Thorn, June 4th, 1812.

My Cousin, write to the Duke of Elchingen, that when you gave him the order to obtain twenty days' provisions, you meant that it should be done regularly and without foraging the country; that the conduct of the Wertembergers has brought terror and desolation into Poland; that it is time to put an end to such actions; that he shall express, in the order, his majesty's displeasure against the Wertembergers, and that he shall take the promptest measures to prevent the devastation of the country, without which we shall find ourselves as in Portugal, &c.

NAPOLEON TO THE MAJOR GENERAL.

Wilna, July 2d, 1812.

My Cousin, send back the viceroy's aid, making known to the viceroy that, having no news, but aware of the general movement, it is ridiculous that he remains stationary at Piloni; that since he knew the Cossacks were at Stoklitzi, he might send his light-horse forward to clear the country, obtain intelligence, and approach Wilna; that the news given him by General R——, of 30 or 40,000 Russians being on his left, is destitute of common sense; that General R—— pretends he told him upon his right; that then, they were the hussars which were seen in the direction of Stoklitzi; that all these delays vex the Emperor; that the finest opportunities are lost, and that all the fatigues of the 4th corps are in consequence entirely fruitless.

Write to General R——, that I see with surprise he is still at Jizmory; that he must have lost his senses not to have continued on the route to Wilna; that, if his artillery was delayed, he might have left a guard of a hundred or 150 men; that he sent news to the viceroy of 30 or 40,000 Russians being on his right, and this absurd news has influenced the operations of the viceroy. Demand of him the reason for giving such information, and order him to answer without delay.

Inform the viceroy, that I directed him, on the 28th, to move upon the right; that he should push strong parties of cavalry upon Olita, to gain intelligence of all that transpires; that he shall approach Wilna with the 4th corps, and that he will have upon his right, that is between the Niemen and Wilna, the sixth corps, which will push parties upon Merecz and Olkeniki, so that a junction may be formed with the King of Westphalia.

NAPOLEON TO THE MAJOR GENERAL.

Wilna, July 5th, 1812.

My Cousin, write to the King Westphalia, that I only received to-day his despatch of the 3d July, while I yesterday received his letter of the 4th. Inform him, that I am exceedingly dissatisfied that he has not put all the light troops under the orders of Prince Poniatowski at the heels of Bagration, to harass his army and arrest their march; that, having arrived on the 30th at Grodno, he should have immediately attacked and vigorously pursued the enemy. Tell him, it is impossible to manœuvre worse than he has done, that General Reynier, and even the 8th corps, were useless on that occasion; that he ought to have sent Prince Poniatowski with all his disposable force after the enemy; that on account of his not having conformed to all the rules and his instructions, Bagration has had time to make his retreat at his ease; that if Bagration left Wolkowisk on the 30th, he could arrive at Minsk on the 7th, and of what consequence would it be that the king should be there on the 10th, since Bagration should have gained four days march on him? Tell him, that if Prince Poniatowski had but one division, he should have sent it; but that every thing leads to the belief, that he could have sent the whole corps forward. He would not have been compromited, since Bagration had neither time to fight nor manœuvre, and that he only sought to gain ground, knowing well, that he was cut off by the manœuvres I have executed; that the Prince of Eckmülh is to-day with a part of his corps in front of Vologin, but will not be strong enough to check Bagration, since the latter is not embarrassed with anything. Tell him, that all the fruits of my manœuvres, and the most excellent opportunity which has been offered during the war, have been lost by this singular forgetfulness of the first notions of war.

NAPOLEON TO THE MAJOR GENERAL.

Wilna, July 7th, 1812.

My Cousin, inform the King of Westphalia, by a letter in cypher, of the position of the Prince of Eckmülh yesterday at 6; you will draw it from the accompanying statements. Repeat to him the order for hastening his march; tell him, that the intelligence he has given in relation to Bagration is so imperfect as to embarrass us; that if he knows which way he has marched to inform us.

NAPOLEON TO THE MAJOR GENERAL.

Wilna, July 7th, 1812.

My Cousin, the guard must march; its movement should take place on the 9th, and continue the 10th and 11th. It is necessary that the bridge equipages, the corps of engineers, the artillery, and all that accompany it, should take six days' half-rations of provisions with them, and should certainly have three quarters or a pound of meat a man. It is, therefore, necessary that, on the 10th, ninety thousand rations of bread should be distributed to the guard to carry in their knapsacks, which will assure their subsistence for six days, three hundred quintals of rice, to distribute a pound to each man, this will

give the guard enough for ten days; on the 11th and 12th, two convoys of bread, of thirty thousand rations each, must follow their movements from Wilna, which will give them bread for four days more; finally, on the 9th, 10th, and 11th, let convoys of bread be placed on the carriages at head quarters, on the auxiliary carriages, on those which have replaced the wagons of the ninth, tenth, and twelfth, battalions, on those of the eleventh battalion, and on all the carriages that arrive in time, so that during the days of the 10th and 11th, there may be in part, forty thousand quintals of flour in the rear of the guard, which will make three hundred and sixty thousand rations of bread, or ten days of certain provisions for the guard and head quarters; this joined to the bread carried by the guard, will give twenty days' bread—should the army not march, other convoys will arrive; if it does march, it will find resources in the towns; but I cannot feel tranquil, until I am certain that the guard and head quarters have twenty days' provisions assured to them, since the guard will march the last, and should give an example of discipline. In this account, you must not include the forty wagons belonging to head quarters, containing biscuit, brandy, &c. these must be a last resource.—As some biscuit has just come in, let the state of it be examined, and fill the biscuit wagons belonging to head-quarters, this will be useful in any unforeseen event.

NAPOLEON TO THE MAJOR GENERAL.

Wilna, July 9th, 1812.

My Cousin, you must consider the last letter which I wrote to you for the Duke of Tarentum, as not having arrived, and substitute the following:—The Duke of Reggio has received orders to direct his march on Solok, the Duke of Elchingen upon Kozatschizna; the King of Naples is at Widzy.—The enemy appears to be concentrated at Dunaberg. The Prince of Eckmülh is arrived at Minsk. The Hetman Platoff, and his Cossacks, and the corps of Bagration, who were advancing on that place, have been checked, and are now marching on Bobruisk. The King of Westphalia is in pursuit of them; and was yesterday at Mir. The viceroy is advancing on the upper Duna; the guard and the head quarters will leave this in a few days. The Emperor intends to march either to Moscow or St. Petersburgh, and by this means oblige the army at Dunaberg to go higher up, and free the whole of Courland and Livonia. The garrison of Riga, commanded by General Essen, whose corps has been broken up, is composed of thirty-three battalions, some of them not more than two to three hundred men, all recruits of this year, and are not worth consideration. It is probable, that as soon as this place is menaced, a division from Dunaberg will be sent there; for, from the information we have, the present garrison cannot properly defend it. The Emperor cannot give you positive orders, he can only send general instructions, the distance is already very considerable and will soon be more so.—March on Jacobstadt and Frederickstadt, and threaten to pass the Duna, this movement will oblige the Russian army at Dunaberg to send a detachment on the right bank to defend the two passages, &c.

NAPOLEON TO THE MAJOR GENERAL.

Wilna, July 11th, 1812.

My Cousin, reply to the King of Westphalia, that it was with astonishment you received his letter of the 9th of July, at two o'clock in the afternoon; that the order of the 30th is positive and expressed in these terms, "*You must march on Minsk; General Reynier will advance on Nieswj; but still continuing to cover Warsaw.*" This means, that the first object of General Reynier is to cover Warsaw; secondly, should there be nothing to fear for the Grand Duchy, and the enemy should retire his troops from Volhynia, then to march to Nieswj. But as every thing seems to prove, that the enemy has left two divisions in Volhynia; it is therefore necessary, that General Reynier should not lose sight of his principal object, that of covering Warsaw. Check therefore his movement on Slonim; the Prince of Schwartzenberg will pass on before him to Nieswj, and then towards the Duna. Let General Reynier send some troops to Pinsk, and place them in detachments in such a manner as to attack in flank any attempt on Warsaw, should it be menaced. When the enemy is aware that they are on the roads to Pinsk, and their corps prepared to fall on his flanks, and that he has to fear our arrival in Volhynia, it will be too imprudent to venture in the neighbourhood, if he does, it will not be with impunity. General Reynier should send back to Praga the regiment destined for the garrison of that place, and which has been improperly removed. The position of General Reynier in the rear, is therefore useful. His majesty is not surprised that you do not comprehend, that instructions given at the distance of a hundred leagues should appear contradictory, but events will elucidate them; of this he does not complain, but that in lieu of attending to his instructions, you pay no respect to them. To cover Warsaw it is not necessary to be on the Bug; if it were so, General Reynier's main object being to cover this duchy, he ought to have left troops on the Bug, if he learnt that the enemy had left two divisions in Volhynia. But, as you are not informed of what Bagration has left in Volhynia, as you are ignorant how many divisions he has with him, that you are not pursuing him, and that he has retreated as quietly as if there were no troops in his rear: all this being contrary to the usages of war, it is not extraordinary that the rest is of the same nature. General Reynier, according to the force left by the enemy in Volhynia, must judge, whether to return to Brezesc or to remain at Slonim, sending some troops to Pinsk. But the principal object, until the enemy retreats from Volhynia, is to place a corps of observation so as to cover Warsaw, and to attack whatever on the side of Volhinia may menace that duchy and the rear of the army.

Order General Reynier to write directly to the Major General, and to send all the information he is possessed of. His Majesty thinks proper to order General Reynier to remain in observation for the purpose of gaining the Grand Duchy and not the Prince Schwartzenberg, many reasons have formed his determination on this subject. The king should let Prince Schwartzenberg know, that it is my desire that he marches on Nieswj, if Warsaw is not strongly menaced.

NAPOLEON TO THE MAJOR GENERAL.

Glubokoe, July 20th, 1812.

My Cousin, write to the Prince of Echmühl that I am not satisfied with his conduct to the King of Westphalia, that I only gave him the command in case that the re-union took place, and the two armies being on the field of battle a commander would have been necessary, that instead of that he has made known this order before the re-union was effected, and when it scarcely communicated by some advanced posts, that after having done this, and after having learnt that the King of Westphalia had retired, he ought to have preserved the command, and sent orders to Prince Poniatowsky—that I do not know now what is doing on my right, that I have given him a proof of the great confidence I have in him, and it appears to me that he has not properly fulfilled it, since, if he assumed the command, he ought to have maintained it, but he would have done better not to have taken it, as he has not joined the King; that at present, being at a distance, I am ignorant of what passes on my right; that my affairs are suffering, whilst, if he had written to Prince Poniatowski, that the King having quitted the command, he would have given him directions and my affairs would not have suffered.

NAPOLEON TO THE MAJOR GENERAL.

Glubokoe, July 22d, 1812.

My Cousin, reply to General Reynier that I authorise him not to send that regiment to Praga, and that I think it well placed where he has posted it. Let him know that the Duke of Belluno, with the ninth corps, 30,000 strong, almost all French, will be at Mariemburg the 1st of August, and that if circumstances should be urgent, and the Duchy of Warsaw really menaced, whilst he, General Reynier, shall defend the entrenched camp at Praga and Modlin, he will write to the Duke of Belluno, to let him know the urgency of circumstances, which will induce him to come to his relief. You will add that the events of the war are such, that already we menace Moscow and St. Petersburg, and also that it is not probable that the enemy thinks of offensive operations with indifferent troops, but that it is supposed that 10 or 12,000 men of their battalions, who are good for nothing in line, may be sent with one or two regiments of cavalry to menace the Duchy. The enemy will never be mad enough to detach 15 or 20,000 men, of good troops, to Warsaw, at the time that Petersburg and Moscow are menaced so closely, that besides, it is possible, that in a short time I carry the war into Volhynia, and that in such case they suffer from it.

NAPOLEON TO THE MAJOR GENERAL.

Witepsk, 2d *August*, 1812.

My Cousin, send an officer to Prince de Schwartzenberg to let him know that I put the seventh corps under his orders, that he must rally this corps and march on Tormasof and Kamenskoi, and give them battle, that he must pursue them every where, till he can effect this. Let General Reynier know

that I have given Prince de Schwartzenburg the superior command of the two corps united.

NAPOLEON TO THE MAJOR GENERAL.

Witepsk, August 3d, 1812.

My Cousin, you must send to-day, before six in the morning, an intelligent and confidential Polish officer to Prince Schwartzenberg, with the duplicate of the letter that you wrote him by your aid-de-camp Flahaut, you will let him know, that, conformably to the intention manifested by the Emperor of Austria, that I wished his corps brought under my immediate orders, that I thought the corps of General Reynier would be sufficient to keep the army of Volhynia in check, intending also to send a considerable body of Poles by Mozyr, in Volhynia, as soon as Prince Schwartzenberg has commenced his march. But at present, as the enemy has so vigorously assumed the offensive, and the corps of General Reynier has permitted itself to be broken, my wish is that he should march with all diligence to repulse the enemy, and prevent him from ravaging that part of the country, and as it is cavalry that Reynier particularly wants, his cavalry must assume the van; that I desire he will leave 1000 horses, two batteries of artillery, and a brigade, altogether 4000 men, at Nieswj, in order to form a reserve, commanded by a general of brigade, who can act according to circumstances, that I leave it to his own judgment to increase this reserve to 7 or 8000 men, if he believes he can do it without inconvenience; that Tormasof has a division at Mozyr, and probably two divisions with him, that these two divisions can only be composed of third battalions, as those of Courland, which were overthrown so easily by the Prussians, that 200 Italian horse of the Viceroy's also met four of these battalions, and overthrew them in one charge, that by the general organization of the Russian army, we know that Tormasof ought to have the 27th division, which is a new one, and which would form his real force, but that I believe this 27th division has not yet joined him, and that in such case it is probable he has retained the 9th or 15th division, that it is necessary that he should take every means to ascertain what divisions the enemy has in Volhynia, independently of the third battalions of Tormasof, that we believe that Bagration has passed the Borysthenes with six divisions, this being the case, there will remain at most, in Volhynia, independent of Tormasof's, three battalions; that I therefore desire that he will march rapidly, attack and overthrow the enemy, Kamenskoi and Tormasof, and carry the war into Volhynia, that besides the events which may occur, and the precise information he may acquire on the number of regular divisions of the enemy in Volhynia, will enable me to make known my ulterior intentions.

P. S.—That the general of brigade, whom he will leave at Nieswj, has orders to correspond with head-quarters, and the general commandant at Minsk, to inform them of whatever may occur.

NAPOLEON TO THE MAJOR GENERAL.

Witepsk, 12th *August*, 1812.

My Cousin, write to the Duke of Castiglione, that you do not understand his saying that he has not a single horseman, as he has a fine Saxon regiment of 700 men, which will be furnished him as soon as he needs them, but that at present it is made use of as the guard of the King of Saxony, that he has a regiment of Hanoverian dragoons, already 800 strong, and which will soon be 1600, that as to expeditions of 60,000 men, it is absurd, that the English and Russians have other things to think of, than making descents, that Sweden, if she wished to attempt any thing, would attack Norway, that at all events this power could not spare more than 15,000 men, that it is always necessary for him to inspect the coast, that he review the troops, and make himself acquainted with the localities.

THE MAJOR GENERAL TO NAPOLEON.

Smolensk, 21st *August*, 1812.

Sire, I have the honour to acquaint your majesty that although there are, at present, 600 men employed in interring the bodies, this operation is still far from being finished; it is almost indispensable to accelerate it, to employ the Russian prisoners. I beg your majesty to permit that 200 may be employed; they shall be formed into companies, with officers and subalterns at their head, and guarded in such a manner that none of these prisoners will be able to escape.

NAPOLEON TO THE MAJOR GENERAL.

Smolensk, *August* 24th, 1812.

My Cousin, You will find enclosed an order on the intendant to furnish the Prince of Schwartzenberg a second advance of 500,000 francs. Communicate to the prince my satisfaction at the victory he has gained, that to-morrow I advance on the enemy, who appears to have the intention of taking post twenty leagues from here on the road to Moscow, that I desire that he will take measures that the troops that the enemy has in Volhynia, do not march against me, that I recommend to him to keep them occupied. Write to the same import to General Reynier. Let the Prince of Schwartzenberg know that I have demanded of the Emperor of Austria, that the promotions be made in his corps, and that he will grant them rewards, that on my side I oblige myself to grant them according to the report he will make, that I expect his propositions. Write to the Duke of Tarentum to let him know what has passed, and that I am about advancing. Write also to General St. Cyr; let him know that I am waiting his propositions, in order to grant rewards to his corps, that it appears from the Russian bulletins that Wittgenstein has only two divisions, formed of battalions of reserve, which are only composed of recruits.

NAPOLEON TO THE MAJOR GENERAL.

Dorogobouje, August 26th, 1812.

My Cousin, Write to the Duke of Belluno to go in person to Wilna, to see the Duke of Bassano, and to inform himself on affairs and the state of things, that I shall be the day after to-morrow at Wiazma, that is five days march from Moscow, that a battle will probably take place there, which will conduct us to Moscow, that as it is possible in this state of things, that the communications may be intercepted, some one must take the command, and act according to circumstances, that I have ordered that the 129th regiment, the Illyrian regiment, the Westphalian regiment, which was at Kœnigsberg, and the two Saxon regiments, be directed to Minsk, that I have, besides, posted between Minsk and Mohilow, the division of Dombrouski, 12 battalions strong, and a brigade of light cavalry; that it is important that his corps, should approach Wilna, and that he should direct himself according to circumstances, to be prepared to succour Smolensk, Witepsk, Mohilow, and Minsk, that the division of Dombrouski ought to be sufficient to maintain the communication from Minsk by Orcha to Smolensk, as it has only to keep in check the Russian division of General Hœrtel, which is at Mozyr, 6 or 8000 strong, the most part recruits, and against which Gen. Schwartzenberg also can act, that the new reinforcements I send to Minsk can also assist if they are needed, and that at all events the movement of the Duke of Belluno on Minsk and Orcha, and from thence to Smolensk, appears to me sufficient to maintain the rear, that I have 4000 men in garrison at Witepsk, and as many at Smolensk, that the Duke of Belluno, thus taking post between the Dnieper and the Duna, will be in ready communication with me, can promptly receive my orders, and will find himself enabled to protect the communications from Minsk and Witepsk, as well as those from Smolensk to Moscow, that I suppose that General Gouvion St. Cyr has a sufficient force of the second and sixth corps to keep Wittgenstein in check, and to have nothing to fear, that the Duke of Tarentum can march on Riga to invest that place; finally, I order the four half brigades, forming 9,000 men, which formed part of Lagrange's division, to march to Konow, thus, except General Gouvion St. Cyr is defeated by General Wittgenstein, and obliged to repass the Duna, the Duke of Belluno need not march to his assistance, this case excepted, he will continue in the direction of Smolensk,

THE PRINCE OF NEUFCHATEL AND WAGRAM TO THE DUKE OF BELLUNO.

Slawkowo, 27th August, 9 in the evening.

My Lord,—You have received the order to go to Wilna on leaving Kowno, you ought to march in four columns; make each man at Kowno take 10 *lbs.* of rice, which each soldier will carry in a bag; and you will take care that he uses but an ounce per day. You will take biscuit for six days, independent of all you can convey in your rear in wagons. You will take at Wilna provisions to last till you reach Minsk, and from Minsk to Borisof, and Borisof to Orcha.

From Orcha to Smolensk, your corps must march by divisions, that it may reach it in three days; the cavalry can take the van. Profit by your presence to collect all the provisions possible on the road from Wilna to Minsk and Orcha. The Emperor advancing on Moscow, your corps cannot arrive too soon at Smolensk, in order to keep up our communications, and to act as a reserve.

His majesty gives you the command of all the troops that are in Lithuania, in the government of Mohilow, of Witepsk, and of Smolensk, that you may direct them all, as circumstances may exact, towards the general object, this is to maintain the great communication from Wilna by Minsk and Smolensk, with head-quarters. You will have the following troops in Lithuania; the division of Dombrowski, seven or eight thousand strong, which is employed to manœuvre between Mohilow, Minsk, and Bobruisk; four Illyrian battalions, two battalions of the 129th, with their cannon, two battalions of the 33d light infantry, with their pieces, gone to Smolensk, a battalion of this regiment remained at Minsk. Repeat the order to General Loison for them to march; this will put at your disposal, with the division of Dombrowski, about twenty-four battalions. Four half brigades, which form Lagrange's division, are at Koenigsburg. I have ordered that they go to Kowno, where these conscripts will remain in reserve.

The Polish regiments of cavalry and infantry of Lithuania, as they embody themselves, will remain in garrison at Wilna, and on the other points; many single battalions are at Wilna and Minsk, several detachments are on the roads from Glubokoe and Kamen; as soon as they are re-armed and arranged, send them to Smolensk, except those who belong to the tenth corps of Macdonald, or the second and sixth.

The third battalions of the fourth, seventh, and ninth Polish, ought not to be incorporated with the line as soon as they arrive at Wilna; you will direct them to Minsk, to keep garrison; they will not rejoin the division of Gerard till they are drilled in battalion manœuvres. The three third battalions of the legion of the Vistula will arrive at Smolensk, which will have a garrison of five to six thousand men, there will be as many at Witepsk.

You must observe Bobruisk, until dispositions can be made to take it. You must maintain the communication from Wilna to Smolensk, which the enemy is endeavouring to cut off with his troops, which may escape Schwartzenberg; this is the first object. You must protect the communication from Smolensk to head-quarters, if they are stopped, and advance to the assistance of the army if it is necessary, in order to form its reserve. It is not believed that the communication can be menaced on the Duna. The siege of Riga will necessarily fix the attention of the enemy on the Lower Duna, St. Cyr appears more than sufficient to keep the enemy in check. Yet, in case of unforeseen occurrences this object ought to fix your attention. You must also protect the territory of Witepsk, Smolensk, and Mohilow. We have five depots of cavalry, Kowno, Merezc, Glubokoe, Minsk, Lepel. You will form marching squadrons. Order a general movement of all that are in the rear of the army to Smolensk. You will march to Minsk and Smolensk as soon as possible.

NAPOLEON TO THE MAJOR GENERAL.

Wiazma, August 30th, 1812.

My Cousin,—Order the King of Naples to make an ordinary march to-morrow, but so as to be within eight or nine leagues of Wiazma, and to be the next day at Gjat. It will be proper, in case of necessity, the Viceroy should turn the right of the enemy, and Prince Poniatowski its left, and that the three advanced guards should be so near, as to charge at the same moment; this will spare blood, and put it out of the enemy's power to resist. Order the Viceroy to follow the enemy on the left, and in such a manner as to turn their right; to place himself as high up as the King of Naples, who is at the village of Koslowo, and that to-morrow, the 31st, he make a short march, to bring him within eight or nine leagues from Wiazma. Inform the Viceroy, that with all his cavalry, and a good advanced guard of infantry and artillery, he can turn the right of the enemy, and take a part in the cannonade, if there should be any; this will be the only means to spare blood, and accelerate the retreat of the enemy. Give the same order to Prince Poniatowski on the right; he should turn the left of the enemy. The Prince of Eckmülh will order his march so as to be a league in the rear of the king of Naples, and the Duke of Elchingen two leagues in the rear of the Prince of Eckmülh. The Duke of Treviso will march at ten o'clock in the morning, to reach Fedorowskoe in the rear of the Duke of Elchingen. The duke of Abrantes will repair to Wiazma, will pass the bridges on the right of the city, and take up a position a league in advance.

NAPOLEON TO THE MAJOR GENERAL.

Gjat, September 2, 1812.

My Cousin,—The general staff is of no use to me, nor the provost-marshal, nor the wagon master, nor the officers of the staff, none serve me as they should do. You have received my order of the day for the baggage; take care that the first baggage I order to be burnt is not that of the general staff; if you have no wagon-master name one, and let all the baggage march under his direction. It is impossible for any thing to be in worse order than it now is.

NAPOLEON TO THE MAJOR GENERAL.

Gjat, the 2d September, 1812.

My Cousin, give orders to the King of Naples, to the Prince of Eckmülh, to the Viceroy, to Prince Poniatowski, to the Duke of Elchingen, to take rest to-day, to rally the troops, at three o'clock let the rolls be called, and inform me of the exact number of men fit for action, let the arms, cartridges, artillery, and ambulances, be inspected, and let the soldiers know that we are on the eve of a battle, and that they must be prepared for it.

It is necessary, that before ten o'clock in the evening, I have statements, to inform me of the number of men, infantry and cavalry, the number of pieces of artillery, their calibre, the number of discharges they will be able

to make, the cartridges in the caissons, the number of cartridges per soldier, the number of flying caissons belonging to the regiments, divisions, or to the corps of artillery, the number of surgeons, the number of dressings they will be able to make; these statements must also inform me of detached men, who will not be present at the action, if it takes place to-morrow, but who will be able to join, if it does not occur for two or three days, indicating the place where they are, and means of putting this into effect.

These statements must be made with great attention, as from their result my determination will be made up; they must first comprehend all the men present at the roll calls, and then all those who will be present at the battle.

You will also add, (that I may be informed,) the number of horses which are unshod, and the time it will take to shoe the cavalry, and place them in a state for action.

The King of Naples can, if he thinks proper, change his position, by advancing his light cavalry and his small guard some wersts; Prince Poniatowski and the Viceroy will also alter their position.

NAPOLEON TO THE MAJOR GENERAL.

Mojaisk, 11th September, 1812.

My Cousin, write to the Duke of Belluno, that the 8th Westphalian regiment, the Saxon regiment of Low, that of Rechteu, the 3d regiment of Infantry formed at Koenigsberg, the third battalions of the 4th, 7th, and 9th Polish regiments, the 8th, 9th, 10th, and 11th regiments of cavalry, must all be directed to Smolensk, that the enemy, attacked in his most vital part, does not attend to his extremities; that he is doing every thing to prevent us from entering Moscow, and evinces a resolution to drive us from it as soon as he can. It is, therefore, from Smolensk to Moscow, that the numerous troops in the rear must be brought up, those of the grand duchy of Lithuania being sufficient to protect the rear. It is also necessary that the Duke of Belluno should hold himself in readiness, with his corps united, to advance from Smolensk to Moscow, in order to reinforce the army, according as the enemy reinforces his. Witepsk is in want of none; with the few troops it has, the enemy will not disturb it. I will retain no one there, as soon as my hospital shall be cleared.

The Duke of Belluno must, therefore, direct every thing, squadrons, battalions, artillery, unattached men, to Smolensk, to come from thence to Moscow.

NAPOLEON TO THE MAJOR GENERAL.

Suburb of Moscow, 15th September, 1812.

My Cousin, order the Duke of Dantzick to come with the young guard to the Kremlin, where he will be exclusively charged with the police of that quarter.

General Durosnel will fulfil the duties of governor of the city.

The King of Naples will cause, from the road of Kalomna to the road of Troitzka, to be occupied by Prince Poniatowski and his cavalry.

The Viceroy will establish his head quarters at the barrier of St. Petersburg, and will occupy the road from Troitzka inclusively to that which he has possession of.

The Prince of Eckmülh will intercept all roads, from that in possession of the Viceroy to that of Prince Poniatowski.

The Viceroy and the King of Naples will send out strong parties on the road to St. Petersburg and on that taken by the enemy, in order to obtain news and pick up stragglers.

NAPOLEON TO GENERAL LARIBOISIERE.

Moscow, 18th September, 1812.

General Lariboisiere, I desire that the two companies of the marines of the guard shall each have six pieces of twelve and two howitzers. You will take the pieces from the arsenal at Moscow. The caissons are also to be found in the arsenal at Moscow. The horses and the drivers are to be taken from those attached to the caissons you wish to send back. By this means the reserve of the guard will be augmented 16 pieces of cannon. It is equally necessary to augment the reserve of the Prince of Eckmülh with eight pieces of cannon, six of twelve, and two howitzers, and, if it is necessary, you will have them served by the two Prussian companies, who are now attached to the old guard. The Prince of Eckmülh, having a corps of five divisions, sixteen pieces in reserve are not sufficient. Report to me, that I may be informed, when the reserve of the guard is as great as when it left Paris, and when all that were dismounted at Wilna shall have been sent off. There are 200 small caissons in the arsenal at Moscow. I desire that they may be used; they can be employed with great rapidity in the bad roads, and can be drawn by the horses of the country.

Make a general report to me on my artillery, and on the means of replacing all the losses. My intention is not to lose a single piece, but to preserve my organisation complete, which is not now too strong. Finally, see if it will be possible to establish powder mills at Moscow.

THE PRINCE OF NEUFCHATEL AND WAGRAM TO THE KING OF NAPLES.

Moscow, 22d September, 1822. *4 o'clock in the afternoon.*

Your aid-de-camp has just delivered to the Emperor, your letter of this day, at 5 o'clock in the morning. You will find herewith, a second report from the Duke of Istria. The Emperor expects, with impatience, positive information. The Cossacks have appeared on the Smolensk road, six or seven leagues from this. Thirty of them surprised a convoy of fifteen caissons, which they burnt. His majesty has just dictated to me the enclosed letter for General Sebastiani. It decrees the penalty of death to every officer who shall parley with the enemy's advanced posts, without authority. His majesty wishes that they should not correspond with the enemy, except by their cannon and muskets. I repeat to you, that the Emperor is very impatient to know what to think of the enemy's movements.

THE PRINCE OF NEUFCHATEL AND WAGRAM TO THE DUKE OF ISTRIA.

Moscow, 22d September, 1812. *4 o'clock in the afternoon.*

Marshal, I send you a report from General Sebastiani, just sent by the king, and which states that the enemy will continue his movement on Kalomna. The King of Naples will have arrived at his advance guard; he will attack the enemy briskly; thus in the night we shall have positive information. The Emperor desires, that during the night, you will also send him information of every thing you may learn, and, particularly, news of Prince Poniatowski, and the reports he has made to you of what he has learnt of the Russians. You should know what passed on the road from Mojaisk; but it was nothing more, than forty Cossacks surprising, in a village, fifteen of our caissons, which they blew up. The Emperor has sent out Major Letort, with 250 dragoons, on the road from Mojaisk, where we slept. Major Letort has orders to stop all cavalry on the march, which will speedily give him 1500 to 2000 men, with whom he will protect the road. All the army is ready for a movement, and the Emperor has decided to drive back the enemy behind the Oka. Ulterior information, that will be received during the night, from the King and yourself, will determine the steps that his majesty will pursue, if the army will march upon the road to Tula, or that to Kalomna. If that of Tula be taken, the cavalry that you have, that of the guard, the Poles of Poniatowski, the division of infantry of Frederick, will, from your position, form the advance guard. Send us, above all, information as speedily as possible.

THE PRINCE OF NEUFCHATEL AND WAGRAM TO THE DUKE OF ISTRIA.

Moscow, 23d September, 1812. *4 o'clock in the morning.*

I laid before the Emperor your letter of yesterday, of 11 o'clock in the evening. Consequently, his majesty expects fresh information before putting the army in motion. Prince Poniatowski ought to have arrived early yesterday at Podolsk, and if you have not information of it, it arises from the Cossack scouting parties. The movements you have ordered your cavalry to make, ought infallibly to bring you news of the Poles of Prince Poniatowski. His majesty also expects the reports the King ought to have made yesterday evening, but which cannot arrive till towards 5 or 6 o'clock in the morning, from the advance guard. His majesty approves of all that you propose to do. Clear Desna. The five or six hundred Cossacks, who have infested the road from Mojaisk, have done us much damage; they have blown up fifteen caissons, and taken two squadrons of cavalry, that is, about 200 horses; these squadrons belonged to a column that General Lanusse was bringing up, who imprudently trusted them on his right. They also wished to attack a larger train of artillery, but a brisk fire drove them back. As I informed you, Major Letort marched yesterday to the palace of Prince Gallitzin, on the Mojaisk road, with 200 horse. From the information in your last letter, and that from the King, his majesty has just ordered General St. Sulpice to

set out with all his dragoons, to support Major Letort, if it is necessary; this will probably be superfluous, but is no disadvantage, as the marches you are making by Podolsk and Desna will entirely drive back the Cossacks from the Mojaisk road.

THE PRINCE OF NEUFCHATEL AND WAGRAM TO THE KING OF NAPLES.

Moscow, September 23, 1812—*4 o'clock in the morning.*

Sire,—The Emperor has received your letter of the 22d of September, at eight in the evening. He expects with impatience news from you, as well as from the Duke of Istria. Particular information leads us to believe that the enemy is no longer at Podolsk. If this is true, Prince Poniatowski should have arrived there yesterday evening, and your majesty will know what measures to adopt. The Duke of Istria, on his side, ought to be at Podolsk to-day. Private information also states, that the enemy will have evacuated Desna, and have retreated to Serpuchow and Kalouga. Your majesty should have but one object, that of following with your advance guard the traces of the enemy, &c.

NAPOLEON TO THE MAJOR GENERAL.

Moscow, 23d of September, 1812.

My Cousin, write instantly to Smolensk, to General Baraguay d'Hilliers and the Duke of Abrantes, to inform them that the cavalry and artillery which compose each convoy, must march together, bivouac in square battalion round the convoy, and not separate from it under any pretext whatsoever; that the commander of the convoy must bivouac in the centre—that every commander who shall neglect these instructions, will be punished as negligent, and culpable of the loss of the convoy.

Reiterate the orders, that no convoy must leave Smolensk, without it is commanded by a superior officer, and escorted by 1,500 men, infantry and cavalry, (not comprising in this number, the soldiers of the convoy, whether artillery or engineers, or military equipages) for I see with displeasure that convoys have been sent off without sufficient troops for their escort. In consequence of what I have prescribed, issue an order of the day, as to the manner in which the convoys are to bivouac, and send it to the commanders of the 5th and 6th convoys. Independent of this order of the day, lay before me the orders for the convoys and their escorts—it appears to me that they are very precise on the mode in which convoys are to be guarded—in that case, these orders must be re-printed, in order to send them to all commandants of places, from Kowno to this city.

NAPOLEON TO THE MAJOR GENERAL.

Moscow, 24th September, 1812.

My Cousin, announce to General St. Sulpice, the receipt of his letter; inform him that I attach great inportance, and rely on him to keep the road from Mojaisk to Moscow free—that he must encamp where he is, it being a

central position, and open a communication with the Duke of Abrantes, who is at Mojaisk; that I order him, when couriers shall pass, to send out patroles to protect them—that Colonel Letort will return again under his orders, and that I leave him to keep his troops in detachments, in the place that appears the most suitable, that the occupation of Desna will probably drive back the enemy.

Recommend to him above all, to see that there are patroles sent out to protect the couriers. It will be necessary that he should endeavour to ascertain if there are any detached parties of Cossacks, and to pursue them. I suppose that he will have two or three hundred men at the place where General Lanusse was defeated a few days back, if he has not, let him do it. Colonel Letort will set out to-day or to-morrow, this will always insure a patrol on the road.

THE PRINCE OF NEUFCHATEL AND WAGRAM TO THE DUKE OF ISTRIA.

Moscow, 26th of September, 1812.

Marshal: His majesty expected to receive news of the King of Naples, before sending back to you, your aid-de-camp. We have this moment learnt, that the King arrived yesterday at 5 o'clock, at Podolsk, where he was joined by Prince Poniatowski. You will have been informed of it, and that it will have determined the enemy to evacuate Desna, of which, we trust you are master at this time. Place the corps of Prince Poniatowski and the third corps of cavalry, under the orders of the King. As regards yourself, the Emperor desires that you will take post as a corps of observation, with Colbert's brigade, the light cavalry of the first corps, and the division of infantry, commanded by General Frederich, to march to the assistance of the King of Naples, if it be necessary, and to intercept all roads that the enemy can make use of, to advance on our line of obversation, which may have been overlooked by the King. Another corps of observation, composed of the dragoons of the guard, and 1000 infantry, is at the palace of Prince Gallitzin, where the Emperor slept. General Guyot, with the chasseurs of the guard, two brigades of Bavarian light cavalry, Broussier's division of infantry, and six pieces of cannon, is posted half way from Moscow to the palace of Prince Gallitzin, to be in readiness to march wherever it may be required. The cannonade you heard yesterday morning on your right, was occasioned by an attack, in a reconnaisance of the dragoons of the guard, who were badly led into action by Major Martod, who was taken or killed. We have lost in this pitiful engagement, some dragoons of the guard taken or killed, the major, a captain, an adjutant major, and twenty dragoons wounded; we also lost a few infantry. This badly conducted reconnaisance, was surprised by 3000 of the enemy, who had cannon. Open a communication, if you can do it without inconvenience, with the corps of observation which is on the road from Mojaisk to the palace of Prince Gallitzin. (I have, however, strongly recommended to General St. Sulpice, not to compromise the dragoons of the guard.) The Emperor orders the King of Naples to pursue the enemy, in

order to drive them several days march from Moscow, and to determine him to take up his cantonments beyond the Oder. Keep up a constant correspondence with the King, and send us information of all you learn, until the enemy be driven back. The corps of observation you command is very important.

THE PRINCE OF NEUFCHATEL AND WAGRAM TO THE DUKE OF ISTRIA.

Moscow, 27th of September—7 in the morning.

The Emperor is displeased that you received at your head quarters, the two envoys who brought letters. In future you must not receive any one from the advance posts; the letters that are sent to the prisoners, can be received by the videttes, and the bearers sent back immediately. All parleys with the enemy, turn to our disadvantage, and serve the end of those who propose them. The Emperor thinks that the movement of the enemy has only one object, that of covering Kalouga, and to place himself immediately on the road to Kiow, by which he hopes to receive his reinforcements. The idea of marching to Mojaisk, appears to his majesty as mere boasting—a victorious army, says he, would not consider itself in a proper condition to attempt such an undertaking; how then believe that a conquered one, that has abandoned its fine city, would think of such a movement.

As to the retreat of the enemy to the Kalouga, after the battle, that would have been evidently to invite the French army to march to Moscow. But Kutusof has acted properly, in retreating by Moscow; he threw up entrenchments in several fine positions, and endeavoured to make us believe, that to enter Moscow, we should have another battle. This measure was so good, that if the caissons under Lariboisiere had brought up 20,000 charges for the artillery less, the Emperor must have halted, although the field of battle might be the finest that we have seen, as it would have been impossible to carry redoubts without artillery, and much ammunition.

The Emperor finds what the envoys say, is ridiculous; that they only lost 1000 officers, in a battle where the Russians had 40 general officers killed or wounded, and 40 to 50,000 of their best troops put *hors de combat*. His majesty observes, that the greater part of the officers are from Moscow, and that in all the conversations with them, they have shown a desire that the capital should have been defended; this not having been done, demonstrates the weakness of their army.

The advance guard of our army was wrong in concluding a kind of suspension of hostilities with the advance posts of the Cossacks, it appeared evident to his majesty that the enemy has advanced his cavalry on his left, to do us some injury; the road from Mojaisk may even be intercepted for several days. The enemy has not rested there; he has posted cavalry on all the roads, to be prepared and advised of our movements.

If the enemy remains in position on the Pakhra, the intention of the Emperor is to march and order him battle; but it is expected that he will accept it, as he has no other object than to ascertain if all our army is before him.

The Emperor desires, 1st. That you will detain the two envoys till the King of Naples has passed the Pakhra; then you will send them off in the night, to the advanced posts of the King of Naples, from which they can return to their army. 2d, That you will receive no more envoys, but only the despatches which they may bring; and that you pursue the same conduct as regards the letters you may send. The wish of the Emperor to spare his troops fatigue, leads him to wish not to march the army to dislodge the enemy; let it generally be believed that his majesty is arrived at the head of the whole army.

It will be proper, when you parley with the envoys, that you should tell them that the Emperor was very desirous that their army had marched to Mojaisk, as in such case it would have found itself between two fires.

Warn all the Generals, Labroussaye, Chastel and Girardin, that they must not bring in from the out-posts, either officers or soldiers, who may be sent as envoys; they must merely receive the letters, saying that answers shall be returned.

I have already advised you, that General St. Sulpice was at the palace of the Prince Gallitzin, with the dragoons of the guard; that General Guyot, with the chasseurs of the guard, six pieces of artillery, two brigades of Bavarian cavalry, and Broussier's division of the fourth corps, was in position on the road from Mojaisk, half way from Moscow to the palace of Prince Gallitzin. I order the Viceroy to send General Ornano with 500 horse additional, and 6 pieces of artillery, to reinforce the brigade of Bavarian cavalry, at present with General Guyot, and to take the command of it.

If any unforeseen events occur, you are authorised to write to General Ornano and General Broussier, to advance on the old road from Moscow to Kalouga, beyond you, either to Fredozino or Szarapowo with their cavalry, infantry and artillery. As to General Guyot, the chasseurs of the guard, and his artillery, they must remain in position on the Moscow road, half way to Prince Gallitzin's palace, the same place they at present occupy.

NAPOLEON TO THE MAJOR GENERAL

Moscow, 27th of September, 1812.

My Cousin, General Baraguay d'Hilliers, may dispose of the Polish regiment as he pleases, so many detachments arrive from the rear, that he ought to be enabled to give a severe lesson to the peasants.

THE PRINCE OF NEUFCHATEL AND WAGRAM TO THE KING OF NAPLES.

Moscow, 28th of September, 1812—2 *in the afternoon.*

The Emperor has just received your letter of yesterday, 27th, of nine in the evening. His majesty has ordered the army to hold itself in readiness to march during the night, as it is 2 o'clock, and it will be too late for it to take up the line of march to-day; besides, from this till night, the Emperor will receive your information, and that of the Duke of Istria, and these despatches will determine him as to the necessity of the army's marching. The Duke

of Istria also wrote yesterday, at nine in the evening, from his head quarters, four wersts in the rear of Gorki—thus your majesty cannot be turned by Desna. Your majesty must be aware that his despatches are expected with impatience. The Duke of Istria says also, that the enemy is before him. General Labroussaye is at Batukinka, behind Gorki.

THE PRINCE OF NEUFCHATEL TO GENERAL LARIBOISIERE.

Moscow, October 1, 1812.

Count,—the Emperor has just ordered the following plan for the armament and fortifications of the Kremlin.

ARMAMENT.

The twelve first pieces of cannon to be placed on the Kremlin, must be placed to-day and to-morrow, in the following spots :

1 piece in tower No. 2.
2 - - - 4.
1 - - - 8.

which will protect the river side, 350 toises in length.

1 piece on tower No. 1.
2 - - - 16.
1 - - . 14.

This will protect the opposite side, 420 toises.

The other side of the trapezium is near 500 toises, you will place on it

2 pieces on tower No. 12.
1 - - - 11.
1 - - - 9.

These 12 pieces, howitzers of 12 and 3, can be brought to bear on the whole circumference of the enclosure, and will defend it entirely.

Eighteen other pieces are intended to finish the armament of the Kremlin: you will point out where they are to be placed.

FORTIFICATION.

The most important works to be accomplished at the Kremlin, are

1. Demolish the building which is situated between towers No. 1 and 2.

2. Open four of the five gates, and surround them with a half moon, so that these gates may serve to enter and make sorties from, at the same time they are protected from cannon shot, by the palisades and works in advance of them.

3. Cut through several of the interior walls, that the circuit of the place can be rapidly made.

4. Rebuild the *lunettes* H. K L. joining them to the walls, let them be strongly palisaded, in such a manner that they will bear much artillery.

5. Finish the gates, and establish kind of covered ways, and small on the side of the enclosure, between Towers No. 11 and 8, the parts which appear to be the weakest.

6. Demolish all the buildings, which are around the Kremlin, particularly those which are between Towers No. 14 and 8, and more especially a mosque with several towers.

Concert with the general of engineers, as regards the execution of all that relates to the Emperor's orders.

NAPOLEON TO GENERAL LARIBOISIERE.

Moscow, October 3d, 1822.

Count Lariboisiere,—I visited yesterday the work-shops. I saw but little activity or energy; all the information we have procured leads us to believe that the enemy had a hundred thousand bullets belonging to this park, and they are supposed to be thrown into the water. It being a pond, it will be easy to drain it. You must, therefore, work actively at a ditch for this purpose, and recover these sunken balls. There has, in the fifteen days we have been here, only been made ten thousand bullet cartridges. I desire that the day after to-morrow you will make your arrangements for completing six thousand cannon cartridges a day, which you will store in the Kremlin as fast as they are made. Independent of a supply and a half, attached to the corps d'armée you must have in reserve half a supply in readiness. I was surprised not to find there any of the superior officers of the park. I saw two hundred small Russian caissons; do you mean to use them or not? in case they are not used for the artillery, they can be used to transport ammunition. Prince Poniatowski complains of having a hundred caissons too many, and having a larger supply of ammunition than is necessary. I desire to know what number of pieces he has, and what ammunition. It appears that he wants to get rid of a hundred full caissons. On this I pray to God to have you in his holy keeping.

THE PRINCE OF NEUFCHATEL AND WAGRAM TO HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF NAPLES.

Moscow, October 4th, half past four in the morning.

His Majesty would have wished, that the horses taken from the carriages following the cavalry had been used to draw the caissons which have been left behind, his majesty having more occasion for artillery than for wagons for the troops. The Emperor has granted the wishes of the fifth corps—he has seen with pleasure the good conduct of the Poles. His majesty has received your letter of the 2nd of October, at nine o'clock at night; he is pleased to find that you have occupied Woronowo. As you announce your intention to write on the morning of the 3d, the Emperor awaits your letter to answer it His majesty having determined to send one of his aid-de-camps to the Russian commander in chief, desires that you will have a letter written by the chief of your staff, to the general commanding the advanced guard of the enemy, in these terms.—"The Emperor having determined to send one of his aids-de-camp general to the general in chief Kutusof, it is desired to know the day, the hour, and the place where this general will receive him." This letter must be addressed to the commander of the Russian advanced guard, and a receipt must be required. As is proper, Sire, the Emperor leaves to you the choice of the time to take this step, that it may be done at a favourable moment, and not in any way have the appearance of being induced by circumstances. The aid-de-camp that his majesty intends sending, will probably arrive this night at your head quarters.

NAPOLEON TO THE MAJOR GENERAL.

Moscow, October 5, 1812.

My Cousin,—The accounts of the intendant general appear to me to be wrong. I can scarcely believe, that it will require forty-five days to remove the wounded from Mojaisk and the convent of Gjatz; for I will only remark, that if nothing is done during these forty-five days, some must die, and some recover; therefore, it can only be the remainder that are to be removed, and experience has proved, that three months after a battle, only a sixth part of those wounded remain. Thus, reckoning six thousand wounded, there would only be at the end of three months, one thousand to remove. It is my determination to remain master of my line of operations, and to remove the wounded, &c. &c.

NAPOLEON TO THE MAJOR GENERAL.

Moscow, October 6, 1812.

My Cousin,—Make known to the Duke of Belluno, that I have not yet given the orders for his movement, because it must depend on the motions of the enemy; that the Russian army of Moldavia, of three divisions, or 20,000 men, infantry, cavalry, and artillery together, passed the Dneiper on the first days of September; that its object may be Moscow, to reinforce the army of Kutusof, or Volhynia, to reinforce that of Tormasoff. The army of Kutusof, beaten at the battle of Moskowa, is now at Kalouga, which induces a belief, that they expect reinforcements may come to them from Moldavia, by the road of Kiow; that in this event, the Duke of Belluno will receive orders to join the grand army, either by the route of Jelnia and Kalouga, or in some other way; if, on the contrary, the 20,000 men from Moldavia are gone to sustain Tormasoff, this reinforcement will make him 40,000 strong; but that our right, commanded by Prince Schwartzenberg, will be of equal force, since this Prince, with the Austrians, Poles, and Saxons, has about 40,000 men: besides, I have demanded of the Emperor of Austria, that the corps commanded by the Austrian general Reuss, at Lemberg, should be ordered to march, and that Prince Swartzenberg should receive a reinforcement of 10,000 men; on the other side, the Emperor Alexander is reinforcing, as fast as possible, the garrison of Riga, and the corps of Wittgenstein, to drive St. Cyr from Polosk, and the Duke of Tarentum from Riga and Dunaberg; that letters received from Prince Swartzenberg, dated the 24th of September, induce a belief that the army at Moldavia, instead of marching on Moscow, has joined the army of Tormasoff, and reinforced it; it is therefore necessary to know, what are their intentions; that in this state of things, I order the Duke of Belluno to post his troops from Smolensk to Orcha; that he will keep up a constant correspondence by all his couriers with the Duke of Bassano; that this minister may write and give him all the news that he may learn from the different points; that he places a sensible, discreet, and intelligent officer near Prince Schwartzenberg, and General Reynier; that this officer may learn from the prince and

General Reynier, what is passing, and the true state of things; that he maintain a regular correspondence with the Governor of Minsk; and, finally, to send agents in different directions to learn what is passing; that the division of Girard shall be posted on the side of Orcha, at the distance of four or five marches from Minsk, three from Witepsk, and four or five from Polosk: that the other division, which will be between Orcha and Smolensk, may easily support it, and that the third division must be stationed near Smolensk; by this arrangement his troops can rest, and readily procure provisions; they must all be placed at the upper side of the road, to leave the communication open for other troops which may arrive, that this position will enable them either to march on Minsk or Wilna, if the centre of our communications and depots are threatened, or Marshal St. Cyr is driven from Polosk, or to execute orders he may receive, to come to Moscow by the route of Jelnia and Kalouga; or, if the capture of Moscow, and the new state of things, have decided the enemy to reinforce itself with a part of the troops from Moldavia; thus the Duke of Belluno will form the general reserve, either to succour Marshal St. Cyr, or to cover Wilna, or to succour Prince Schwartzenberg, and cover Minsk, or march to Moscow to reinforce the grand army; that General Dombrowski, who has a division of eight thousand infantry, and twelve hundred Polish horse, under his command, which will make his corps of four divisions; that the brigade of reserve at Wilna, composed of four regiments of Westphalians, two battalions of Hesse Darmstadt, who will arrive at the end of this month from Swedish Pomerania, together with eight pieces of cannon, will also be under his orders; finally, in the course of November, two new divisions will unite, one at Warsaw, this is the thirty-second division, which will be augmented by three battalions from Wurtzburg, and will remain under the command of General Durotte; the other at Kœningsberg, this is the thirty-fourth division, which was in Pomerania, under the command of General Morand, which also augmented by some battalions, will be equally under the command of General Loison. Thus, whether to march to the support of Prince Schwartzenberg, or to succour General St. Cyr, the Duke of Belluno can always unite a mass of forty-thousand men, to which, as correspondence by express is rapid, I shall always be able to give orders; it must only be in case that Minsk or Wilna are threatened that the Duke of Belluno, should march on his own authority to cover the grand depots of the army. The Duke of Belluno having the general command of Lithuania, over the Governors of Smolensk and Witepsk, should urge activity to the administration, and above all, take the necessary measures that the requisitions in forage and grain are brought in; that there are ovens in Mohilow, Orcha, Rasasna, and Dubrowna; that plenty of biscuit must be made, and must place himself in such a situation, as to have thirty days' provision certain, for his troops, without taking any thing from the military stores, or the convoys which may arrive from the army. The Duke of Belluno will take care to keep up a correspondence with Witepsk, and he must judge, whether or not to send troops to support and maintain this point. He can personally inspect the ground, and make the administration of Mohilow, Witepsk, and Smolensk, exert themselves. If, by any accident the communication with Moscow should be cut off, he will

take care to send cavalry and infantry to open it. His head-quarters must be at Smolensk.

NAPOLEON TO THE MAJOR GENERAL.

Moscow, 6th October, 1812.

My Cousin, the Duke of Treviso demands provisions for the police department, also for the foundlings and the Russians who are in the hospitals, for the inhabitants who are sick, &c. All these demands are proper, but it is impossible to comply with them. The Russian municipality must form a Russian company, who will go by detachments to the villages and take provisions, but paying for them. The intendant general will grant the necessary money, out of the funds I have placed at his disposal; we will furnish to the municipality a magazine, which shall be appropriated for the city, and stocked as I have just mentioned. This company may be called the company of the police, and if it succeeds, two or three similar to it can be formed, who shall scour the environs and bring in, but paying for them, all that is necessary for the inhabitants, and above all, for the hospitals; this is the only method to supply them all; speak of it to the Sieur Lesseps, and let no time be lost.

NAPOLEON TO THE MAJOR GENERAL.

Moscow, 6th October, 1812.

My Cousin, having provided men sufficient for the Duke of Abrantes and General Baraguay d'Hilliers, to render them masters of the whole surrounding country, my intention is, that the consequences shall follow. Order, on his responsibility, the Duke of Abrantes to send all the wounded to Wiazma, and General Baraguay d'Hilliers to transport them from Wiazma to Smolensk. For this purpose, the Duke of Abrantes and General Baraguay d'Hilliers will scour the country for ten leagues round, and collect a sufficient number of wagons to effect the above purpose, the military wagons which may arrive at Mojaisk, may also be employed, provided they are loaded with flour only, and not with clothing and hospitals stores. The flour is to be used for the hospitals, and for daily rations, and the wagons are to assist in the transportation of the wounded from Mojaisk, Ruza, and the Abbey, to Wiazma.

Thus, the orders to retain the military store wagons, should only be given to the Duke of Abrantes, and to the Adjutant commandant Simonin, who commands at the Abbey; these are to employ the wagons to Wiazma, and afterwards send them empty from Wiazma to Moscow. Let the intendant know of these changes, which will modify the orders he has given. Finally, whatever may take place, my will is, that in 8 days from this, there shall not be a wounded man at Ruza, at the Abbey, at Mojaisk, or at Gjatz; inform the generals, that this is of the greatest importance.

NAPOLEON TO THE MAJOR GENERAL.

Moscow, 6th October, 1812.

My Cousin, write to the Duke of Belluno, that hereafter, my will is, that the regiments formed of unattached men, either at Koenigsberg, or Witepsk, shall not be intrusted with escorting convoys of artillery. These convoys

ought to be escorted by the battalions, or parts of battalions, that are well organized.

NAPOLEON TO THE MAJOR GENERAL.

Moscow, 6th October, 1812.

My Cousin, inform General Baraguay d'Hilliers, of all the dispositions which regard the organization of the ninth corps, and the position he must maintain. Let him know that I agree willingly to the demand he has made, to have a strong corps at Wiazma, one at Gjatz, and another at Dorogobouje, that in consequence, I order him to retain the following troops, which you will tell the commandant of Gjatz, not to permit to pass that city, and to the Duke of Abrantes, not to permit to pass Mojaisk, if they have not already passed these points.

NAPOLEON TO THE MAJOR GENERAL.

My Cousin, the route from Smolensk to Mojaisk being worn out, it will be proper for you to write to General Baraguay d'Hilliers, to order the commandants of Dorogobouje, Gjatz, Wiazma, &c. to lay out two roads parallel to it, two or three leagues to the right, where he will have resources, as the detachments arriving by these roads, touch at Dorogobouje, Wiazma, and Mojaisk, but leave the main road to search for others, where there are villages and shelter.

NAPOLEON TO THE MAJOR GENERAL.

Moscow, 10th October, 1812.

My Cousin, write to the Duke of Belluno, that my will is, that on the receipt of the present order, the detachments of cavalry, infantry, artillery, military equipages, convoys of artillery, clothing, &c. shall be detained at Smolensk, so that no more shall arrive by the road from Wiazma, and Mojaisk, which is destroyed: generals and officers, who are coming to the army to take their commands, must also halt at Smolensk, except those who are specially ordered on.

There must be formed at Smolensk, a division of 12,000 infantry, and 4000 cavalry at least, to whom must be allotted five or six hundred caissons, military equipages, convoys of clothing, and artillery, among which must be at least twelve pieces of cannon for their defence; they are to be commanded by a general of division, three generals of brigade for the infantry, and three generals or colonels of cavalry. This division, consisting of 16 to 18,000 men, must take provisions at Smolensk for ten days, and hold themselves in readiness to march, not by the old road from Wiazma, which is destroyed, but by a new route, which I will designate.

By this means, nothing more will arrive by the old road, neither convoys of artillery, military equipages, clothing, nor detachments of infantry or cavalry, but only couriers, the mail for the army, some officers of the general staff on service, and a few necessary articles, such as five hundred hand mills expected from Paris, the first convoy of which ought to have arrived at

Smolensk. This road will also be open for the wounded from the hospitals, and for the detachments going from the army to Smolensk, but nothing must pass by it from Smolensk to Moscow. Thus, order can again be established on this road, and I shall not be under apprehensions of the detachments of infantry or cavalry coming to the army, suffering in their march. Every month a convoy is to be sent off by the new route, for, except at the spot occupied by the enemy, 6000 men can traverse it without danger.

Draw out the list of the first column, according to the information you have received from Smolensk, and let me know when it will be ready to march. I already know that it has, 1st. Three half brigades forming 6,000 men; 2d. the 4th, 5th, and 6th regiments of infantry formed at Konigsberg, making about 6,000 men; 3d. two battalions, formed of men from the hospitals of Witepsk and Smolensk, who may be estimated at 2,000.

Independent of these, I will see if it will be proper to add to it two battalions of the 129th, and of the Illyrian regiment. This corps, with the detachments of all kinds of troops which may arrive at Smolensk, ought to form above 13,000 infantry. As to the cavalry, the artillery and military equipages, I have not at present the details. There will be a sufficient number of generals of divisions and brigades to command this corps.

General Baraguay d'Hilliers appears out of place at Wiasma, send there general of brigade, Charriere, formerly colonel of the 57th, who, being active and zealous, will be proper for that post, he will have a colonel or adjutant-commandant at Ojatz under his orders.

You may order General Baraguay d'Hilliers to Smolensk, to take command of the division which is forming there.

NAPOLEON TO GENERAL LARIBOSIERE.

Moscow, October 11th, 1812.

General. I order that the 13 companies of artillery which are at Erfurt, Magdeburg, Spandeau, Glogau, Custrin, Stettin, Stralsund, Thorn, Dantzick, Pillau, and Kowno, rejoin the army as soon as they are relieved by the 22 companies that I have ordered from the interior of France; by this you will have these 22 companies about to march, and the 13 companies which are in garrison, and you will dispose of them in the following manner: Three companies for the guard, one for the third corps, four for the 32d and 34th divisions of infantry, two for the 28th division, two for the battery of reserve attached to the ninth corps, two to be sent to Wilna, one to Minsk, three to Smolensk, this will make 18 companies, the remainder will serve for the general park and supply all deficiencies.

THE PRINCE OF NEUFCHATEL AND WAGRAM TO THE KING OF NAPLES.

Moscow, October 13th, 1812, 2 *in the morning.*

The Emperor, from your reports, and from the information that has been sent him, thinks that the position of Woronowo is good and commanding, and can be defended by the infantry, which will easily cover the cavalry. If you are of the same opinion, you are authorised to take up that position.

The Emperor sent off his horses this evening, and the day after to-morrow the army will arrive with you, to advance on the enemy and drive them back. It will require three days for the army to reach you, hence you will be obliged to remain five or six days, but if you fear that the enemy will attack you, or that the nature of things renders it impossible for you to avoid the losses you have experienced for eight days past, you have the resource of taking post at Woronowo. All the wagons that you have sent are loaded with provisions, those which arrived this evening will also be despatched to-morrow. The Emperor is very desirous that things should be so arranged, that your army should no longer experience the losses it has hitherto done. Cannot you make the commanders of corps responsible?

THE PRINCE OF NEUFCHATEL AND WAGRAM TO THE KING OF NAPLES.

Moscow, October 14th, 1812, 10 *in the evening.*

The Emperor received your letter of yesterday at noon, the movement on Borousk appears to the Emperor a difficult one, if the enemy be advised of it, since you present him your flank for a whole day. Prince Poniatowski has to-day sent 100 sick to Moscow, they will be transported to Mojaisk.

The Emperor is sending off his wounded to Smolensk, at the same time that he is fortifying the Kremlin, in order to have no embarrassments in Moscow. Send to Mojaisk the sick and wounded, and any others that may be in the way, forming them into a convoy. Reconnoitre well the road which will take you to Mojaisk, that if you are obliged to retreat before the enemy, you may be perfectly conversant with the route. The Emperor supposes, that your baggage, your park of artillery, and the greatest part of your infantry, may retreat before the enemy is apprised of it.

Is it true, that in repassing the defile of Woronowo, your cavalry can be covered by your infantry, and in a position less fatiguing than that in which it would be in a level country, where it is obliged always to be on the alert? At all events, it is very important to procure several days' provisions for your troops; there is at Moscow 1,000 quintals of flour and much brandy at your disposal; order all the wagons that you have at command to come for these articles. The Duke of Elchingen and a part of the Viceroy's corps are not yet arrived, added to which, the Emperor before putting the army in motion, wishes to feel assured that there will be no confusion in Moscow.

NAPOLEON TO THE MAJOR GENERAL.

Moscow, 16th *October*, 1812.

My Cousin, repeat the order to the Duke of Belluno, that the artillery send horses to Wiazma, to recover the caissons and carriages belonging to the artillery, which have been abandoned on the road, and to convey them to Smolensk.

NAPOLEON TO THE MAJOR GENERAL.

Moscow, 18th *October*, 1812.

My Cousin, let the Duke of Treviso know, that I set out with the army to-morrow in pursuit of the enemy, that my will is that the Duke of Treviso takes up his quarters at the Kremlin with the following troops.

1. Laborde's division.
2. General Charrier's brigade, composed of 4 battalions of dismounted cavalry, about 4,000 strong.
3. Two companies of sappers.
4. One company of artillery.
5. Artillery of Laborde's division.

Finally, one brigade of cavalry 500 strong. With this force the Duke of Treviso can guard the city, but using proper precautions. The intendant will leave a director, several commissaries of war, and chiefs of his department. The general of engineers will leave a superior officer in command. The general of artillery will leave a superior and several other officers of artillery. The Duke of Treviso must labour with the greatest activity in arming the Kremlin, and will place the pieces he finds there in batttery; he will construct a small breastwork on the level ground; and place in it 4 field pieces, to enable him to command the stone bridge, he must keep a strong force at the convent of the Prince Echmülh, the position of which is important as it commands the bridge over the Moskwa. All the sick which are here must be taken to the Foundling hospital, there are about 3 or 400, they must therefore be guarded by a strong force. The magazine of brandy near the stone bridge must also be protected by a strong detachment. All the magazines which are distant, the Duke of Treviso must have removed to the Kremlin. The commandant of the place and the intendant may continue to lodge in the governor's quarters, and that occupied by the Duke of Treviso near the Kremlin. The generals, superior officers, the superior officers of the administration who remain must lodge in the Kremlin. The Duke of Treviso will see if the convent of Marshal Ney requires a guard. It would be useful to guard with a detachment the prison entrenched by the Viceroy on the Petersburgh road. As for the other places he will guard them if necessary, always giving the preference to those nearest the Kremlin.

To-morrow when the army shall have marched, he will cause a proclamation to be made through the municipality, to announce to the inhabitants that the rumours of an evacuation are false, that the army is advancing on Kolouga, Tula and Briansk, to take possession of these important places, and of the factories of arms which are situated there; to engage the inhabitants to preserve the police of the city, and to prevent the enemy from accomplishing the ruin of the city. He will commence the works on the Kremlin to-morrow, and take care that they be pursued with the greatest activity; he will send out strong patrols through the city, particularly one the side of the Mojaisk and Kalouga gates, in order to protect all convoys or regiments that may be on the road from Mojaisk to this place. Roguet's division will remain here all to-morrow, it must march to-morrow evening escorting the treasure and the staff of the intendant general. The Duke of Treviso must keep up a severe police, he must shoot every Russian soldier found in the streets, and give orders to all those who are in the hospitals not to leave them. He must not place weak posts in any spot, to avoid any danger from the malevolence of the peasants, or attacks from the Cossacks. Finally, the Duke of Treviso must collect all the provisions possible, he must have a great quantity of biscuit

made, he must insure himself provisions for a month at least, in flour, potatoes, sour-crout, brandy, &c. He must keep these provisions for urgent circumstances, grinding in all the mills to supply the daily consumption. Take care to give the Duke of Treviso a cipher, that the correspondence with him may be free and certain.

NAPOLEON TO GENERAL LARIBOSIERE.

18th *October*, 1812.

General, I fix my head-quarters to-night at the Kalouga gate, where all the army will bivouack. To-morrow I shall commence the march in search of the enemy.

The Duke of Treviso, with 10,000 men, will remain in the city, and under all circumstances will defend the Kremlin. It is therefore necessary, that all the caissons, and carriages of every description, must be collected to-morrow morning at the Kremlin. It is possible I may return to Moscow: therefore, nothing of value must be destroyed, such as powder, musket and cannon cartridges, lead to make balls; but the saltpetre and sulphur may be burnt, I have a sufficiency of powder; the store houses and magazines which are around the city may also be burnt. The Russian caissons and other materials which cannot be transported to the Kremlin, must be burnt to-morrow at eight in the morning with the sulphur and saltpetre.

The Duke of Treviso commands at Moscow. A superior officer of artillery, with some magazine keepers, must be left there; also, a company of artillery for the service of the pickets which act as a rampart, and four officers of artillery attached to the Kremlin for that important service.

It is necessary to have as many caissons as possible with the army, wherefore the 400 horses belonging to the bridge equipages, must be attached to the caissons we have, and follow the army. The general in chief's staff will set out to-morrow under escort of a division of infantry.

Write to the Duke of Treviso, to let him know of the colonel, officers, and company of artillery you leave him, and all the details relative to the artillery in the Kremlin. The company of artillery must be employed to-morrow and the next day in strengthening the defences of the Kremlin, charging obuses, bombs, and grenades, and taking every measure which may insure the defence of that place.

The officers of artillery charged with blowing up the Kremlin, when it will be time, will remain at that place.

NAPOLEON TO THE MAJOR GENERAL.

Krasnow Pachra, 21st *October*, 1812.

My Cousin, Let the Duke of Treviso know, that as soon as his operations at Moscow shall have been finished, that is, on the 23d, at 3 in the morning, he must commence his march, and arrive at Kubinshoe on the 24th, that from that place, instead of going to Mojaisk, he must direct his march on Wereia, where he must arrive the 25th. He will thus act intermediately between Mojaisk, where the Duke of Abrantes is, and Borosk, where the army will be;

he had better send officers to Fominskoe, to give information as to his march. He must take with him the adjutant commandant, Bourmont, the Bavarians, and the Spaniards who are at the palace of Galitzin, all the Westphalians from the first and second posts, unite them, and send them to Mojaisk. If they are not in sufficient numbers, they must be protected by cavalry. The Duke of Treviso will instruct the Duke of Abrantes on every thing relative to the evacuation of Moscow. It is necessary that he should write to us to-morrow, the 22d, not by the route of Désna, but by that of Szarapowo and Fominskoe. The 23d he must write by the route of Mojaisk. His officer must leave the road from Kubinskoe, to arrive at Fominskoe ; head-quarters will probably be at Borousk, or Fominskoe, on the 23d. Whether the Duke of Treviso begins his operations to-morrow, the 22d, at 3 in the morning, or on the 23d, at the same hour, as I afterwards ordered him, he must pursue the same course. By this means the Duke of Treviso will be considered as the rear guard of the army.

I cannot too strongly recommend to him to place the men who remain in the hospitals, on the wagons of the young guard, on those of the dismounted cavalry, and upon all he can find ; for as the Romans gave civic crowns to those who saved their fellow citizens, the Duke of Treviso will merit one, if he shall save soldiers; that he must mount them upon his horses, and those of all his officers, that it was thus the Emperor acted at St. Jean d'Acre, that he ought to adopt this measure the more, as the moment the convoy shall have rejoined the army, wagons and horses will be allotted to them, which the consumption of the load of provisions will have rendered useless, that the Emperor hopes that he will have the satisfaction of testifying to the Duke of Treviso his gratitude for having saved for him 500 men, that he must, of course, commence with the officers, then the subalterns, preferring the French, that he must assemble all the generals and officers under his command, to make them sensible of the importance of this measure, and how much they will merit from the Emperor by having saved him 500 men.

NAPOLEON TO THE MAJOR GENERAL.

Fominskoe, 23d *October*, 1812.

My Cousin, Write to the Prince Poniatowski, that all the marching regiments of infantry, cavalry, the batteries of artillery, and other matters, that the Duke of Abrantes will send to Wereia, will be under his command, and that when he receives the order to march he will leave nothing behind him, but carry every thing with him until he rejoins the army. Let him also know that he must not send his sick and wounded to Mojaisk, which would impede this route, already too much encumbered, that he had better keep them with him.

Write to General Teste, who commands at Wiazma, and send your letter by the officer whom you will send to Prince Poniatowski, who will forward it to the Duke of Abrantes to transmit; in this letter you will inform General Teste of the intention of the Emperor that General Evers, with a column of from three to four thousand men, infantry, cavalry, and artillery, selecting especially the marching regiments, who are going to rejoin the army, should di-

rect his march from Wiazma upon Jukhnow, eighteen leagues from Wiazma, and from thence push his posts on, to the intersection of the roads to Znamanskoe. The general will carry with him the couriers who shall have arrived from Smolensk; he will place at each post, that is to say, at Sosowa, Trofimowa, and Andriewka, detachments of infantry of a hundred men, and a picket of cavalry, under the orders of the commandant of the place, who will entrench themselves in the houses to avoid the attacks of the Cossacks and peasants. Order General Teste to write to Smolensk to give information that the army is directing its march on Kalouga, and from thence will take up its line of operations on Jelnia. Give orders to General Teste to retain all the expresses which may be passing from Wiazma to Juhknow, where it is probable the junction will soon be made, that is to say, from the 25th to the 27th.

NAPOLEON TO THE MAJOR GENERAL.

Borosk, 24th *October*, 1812.

My Cousin, Write to the Duke of Belluno, in cipher, because he cannot receive the letter before the 26th, and then he will have seen General Nansouty. Let him know that being still without couriers, I do not know the late situation of affairs on his side; that I am ignorant if events have forced him to make a movement, that in case he has not, and that the division of Girard is disposable, as well as the light cavalry, I desire that he may immediately march with his troops towards Jelnia, and push them on the road to Kalouga, to meet the army, for the purpose of forming our junction, if they can begin their march on the 26th, they may by the 30th be within five marches of Kalouga, where I shall establish my line of operations, first by Wiazma, Jukhnow, and Znamenskoe, until we form a junction with him; then I shall establish it by Smolensk and Jelnia; in thus overrunning these forty leagues, he must be careful to organize this part of his route, by placing at each post a commandant, a detachment of an hundred men, and a relay to serve as couriers; but this must not interfere in any way with his decision, should any unexpected event arise.

Explain clearly to the Duke of Belluno that the army has united at Borosk; that Moscow has been evacuated after blowing up the Kremlin, and that the army is advancing on Kalouga; that the province of Kalouga is one of the most abundant in Russia, and that in fact we have here plenty of every thing.

THE PRINCE OF NEUFCHATEL AND WAGRAM TO GENERAL CHARPENTIER.

Wiazma, November 1st, 1812.

The Emperor orders, General, that you send an officer of your staff to Marshal St. Cyr and the Duke of Belluno, to inform them that the army, which is now, the 1st of November, at Wiazma, will be, the 3d, at Dorogobouje; that we expect with impatience to hear from them; his Majesty supposes that the Duke of Belluno will have already taken an offensive position, and driven the enemy from Polotzk. You will also send an officer to the governor of Mohilow to inform him of the movement of the army; you will

add that this is a voluntary movement, that it is a manœuvre to enable us to reach the armies which form our wings; that since our departure from the environs of Moscow, we have no intelligence of the enemy, except through some Cossacks. Order him, from me, to forward as much provision as possible to Smolensk.

Make known, also, the movements of the army, and the motives of them, to the governor of Witepsk; order him to have a great deal of bread prepared, because part of the army must be provisioned there. Make known to General Baraguay d'Hilliers the movements of the army, &c. &c. I have before told you that this general must not commit himself; renew to him, from me, this advice.

Inform the governor of Minsk that the army is manœuvring to approach a hundred leagues nearer to its wings, with the object of reaching Poland, and a friendly country. Send me by to-morrow night, or on the 3d, in the morning, to Dorogobouje, a statement of the amount of provisions, grain, flour, &c. artillery, harnessed or unharnessed, and of the munitions of every kind to be found in Smolensk. Let me know, in all its details, the news, direct or indirect, that you can obtain of the movements of the Duke of Belluno, General St. Cyr, and Prince Schwartzenberg.

NAPOLEON TO THE MAJOR GENERAL.

Wiazma, November 2d, 1812.

My Cousin, Write to the Duke of Reggio, that I have learnt with a lively satisfaction, that his wound is healed, and that he was in a state to re-enter the service; it is, therefore, my desire that he returns to the command of the second corps. Inform the Duke of Belluno that I am acquainted with the events in Polotzk, and his march on that quarter, that I hope Wittgenstein is repulsed, and that he has regained Polotzk. Write to him in cipher that the army is in march, as I have already informed him; that the winter is too long for me to pass it at a distance from my flanks; that it is possible I shall place my right on the Duna, and my left on the Borysthenes, and by this means we shall find ourselves in contact.

THE PRINCE OF NEUFCHATEL AND WAGRAM TO THE DUKE OF BELLUNO.

Mikalewka, November 6th, 1812.

Duke of Belluno, I have just placed before his majesty, the Emperor, your letter of the 2d of November, which reached me this moment by express. His majesty cannot conceive why, after uniting to your troops the second corps d'armee, you did not take the offensive vigorously. By halting before the enemy, you have risked losing every thing, from the superiority of his light cavalry, enabling him to cut off our communications. The Emperor orders you to march on General Wittgenstein, and drive him over the Duna, to retake Polotzk, and force Wittgenstein to abandon this bank. The Emperor will be at Smolensk the day after to-morrow, announce to him your victory, which is undoubted, with the troops you have.

PRINCE OF NEUFCHATEL AND WAGRAM TO THE DUKE OF BELLUNO.

Mikalewka, November 7th, 1812.

I have placed before the eyes of the Emperor your letter of the 2d.—As the army will be at Smolensk to-morrow, it is necessary that you should manœuvre,

1st, To drive the enemy beyond the Duna.

2d, To maintain a constant communication with the Emperor and the army. You must be sensible of the importance and necessity of this.

THE PRINCE OF NEUFCHATEL AND WAGRAM TO THE DUKE OF BELLUNO.

Smolensk, November 9th, 1812—*at night.*

Duke of Belluno, I received your letter of the 4th, at Smolensk. I placed it before the Emperor; his majesty has seen with regret that you were uncertain of marching. This uncertainty has already been injurious. I informed your adjutant commandant Albignac, that it was the intention of the Emperor that you should march direct to the enemy, in the direction of Polotzk—and that you should drive him beyond the Duna. The greatest part of Wittgenstein's troops are militia, who have not been six weeks drilled. His majesty expects to hear from you. Let us know who occupies Beszenkhowiczi and Ula. You have not a moment to lose in marching on the enemy, and it is highly important that you do so. Your principal instructions were to defend Minsk and Wilna, in which are the magazines of the army; this also is very important. Two couriers to the Emperor are missing, which arises from the retrograde movement you made towards Senno, and which has uncovered the whole of the country to the enemy.

THE PRINCE OF NEUFCHATEL AND WAGRAM TO THE DUKE OF BELLUNO.

Smolensk, 11th of November, 1812.

Marshal: Adjutant commandant d'Albignac, carried you the orders of the Emperor, under date of the 7th of November, an officer of the staff of General Charpentier, took them in duplicate the 9th. Your aid-de-camp, Colonel Chatean, has this moment arrived and handed me your letter of the 9th. His majesty has seen with pleasure the advantages that your advance guard have obtained over the enemy, in the affair of posts, and on your report, has named General Fourrier a general of division. This mark of the Emperor's good will, ought to stimulate him to merit others, in the battle which will take place soon. His majesty is about to march with a part of the army to Orcha, but this movement can only take place slowly. It becomes the more urgent that you should attack Wittgenstein; if this general has fixed his camp in an advantageous position, where it will be difficult to give him battle, it is easy for you to manœuvre in such a manner, as to cut off his retreat and his communications on the Duna. You must give up the idea that Wittgenstein will

not permit himself to be cut off from that river. With the troops you have, the Emperor is not doubtful of your success; it will be of the greatest importance, if it takes place speedily, it will enable the Emperor to occupy Witepsk, and to take up winter quarters, between that city, Orcha and Mohilow, and along the Duna to Polotzk. Winter quarters thus established, ought to give us peace in the course of the winter, or prepare us for certain success in the next campaign, in openly menacing St. Petersburg. If, on the contrary, you are tardy in attacking Wittgenstein, General Kutusof, will have time to unite with that general at Witepsk, and then we cannot dislodge them from that position but by a general battle, which cannot be undertaken this winter; we would therefore be obliged to take up winter quarters, in leaving the Duna and a part of Lithuania to the enemy, and hence in the next campaign, the enemy will be placed in a better military position than we. You perceive, Marshal, the consequences of these dispositions.

The grand armies, both French and Russian, are fatigued—they may take positions by marching, but neither the one nor the other is in a condition to enter into a great battle for the advantage of a post. Your army, on the contrary, and that of General Wittgenstein, are under the necessity of engaging before going into winter quarters—the sooner the better. The victory will be complete for you, if you oblige Wittgenstein to repass the Duna, and that a French corps can occupy Witepsk. If your corps is beaten, which is not probable from the organisation of Wittgenstein's corps, composed in part of recruits, then his majesty will resolve on his winter quarters. Wittgenstein has every thing to gain by remaining in position, and you every thing to lose. Communicate this letter to the Duke of Reggio, and concert together on giving battle, which will be of the greatest importance as regards future operations. The Emperor, Marshal, trusts to your fidelity, your zeal, and your talents, in a circumstance where your success over the enemy is of so great importance, as regards the winter quarters of the armies, and the advantage of operations in the next campaign.

NAPOLEON TO THE MAJOR GENERAL.

Smolensk, 14th November, 1812.

My Cousin, write to the Duke of Elchingen, that I am going to Krasnow—that it is necessary that he should continue to form the rear guard—that the Prince of Eckmülh will support him—that he ought to remain in the position he at present occupies, all to-day—that to-morrow the 15th, he will take post at the convent and suburb; and that on the 16th, he will blow up the city on leaving it, or he must simply take post at the head of the bridge, and not blow up the city till the 17th.—If all is not ready, that it is necessary he should concert with the Prince of Eckmülh, and that I recommend to him above all, to take measures to insure the destruction of the cannon and ammunition, and that he leaves as few stragglers as possible in the place.

THE PRINCE OF NEUFCHATEL AND WAGRAM TO THE PRINCE OF ECKMULH.

Smolensk, 14th November—7 in the morning.

Prince: The Emperor's wish is, that you should support the Duke of Elchingen, in the retreat he is making with the rear guard. The Viceroy setting out to-morrow the 15th, for Krasnow, you will relieve and occupy such of his posts as appear necessary, and which the Viceroy will be enabled to evacuate.

The Emperor's intention is, that you fall back, with your corps and that of the Duke of Elchingen, on Krasnow, making your movement the 16th or 17th. General Charpentier with his garrison, composed of the third Polish battalions and a regiment of cavalry, must leave the city. Before you leave it, blow up the towers on the walls of Smolensk, by setting fire to mines already prepared—you will see that the ammunition is destroyed, and burn all the caissons that cannot be carried off, as well as the muskets. As to the cannon that cannot be brought away, let the artillerymen saw off the trunnions, and bury them. Generals Chasseloupe and Lariboisiere will remain here to execute each in his own department, the above orders.

You will be careful, Marshal, to order the patroles not to permit any French stragglers to remain. You will also take measures to leave as few sick in the hospitals as possible.

PRINCE OF NEUFCHATEL AND WAGRAM TO THE DUKE OF ABRANTES.

Liady, 17th November, 1812. *8 o'clock in the evening.*

My Lord, you must continue your movement, in order to reach Dubrowna to sleep to-morrow, from whence you will send an officer to where the Emperor will halt, between Liady and Dubrowna, that I may despatch orders to you; but still, if you do not receive any, you must, after to-morrow morning, continue your march to Orcha; there you must take post, taking care to guard the bridge; you must endeavour to establish the greatest order in the city, and distribute rations to your corps in a regular manner to those under arms; you must detain at Dubrowna and Orcha all unattached men, and class them by their corps; you must hinder all kinds of pillage and all excesses committed by the stragglers; make distributions to them in regular form, and if there are any who pillage and behave badly, have them taken before a military tribunal and shot, to serve as an example. We shall arrive at the line, where the army is to halt and re-organise; we must therefore economise in the provisions and resources. General d'Alorma and General Jomini are at Orcha; they have similar orders to those given to you above. Overlook, Marshal, their execution; the Emperor desires it particularly.

NAPOLEON TO THE MAJOR GENERAL.

Dubrowna, 18th November, 1812.

My Cousin, write to the governor of Minsk, that I shall be at Orcha to-

morrow; let him know that I have ordered the second corps, with a division of cuirassiers and one hundred pieces of cannon, commanded by the Duke of Reggio, to march in all haste directly to Borisof, to insure this important post, and from thence to march to Minsk. In the mean time, General Dombrowski will march to that place with his division, and observe the movements of the corps at Minsk. Recommend to him to send couriers to the Duke of Bassano and to Prince de Schwartzenberg, and to be careful to write to you frequently.

THE PRINCE OF NEUFCHATEL AND WAGRAM TO THE DUKE OF BELLUNO.

Dubrowna, 19th November, 1812. *3 o'clock in the morning.*

I send you, Marshal, by the aid-de-camp of the Duke of Reggio, the duplicate of the orders that I addressed to you yesterday by your aid-de-camp.

The Emperor will arrive at Orcha to-day at noon. It is necessary, Marshal, the position you will take be nearer Borisof, Wilna, and Orcha, than the enemy's army. Endeavour to mask the movement of the Duke of Reggio, and cause a belief, on the contrary, that the Emperor is advancing on General Wittgenstein, a manœuvre natural enough. The intention of his majesty is to march to Minsk, and when he is master of that city, to take the line of the Berezina. It will therefore be probable that you may receive an order to march to Berezina, to cover from thence the Wilna road, and to be in communication with the 6th corps. Study this movement and let me know your observations.

As soon as you shall have informed me of the state of the artillery, which you can cede to the other corps, I will send you orders as to the point where it may be sent. I have ordered General Nansouty to send you a cipher. I think he may have left it with the Duke of Bassano, who perhaps may have sent it you; let me know if you have received it, in order that in the letters some words may be written in cipher, which will prevent these letters from being useful to the enemy, in case they fall into his hands. This measure is indispensable, from the great number of Cossacks, who are to be found every where.

THE PRINCE OF NEUFCHATEL TO THE DUKE OF REGGIO.

Head-quarters, near Kokhanow, 22d November, 1812. *Half after 2 o'clock in the morning.*

My Lord, I have received your letter of the 21st; his majesty sees with pleasure that you will be at Borisof to-day; the Emperor hopes that the governor general of Minsk will have felt the necessity there existed for guarding the bridge, which affords the passage. General Dombrowski should have arrived the 20th, with a part of his division, and would place this important point out of danger of any attack.

If the enemy have taken possession of the entrance to the bridge, and shall have burnt it in such a manner that it cannot be passed, it will be a great misfortune, and General Dombrowski will be very culpable for the

wrong direction he has taken with his division. It will be necessary that you should personally observe if there are means of passing the Berezina at any point; and in case it would be dangerous, make arrangements to march to Lepel. But the Emperor hopes that the governor of Minsk has not given up the passage to the bridge to cavalry, and that General Dombrowski will arrive, and afterwards your corps. Leave officers in the rear, at different stations, that the important news from Borisof may reach us speedily.

NAPOLEON TO THE MAJOR GENERAL.

Bobr, 23d November, 1812.

My Cousin, write to the Duke of Belluno, that he ought to be at Kolopeniczi this evening; let him know that I am at Bobr, that the Duke of Reggio is at Borisof, that it is important that he intercepts the road from Lepel as he proposed, towards Baran, to be certain that Wittgenstein sends no troops against the Duke of Reggio; that if he does, they must be vigorously attacked; that I hope that he has written to me; that I shall receive one of his officers this evening; that it is probable I shall set out for Borisof to-morrow; that as soon as I shall have seen the officer, which he will not fail to send, I will again write to him; our rear guard is at Toloczin.

THE PRINCE OF NEUFCHATEL AND WAGRAM TO THE DUKE OF BELLUNO.

Bobr, 23d November, 1812. *4 o'clock in the afternoon.*

Marshal, the Emperor has arrived at Bobr. The Duke of Reggio is at Borisof: it is important that you intercept the Lepel road, as you proposed to do towards Baran, in order to be certain that Wittgenstein advances no troops on Oudinot; if he does, you must attack them vigorously. His Majesty hopes that you have written, and that he will receive one of your officers this evening. It is probable, that the Emperor will march to Borisof to-morrow. As soon as we shall have seen the officer, which you surely will not fail to send, I will write again to let you know the intentions of his Majesty. Our rear guard is at Toloczin.

THE PRINCE OF NEUFCHATEL AND WAGRAM TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL EBLE.

Bobr, 24th November, 1812. *Half after 4 o'clock in the morning.*

General, the Emperor orders that you set out before 6 o'clock in the morning, to reach, as speedily as possible, the Duke of Reggio's head-quarters at Borisof, and endeavour to establish several bridges over the Berezina, for the passage of the army. Divide your force. If all your troops cannot march sufficiently fast, you must take with you those who are in the best condition, so that if you should arrive in the night, you may commence work to-morrow at day break; the other part can begin by noon. Be sure to leave workmen on the road, to repair bridges and the worst spots of road. I give the same order to General Chasseloup; you will confer with him and the Duke of Reggio on the works to be erected over the Berezina, for it is indispensable the army should pass to-morrow at the latest.

THE DUKE OF REGGIO TO THE PRINCE OF NEUFCHATEL AND WAGRAM.

Borisof, 24th *November*, 1812—*half after 5 in the morning.*

My Lord, As I had the honour of announcing to your serene highness, I sent to reconnoitre the ford at Studianka, which was occupied by the enemy, as will be seen by the report of General Corbineau.

There are two passages, one at Stakow, a mile above, the other at Ukholoda, two miles below Borisof. The movements remarked yesterday evening, on the enemy's flanks, had the occupation of these passages for their object, which are all guarded.

It has been impossible to make reconnaissances sufficiently exact during the night, to be certain of the most favourable point to erect a bridge, but I propose to-day to make demonstrations on the three points indicated above, to try the passage, and erect my bridge during the night, at that which I may fix on.

I have 20,000 men before me, who will doubtless march on the point where I may endeavour to effect my passage; I dare not guarantee the success of this enterprize, although determined to make every exertion for its accomplishment.

From the information that has been collected, it appears that the Russians are persuaded that the emperor wishes to pass the Berezina here; yesterday the advance guard under Langeron arrived, and that of Admiral Tchitchakoff is also announced, that Wittgenstein has spoken of his immediate junction, that Prince Schwartzenberg follows General Muller closely, who commands the three divisions which the enemy left opposed to him; this pursuit embarrasses the Russians. It is also reported that the troops which had been directed on Wilna, have been recalled.—I am, &c.

THE DUKE OF REGGIO TO THE PRINCE OF NEUFCHATEL AND WAGRAM.

Borisof, November 24th, 1812—*1 o'clock.*

My Lord, I have decided on the point of Studianka, where I expect to effect my passage to-night, and to-morrow morning I shall make demonstrations at Ukholoda, and Stakow; the enemy is on the alert, his troops before us are in continual motion. He has even the appearance of bringing materials to repair the bridge at Borisof, but his most decided movement appears to be that making by his right, in the direction of Berezino. I have them followed and not lost sight of, but we all here think that this movement, made with so much ostentation, masks some other project, but it is always proper to inform your highness of it.

Whatever may happen, I hope to-morrow to be on the other bank, and I expect to maintain it sufficiently long to insure the passage which his majesty may think proper to make afterwards, but it is not to be doubted that Wittgenstein and Steinheil, who are aware of it, will make every effort to thwart us. I have sent officers to the Duke of Belluno for information, and to inform him of my operations; I have not yet received an answer. I am

also about sending him information at Baran to let him know the march I propose to make to-night.

THE DUKE OF REGGIO TO THE PRINCE OF NEUFCHATEL AND WAGRAM.

Borisof, November 24th,—quarter before 5 in the afternoon.

My Lord, Your serene highness will perceive from the annexed report from General Aubry, who returned from Studianka at the moment I received the last despatch, that the passage is far from being assured; the enemy does not appear to have changed his movements, and it is now certain that Steinheil's troops arrived by way of Berezino, are before that ford; this explains the movements towards his right that the enemy made yesterday. A peasant who yesterday served as guide to a column of about 6000 Russians which were marching towards their left, and who escaped from them, declared that this column made an inverse movement to-day, but notwithstanding the obstacles which the passage at Studianka may oppose, I think that we could overcome them if I was promptly supported, for in a few hours I shall find myself between two corps of the enemy. I have ordered my movement; it ought to commence at 6 o'clock, but it appears to me of too great importance not to postpone it to wait his majesty's commands, particularly as they may arrive in time to allow me to move to-night, as we are only three leagues from the point of passage.

I annex to this letter a rough draught of a reconnaissance which was made at Ukholoda, a village situated on the Berezino road, two miles from here, and that I have hitherto occupied.

I have had the ford at Weselowo also reconnoitred by a party, who found that it was guarded by infantry and cavalry; this ford is only a league above that of Studianka.

NAPOLEON TO THE MAJOR GENERAL.

Losnitza, 25th November, 1812. 1 at night.

My Cousin, Send your aid-de-camp, Flahaut, to the Duke of Reggio, he must go as speedily as possible, and transmit by him the following letter.

"By your letter of the 24th, at 5 P. M. you inform me, that you think you will have need of support to effect the passage of the river. The Duke of Treviso will be at Borisof early to-day with two divisions of the guard. The Duke of Belluno had an action yesterday, the 24th, which, judging from the cannonade, must have lasted some time, between Kolopeniczi and Baran. You have no doubt prepared tressels for at least two or three bridges. General Eblé ought to have arrived at Borisof; if you have not passed over to-night, it becomes very urgent, in the actual state of things, to do so to-morrow."

THE PRINCE OF NEUFCHATEL AND WAGRAM TO THE DUKE OF BELLUNO.

Losnitza, 25th of November. 5 in the morning.

I laid your letter of the 24th before the Emperor. You say nothing of a brisk cannonade which commenced yesterday at half after 3, and neither do

you state if you have observed any infantry. Your great aim, Duke, is to prevent General Wittgenstein from attacking Oudinot, and it has been enjoined on you to arrive as speedily as possible at Baran, to intercept the Lepel road; you have done neither; hence General Steinheil has already joined the army of Tormasof, and delayed our passing the Berezina, which it is however important, in the situation in which we are placed, to effect promptly. You have, you say, two divisions, which are at fifteen wersts from Kostritza; join them as soon as possible, so as to reach Kostritza early; observe all that occurs from Kostritza to Baran, attack vigorously any troops that present themselves, keep up a communication with Oudinot, who is at Borisof, where the Emperor is also going. It is necessary that you should send many officers in order to communicate your operations several times a day, and you can, on the night of the 25th—26th, pass the Berezina, on the bridges about to be erected, with the Duke of Reggio, the imperial guard, and your corps, this passage must not be delayed longer. Your rear guard being more distant, can continue to cover the army, the rear guard of which marches today to Bobr, from thence to Nacza, and by forced marches to the bridge, as soon as the passage is open; if General Fourrier meets with an inferior force to his own, he must attack it.

THE PRINCE OF NEUFCHATEL AND WAGRAM TO THE DUKE OF BELLUNO.

One league from Borisof, 25th *of November*, 1812. 2 *in the afternoon.*

I received your letter of the 25th, of 10 in the morning. The Emperor is astonished that you have withdrawn the rear guard which covered the road from Bobr to Nacza, and that you have entirely abandoned the road from Lepel to Borisof. Since you are on the Lonitza road, it is without remedy; this increased embarrassment will injure your corps. It is to be lamented, when you were in the presence of the enemy, that you did not give them a severe defeat. If he follows you, and is troublesome, overthrow him with your rear guard, and one of your divisions. To-morrow, before day, march with two of your divisions to Borisof, and from thence to the place of passage.

It would be dangerous to evacuate Ratuliczi in the presence of the enemy; in such case you must turn against him with a force proportionate to his, and beat him; if you do otherwise you will endanger all the corps which are at Krupki. The Emperor observes that the enemy has afforded you excellent opportunities for defeating him, and of which you have not taken advantage. I repeat the order of the Emperor, which is, that you attack the enemy if he be in sight; this is of the greatest importance, if he is in a position to intercept our columns. The Emperor's head-quarters will be at Borisof this evening. The passage of the river must be effected to-morrow.

NAPOLEON TO THE MAJOR GENERAL.

Studianka, November 27th, 1812. *Half after* 12 *at night.*

My Cousin, order Marshal the Duke of Elchingen to pass the river with all the Poles, what he has collected of the third corps, and Claparede's division, which will arrive at day-break, and which I place under his orders, and with these troops to support Marshal the Duke of Reggio if he is attacked this morning. As soon as the Duke of Belluno shall arrive, he must also march to the support of the Duke of Reggio. Finally, the Duke of Treviso, with the young guard will pass the river also to reinforce the Duke of Reggio. I would wish this last movement to be retarded until the Viceroy's troops arrive here, in the fear that Wittgenstein's troops may make their appearance on this bank.

NAPOLEON TO THE MAJOR GENERAL.

Zaniwhi, November 28th, 1812, 9 *in the morning.*

My Cousin, order General de Wrede, who is at Dokszitzi, to hasten to Welieka, to collect provisions, take possession of the bridges, and to send parties on the road from Ilia, and the old road from Minsk, and to communicate at Smorgoni, with Adjutant-commandant d'Albignac. This letter is to be carried by the man who was sent here by General de Wrede (addressed to General Zrazinski). If he delivers it in 15 hours, he shall have a reward of fifty napoleons, which shall be paid him as soon as he lets us know the result.

THE PRINCE OF NEUFCHATEL AND WAGRAM TO THE VICEROY OF ITALY.

Selitzka, December 3d, 1811, *half after one in the morning.*

Sire. The Emperor orders, that you shall send a Polish officer to Dolhinow and Dokszitzi to meet General de Wrede, to inform him, that yesterday, the 1st of December, General Wittgenstein was at Pleszeniczi, that the 3d we shall be at Malodeczno, that orders have already been sent to him several times to hasten to Welieka, that he may be on our left.

As soon as your highness shall have communicated with the Adjutant-commandant d'Albignac, the Emperor desires that you will let him know the situation of that officer's troops, and that you order him to send to us under a strong escort, the twenty couriers he should have with him. Recommend to him to post troops at all places, in order that the marauders do not destroy them, and that the service of the couriers and communications may be rapid between Wilna and Paris.

The Emperor also desires, that your highness will inform him, if a short halt can be made on the line of the Wilia, which runs to Weizyn and Radoszkowiczi, if the adjutant-commandant has with him convoys of provisions; it is known there are some in the road from Wilna.

During the days of the halt, all the wounded, the dismounted cavalry, and baggage not wanted by the army, must be sent off, but all must be subordinate to the obtaining provisions.

The Emperor orders me to demand of your highness, what number of men have rallied, and if you have commenced a re-organization in your regiments.

I send you an order for General Hogendorp, governor-general for Lithuania, and for General Bourcier. I beg your highness to send off a courier with them, and order him to use all possible despatch.

THE PRINCE OF NEUFCHATEL AND WAGRAM TO THE VICEROY OF ITALY.

Selitzka, December 2d, 1812, 2 *in the morning.*

Sire. I placed before the Emperor your letter, dated on the Malodeczno road on the 2d. The intention of the Emperor is, that your highness should send a strong advance guard on the Minsk road, to ascertain what passes in that quarter, and if there are any news of the enemy. The Emperor hopes, on his arrival at Malodeczno, to find there the couriers.

His Majesty orders, that your highness should send to Wilna under an escort, furnished from Adjutant-commandant d'Albignac's troops, the heavy baggage, the treasure, and all the wagons or carts with the sick and wounded.

Your highness will also order the Duke of Abrantes to unite and march all the dismounted cavalry, by short marches, the most direct road from Malodeczno to Merecz, without passing by Wilna.

As to the Poles, the Emperor orders, that you also send them from Malodeczno to Olita, without passing through Wilna.

Send agents to Minsk for information, and despatch the baggage and wounded to Wilna, all the dismounted cavalry to the depot of Merecz, and the Poles to Olita.

You must canton your troops in the environs of Malodeczno, the Prince of Echmülh will also canton there his troops, that he may rally and rest them.

THE PRINCE OF NEUFCHATEL AND WAGRAM TO GENERAL COUNT DE WREDE.

Selitzka, December 3d, 1812, *one in the morning.*

General. I received your letter of the 2d. Head quarters will be at Malodeczno this evening, it will fall back, successively, till it reaches a spot where regular distributions can be made. The army suffers from its long privations.

Send me a statement of the situation of your troops and artillery. If you can send us provisions, bread and cattle, to different points on the route, it will be the greatest service you can render us. We have a great number of dismounted men, let me know for what cavalry your horses are suited. Send your parks, your hospitals, and provisions to Wilna, as well as your cattle and magazines. Let me know the place where the Bavarian troops and the 10,000 recruits who left Munich several months since, are stationed, that measures may be taken to rally them all at the central position.

THE PRINCE OF NEUFCHATEL AND WAGRAM TO ADJUTANT-COMMANDANT D'ALBIGNAC.

Malodeczno, December 3d, 1812, 3 *in the morning.*

Sir. The Emperor does not find your correspondence sufficiently explicit, you have not sent me a statement of the composition of the convoys you are escorting, you do not mention of what carriages it is formed, hence I can give you no orders.

Send back to Wilna all the clothing, they will be distributed at that city. Send quickly to meet us half way on the Markowo road, provisions to distribute to the army on its march. Let the magazines of Smorgoni and Ochmiana be filled. Send the cattle to Wilna, that they may not be taken by the Cossacks, except what are necessary for the army for two or three days.

THE PRINCE OF NEUFCHATEL AND WAGRAM TO COUNT KREPTOWICTZ.

Malodeczno, December 4th, 1812, 4 *in the morning.*

Count, the Emperor orders, that you take measures to send from the magazines at Smorgoni, 10,000 rations of biscuit to the Duke of Belluno, as much to the Duke of Elchingen, who commands the 2d and 3d corps. The Empeperor's will is, that you also send to each of these marshals, 20,000 rations of meat, and 10,000 rations of brandy. Contrive that these provisions shall arrive as soon as possible, and if it can be done, to-morrow, as the retrograde movement will cease at the spot where these provisions may be received.

They write from Wilna, that there is at Smorgoni 60,000 rations of biscuit, 20,000 are to be distributed as above, 30,000 given to the guard, who will be sent to take possession to-day, 5,000 to the Prince of Echmülh, and as much to the Viccroy, double the quantity of meat not yet killed, and the same quantity of brandy to each of these corps. There is at Smorgoni 350,000 rations of flour, and we are assured, that the government of Lithuania has taken measures that a great quantity of bread be prepared. If all these details are true, and that the magazines of Ochmiana are as well furnished, the army will be rallied, and meat, bread, and brandy, issued to them in a regular manner. It is, therefore, necessary, Count, that you should inform the Emperor, as soon as possible, the real resources afforded by the magazines of Smorgoni and Ochmiana, and transmit an account of them to me.

THE PRINCE OF NEUFCHATEL AND WAGRAM TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL COUNT HOGENDORP, GOVERNOR OF LITHUANIA.

Miedniki, December 7th, 1812, 7*in the evening.*

General. I hereby advise you, that the imperial guard will arrive at Wilna to-morrow; his Majesty desires that cantonments may be provided for it in the suburb of Ochmiana, the cavalry of the guard will also arrive to-morrow, and will take up provisionary quarters in the places which they formerly occupied. The corps of the Viceroy and that of the Prince of Echmülh will halt to-morrow at Rukoni. We hope that you have taken measures to de-

prive the stragglers and unattached men of their horses; let them be conducted immediately to the convents or places you have chosen, to re-unite them to their corps. There must be patrols in the city to prevent stragglers. We are desirous of learning the state of the villages which are situated two leagues around Wilna, and what resources they offer for the troops. The king thinks that you should not lose a moment in sending off our sick and all the encumbrances of the administration. The six millions which are at Wilna must be sent away, two to Warsaw and four to Kœnigsberg. As to the dismounted cavalry, they must be collected at the same place, and sent in troops of 500 to Kowno and Warsaw. General Bourcier will instruct you as to the number of men of each kind of troops that are to be sent to each place. I have already written to you to despatch all the remounted cavalry from Wilna to Kœnigsberg. Numbers of soldiers will ask to be admitted into the hospitals. Endeavour to direct them immediately to Kowno. The number of horses and small carts that will be taken from the soldiers entering the city, will furnish more than is wanted to carry off the sick. Prepare for me exact and detailed statements of all that Wilna affords.

THE PRINCE OF NEUFCHATEL AND WAGRAM TO GENERAL COUNT DE WREDE.

Wilna, 8th December, 1812, *five in the afternoon.*

The will of his majesty, general, is that you quit your position at Slob Chomska, and march to Rukoni, where you will receive orders from the Duke of Elchingen, to whom his majesty has confided the command of the rear-guard. The Duke of Elchingen, with the troops of the second and third corps, will support you. It is important that you proceed, as soon as possible, to Rukoni; on arriving there, your excellency will form our rear-guard. If there are any stragglers, protect them, and take great care to reconnoitre as far as possible, on your right and left. The troops of the Duke of Elchingen, who will support you, will be in position at Niecmicza; they are ordered to cover and reconnoitre the road from Rudomin. The Viceroy and the Prince of Eckmülh will sleep to night at Rukoni, and will leave it to-morrow morning; the corps of the Duke of Belluno is at Miedniki to-day, and will also fall back on Wilna to-morrow, leaving you the care of the rear-guard. His majesty relies on your talents, and your zeal in this affair, where you are in a situation to render great services to the army.

THE PRINCE OF NEUFCHATEL AND WAGRAM TO THE DUKE OF ELCHINGEN.

Wilna, December 8th, six in the evening.

Duke,—His Majesty thinks proper to confide to you this evening, the command of rear guard of the army. You will have under your orders the second and third corps, Loison's division, which is so already, and besides, the Bavarian corps of seven to eight thousand men, commanded by General de Wrede. I have given orders to that general to instantly leave his position at Slob-

Chomska, and march to Rukoni. I herewith annex a copy of the instructions I have sent to him. I order the Duke of Belluno not to quit the position at Rukoni, until General de Wrede shall arrive; with the rest of your troops you must take post at Niesmicza, and cover the Rudomin road.

You will, Marshal, give such instructions to General de Wrede as you may judge necessary. You must be sensible, Sir, that the safety of the army is in your hands; his Majesty has every confidence in you, and I beg that you will communicate to me all the information your advance guard may obtain of the enemy in different directions. We will attempt to rally the first, fourth, and ninth corps, as well as the guard, to support you if necessary.

THE PRINCE OF NEUFCHATEL AND WAGRAM TO THE DUKE OF ELCHINGEN.

Wilna, December 9th, 1812.

Duke. General de Wrede having been forced from his positions, and being at the gates of the city, and the division of Gratien,* not having afforded you means to check and repulse the enemy, the king has removed his head quarters to the Kowno gate, where he has collected the guard. The wish of his Majesty is to take up his line of march at four to-morrow morning with the imperial guard, in order to arrive as speedily as possible at Kowno, to rally, as much as possible, the stragglers and runaways, and to take post there.

The intention of the King is, for you to continue to form the rear guard, and to protect the retreat with de Wrede's division, Loison's division, and all the troops you can rally. Send away, to-night, the artillery and all you can, especially the treasure. The will of the King is, that some caissons be abandoned and the horses be employed for the treasure. I have given orders to General Eblé to blow up the caissons, that we are obliged to leave in the arsenal, and to destroy, to-night, the muskets. Under present circumstances, the King must march as speedily as possible to Kowno.

His majesty leaves you master to march, as circumstances may exact, making the best of the disastrous occurrence, that the severe cold has completed the disorganisation of the army. Burn, as soon as possible, all that cannot be brought away. Inform General Hogendorp, that he must not leave the city before you. The King authorises you to write before your departure, to the general commanding the Russian troops, recommending our sick to his care.

THE PRINCE OF NEUFCHATEL AND WAGRAM TO COUNT DARU.

Wilna, 9th December, 1812.

Count, the King has removed his head-quarters to the barrier of Kowno. The Duke of Elchingen conducts the retreat, and will set out to-morrow as late as possible. Send off the treasure during the night. I have authorised General Eblé to give the artillery horses, if necessary. Every thing must be done to save it; let it come to-night to head-quarters, at the barrier of Kowno, where we will give it an escort.

* Brigadier General Baron Gratien, replaced General Loison, who fell sick.

Distribute without the tedious forms of service, and abundantly, provisions and clothing to all those who demand them, as the position of the enemy will not permit us to hope of retaining Wilna all to-morrow. Rejoin head quarters to-night, and put every thing in train to send to Kowno, all that you can.

THE PRINCE OF NEUFCHATEL AND WAGRAM TO PRINCE DE SCHWARTZENBERG.

Wilna, December 9th, 1812.

Prince: The army is at present at Wilna, but every thing leads us to believe that his majesty has determined to repass the Niemen, and take up his winter quarters on this river; this movement requires that you should manœuvre with your corps and that of Regnier, to be in communication with us, in the new line we shall take up on the left bank of the Niemen. The intention of the Emperor having been, that your corps and that of General Regnier, should cover the Duchy of Warsaw, his majesty orders me to order you to manœuvre on Balistock, but at the same time to inform you that your movement must be made as slowly as possible, except you are pushed by those of the enemy.

THE PRINCE OF NEUFCHATEL AND WAGRAM TO THE DUKE OF TARENTUM.

Wilna, 9th December, 1812.

Duke,—the army is at present at Wilna and its neighbourhood. The intention of his majesty is, therefore, that you approach our new line of operations, in advancing on Tilsit, that you may cover Koenigsberg and Dantzwick. But his majesty orders me at the same time to inform you, that your movement must be made as slowly as possible, except you are pushed by those of the enemy.

The army will march to Kowno, which it will preserve as a key; you must make your reports to that place. Send us news as often as you can.

THE PRINCE OF NEUFCHATEL AND WAGRAM TO THE DUKE OF ELCHINGEN.

Kowno, 12th December, 1812—*at noon.*

Marshal,—The King has received the verbal report which you have made to him. His majesty has learnt with pain, that the enemy pursues you so closely. I am about sending you six pieces of artillery of Loison's division—We hope that you will maintain to-day the defile of Rumsziki—you must be aware how important it is, that we should not be driven from here, where we have immense magazines. Under present circumstances, the king has thought that the first thing to be done is to send off every thing in Kowno, during to-day and to-morrow,—we have here, a key post, or a kind of entrenched camp, armed with 12 pieces of artillery, a work in which we can maintain ourselves, unless the enemy's infantry appears in superior force. The King has ordered the dismounted cavalry, the whole imperial guard, in-

fantry and cavalry, the first and fourth corps to take provisions for eight days, and to pass over to the right bank of the Niemen. Twelve pieces of artillery which were in the place, have been placed on the heights, on the left bank. The wish of his majesty is, that all who belong to the second and third corps, which includes Loison's division and the legion of the Vistula, who form part of the third corps, should remain in Kowno to defend the entrance to the bridge, and in a place where there is artillery, ammunition, provisions, and clothing. The head quarters of the King will probably be to-morrow on the left bank, with the troops of the guard, and those of the first and fourth corps.

The King thinks that in this position he can check the Cossacks who pursue us so closely, but his majesty waits your reports before taking a decided step. Loison's division will find here all that it wants, thus we shall form a respectable body of infantry.

NAPOLEON TO THE MAJOR GENERAL.

Moscow, September 25th, 1812.

My Cousin, write to General Baraguay d'Hilliers, that I have given an order to the intendant general, to send 200,000 francs in roubles, (at the rate of a ruble in paper per franc,) along the line from Mojaisk, Gjatz, Wiazma, Dorogobouje, and Smolensk; and I have authorised him to purchase for all the points on the route, flour and meat, that I do not perceive that he has as yet, done any thing to organise the government of Smolensk.

THE END.

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